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 The subject of this tŚĞƐŝƐ ŝƐ , ?> ? ? ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ dŚĞ ŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ >Ăǁ ? dǁŽ ŵĂŝŶ
ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞŵĂĚĞ ?ĨŝƌƐƚůǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǁŚŝĐŚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƐĞŵŝŶĂů
work can be purposefully read as an exercise in Ordinary Language Philosophy, which 
will dissolve many of the problems ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƚŽƌƐ ĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ ǁŝƚŚ ŚŝƐ ǁŽƌŬ ?
^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐĂŶĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŝŶKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŽ
the problems of general jurisprudence. To effectively demonstrate the arguments, 
this thesis is divided into three main sections. Section A provides an overview of 
Ordinary Language Philosophy, grounding the thesis in its historical context. Section B 
is the main and most substantive section of the thesis, where the arguments are 
cultivated through an analysis of the main contributions in this area. Here, 
contradictions in the existing literature are highlighted, even amongst those who 
ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽƚĂŬĞƚŚĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ?dŚĞĨŝŶĂůƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?
draws together my arguments and suggests scope for future research. The thesis 
advocates for a reading of The Concept of Law which would render it more relevant 
and immediate to the source text; something that has been lacking in the extensive 
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We run, as a rule, worse, not better, if we 
think a lot about our feet. So let us, at least 
on alternate days, speak instead of 
investigating the concept of causation. Or, 
better still, let us, on those days, not speak 
of it at all but just do it.1 
Gilbert Ryle, 1953 
 
 This thesis attempts to address and relieve an intellectual burden that has 
been placed upon philosophers of law2 ?ƚŽďĞƚƚĞƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƐĞŵŝŶĂůǁŽƌŬŝŶ
jurisprudence, The Concept of Law3 ?dŚĞŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶƚŽďĞƚƚĞƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ
comes from the growing fear amongst commentators that it is presently understood 
poorly, with little attention paid to some of its key features4.  The significance of the 
project is captured in (though not exhausted by) the worry that it is difficult even to 
assess how seminal the work is, or if it is, in the absence of the sought-after 
understanding of these key features.  At the same time, the project raises the exciting 
ƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƚŚĂƚŶĞǁƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŵŝŐŚƚďĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?ƐŚŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞďŽŽŬ
                                                          
1 GilberƚZǇůĞ ? ‘KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?dŚĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůZĞǀŝĞǁ ? ? ? ? 
2 Jules L Coleman (ed), ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ WŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚ P ƐƐĂǇƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ WŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚ ƚŽ  ‘ƚŚĞ ŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ
>Ăǁ ? (Oxford University Press, USA 2001), 61. Nicos Stavropoulos, whose work is the subject 
of chapteƌƐŝǆŽĨƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚĚƵĞƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞŽĨ
linguistic philosophy, we have an intellectual burden to try and understand any semantic views 
ƚŚĂƚĚƌŝǀĞ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?
3 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Joseph Raz and Penelope A Bulloch eds, 3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2012).  
4 See, for example, <ĞǀŝŶ dŽŚ ?  ‘&ŽƵƌ EĞŐůĞĐƚĞĚ WƌĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ,ĂƌƚŝĂŶ >ĞŐĂů WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?
(2014) 33 Law and Philosophy 689; A Brian W Simpson, ZĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŽŶ  ‘ƚŚĞ ŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ
>Ăǁ ? (Oxford University Press 2011). 
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to be richer, more sophisticated, more useful and less prone to criticism than has 
hitherto been thought to be the case.  Though the ambition is not for a complete and 
ĨŝŶĂůĐŽŶƐƉĞĐƚƵƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ?ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŚĞƐŝƐĂŝŵƐƚŽŵĂŬĞĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĚƐĞǀĞƌĂů
robust claims that together amount to a significant re-ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
masterwork. 
 
The Rationale of the Thesis 
As it happens, the thesis occupies a place at the intersection of the two most obvious 
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵŽŶŽŐƌĂƉŚ ? dŚĞƐĞ ĂƌĞ ŝƚs routine 
(though scarcely universal) acclamation as the towering work in legal theory of the 
last one hundred years5, and the similarly commonplace lack of interest in, or 
awareness of, what is actually in the book.  Strikingly, these two phenomena are often 
found together, in the views and attitudes of individual theorists6.  This requires both 
demonstration and explanation, and the space occupied by the present enquiry 
enables the evidence to be considered and at least one type of explanation given.  
Relevant explanations might reasonably be found, for example, in an enquiry into the 
                                                          
5 See, for example, Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
 ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ?EĂŐĞůdŚŽŵĂƐ ? “dŚĞĞŶƚƌĂůYƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ?London Review of Books 27/3 (2005), 4; 
Nicola Lacey, A Life of H. L. A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (Oxford University 
Press, USA 2006), 224. 
6 For a clear example of a legal theorist who acknowledges The Concept as the towering work 
in legal theory, but who raises doubt over its contents, please see A Brian W 
Simpson, ZĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶ  ‘ƚŚĞ ŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ>Ăǁ ? (Oxford University Press 2011), 183-206. This 
ĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁŝůůďĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌ
2, where reference will be made to the literature surrounding the reception of The Concept 
and the conflicting opinions and interpretation that followed.  
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social and professional history of academic jurisprudence since the mid-century, or in 
ƚŚĞ ůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬĂƐ ƚŚĞďĞƐƚďƵƚĂůƐŽ ůĂƐƚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨĂ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂů
paradigm whose time was up.  These enquiries and others deserve exploration, but 
ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŶŽƚƚŚĞĨŽĐƵƐŚĞƌĞ ?  /ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁŝůůďĞƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ
from within the philosophy of language, as both an expression and application of 
philosophy of language, for it is in this regard that scholars have begun to worry that 
something has been missed. The approach therefore depends principally upon an 
engagement with the philosophical ideas expressed by Hart and his commentators, 
rather than upon wider matters of social and intellectual history or critique.  However, 
as the ideas I deploy have developed over the last fifty years in arguments about the 
content and status of The Concept of Law, my analysis necessarily draws upon the 
evolution of these ideas in their intellectual context.  In turn this attention might (and, 
I will show, does) help to explain the strange asymmetry in the phenomena of 
responses to it. So, the present enquiry is offered in philosophy of law; as an enquiry, 
that is, into one area of applied philosophy.  But as that philosophy will require some 
excursion into the development of arguments over time, it requires some attention to 
the history of those ideas.  It can seem, then, as if I aim to answer two distinct 
questions:  first, whether something of significance is indeed missing in our 
understandings of the book, and, second, why this has occurred, if it has.  But in the 
present thesis the second question is engaged just in support of my analysis and 
argument regarding the first. 
 With this in mind, I make two main claims: firstly, that there is a perspective 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǁŚŝĐŚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƐĞŵŝŶĂůǁŽƌŬĐĂŶďĞƌĞƐŽůƵƚĞůǇƌĞĂĚĂƐĂŶĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŝŶKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ
Language Philosophy, which will prove more illuminating and enlightened, rendering 
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,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛwork more relevant and immediate to the source text. I also make a second 
ĐůĂŝŵůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞŵŽƌĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽƵƐ ?dŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐĂŶĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŝŶĂƉƉůŝĞĚ
Ordinary Language Philosophy and that the extensive literature which presently cites, 
referencĞƐ ? ƌĞǀŝĞǁƐ ĂŶĚ ĚĞƉůŽǇƐ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂƐ ŝŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ŐŽĞƐ ǁƌŽŶŐ  ?ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ
substantially wrong) in its failure to perceive the book in the way that I suggest. Now, 
the first claim as I say is likely easier to defend than the latter and indeed I hope that 
there is sufficient matter in the first claim alone to support a lively PhD thesis. 
Certainly, if I do not make a compelling case at least on the first claim then my 
argument will have failed. As to my second more ambitious claim my aim here is at 
the very least to make the contention robustly, and to cause even the sceptical reader 
to take seriously the argument that I propose. I take it that this is the minimum 
condition for the success of my second claim; however plainly my wish is to make a 
case that is compĞůůŝŶŐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚŝŶŵǇǀŝĞǁŝŵƉŽǀĞƌŝƐŚĞĚ ?ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
text. Whilst it may be that further research proves necessary to make an absolute 
case, at the very least my aim in this work is to prompt serious minded reflection in a 
way that I claim has hitherto been overlooked. And, in light of existing literature this 
is a considerable ambition in its own right.  
 There are however a number of matters that the thesis argues for which, 
whilst subsidiary, are nonetheless significant. Amongst these are the importance of 
chronology and history of ideas in seeing what otherwise could be missed, a view on 
the benefit of employing a proper philosophical approach to matters of legal theory, 
and highlighting the problems that are produced where theorists attend only to 
sections or parts of a jurisprudential source text or where only fragments of a 
philosophical or other approach are deployed, particularly where that philosophy is 
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properly or explicitly holistic. Moreover, the thesis will also highlight the importance, 
missed by many, of attending with care and precision to what the source text has to 
say about a particular issue, and the danger of imputing to a source text matters that 
are not expressly there. The thesis will also highlight the contribution that legal theory 
(such as legal scholarship) can make to an understanding of a wider body of 
philosophical knowledge which it is part of (my thesis stands as an argument for 
reading The Concept of Law as an important text in Ordinary Language Philosophy, 
though this thought will remain mostly implicit in what I have to say). The thesis will 
also show the extent to which a work in general jurisprudence may be enlivened by 
tracing its intellectual sources in a way which might have been overlooked. In the 
present case, for example, the relation between The Concept of Law ĂŶĚ'ŝůďĞƌƚZǇůĞ ?Ɛ
Concept of Mind7; other connections will emerge in the course of this thesis. And, as 
will be seen, my thesis also stands, in a grander way, as a contribution to the recent 
revival of linguistic philosophy as a core element in approaches to the philosophy of 
law8. 
 Though I argue for a better way, a more illuminating way, of reading The 
Concept of Law, demonstration is difficult. There is no scope sentence that says what 
                                                          
7 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (HarperCollins Publishers 1986). 
8 For contributions regarding the employment of linguistic philosophy in philosophy of law 
see, for example, Dennis Patterson, Law & Truth (Oxford University Press 1996); Brian 
Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal 
Philosophy (Oxford University press 2007); Susan Haack, Putting Philosophy to Work: Inquiry 
and Its Place in Culture - Essays on Science, Religion, Law, Literature and Life(Prometheus 
Books 2008); Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory, Or, How to Succeed in Jurisprudence 
without Moral Evaluation (Hart 2001) to name but a handful of relevant material in this field. 
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I am arguing for is right. If this aspect of my thesis has merit it will be shown in the 
extent to which I am able to persuade the reader of such. Final demonstration is 
beyond this thesis, or even perhaps any thesis. The striking matter (and this I do 
demonstrate) is that the existing literature fails completely in its attempt to conceive 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶƚŚĞŵĂŶŶĞƌ/ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ?/ĐĂŶŶŽƚĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝǀĞůǇƉƌŽǀĞƚŚĂƚǁŚĂƚ/ĂŵĂƌŐƵŝŶŐ
for is right, but will demonstrate that the widespread disagreements and difficulties 
in the existing literature are largely owed to the failure I pick out, which so far no one 
has attended to.  The demonstration of such failure stands as a significant research 
conclusion in its own right. This thesis is not the attempt to fully demonstrate how a 
reading of The Concept of Law could be done through Ordinary Language Philosophy, 
but it is intended as a strong argument for the attempt. 
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of the thesis has been chosen to best support the argument that 
I make, and so I will give advance indication here of what that argument will be. 
dŚƌŽƵŐŚĞŶƋƵŝƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ďŽƚŚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂŶĚŚŝƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƚŽƌƐ ? ?
I will argue that the philosophy of language present in The Concept of Law has been 
missed or misunderstood by many (indeed, most, and perhaps all) academics. Much 
of value can be gained by examining the initial reception of The Concept of Law, as 
well as its second and third editions (to the last of which the second chapter of this 
thesis is principally dedicated).  So, Chapter Two examines the reception of The 
Concept of Law, and highlights the surprising fact that even though some early 
 10 
 
ƌĞǀŝĞǁƐ ?ZŽďĞƌƚ^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ?9 in particular, mention the impact of Ordinary Language 
Philosophy in The Concept of Law most others entirely disregard the philosophical 
ďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ?dŚƵƐ/ďĞŐŝŶƚŽďƵŝůĚƚŚĞĐĂƐĞ ?ĚƌĂǁŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ
ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐƐŚĂǀĞƉĂŝĚŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƉůĂĐĞŽĨKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ
Language Philosophy in framing, informing and motivating the work. In light of the 
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶĐĞŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬŝŶƵŶĚĞƌŐƌĂĚƵĂƚĞƌĞĂĚŝŶŐůŝƐƚƐĂŶĚŝŶƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇ
literature, it is unsurprising that at least some other scholars have attempted to 
address the gap I pick out above.  However, these scholars are notably few in number, 
and a researcher has to look diligently and hard for their contributions. Moreover, the 
ĨĞǁ ǁŚŽ ŚĂǀĞ ǀĞŶƚƵƌĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĂƌĞĂ ŚĂǀĞ ? / Ăŝŵ ƚŽ ƐŚŽǁ ? ŵŝƐĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
approach. Section A concludes with this enƋƵŝƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞďŽŽŬ ?ƐƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞ ?  
In view of these several related arguments brought into focus in section A, the 
main argument and analysis of the thesis will be presented in one section: section B, 
comprised of six chapters, which together amount to a review and comprehensive 
analysis of the jurisprudential literature in this area. This last point deserves emphasis, 
because section B provides a comprehensive comment on the works of all of those 
ǁŚŽŚĂǀĞ ƚĂŬĞŶ ƚŚĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?s work seriously.  The minimal 
amount of literature available in this area allows me to do this. However, an additional 
reason for looking at these works as a set in section B lies in the fact that each of the 
legal theorists in question provides a different interpretation of The Concept of Law. 
This will subject my thesis to a stern test since it is one of my argumentative aims to 
show that even though these philosophers all say different things, they all end up 
                                                          
9 ZŽďĞƌƚ^^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ? ‘WƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ, ?> ? ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ “ŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )ƵŬĞ>Ăǁ:ŽƵƌŶĂů ? ? ? ? 
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committing similar mistakes, and these not only of omission. In light of the potential 
scope of my topic  W ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ- it is necessary to adopt a very clear and 
well-defined structure.  However, the precise and particular focus of my research 
imposes a structure itself. It is for this reason that section B is divided into six chapters. 
The first of these chapters, Chapter Three, deals with the newest, and perhaps most 
important contribution, to literature surrounding ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ? >ĞƐůŝĞ 'ƌĞĞŶ ?Ɛ
introduction to the third edition of The Concept of Law. Leslie Green is the only legal 
ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚǁŚŽƐĞǁŽƌŬŝƐĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚŝŶĚĞƉƚŚŝŶƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐǁŚŽĚŽĞƐŶŽƚďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
work has a foundation in philosophy of language. Though his view is not unique, due 
to the prominence of his contribution it simply cannot be disregarded. The third 
edition of The Concept of Law, currently the only one in print, includes a long and 
ĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ?'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĨĂƌĨƌŽŵďĞŝŶŐŝŵƉĂƌƚŝĂů ?
ƌĞĂĚƐĂƐŚŝƐŽǁŶĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ? ǁŚĞƌĞ'ƌĞĞŶƚƌŝĞƐ ƚŽ  “ĨŽƌĞƐƚĂůů ƐŽŵĞ
ŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐ ? ƚŚĂƚ ŚĂǀĞ ĂƌŝƐĞŶ ƐŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ďŽŽŬ ?Ɛ ƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ10. Based on an 
article published by Green after the publication of the second edition of The Concept 
of Law11 ?'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞƐ “ŚŽǁůŝƚƚůĞ linguistic analysis there is in The 
ŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ>Ăǁ ?12 ?ĂŶĚƉƵƚƐĨŽƌǁĂƌĚƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇǁĞƌĞ
ƐŝŵƉůǇ ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŶ ? dŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ 'ƌĞĞŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ŚŝƐ ǀŝĞǁƐ ŽŶThe 
Concept of Law cannot be underestimated. Though arguably of little importance and 
relevance when simply published as an article on the Michigan Law Review, his view 
has gained canonical status by being published at the beginning of The Concept of Law, 
                                                          
10 Hart (n 3) xi. 
11 >ĞƐůŝĞ'ƌĞĞŶ ? ‘dŚĞŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ>ĂǁZĞǀŝƐŝƚĞĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? )  DŝĐŚŝŐĂŶ>ĂǁZĞǀŝĞǁ ? ? ? ? ? 
12 Hart (n 3) xlvii. 
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ensuring that for many years to come most new readers of The Concept of Law will 
read his interpretation of the book first; that is, before the book itself is read. 
Moreover, a new edition of The Concept of Law, bearing in mind that the previous 
edition included a never-before seen postscript written by Hart, carries with it some 
momentum and sets Green as a pre-ĞŵŝŶĞŶƚƐĐŚŽůĂƌŽŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?/ƚŝƐĨŽƌĂůůƚŚĞƐĞ
ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŝŶƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŽ'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽThe 
Concept of Law. Throughout the chapter I argue that Green is wrong to claim that The 
Concept of Law ŚĂĚ “ůŝƚƚůĞůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ?ĂŶĚĂŝŵƚŽƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚŚŝƐǀŝĞǁŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
work is misleading and misinformed.  
 &ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ 'ƌĞĞŶ ?Ɛ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐ &ŽƵƌ ĂŶĚ &ŝǀĞ ĚĞĂů ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ
ĚĞƚĂŝůŝŶŐ>ƵĚǁŝŐtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵence on The Concept of Law, looking at the work 
of Brian Bix and Andrei Marmor respectively. Both Bix and Marmor pursued 
doctorates in jurisprudence at Oxford, completing their doctorates a mere year apart, 
under the supervision of Joseph Raz. Their works in the area of concern to this thesis, 
ŝǆ ?ƐLanguage and Legal Determinancy13 ? ĂŶĚ DĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐInterpretation and Legal 
Theory14 are products of these doctorates.  The two authors may differ from one 
another over certain refinements and minutiae, but they make many of the same 
analytical claims (and, I hold, mistakes) in their approach to The Concept of Law. Brian 
Bix, whose work was published in 1993, aims to study the relationship between law 
ĂŶĚ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ĂŶĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚŝƐ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚ ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐThe Concept of Law, amongst 
others, ĂƐ ĂŬĞǇƉŝĞĐĞŽĨ ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ĨŽƌĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?dŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝĂŶŝǆ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ
                                                          
13 Brian Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy (Oxford University Press 1995). 
14 Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory (2nd edn, Hart Publishing (UK) 2005). 
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ŵĂƌŬƐƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨĂƉƌŽůŽŶŐĞĚŐĂƉ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ? ? ? ? ?ƐƵƉƚŽŝƚƐƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚ
no Anglo-ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞĐĂŶďĞĨŽƵŶĚŽŶƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ work, and 
this is why his work constitutes the second chapter of section B. He starts by putting 
forward the view that The Concept of Law is a work in the area of judicial 
interpretation. Despite the fact that he provides no evidence, references or 
interpƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚĞǆƚƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚŝƐĐůĂŝŵ ?ŚŝƐƐƵƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƉĞƌƐŝƐƚƐ
throughout his work and it is clear that this inevitably influences the way he interprets 
The Concept of Law. ŝǆ ?ƐŚĂƉƚĞƌŽŶ,ĂƌƚĨŽĐƵƐĞƐƐŽůĞůǇŽŶŚĂƉƚĞƌs//ŽĨThe Concept 
of Law, ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ  “&ŽƌŵĂůŝƐŵ ĂŶĚ ZƵůĞ ^ĐĞƉƚŝĐŝƐŵ ? ? ĂŶĚ ŚŝƐ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ĨŽĐƵƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ
ƚŚƌĞĞ ŵĂŝŶ ĂƌĞĂƐ ŽĨ ũƵĚŝĐŝĂů ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? ? ũƵĚŝĐŝĂů
discretion and rule-following considerations.15 Brian Bix supports this proposition 
utiliƐŝŶŐĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŝĚĞĂƐĂŶĚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?16  Andrei 
Marmor, on the other hand, undertook a study in interpretation and legal theory, and 
chose to analyse The Concept of Law from the perspective of how judges, according 
to Hart, intĞƌƉƌĞƚůĂǁ ?dŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨŶĚƌĞŝDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚĂŬĞƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌ
Five. The core idea on which he elects to base his analysis is the distinction between 
 “ĂƐǇ ? ĂŶĚ  “,ĂƌĚ ? ĐĂƐĞƐ ? ƚŚĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ĐĂƐĞƐ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ĐĂŶ ďĞ
                                                          
15 Bix (n 13) 7-35.  
16 Wittgenstein is considered one of three major figures of Ordinary Language Philosophy. 
Wittgenstein championed Ordinary Language Philosophy at Oxford, whereas J. L. Austin and 
Gilbert Ryle instigated the movement at Oxford. Much debate ensued as to whether 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ  “ĨĂƚŚĞƌ ? ŽĨ KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ >ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? Žƌ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ : ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ
championed the movement. Others still, argue that Gilbert Ryle was the founder of Ordinary 
Language Philosophy. This discussion, alongside short historical background of Ordinary 
>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ǁŝůů ďĞ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚ ŝŶ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ƚǁŽ ?  “ ĂƐĞ ĨŽƌ KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ >ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ
WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ? 
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understood simply and those that are not pre-determined by legal standards.17 This 
ultimately leads Marmor to an analysis of rule following, where he will also, like Bix, 
support his remarks by utilising the work of Wittgenstein. Both of these legal theorists, 
then, engage with and explore the philosophy of Wittgenstein. However, it is my 
intention to argue that despite their best efforts they have both adopted an approach 
to Wittgenstein that prevents them from reaching a comprehensive understanding of 
his philosophy. Both these authors seem to be more concerned with how judges apply 
rules, rather than how rules are followed. They therefore completely miss, or fail to 
appreciate the essence of Ordinary Language Philosophy. In short, they do not engage 
ǁŝƚŚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐĂŶĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁĂǇŽĨĚŽŝŶŐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ĂŶĚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨ
this, they both fail to understand Hart because they fail to understand Wittgenstein. I 
will seek to demonstrate this failure on their part through a thorough and careful 
analysis of both these authorƐ ?ǁŽƌŬƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ƌĞĐŽƵƌƐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞƚĞǆƚƐ
concerned. But the study of the works of Bix and Marmor will also help demonstrate 
another important mistake that some legal theorists have committed in their 
approach to The Concept of Law. To fully understand what it is that an author is trying 
to put across in a piece of work, it is generally unwise to analyse any part of that work 
in isolation, because of the ready prospect that something will be missed or that the 
whole will be underestimated. Whereas this is trivially true of all publications, it is 
perhaps more detrimental in the case of The Concept of Law than in many other work 
because of the holistic approach made by Hart to his subject there, and this for 
reasons that attach to the philosophical style in question. By choosing to focus on one 
                                                          
17 Marmor (n 14) 97.  
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chapter, or one thought, expressed in The Concept of Law, Bix and Marmor leave 
ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞƚŽŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŚŽůĞǁŽƌŬ ?ĂŶĚĚŽŝŶĨĂĐƚĚŽƐŽ ?
The fourth chapter of section B, Chapter Six, provides an analysis of Nicos 
^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ǁŽƌŬ ?,ŝƐǁŽƌŬŝƐŽĨĂŶĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ǁŽƌŬŽŶ
The Concept of Law ǁĂƐƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚŝŶ:ƵůĞƐŽůĞŵĂŶ ?Ɛ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐWŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚ PƐƐĂǇƐŽŶƚŚĞ
Postscript to The Concept of Law18. As the title suggests, ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ^ĞŵĂŶƚŝĐƐ is indeed an 
investigation into the semantic doctrines that emerge in The Concept of Law. As 
ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?ŝƚŝƐ^ ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚǁĞĂƌĞƵŶĚĞƌĂŶ “ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůďƵƌĚĞŶ ?
ƚŽĨŝŶĚ “ƚŚĞƉƌĞĐŝƐĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐĂŶĚůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛthought, and 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇ ƚŚĞ ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞ ƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐ ǀŝĞǁƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĚƌŝǀĞ ŝƚ ?19. As with the others, he 
recognises that Hart was influenced by both Wittgenstein, and, to a lesser extent, J.L. 
Austin, both prominent Ordinary Language Philosophy philosophers20. It will become 
ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚĨƌŽŵŵǇĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨŚŝƐǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ǀŝĞǁƐĂƌĞƚĞŶĚĞŶƚŝŽƵƐ ?,ŝƐ
key assertion is that semantics were important to Hart, and in support of this looks in 
ĚĞƉƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐ ?,ŝƐŽǀĞƌĂƌĐŚŝŶŐĐůĂim throughout the paper is 
that Hart was looking at the nature of law, and Stavropoulos is of the opinion that Hart 
used a semantic approach which is consistent with this enterprise. It should be noted 
                                                          
18 Nicos Stavropoulos work, an article entitled ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ^ĞŵĂŶƚŝĐƐ, is featured in the book ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
Postscript edited by Jules Coleman. Coleman, J. (ed), ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐWŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚ PƐƐĂǇƐŽŶƚŚĞWŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚ
to the Concept of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) 58-98. 
19 Coleman (n 2) 61. Cf text to footnote no. 1. 
20 Cf footnote no. 16 above. As mentioned, J. L. Austin is considered a prominent figure of 
KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ >ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ĂŶĚ ǁĂƐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĐůŽƐĞĨƌŝĞŶĚ ĂŶĚ ĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞ ? : ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
relationship with Hart, as well as his role in Ordinary Language Philosophy at Oxford, will be 
discussed further in the next chapter, chapter two.  
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however, that nowhere does Hart say that he is looking into the nature of law. Despite 
this fact, Stavropoulos is not alone in attributing this idea to Hart. Scott Shapiro, for 
example, also claims that The Concept of Law is a study of the nature of law.   
^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ǁŽƌŬƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƵƐǁŝƚŚĂĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚwhich to discuss important, yet 
arguably mistaken views that several legal theorists have on The Concept of Law.  In 
fundamental terms, Stavropoulos attempts to convince the reader that since Hart is 
exploring the nature of law, he must be pursuing a metaphysical enquiry21. I argue 
that this assumption is mistaken and leads to rather damaging consequences, both for 
^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĂŶĚĨŽƌŽƵƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ?WĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ
of these consequences is that the position is completely inconsistent with the 
philosophy of both Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin. Thus, I believe that whilst 
^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŝƐ ĂŶĂŵďŝƚŝŽƵƐŽŶĞ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ĨůĂǁĞĚĂƚ ŝƚƐďĂƐĞĂŶĚ ƐŽ
ultimately falls short of its promise.  
 The fifth chapter of section B, Chapter Seven, is dedicated to the only legal 
philosopher who has attempted to look seriously at the influence J.L. Austin had on 
The Concept of Law. /Ŷ ŚŝƐ ƵŶƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ ƉĂƉĞƌ ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ  “ŽŝŶŐ :ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ
,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇ P /ŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝŶŐ ,Ăƌƚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ : ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?22, Tony Cole proposes to analyse 
The Concept of Law ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?,ĞĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ ?  “ŽŶĐĞƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
                                                          
21 Coleman (n 2) 64. Stavropoulos is convinced that Hart is looking for the nature of law, he 
ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “,ĂƌƚĐůĂŝŵƐŝŶƚŚŝƐƉĂƐƐĂŐĞƚŚĂƚ ?ĂƚůĞĂƐƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ‘ŝŶĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƵƐĞ ? ?ƚŚĞ
quest for definitions is not exclusively about language, but is meant to provide metaphysical 
ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ PǁĞǁĂŶƚƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞ ‘ůĂǁ ? ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƐŽƚŚĂƚǁĞůĞĂƌŶǁŚĂƚĐŽƵŶƚƐĂƐ legal, and 
ƚŚĞƌĞďǇƐŽƚŚĂƚǁĞĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚŝŶŐƐůĞŐĂů Q ? 




ǁŽƌŬ ŝƐ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚůǇ ? ŝƚƐ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ĐĂŶ ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ďĞ ƚƌĂĐĞĚ ŝŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?23. Cole believes The Concept of Law ƚŽ ďĞ Ă  “ǀĂŐƵĞ Ănd arguably 
inconsistent book, in which impressive theoretical insights are buried in the midst of 
rambling digressions, and prominent praise of the importance of analytical clarity 
stands uncomfortably alongside an obscure and barely explicated methodologǇ ?24. 
The existence of these uneasy relationships was why he attempted to clarify both 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ŽůĞ
ƐƉĞĐƵůĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ “ŽďƐĐƵƌĞĂŶĚďĂƌĞůǇĞǆƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ? ?
might have been that he wanted to maximise the acceptability of his arguments25. I 
argue that Cole is wrong about almost all of this, and indicate that his misreading arises 
from too light an appreciation of the debt owed by Hart to J. L. Austin and Ordinary 
>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?zĞƚƚŚŽƵŐŚ /ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚŽůĞ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŽƚŚĞƌ ůĞŐĂů
ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐǁŚŽƉůĂŝŶůǇĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĂŶŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽŚŝƐ ?ĂůďĞŝƚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŽůĞ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů
engagement (as we shall see in Chapter Seven). Cole presents the reader with a single 
ƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ “WůĞĂĨŽƌǆĐƵƐĞƐ ?26, and based on this single quotation 
ƐĐŚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇůĂǇƐŽƵƚŚŽǁ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶ,ĂƌƚĐĂŶďĞƚƌĂĐĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ
The Concept of Law. Of course, other works than those of J. L. Austin are mentioned. 
                                                          
23 Cole (n 22) 1. 
24 Ibid, 3. 
25 An earlier theorist, Matyas BodiŐ ?ŵĂŬĞƐĂǀĞƌǇƐŝŵŝůĂƌĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?
ŽĚŝŐ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚŚŽǁŝƚƌĞůĂƚĞƐƚŽŽůĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁŝůůďĞĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚŝŶĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐĞǀĞŶŽĨƚŚŝƐ
thesis.  ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ:ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ P/ƚƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?DĂƚǇĂƐŽĚŝŐ ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ:ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ P/ƚƐ
relation to Philosophy (2011) 41 Acta Juridica Hungarica 1. 
26 JL Austin ? ‘WůĞĂĨŽƌǆĐƵƐĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) Philosophy and Linguistics 79. The same passage was 
quoted by Hart in The Concept of Law, Hart (n 3) vii. 
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/ĞǆĂŵŝŶĞŽůĞ ?Ɛmethod critically and in detail. ŽůĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁŝůůƉĞƌĨŽƌĐĞďĞŵǇŵĂŝŶ
point of reference for the development and staging of own commentary on J. L. Austin 
ĂŶĚŚŝƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ŽůĞĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƚŚĞŽŶůy academic 
ƚŽĨŽĐƵƐƐŽůĞůǇŽŶƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚƚŚĂƚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŚĂĚŽŶThe Concept of Law, 
and even then, in an unpublished paper. 
 dŚĞĨŝŶĂůĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŽĨƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŚĂƉƚĞƌŝŐŚƚ ?ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ “ĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞŶŐůŽ-Saxon 
ZĞĂůŵ ? ?ĞǆƉůŽƌĞƐƚŚĞƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨThe Concept of Law in Spanish speaking countries. 
Interestingly, a number of legal theorists in Spanish speaking countries have had an 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐThe Concept of Law since its publication. Ignacio Sánchez Cámara 
ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ Ă ďŽŽŬ ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ  “>Ăǁ ĂŶĚ >ĂŶŐƵage: the philosophy of Wittgenstein and 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?27. Cámara says that: 
Even though Hart only quotes Wittgenstein once in The Concept of Law, 
he is, without a doubt, one of his biggest inspirations.28 
Ɛ ƚŚĞ ƚŝƚůĞ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ? ĄŵĂƌĂ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ŝƐ ĚĞǀŽƚĞĚ to exploring The Concept of Law 
ĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?/ƚŝƐƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚThe Concept of Law has not 
been perceived in Anglophone countries, at least by the majority of its academic 
readers, as an exercise in the philosophy of language, but on the Continent legal 
ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ƐĞĞŵ ƚŽ ŚĂǀĞ ŶŽ ĚŽƵďƚ ŽĨ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? dŚŝƐ
                                                          
27 There is no English translation of the book is available. Cámara, I.S., Derecho y Lenguaje 
(Coruna, Universidade de Coruna, 1996). ^ŝŶĐĞ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĄŵĂƌĂ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ŝƐ
available, there will be few quotations of his work provided in this thesis. Where quotations 
are provided, please note that they have been translated by me and the reference will direct 
the reader to the original material, written in Spanish.   
28 Ibid, 49. 
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intriguing fact alone merits some investigation, indeed demands it - since Cámara does 
not put forward a reason for believing that Wittgenstein was oŶĞŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŝŐŐĞƐƚ
inspirations. Throughout his book, Cámara simply takes for granted that the reader 
knows this connection to be an indisputable fact. Furthermore, Cámara reads the 
same words in The Concept of Law in an entirely different light to the majority of 
Anglo-ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ?ŬĞǇĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚŝƐŝƐŚŝƐƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ
of law as the union of primary and secondary rules. According to many who take Hart 
ƚŽďĞ  ‘ũƵƐƚ ?Ă ƌƵůĞƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚ ?ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ ũƵƐƚŽŶĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨŚŽǁ,ĂƌƚďĞůŝĞved law to be 
ŵĞƌĞůǇĂ  “ƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨ ƌƵůĞƐ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĄŵĂƌĂ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ  “ƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨ
ƌƵůĞƐ ?ŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƚƐŝŵƉůǇĨŽůůŽǁĞĚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƌƵůĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƐŽ,ĂƌƚƐĞĞƐ
rules as either custom or an institution29.  Cámara might have been the only one to 
publish a book on this matter, but there are other legal philosophers who have 
published articles on the subject30.  A further two Spanish theorists who have 
published relevant literature are Pablo Navarro and Hernan Bouvier31. These two 
authors focus their attention on the rule-following considerations in The Concept of 
Law. However, it is interesting to note that they also take for granted that 
Wittgenstein was one of the main influences in The Concept of Law. They write, 
 
                                                          
29 Camara (n 27) 36.  
30 : ?D ?ZŽĚƌŝŐƵĞǌ WĂŶŝĂŐƵĂ ?  “>Ă ĨŝůŽƐŽĨŝĂ ůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐĂ Ǉ ů  ƚĞŽƌŝĂ ĚĞů ĚĞƌĞĐŚŽ ĂŶĂůŝƚŝĐĂ P , ?> ? ?
,Ăƌƚ ? ?:ŽƐĞntonio Ramos Pascua, La regal de recneocimento en la teoria juridical de H.L.A. 
Hart.  
31 EĂǀĂƌƌŽ ?W ?ĂŶĚŽƵǀŝĞƌ ?, ? “ŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂƐũƵƌşĚŝĐĂƐǇƐĞŐƵŝŵŝĞŶƚŽĚĞƌĞŐůĂƐ ? ?
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tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐ Žn the existence and nature of rules flowed 
rapidly to legal theory, in the shape of a book, published in 1961, The 
Concept of Law by H.L.A. Hart.32 
Once again, one thing worth noting about the Spanish literature is that, much like its 
English equivalent, it makes reference to J.L. Austin but devotes little attention to his 
influence in The Concept of Law. In essence, it is acknowledged that he played a vital 
ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ?ďƵƚŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŵŽƌĞ ŝƐ ƐĂŝĚ ? DŽƌĞǀ ƌ ? ůĞŐĂů ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ŝŶ^ƉĂŶŝƐŚ
speaking countries were not the only ones to think that Hart was influenced by 
Wittgenstein. Intriguingly, in 1965 Justus Hartnack, a prominent Danish philosopher, 
wrote that Hart is a disciple of Wittgenstein33. Hartnack is credited with introducing 
Ordinary Language PhilŽƐŽƉŚǇƚŽĞŶŵĂƌŬ ?,ĞďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ “ŚŽůĚƐƚŚĞ
ŬĞǇƚŽŵŽĚĞƌŶƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?34 ?ĂŶĚŝŶ ? ? ? ?ŚĞƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ “tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶĂŶĚ
DŽĚĞƌŶ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?35, which aimed to shed a greater degree of light on 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?,ĂƌƚŶĂĐŬĚedicated the last chapter of his book to, in 
his own words,  
hint  W but do nothing more than hint  W at something I believe to be of 
ŐƌĞĂƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇƚŚĂƚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĐĂŶƚŚƌŽǁ
light on a very wide and diverse range of problems36.  
                                                          
32 Ibid, 8. 
33 Hartnack, J. Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy (London: Butler & Tanner, 1965), 112. 
34 Ibid, 112.  
35 Ibid, 112. 
36 Hartnack (n 33) 113. 
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,ĞŚŽůĚƐƚŚĂƚ,ĞƌďĞƌƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞ “dŚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚZŝŐŚƚƐ ?37 is 
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇƚŽƚŚĞĂƌĞĂŽĨ>Ăǁ ?EŽƚ
only is this chapter a good addition to the thesis since it provides an overview of the 
key aspects of The Concept of Law from legal theorists who did not study at Oxford38, 
but it also provides an opportunity to further explain and explore the theory of J.L. 
Austin. Whereas in other chapters, namely Chapters Four, Five and Six, on the work of 
Bix, Marmor and Stavropoulos respectively, the focus was on the work of Wittgenstein 
 ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ
later philosophy is flawed) and there is little opportunity for discusƐŝŽŶŽĨ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
work, this chapter will provide us with the scope to fully argue for an understanding 
ŽĨ : ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ŝƚ ŝƐĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐĂů ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ
understood the theory of Wittgenstein, and applied it correctly, but the absence of 
: ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁĂǇ ŽĨ ĚŽŝŶŐ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ǁĂƐ Ɛƚŝůů ŶŽƚĂďůĞ ? dŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ
ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚĞǀĞŶǁŚĞŶtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇis understood correctly, 
its analysis alone is not enough to shed light on The Concept of Law. The chapter 
ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚƉƵƚƐĂƐƚƌŽŶŐĐĂƐĞĨŽƌǁĂƌĚĨŽƌƚŚĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶĂ
ŚŽůŝƐƚŝĐ ǁĂǇ ? ƚĂŬŝŶŐ ŝŶƚŽ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŶŽƚ ŽŶůǇ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ďƵƚ ĂůƐŽ : ?> ?
ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁĂǇŽĨĚŽŝŶŐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? 
                                                          
37 ,>,Ăƌƚ ? ‘y/ ? ?dŚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚZŝŐŚƚƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ?WƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐŽĨƚŚĞ
Aristotelian Society 171. 
38 It is interesting that all other legal theorists whose work is discussed in this thesis were 
students at the University of Oxford during the same decade. This will be discussed further in 
the next chapter of this thesis, chapter two.  
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The final section of this thesis, Section C, comprising just Chapter Nine, 
provides a short conclusion in which I aim to summarise and consolidate the argument 
put forward throughout Section B, by providing the reader with a concise review of 
the ground covered.  It will also offer several comments on the possible ways in which 
the research offered in this thesis connects to other research in the field, and the 
extent to which it might prompt, and serve as a platform for, future research.  But it 





















 “/ŶThe Concept of Law we find the influence of 
KǆĨŽƌĚ “ůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐ ?ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ? ?1 
Robert Summers, 1963 
 
 “&Žƌ Ăůů ƚŚĂƚ ? ǁŚĂƚ ŝƐ ŵŽƐƚ Ɛtriking is how little 
linguistic analysis there is in The Concept of Law. ?2 
Leslie Green, 2012 
 
 
Most theorists to have expressed a view agree that Herbert Hart changed the face of 
Anglo-American jurisprudence with the publication of The Concept of Law. On 
publication he received praise from all over the world for the production of a 
masterpiece at a time which had witnessed the level of interest in jurisprudence 
gradually wane3.  For many, The Concept of Law marked an exciting new dawn in the 
history of jurisprudence.  Among those to have praised The Concept of Law recently 
are Brian Simpson in Reflections on The Concept of Law who says of The Concept of 
Law ƚŚĂƚ ?  “ŝƚ ŚĂƐ ƚŽ ďĞ ĐŽŶĐĞĚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ ďŽŽŬ ŝƐ ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ǁŽƌŬ ŽĨ
                                                          
1 ZŽďĞƌƚ^ ^ ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ? ‘WƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ, ?> ? ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ “ŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ?ƵŬĞ>Ăǁ:ŽƵƌŶĂů
629. 
2 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Joseph Raz and Penelope A Bulloch eds, 3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2012). 
3 KŶƚŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞ ?EŝĐŽůĂ>ĂĐĞǇǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “/ŶƚŚĞĚĞĐĂĚĞƐƉƌĞĐĞĚŝŶŐ,ĞƌďĞƌƚ ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞKǆĨŽƌĚ
Chair, the jurisprudence taught in Britain tended to consist in a rather dry offshoot of technical 
legal analysis: writers picked apart, with minute attention to detail, legal concepts such as 
ownership, possession, or the corporation. No attempt was made either to link this analysis 
to any broader idea of the nature of law, or to consider how technical legal concepts assisted 
law to serve its various social functions. Questions about what purposes law ought to pursue 
were confined to the realm of moral and political philosophy, the latter itself a relatively arid 
ĨŝĞůĚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƚŝŵĞ ? ? EŝĐŽůĂ >ĂĐĞǇ ? A life of H. L. A. Hart: The nightmare and the Noble 
Dream (Oxford University Press, USA 2006) 224-5. 
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jurisprudence ever to appĞĂƌ ŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶůĂǁǁŽƌůĚ ? 4; Jules Coleman, in ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to The Concept of Law5 ?ǁŚŽǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ?  “, ?> ?
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐThe Concept of Law is the most important and influential book in the legal 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?6; and Nicola Lacey, in A Life of H.L.A. Hart  W The Nightmare and the 
Noble Dream7, who states that The Concept of Law ? “ŚĂƐŚĂĚĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶ
ƚŚĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ũƵĚŝĐŝĂů ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ŝŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ĂŶĚ ďĞǇŽŶĚ ?8.  These comments 
ĂďŽƵƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƌĞĨůĞĐƚƚŚŽƐĞŵade in the initial book reviews, when The Concept of 
Law was first published. For example, in Positivism and Fidelity to Law  W A reply to 
Professor Hart9 ?WƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ>ŽŶ&ƵůůĞƌƌĞŵĂƌŬƐƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞƐŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚǁŝůůnever 
again quite assume the form they had before being touched by his analytical 
ƉŽǁĞƌƐ ?10 ?>ŽŶ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐůĂƐƚŝŶŐŝŵƉĂĐƚŝƐĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚŝŶĂŵƵůƚŝƚƵĚĞ
ŽĨǁƌŝƚŝŶŐƐƐŝŶĐĞ ?dŚƵƐƌŝĂŶŝǆǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “, ?> ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞĐŽŵĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞǁĂǇ
he moved positivism in a different ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?11 ?ǁŚŝůƐƚ ? ?<ŝŶŐďĞůŝĞǀĞƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŽ
ďĞ “ĂŶŽƵƚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽ ůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?12. Philosopher Thomas Nagel adds 
ĚĞƚĂŝů ? ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ,Ăƌƚ ĂƐ  “ƚŚĞ ĨŽƵŶĚĞƌ ŽĨ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ĂƐ Ă ĨŝĞůĚ ĨŽƌ ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐ
                                                          
4 Brian Simpson in Reflections on The Concept of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 1. 
5 ColemaŶ ?: ? ?ĞĚ ) ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐWŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚ PƐƐĂǇƐŽŶƚŚĞWŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚƚŽThe Concept of Law (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). 
6 Ibid, 1. 
7 Lacey (n 3), 232. 
8 Ibid, 232. 
9 Lon L. Fuller, 'Positivism and fidelity to law: A reply to professor Hart' (1958) 71(4) Harvard 
Law Review 630. 
10 Ibid, 630. 
11 B. Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2009), 36. 
12 Lacey (n 3) 232. 
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ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? Q )ŚĞƌĞ-created the subject, posed the central questions, and started a 
ŐƌĞĂƚĨůŽŽĚŽĨǁŽƌŬďǇŽƚŚĞƌƐǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐŶŽƚĐĞĂƐĞĚǁŝƚŚŚŝƐĚĞĂƚŚ ?13. Nagel sums The 
Concept of Law ĂƐ Ă  “ƐƵƉĞƌď ĂŶĚ ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝďůĞ ďŽŽŬ ?14 ǁŚŝĐŚ ĞŵďŽĚŝĞƐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
contribution to the field. However, despite all the express respect and admiration for 
this supposed masterpiece in the field, there were many who regarded Hart as just 
another rule theorist and a slightly underwhelming expositor of a misconceived 
formalism about law. Indeed, it should be recognised that most legal philosophers 
ǁŚŽ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚ ŽŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ƉŽƌƚƌĂǇ Śŝŵ ĂƐ Ă ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ǁŽĚĞŶ ƌƵůĞ ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚ ? ĂŶĚ
ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬůĂĐŬƐƚŚĞƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŶƵĂŶĐĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌŬƐŽĨ
the legal scholars who followed him.  A good example can be found in John W. Van 
ŽƌĞŶ ?Ɛ15 ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ?  “dŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ŽĨ WƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌƐ , ?> ? ? ,Ăƌƚ ĂŶĚ ZŽŶĂůĚ ǁŽƌŬŝŶ  W a 
ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ ?16. He writes: 
,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ůĞŐĂů ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ƉŽƐƚƵůĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƌƵůĞƐ ĂƌĞ ĞĂƐŝůǇ ĨŽƵŶĚ ĂŶĚ
applied in solving legal problems does not adequately reflect the legal 
process. His limited analysis overlooks the human spirit which refuses to 
be bound by rules deemed unfair.17 
/ƚ ŝƐ ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ƚŽ ƐĞĞ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŶĂŵĞ ƋƵŽƚĞĚ ĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞ <ĞůƐĞŶ ?Ɛ ? ŶŽƚ ŽŶůǇ ĚƵĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŝƌ
proximity in time, but also for the similarity of their ideas. Thus:  what Hart has done 
                                                          
13 E ?dŚŽŵĂƐ ? “dŚĞĞŶƚƌĂůYƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ?London Review of Books 27/3 (2005), 4. 
14 Ibid, 4. 
15 John W. Van Doren is a Professor of Law in Florida State University. He graduated of Harvard 
law school, and has his LLB from Yale Law School. 
16 J.W.Van Doren, Theories of Professors H.L.A.Hart and Ronald Dworkin  W a critique (1980) 29 
Clev St. L. Rev 219. 
17 Doren (n 16) 287.  
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for Anglo-American jurisprudence, Kelsen did for the Continent18.  Hart was not 
enthusiastic about the connection, however.  Brian Simpson, when commenting on 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽŽĚĞŶŚĞŝŵĞƌ19, remarked: 
There is a passage emphasizing the importance of identifying the 
varied ways in which legal rules function in a legal system and the manner 
in which this is reflected in language. But the only earlier writers whose 
work is discussed in any detail whatever are Hohfeld and Kelsen. Both 
receive pats in on the back for their contributions to jurisprudence, but 
Hart is at pains to differentiate his theory from that of Kelsen.20 
 This thesis will stand against the conventional, rather simplistic, view of Hart 
as rule theorist (regardless of whether contemporaries such as Kelsen could be so 
described). It is undeniable that the theory of rules plays an ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƌŽůĞŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
work; throughout The Concept of Law Hart explores the nature of social rules and the 
role they play in our legal system. So, it should be clarified that the objection to the 
view of Hart as a rule theorist pertains to the way this term has been used in the wider 
literature on Hart. There could be no objections to referring to Hart as a rule theorist 
if legal philosophers simply meant by this that rules play a vital role in Hart ?s theory. 
                                                          
18 Simpson (n 4) 96. 
19 Simpson (n 4 ) ? ? ?ƌŝĂŶ^ŝŵƉƐŽŶŝƐƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĂƌƚŝĐůĞ “ŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů:ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞŝŶDŝĚ-
ƚǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ PƌĞƉůǇƚŽƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌŽĚĞŶŚĞŝŵĞƌ ?ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?KĨƚŚŝƐŚĞƐĂǇƐƚŚĂƚ
ŝƚ “ŝƐƚŚĞĐůŽƐĞƐƚŚĞĞǀĞƌĐĂŵĞƚŽƉƵďůŝƐŚŝŶŐĂƉƌŽůĞŐŽŵĞŶŽŶƚŽŚŝƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨThe Concept of 
law ?ĂŶĚĂůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?,ĞĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐĞƚ ŽƵƚƐŽŵe features that play a vital role 
in The Concept of Law, such as the limitations of the definition per genus et differentiam. 
20 ^ŝŵƉƐŽŶ ?Ŷ ? ) ?ǁŚĞƌĞƌŝĂŶ^ŝŵƉƐŽŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ “dŚĞŽŶĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚǁŚŝĐŚŚĞ ?,Ăƌƚ )ĚŝĚĂĚĚƚŽƚŚĞ
canon was what he called a rule, in KeůƐĞŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌŶŽƚŝŽŶĂƉƉĞĂƌƐĂƐĂŶŽƌŵ ? ? 
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However, iƚŝƐŵǇĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐǁŚŽůĂďĞů,ĂƌƚĂƐĂ “ƌƵůĞƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚ ?ĂƚƚĂĐŚ
to this ůĂďĞů ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ĐŽŶŶŽƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĂƐ ĞǆĞŵƉůŝĨŝĞĚ ďǇ ŽƌĞŶ ?Ɛ ƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĂďŽǀĞ ? 
Another good example can be found in Raymond Wacks ?  “sĞƌǇ^ŚŽƌƚ/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽ
WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨ>Ăǁ ?21, when he writes that:  
dŚĞŶƵĐůĞƵƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŝƐƚŚĞ existence of fundamental rules 
accepted by officials as stipulating procedures by which the law is enacted. 
The most important of these he calls the rule of recognition which is the 
fundamental constitutional rule of a legal system, acknowledged by those 
officials who administer the law as specifying the conditions of criteria for 
validity which certify whether or not a rule is indeed a rule. 
 LĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐǁŚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽ,ĂƌƚĂƐĂ “ƌƵůĞƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚ ?, much like Wacks, tend 
to focus solely on ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ distinction between primary and secondary rules, and the 
rule of recognition, ignoring the wider insights and philosophical nuances present in 
his work. Given the belittling way in which the term  ‘rule theorist ? has been used in 
the literature, for clarity let ?s avoid it altogether. In this way the thesis runs against 
jurisprudential orthodoxy, for as has already been recognised, this is a common view 
amongst legal theorists.  So Section B, rather than focussing principally on the works 
of legal academics who, in the same vein as John Van Doren, regard Hart merely as an 
adherent of rule theory (on which position I expand in later chapters), I will place my 
analytic foĐƵƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĨĞǁ ǁŽƌŬƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐThe 
Concept of Law as a work in the philosophy of language, and Ordinary Language 
                                                          
21
 Z ?tĂĐŬƐ ? “WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨ>Ăǁ PsĞƌǇ^ŚŽƌƚ/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?EĞǁzŽƌŬ PKǆĨŽƌĚhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ
Press, 2006), 28. 
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WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ? /ƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽ ĨŝƌƐƚĐůĂƌŝĨǇ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ
Ordinary Language Philosophy, and its potential relevance to how The Concept of Law 
can be understood.  
Hart and Ordinary Language Philosophy 
The Concept of Law was published during a time of great excitement not only 
for law, but also for philosophy. Halfway through the twentieth century a new 
approach to philosophy had emerged. This approach claimed that much of the 
philosophical debate that had come before had been fruitless, and instead offered a 
new and fresh approach22 that came to be known as Ordinary Language Philosophy. 
Ordinary Language Philosophy, also sometimes called Oxford Philosophy, is a 
philosophical movement that avers that most philosophical problems can be solved 
by looking at the everyday use of words; that is, by looking at the ordinary ways in 
which we do things with words23. Ordinary Language Philosophy came as a late phase 
in the history of analytical tradition, and differed from previous analytical approaches 
since it claimed that you did not have to apply formal logic; for Ordinary Language 
Philosophy philosophers ordinary language is the base, and everyone has this 
knowledge base just by virtue of being a speaker of the language. Ordinary Language 
Philosophy holds the view that words and sentences are meaningful by the ways in 
which they are put to use. Interestingly, and even though we used the word 
 “ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ? ĂďŽǀĞ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ĐůĞĂƌ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ >ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ
                                                          
22 A.Baz, When words are called for: A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2012), 5. 
23 R. Audi (ed), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2nd Ed, 1999), 634. 
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philosophers would consider themselves to be a coherent group of philosophers24. In 
1953, Ryle published an article on Oxford Philosophy where he stated that there was 
much misconception about what Ordinary Language Philosophy stood for25.  As 
mentioned in the introductory chapter, Wittgenstein was seen as the leading Ordinary 
Language Philosophy philosopher at Cambridge University, with J. L. Austin and Gilbert 
Ryle heading the movement at Oxford University. However, one question that is often 
asked, and has yet to be answered, is where Ordinary Language Philosophy started 
and who was its founding father. Weitz, writing in 1953 at the height of the Ordinary 
Language Philosophy movement in Oxford, remarks that the extent to which 
Wittgenstein was influential, and influenced, Oxford Philosophers is questionable. 
According to Weitz, some philosophers claimed that Oxford Philosophy developed 
quite independently from Wittgenstein until after the war, and others claim that 
Wittgenstein was heavily influential26. Irrespective of whether or not Wittgenstein was 
                                                          
24 Morris Weitz, who spent a year in Oxford trying to understand Ordinary Language 
Philosophy, claims that Ryle himself would have been against the use of the term 
 “ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?DŽƌƌŝƐtĞŝƚǌ ? ‘KǆĨŽƌĚWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?dhe Philosophical Review 187. 
25 'ŝůďĞƌƚZǇůĞ ?  ‘KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ?dŚĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůZĞǀŝĞǁ  ? ? ? ? Ryle starts by 
ĐůĂƌŝĨǇŝŶŐǁŚĂƚ ŝƐŵĞĂŶƚďǇ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  “ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ? ?ǁŚŝĐ ŚĞĐůĂŝŵƐ ŝƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇŵŝƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ?
According to Ryle, ordinary is not used as a contrast to extraordinary, but rather has a contrast 
ƚŽ “ĨŽƌŵĂů ?ĂŶĚ “ůŽŐŝĐ ? ? 
26 Weitz (n 23) 189. It is important to note that, as mentioned, Wittgenstein led the Ordinary 
>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ “ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂƚĂŵďƌŝĚŐĞ ?ĂŶĚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶĂŶĚZǇůĞǁĞƌĞ ŝƚƐďŝŐgest 
instigators at Oxford. According to Julia Tanney, Ryle was part of the Ordinary Language 
Philosophy School from the beginning, and his contributions to this area of philosophy date 
as back as 1932, but still some of his work is now attributed to Wittgenstein. Tanney discredits 
Wittgenstein as the founder of Ordinary Language Philosophy, and claims that Ryle was 
ĂůƌĞĂĚǇ ƉƵďůŝƐŚŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĂƌĞĂ ďĞĨŽƌĞ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƌĞƚƵƌŶ ƚŽ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? :ƵůŝĂ dĂŶŶĞǇ ?
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Kent, participated in a BBC programme on 
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ƚŚĞ “ĨĂƚŚĞƌ ?ŽĨKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ǁŚĂƚtĞŝƚǌĐůĂŝŵƐŝƐŝŶĚŝƐƉƵƚĂďůĞŝƐƚŚĞ
recognitiŽŶŽĨ  : ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƵŶŝƋƵĞĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚŝƐĂƌĞĂŽĨƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇ
through his striking way of doing philosophy27. As an aside, it is important to note that 
ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶĂŶĚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁĂƐďƌŽĂĚůǇƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ?ƚŚĞŝƌǁĂǇŽĨ
doing philosophy was very distinct. The importance of the difference in approach, and 
the way in which the approach of these two philosophers varied, will be discussed in 
depth in the chapters to follow.  
In Oxford, Ordinary Language Philosophy was promoted iŶ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐĨĂŵŽƵƐ
Saturday morning meetings28, which were held at the university. These meetings have 
                                                          
 “KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞ^ƚĞƉŚĞŶDƵůŚĂůů ?&ĞůůŽǁĂŶĚdƵƚŽƌŝŶWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ
at New College, Oxford) and Ray Monk (Philosophy Professor at the University of 
Southampton) where she expressed these views.   ? ‘Krdinary Language Philosophy, in Our 
Time -  ZĂĚŝŽ  ? ?  ?BBC, 7 November 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b03ggc19#in=collection:p01f0vzr> accessed 24 
January 2016.  
27 Weitz (n 23) 189. 
28 : ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ^ĂƚƵƌĚĂǇŵŽƌŶŝŶŐŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚof much discussion. Geoffrey 
tĂƌŶŽĐŬŐŝǀĞƐĂŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐŝŶŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞƚŝƚůĞĚ “^ĂƚƵƌĚĂǇDŽƌŶŝŶŐƐ ? ?ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ
as part of a collection of essays on J.L. Austin. See I. Berlin et al, Essays on J.L.Austin (Oxford: 
Clarendon Series, 1973) 31. See also, Richard Sørli, The Philosophy of J. L. Austin (Martin / 
Gustafsson and Richard Sorli eds, Oxford University Press 2011) 11; Mary Warnock, A Memoir: 
People and Places (Duckworth, Gerald & Company 2002) 17. Interestingly, in an interview with 
David Sugarman, Hart mentions the Saturday Morning meetings and credits them with helping 
ŚŝŵƐĞƚƚůĞŝŶǁŚĞŶŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĂƌƌŝǀĞĚĂƚKǆĨŽƌĚ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ,ĂƌƚŚĞŚĂĚ “ƚƌĞŵĞŶĚŽƵƐĐŽůĚĨĞĞƚ ?
and attending these meetings made him more certain of his decision to return to academia. 
^ƵŐĂƌŵĂŶ ? ? “,Ăƌƚ/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚ P, ?> ? ?,ĂƌƚŝŶĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĂǀŝĚ^ƵŐĂƌŵĂŶ ?Journal of 
Law and Society 32/2 (2005), 274. A recording of this interview is also available online Oxford 
ĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ  ?KǆĨŽƌĚ hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ WƌĞƐƐ ) ?  ‘, ?> ? ? ,Ăƌƚ /ŶƚĞƌǀŝew Part One: Childhood and Early 




ůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?29. Interestingly, they were not restricted 
geographically to Oxford, with George Pitcher once recalling that during a visit to 
,ĂƌǀĂƌĚ “ƵƐƚŝŶĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨŚŝƐĨĂŵŽƵƐ ‘^ĂƚƵƌĚĂǇDŽƌŶŝŶŐƐ ? ?30.  Whatever 
the location, the purpose of these seminars led by J.L. Austin was always the same: a 
group of philosophers would meet to discuss longstanding philosophical issues. 
'ĞŽĨĨƌĞǇtĂƌŶŽĐŬĨĂŵŽƵƐůǇƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚǁĂƐƚŽƌĞĂĐŚĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ?ŝĨƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝĨ Ă  “ĚŽǌĞŶ ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ĂƌŐƵĞƌƐ ? ĐŽƵůĚ ƌĞĂĐŚ ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ŽŶ ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ŝƚ
stood a ŐŽŽĚĐŚĂŶĐĞŽĨďĞŝŶŐƌŝŐŚƚ ?31. Both in Oxford and Harvard not only did J.L. 
Austin lead these meetings but they were also arranged by him, and attendance was 
solely at his express invitation32. Amongst the attendees were George Paul, Jim 
Urmson, Tony Woozley, Richard Hare, Peter Strawson, Mary and Geoffrey Warnock, 
Philippa Foot, Tony Honoré, Friedrich Waissmann, and, of course, Herbert Hart33. Hart 
                                                          
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xgigb36aC7Y&list=PL3MAPgqN8JWiLdUqgmrQMzhao
6b-RrS49> accessed 10 January 2016. 
29 Simpson (n 4) 49.  
30 I. Berlin et al, Essays on J.L.Austin (Oxford: Clarendon Series, 1973), 21. George Pitcher 
recalls that the Saturday Morning sessions in Harvard had the same format as those in Oxford, 
with Austin inviting his colleagues (and a couple of graduate students) to discuss a  topic 
during that term. The topic discussed in Harvard was sense-data. Once again, not much insight 
is given into this Saturday Morning Meetings since, akin to those in Oxford, no one felt the 
need to take notes or even a sketch of what happened at those meetings. 
31 Gustaffson and Sorli (n 27) 96. 
32 Lacey (n 3),  ? ? ?^ĞĞĂůƐŽtĂƌŶŽĐŬ ?Ŷ ? ? ) ? ? ?DĂƌǇtĂƌŶŽĐŬƌĞĐĂůůƐ P “dŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚfigures 
were Gilbert Ryle and J.L. Austin, who held an informal meeting every Saturday morning for 
invited members of the faculty, all of them younger than he, and all of them full-time teaching 
ĨĞůůŽǁƐ ?/ƚǁĂƐƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞďĞĨŽƌĞǁŽŵĞŶǁĞƌĞĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽƚŚŝƐŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ Q ? 
33 Lacey (n 3) 45 
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was very much involved with the new philosophical approach being developed at 
Oxford, and was regarded as part of the group. Not surprisingly, it has been speculated 
ƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐThe Concept of Law might have developed through the course of 
these meetings, for the meetings often explored rules, a theme which is prominent in 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ŝŶĂŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚĂǀŝĚ^ ƵŐĂƌŵĂŶ ?,ĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
^ĂƚƵƌĚĂǇ ŵŽƌŶŝŶŐ ƐĞŵŝŶĂƌƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƌĞŵĂƌŬĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƵƐƚŝŶ ŚĂĚ Ă  “ĚŝƌĞĐƚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽŶ ŚŝƐ
ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?34.  
In addition to their discussions during the Saturday morning meetings, Hart 
and J.L. Austin ran a series ŽĨ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ƐĞŵŝŶĂƌƐ ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ŽŶ  “ǆĐƵƐĞƐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
1950s35. These two prominent philosophers joined forces to conduct a seminar that 
in many ways was linked as much to philosophy as to law. The seminars were intended 
to serve as a forum for exploration of the concept of human action, about the 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  “ĚŽŝŶŐ ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞůǇ ? ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ĂŶĚ ŽŶ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ?
doing something recklessly, heedlessly, and thoughtlessly, doing something absent-
minded, inadvertently and unwittingly  W and so on and ŽŶ ?36. J.L. Austin continued to 
run this seminar without Hart after the latter was appointed to the Chair of 
                                                          
34 Sugarman (n 27) 274. During this interview, Hart acknowledged that the discussions on rules 
and how rules were used was highly influential and spurred him to write The Concept of Law. 
Moreover, Hart himself ran a weekly seminar with staff and students where these issues and 
their relation to law were often discussed. 
35 K.T.Fann (eds), Symposium on J.L.Austin (London: Routledge & Kegal Paul, 1969), p.37 where 
StƵĂƌƚ,ĂŵƉƐŚŝƌĞƚĂůŬƐĂďŽƵƚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚ,Ăƌƚ ?,ĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “ƵƐƚŝŶďĞŐƵŶƚŚŝƐŬŝŶĚ
of investigation in a class with Professor Hart in 1948, concentrating on legal concepts 
ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ,Ğ ŚĂĚ ĨŽƵŶĚ Ă ƌŝĐŚ ǀĞŝŶ ŽĨ  “ĨĂĐƚƐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐĂů
ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? 
36 Berlin et all (n 27) 19. 
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:ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞĂƚKǆĨŽƌĚ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽWŝƚĐŚĞƌ ?ĂŐƌĞĂƚŵĂŶǇŽĨ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ
in this seminar derived from his discussions with Hart. Indeed, Pitcher went as far as 
ƚŽĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚ “,ĂƌƚŵƵƐƚŚĂǀĞƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ
of many excuses-ƚĞƌŵƐ ?37.  
Ordinary Language Philosophy thrived in the 1940s, and would come to 
dominate philosophy at Oxford for decades to come38. Together the prominent 
members of the group, Gilbert Ryle, Geoffrey and Mary Warnock, John Wisdom, Peter 
Strawson, and H. L. A. Hart, all professed the importance of Ordinary Language 
Philosophy, and all went on the produce work accredited as significant, and even 
ground-breaking, in their respective fields39.  With the publication of The Concept of 
Mind40 ?'ŝůďĞƌƚZǇůĞ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚĂĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽŵŝŶĚ ?ďŽĚǇĚƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂǀŝĞǁ
                                                          
37 Berlin et all (n 27) 20. 
38 Despite the interest and reach of Ordinary Language Philosophy, Summers notes that some 
ƵƐĞĚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ?ƉĞũŽƌĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ?^ƵŵŵĞƌƐǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞthose who 
think less of "linguistic philosophy." Thus, one writer has recently warned of the possibility 
that "the sharp outlines of American thought are being gradually eroded into more pleasing 
shapes by the gentle yet persistent flow of 'ordinary' language across the Atlantic. Erosion 
being what it is, we may all sink into the sea together." Peterson, Book Review, 12 THE PHIL. 
Y ?  ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ?Z ?^ ?  “WƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ, ?> ? ? ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ Concept of Law ?Duke Law Journal 
(1963), 662. 
39 Interestingly Avner Baz argues that Ordinary Language Philosophy is better justified and 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ǁŚĞŶ ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ƚŽ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ĂƌĞĂƐ ŽĨ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?,Ğ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P  “KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ >ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ
WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ĂƐ/ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝƚ ?ŝƐďĞƚƚĞƌũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůĨƌƵŝƚƐŝƚǇŝĞůĚƐ
when applied to particular areas of philosophical difficulty than by any set of general 
ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?Baz (n 21) 5.  
40 G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Routledge, 2009). Gilbert Ryle was one of the 
leading figures in Ordinary Language Philosophy. We will provide a further insight into his 
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂŶĚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĂƌĞĂƐŽĨŽǀĞƌůĂƉǁŝƚŚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŽǁŶConcept later on.  
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previously championed by Descartes, and having a place as a ruling metaphysic of the 
ůĂƐƚƚŚƌĞĞŚƵŶĚƌĞĚǇĞĂƌƐ ?:ŽŚŶtŝƐĚŽŵ ?ŚĂǀŝŶŐďĞĞŶĂƐƚƵĚĞŶƚŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐĂƚ
ĂŵďƌŝĚŐĞ ?ǁĂƐĂŶĂĚŚĞƌĞŶƚŽĨŚŝƐWƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?,ĞŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐĂŶ
Ordinary Language Philosopher, having extended the work of G.E. Moore, 
Wittgenstein and Freud41 in the direction mapped by J.L. Austin in his meetings. Peter 
Strawson is credited with being largely responsible for establishing metaphysics as a 
worthwhile direction in the field of analytic philosophy42. It is worth noting that 
Strawson was one of the few people whom Hart thanked in The Concept of Law, for 
reading his work prior to publication, and providing him with his advice and criticism43. 
Finally, H. L. A. Hart himself published The Concept of Law, a book on legal rules that 
was receŝǀĞĚďǇŵŽƐƚŝŶƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐƌĞ-conception and 
ƵƉĚĂƚŝŶŐ ŽĨ >ĞŐĂů WŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ?  zĞƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ
publication of The Concept of Law, seems minor when compared to the achievements 
of those other philosophers who attended the Saturday Morning Meetings. Granted, 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬŝƐĂďŽŽŬĂďŽƵƚůĂǁ ?ďƵƚĞǀĞŶƚŚĞŶŝƚŝƐƐĞĞŶƚŽĂĚĚůŝƚƚůĞƚŽƚŚĞphilosophy 
ŽĨůĂǁ ?ĨƚĞƌĂůů ?ĂŶĚĚĞƐƉŝƚĞŚŝƐƌŝĐŚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ
a book on rules. This perceived lack of philosophical sophistication in The Concept of 
Law is particularly odd considering what Ryle said of Hart in his reference as supplied 
ŝŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŚĂŝƌŽĨ:ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞŝŶKǆĨŽƌĚ ?ǁŚĞƌĞZǇůĞ
                                                          
41 I Dilman, Obituary: John Wisdom, Philosophical Investigations (1994) 17, 471. 
42 Audi (n 22) 634. 
43 Hart (n 2) vii. Dr Rupert Cross and Peter Strawson were the only two people Hart thanked 
for reading The Concept of Law prior to publication. Sir Rupert Cross was a prominent English 
lawyer and academic. It is important to note that Hart asked both a philosopher and a lawyer 
to cast their eyes over The Concept of Law prior to its publication.  
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begins by noting that the field of philosophy of law had been quiet for some time, and 
almost nothing of interest to philosophers had been produced for many years44 ?ZǇůĞ ?Ɛ
ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶůĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĞŶƐƉĞĂŬƐǁĂƌŵůǇŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůŝƐƐƵĞƐ
connected to law, and since Ryle was a devoted practitioner of Ordinary Language 
WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇǁĞĐĂŶŽŶůǇĂƐƐƵŵĞƚŚĂƚŚĞǁĂƐƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶƚŚŝƐĂƌĞĂ ?ZǇůĞ
went on to recommend Hart for the Chair of Jurisprudence at Oxford both for his 
philosophical background, and for his potential to produce something interesting for 
philosophers and lawyers alike.  But to many commentators the disappointing result 
appeared to be that Hart produced a book merely modernizing the idea of law as a 
system of rules; feted, yes, but still just a version of legal positivism for all that45 ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
                                                          
44 >ĂĐĞǇ ?Ŷ ? ) ?ZǇůĞǁƌŽƚĞ P “dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůƉŽŝŶƚŽŶǁŚŝĐŚ/ŵƵƐƚĞǆƉůĂŝŶŵǇŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ?dŚĞ
philosophy of law is, in this country, in the doldrums. With one or two exceptions hardly 
anything of interest to philosophers has been produced here for a very long time. The subject 
has advanced in Germany, Scandinavia and the United States  W but not very much, noticeably. 
tĞĂƌĞŶŽƚŚĞůƉŝŶŐŝƚƚŽĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ ?DǇĐŚŝĞĨĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŽĨƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ?
45 See  ?  ? <ŝŶŐ ?  ?dŚĞ ďĂƐŝĐ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ? ? ? ) dŚĞ
ĂŵďƌŝĚŐĞ>Ăǁ:ŽƵƌŶĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞ<ŝŶŐǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “/ĨWƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ,ĂƌƚŶŽǁƌĞǀĞĂůƐŚŝŵƐĞůĨĂƐ
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐƚĂƐǁĞůůĂƐůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƚŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƌ ?ƐŐƌĂƚŝƚƵĚe to Professor Hart 
in the latter capacity is only tinged with regret that he does not display greater boldness in 
ƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞŚŝƐĐůĂŝŵƚŽŚĂǀĞĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ “ĂŶĞƐƐĂǇŝŶĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ? ?ŝƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌ
that jurisprudence remains for him under the theoretical umbrellas of logic and philosophy 
ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚŽƐĞŽĨ “ƚŚĞƐƚŝůůǇŽƵŶŐƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĂŐĞŶĞƌĂů
ƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶŝƐďĞŝŶŐĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ? ?See also L.J. Cohen, 'Critical Notices: The Concept of Law' 
[1961] Mind 39 ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞ:ŽŶĂƚŚĂŶŽŚĞŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐŝƐƚŚĂƚ ŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
rules which impose obligations or duties, and rules which confer powers, is of crucial 
importance in jurisprudence. Rules of the former kind he calls primary, and of the latter kind, 
ŚĞĐĂůůƐƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇ ? ? Q ),ĂƌƚĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚůĂǁĐĂŶďĞďĞƐƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚĂƐĂƵŶŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƚǁŽ
ƚǇƉĞƐŽĨƌƵůĞ ? ? Q )hŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞůǇ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚŵĂŬĞƐŽŶďĞŚĂůĨŽĨŚŝƐ
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product was therefore surprising and deflating, yet little sustained work has been 
ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶƚŽŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƌƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬŚĂƐŝƚƌŝŐŚƚ ?
Specifically, few have tried to understand to what extent philosophy of language 
influenced The Concept of Law. Fewer still have attempted to detail the extent to 
which Ordinary Language Philosophy runs through The Concept of Law or to deliberate 
ƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ as an exemplar of Ordinary Language Philosophy itself.   
Interestingly, this lack of interest in the philosophy of language present in The 
Concept of Law seems to stem from its early reception. Upon its publication, though 
ŵĂŶǇǁƌŝƚĞƌƐĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ affiliation with Ordinary Language Philosophy, not 
ŵĂŶǇďŽŽŬ ƌĞǀŝĞǁƐŵĞŶƚŝŽŶ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƵƐĞŽĨKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ >ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ 46. This is 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐŝŶ:ŽŶĂƚŚĂŶŽŚĞŶ ?ƐŚŝŐŚůǇĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨThe Concept of Law 
for the philosophy-based academic jŽƵƌŶĂůDŝŶĚ ?ǁŚĞƌĞŶŽŵĞŶƚŝŽŶŝƐŵĂĚĞŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
employment of Ordinary Language Philosophy 47. There are however some who have 
                                                          
distinction between primary and secondary rules do not seem altogether justifiable. The 
ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐĞĞŵƐƚŽďĞƐĐĂƌĐĞůǇĂďůĞŽĨƉůĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŽůĞĨŽƌǁŚŝĐŚ,ĂƌƚĐĂƐƚƐŝƚ ? ? 
46 For early book reviews of The Concept of Law please see DŽƌƌŝƐ'ŝŶƐďĞƌŐĂŶĚ,>,Ăƌƚ ? ‘The 
Concept of law ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?dŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ^ŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ? ? ?<ŝŶŐ ? ‘dŚĞĂƐŝĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ
WƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ:ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?dŚĞĂŵďƌŝĚŐĞ>Ăǁ:ŽƵƌŶĂů ? ? ? ?>:ŽŚĞŶ ? ‘ƌŝƚŝĐĂů
Notices: The Concept of law ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?DŝŶĚ ?,ĞƌďĞƌƚDŽƌƌŝƐ ?  ‘The Concept of law ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ?
,ĂƌǀĂƌĚ>ĂǁZĞǀŝĞǁ ? ? ? ? ?ůĨZŽƐƐ ? ‘The Concept of law ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?dŚĞzĂůĞ>Ăǁ:ŽƵƌŶĂů ? ? ? ? ? 
47 ŽŚĞŶ ŝƐ ŚŝŐŚůǇ ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ĂŶĚ ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇ ƌƵůĞƐ ĂŶĚ
ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞƐƚŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞĂƚůĞŶŐƚŚŝŶŚŝƐďŽŽŬƌĞǀŝĞǁ ?dŽƐƵŵƵƉ ?ŽŚĞŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “/ŶƐŚŽƌƚ ?ŝƚŝƐŶŽƚ
at all clear how anyone could successfully defend Hart's claim to have found the key to the 
science of jurisprudence in his distinction between primary aŶĚƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇƌƵůĞƐ ? ?ŽŚĞŶ ?Ŷ
45) 410. In the last paragraph of his book review he acknowledges that Hart made other 
impressive remarks, but these were not covered by his review. Nonetheless, he still writes of 
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ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞĚƚŚĞ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽĨ>ƵĚǁŝŐtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐPhilosophical Investigations48 in 
The Concept of Law with sophistication and philosophical nous. The legal theorists 
who rightly advocate the connection have done so in short papers or essays. Perhaps 
the first person to document his analysis of this connection was Robert Summers who, 
according to Nicola Lacey49, became a close friend of Hart.  The connection between 
,ĂƌƚĂŶĚ “ůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐ ?ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇǁĂƐŵĂĚĞĐůĞĂƌŝŶŚŝƐƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨThe Concept of Law 
published in 1963 in the Duke Law Review50, with Summers writing that: 
                                                          
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬƚŚĂƚŝƚ  “ŵĂĚĞĂĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚůǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽ
the ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨůĂǁ ? ?ŽŚĞŶ ?Ŷ ? ?) 412. 
48 Ludwig Wittgenstein and translated [from the German] by G. E. M. Anscombe, Philosophical 
Investigations Philosophische Untersuchungen (3rd edn, Blackwell Publishers 1967). 
49 >ĂĐĞǇ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ? ?EŝĐŽůĂ>ĂĐĞǇǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “ŶŽƚŚĞƌƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚďƵƚŝŶŝƚŝĂůůǇůĞƐƐůŝŬĞůǇĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉ
was with Bob Summers, later a well-known American legal theorist and Professor at Cornell. 
(...) Herbert seems almost to have regarded Summers as a surrogate intellectual son: he later 
organized sabbaticals for him at Oxford and showered both him and his family with kinĚŶĞƐƐ ? 
50 Summers (n 37) 629- ? ? ? ?^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ?ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞƌĞǀŝĞǁǁĂƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůǇůŽŶŐĞƌƚŚĂŶ
ŵĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ?ƌĞǀŝĞǁƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĂŶŝŶ-ĚĞƉƚŚ ?ĂŶĚǁĞůůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ?ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
The Concept of Law. /Ŷ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ s/ ŽĨ ŚŝƐ ƌĞǀŝĞǁ ? ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ  “WƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ DĞƚŚŽĚƐ ŽĨ
ŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ?^ƵŵŵĞƌƐŶŽƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐĚƵĞƚŽŚŝƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?,ĂƌƚƵƐĞƐƚŚĞ
same methods of analysis that can be found in the work of many of his philosophy colleagues. 
,Ğ ƌĞŵĂƌŬƐ P  “ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƐŽŵĞ ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐ ŚĂǀĞ ŶŽƚĞĚ ƚŚŝƐ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌity of method, no one has 
heretofore attempted to explain the methodological ideas, techniques and distinctions 
ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ? Q )^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƐĞŵĞƚŚŽĚƐŚĂǀĞŶŽƚŐĂŝŶĞĚĐƵƌƌĞŶĐǇŝŶĨŝĞůĚŽĨůĞŐĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ƚŚĞŝƌ
importance may not yet be widely understood amongsƚůĞŐĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ? ?^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ?Ŷ ? ? )
661. It is remarkable how fifty-five years latter legal philosophers are still grappling with these 
ƐĂŵĞŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?ƐĂŶĂƐŝĚĞ ?ŝƚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŽŶŽƚĞŚĂƚ^ƵŵŵĞƌƐƉƌĂŝƐĞĚ,ĂƌƚĨŽƌ “ƵŶůŝŬĞŵĂŶǇ
of his philosopher collĞĂŐƵĞƐĂƚKǆĨŽƌĚ ? ?ŚĞƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚŚŝƐǀŝĞǁƐ ?dŚŝƐƌĞŵĂƌŬŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ
directed at his fellow linguist philosophers, many of which, like Austin, were not driven to 
publish their work. Summers (n 37) 670. 
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In The Concept of Law ǁĞ ĨŝŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ KǆĨŽƌĚ  “ůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐ ?
philosophers. Professor Hart not only puts to good use some of their 
characteristic techniques of analysis, but also stresses the importance of 
rules in social life.51 
For Summers, it was clear that Hart was influenced by the linguistic philosophy 
movement at Oxford, and that proof of this influence is to be found in his analysis of 
ƚŚĞůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?/ŶƚŚĞůĂƐƚƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ ? “WƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽĨ
ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ?ŚĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚƐǁŚŝĐŚ ?ŚĞƐĂǇƐ ? “ŶŽĚŽƵďƚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶƉĂƌƚĨŽƌ
the hŝŐŚƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨŚŝƐǁŽƌŬ ?52 ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ?ŽŶůǇďǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
philosophical background and methodology, could one properly and effectively study 
WƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ53 ?/Ŷ ? ? ? ? ?ŶƚŚŽŶǇ^ĞďŽŬƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚĂŶĂƌƚŝĐůĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ “&ŝŶĚŝŶŐ
WittgenstĞŝŶĂƚƚŚĞŽƌĞŽĨƚŚĞZƵůĞŽĨZĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?54, where he comments on the 
ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŶŽƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƌƵůĞ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ǁĂƐ ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚ ďǇ
                                                          
51 Summers (n 37) 631. 
52 Summers (n 37) 629. 
53 Summers (n 37 )  ? ? ? ? ^ƵŵŵĞƌ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P  “ Q ĂŶ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƐĞǀĞƌĂů ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ
methodological notions is valuable background for those who wish to study Professor Hart's 
ǁŽƌŬ ? ?>ĂƚĞƌ ?ŝŶĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĂƌƚŝĐůĞĂďŽƵƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “dŚĞŝŶƚƌŝŶƐŝĐƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞďŽŽk 
is, of course, a major factor accounting for its extraordinary reception. This quality is informed 
ďǇ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ?,ĂƌƚĂŶĚ/ ?ĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ŚĂǀĞǁƌŝƚƚĞŶĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞůǇŽŶƚŚŝƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ
elsewhere. I will only observe here that Hart was a professional lawyer and a professional 
philosopher, and brought the sophistication and techniques of both fields to bear. It may also 
be noted that he was a personal friend and collaborator of the influential Oxford philosopher 
:ŽŚŶ >ĂŶŐƐŚĂǁ ƵƐƚŝŶ ? ? Robert Summers,  ?, ?> ? ? ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ dŚĞ ŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ >Ăǁ P ƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
Reflections and a Personal Memoir' (1995) 45 Journal of Legal Education 587 W596 
54 ^ĞďŽŬ ? ? “&ŝŶĚŝŶŐtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶĂƚƚŚĞŽƌĞŽĨƚŚĞZƵůĞŽĨZĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?S.M.U.L. Review 
(1999), 75-109.  
 40 
 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?^ĞďŽŬǁĂƐŶŽƚǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚThe Concept of Law, but 
rather on what has become widely known as the Hart-&ƵůůĞƌĚĞďĂƚĞ ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ,ŽůŵĞƐ
Lecture at the Harvard Law School in 1957, later published in the Harvard Law Review, 
ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ “WŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ>ĂǁĂŶĚDŽƌĂůƐ55 ? ?ŵĂƌŬĞĚƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ
of this famous debate. My work is dedicated to The Concept of Law, and the focus of 
the thesis is on the literature concerning this work directly. However, it cannot be 
ŝŐŶŽƌĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ,ŽůŵĞƐ>ĞĐƚƵƌĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ĐŽƌĞ ?ĂŶĚ “ƉĞŶƵŵďƌĂ ?ŽĨ
concepts which was later developed in The Concept of Law ? ^ĞďŽŬ ?Ɛ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ŝƐ ĂŶ
important addition to this area of Jurisprudence, and it offers a new perspective on 
the famous debate. In particular, he comments on the issue of Easy and Hard cases, 
professing that: 
One might be tempted to think ƚŚĂƚǁŚĂƚŵĂĚĞĂ “ĐŽƌĞ ?Žƌ “ƉůĂŝŶ ?ĐĂƐĞ
 “ĞĂƐǇ ?ǁĂƐƚŚĂƚŝƚŵŽƌĞĐůĞĂƌůǇĨŝƚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚƐĐŚĞŵĞŽĨƚŚĞůĞŐĂů
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?Ɛ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ƚŚĂŶ Ă  “ŚĂƌĚ ? ĐĂƐĞ ? ƐŽ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ
options just seemed automatic. But Hart clearly rejected that approach in 
The Concept of Law, stating that the only difference between a core and 
ƉĞŶƵŵďƌĂůĐĂƐĞŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌŝƐ “ĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌ ?ĂŶĚŚĂĚďĞĞŶůĞĂƌŶĞĚĂƐĂ
result of recurring experience.56 
                                                          
55 ,Ăƌƚ ?, ?> ? ? “WŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ>ĂǁĂŶĚDŽƌĂůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ),ĂƌǀĂƌĚ>Ăǁ
Review, 593-629. 
56 Sebok (n 53) 91. 
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It ǁŝůůďĞƌĞĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĂƚŶĚƌĞŝDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŽŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞŝƐƐƵĞŽĨ “ĞĂƐǇ ?ĂŶĚ
 “ŚĂƌĚ ?ĐĂƐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚŝƚŝƐǀĞƌǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŽƐĞĞŚŽǁƚŚĞŝƌǀŝĞǁƐŽŶƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞĚŝĨĨĞƌ ?ŶĚƌĞŝ
DĂƌŵŽƌƐĂǇƐŽĨƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ “ĞĂƐǇ ?ĂŶĚ “ŚĂƌĚ ?ĐĂƐĞƐƚŚĂƚ P
Legal positivism is committed to the thesis that a distinction exists 
between (so-called ) ‘ĞĂƐǇĐĂƐĞƐ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞůĂǁĐĂŶďĞƐŝŵƉůǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ
ĂŶĚ ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ƐƚƌĂŝŐŚƚĨŽƌǁĂƌĚůǇ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŚĂƌĚ ĐĂƐĞƐ ? ? ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ŝƐƐƵĞ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ
determined by existing legal standards.57 
^ĞďŽŬĂŶĚDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐĚŝǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŽĨŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁŝůůďĞĐŽŵĞĐůĞĂƌĞƌƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞ
analyƐŝƐŽĨDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ƐƚĞŵƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽĨ
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ? /ŶĚĞĞĚ ? ŝƚ ǁŝůů ďĞ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐDĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ ŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚůĞĂĚƐŚŝŵƚŽĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĂƚŽĨ^ĞďŽŬ ?dŚŝƐǁŝůů
be approached in full in Chapter 5.  As an aside, on the matter of the Hart-Fuller 
debate, it is interesting to note that of the seven articles published in the New York 
University Law Review for the Symposium marking 50 years since it took place58, not 
                                                          
57 Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory (2nd edn, Hart Publishing (UK) 2005), 95. 
58 To mark the fifty-year anniversary of the Hart-Fuller debate, Jeremy Waldron and Benjamin 
Zipursky organized a conference in New York where leading Hart scholars re-addressed the 
issues raised at the famous debate. The NYU Website writes about the conference,  “dŚĞ
conference addressed the substance of the debate, of course, in a series of papers of 
extraordinary depth and sophistication.  But they also repeated aspects of the mood and 
tempo of the original confrontation, building from cool analysis to a crescendo a insistent 
ĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ŝŶ tĂůĚƌŽŶ ?Ɛ ĨŝŶĂů ƌĞŵĂƌŬƐ ? Kn Friday, the conference heard from Leslie Green, 
professor of philosophy of law at Oxford University; Jules L. Coleman, Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence and professor of philosophy at Yale Law School; Liam 
Murphy, professor of philosophy and professor of law at New York University; Frederick 
Schauer, Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment at the Kennedy School at Harvard 
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one of the cŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŽƌƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶĂŵĂŶŶĞƌƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽƚŚĂƚŽĨ^ ĞďŽŬ ?Ɛ ?
A good example of this is the article by Leslie Green59 ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŚĞĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ǁĂƐ ƚŽ ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ Ă ƐůŽŐĂŶ P  ‘WŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ŝƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ
ŵŽƌĂůƐ ? ?KĨƚhis he writes, 
dŚĞǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐůĞĐƚƵƌĞŝŶƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐƚŚŝƐƐůŽŐĂŶǁĂƐǀŝƌƚƵĂůůǇƚŽƚĂů ?
People who know nothing else about jurisprudence know that legal 
positivists are those who maintain the separability of law and morality.60 
^ĞďŽŬ ?ƐĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŽƐĞĞ ƉĂƐƚƚŚĞ “ƐůŽŐĂŶ ?ĂŶĚĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞŽŶǁŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ
was about at a deeper level, as well as to provide a number of useful and enlightening 
insights on the issue. 
 Another legal philosopher who has published in this area is Alexandre 
Lefebvre61. His wŽƌŬ ? “>ĂǁĂŶĚƚŚĞKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ P,Ăƌƚ ?tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?:ƵƌŝƐƉƌ ĚĞŶĐĞ ?62 is a 
                                                          
hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ ŝƉƵƌƐŬǇ ? dŚĞǇ ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ ? ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ƉĂƌƚ ? ĂƐ ŽůĞŵĂŶ ƉƵƚ ŝƚ ? ŽŶ  “ƚŚĞ
philosophically interestinŐ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ? EĞǁ zŽƌŬ ? Ezh
conference celebrates 50th anniversary of Hart-Fuller debate' (2016) 
<http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/hart_fuller_debate> accessed 13 March 2016 Following the 
conference, the New York University Law Review published a special edition containing all 
eight contributions. 
59 'ƌĞĞŶ ?> ? “WŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵĂŶĚƚŚĞ/ŶƐĞƉĂƌĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ>ĂǁĂŶĚDŽƌĂůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?New York Law 
Review, 1035-1058. More recently, Green re-ŝƚĞƌĂƚĞƐŚŝƐǀŝĞǁŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ>Ăǁ
and Morals in his article, The Morality in Law, published as part of >ƵŝƐƵĂƌƚĞĚ ?ůŵĞŝĚĂ ?
James R. Edwards, and Andrea Dolcetti (eds),ZĞĂĚŝŶŐ,>,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ  ‘ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ůĂǁ ? (Hart 
Publishing 2013) 177-207. 
60 Ibid, 1037. 
61 Alexandre Lefebvre is a lecturer in the School of Philosophical & Historical Inquiry (SOPHI) 
and the School of Social & Political Sciences (SSPS) in the University of Sydney. 
62 >ĞĨĞďǀƌĞ ? ? ? “>ĂǁĂŶĚƚŚĞKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ?Telos.  
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short piece that analyses how The Concept of Law ĞŵďƌĂĐĞƐ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ
philosophy on a more holistic level. As Lefebvre points out, and has been mentioned 
earlier in this work, the commentaries on Hart and Wittgenstein have mainly been 
focused on the issues of rule-following and open-texture in law63. Lefebvre intended 
to demonstrate how, 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?ĂƐĨŽƵŶĚŝŶĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŽŶĞŽĨThe Concept of 
Law, is a powerful adaptation of the relationship between ordinary and 
ŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?/ŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐ ?/ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
philosophy.64 
As the author points out, his focus is uncharted territory, and this is precisely why his 
article proves to be of importance for this thesis. It is the purpose of this work to 
understand the philosophical influences in The Concept of Law, ĂŶĚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ
influence can be traced throughout ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐThe Concept of Law and is not limited to his 
commentary on rule-following and open-texture. However, it is important to note that 
>ĞĨĞďǀƌĞŝƐŶŽƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂůƐŽƉůĂǇĞĚĂƉĂƌƚ
ŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐThe Concept of Law and, apart from a minor reference, there is no mention 
ŽĨŚŝƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂŶĚŚŽǁŝƚŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞŝŵƉĂĐƚĞĚŽŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐ ?dŚŝƐƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚ
ďĞƚĂŬĞŶĂƐĂĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨ>ĞĨĞďǀƌĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ƐŝŶĐĞŚŝƐĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞ
the connection between Hart and Wittgenstein, but it is nevertheless an intriguing 
omission worthy of mention. This also raises the question of how influential 
                                                          
63 Ibid, 100- ? ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞŚĞƐĂǇƐ P  “dŽĚĂƚĞ ?ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇŽŶ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ debt to Wittgenstein has 
almost exclusively focused on the question of rule-following and the open-ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞŽĨůĂǁ ? ? 
64 Lefebvre (n 61) 100. 
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tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁĂƐŝŶThe Concept of Law ŽŶĐĞǁĞƚĂŬĞŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ?/ƚŵĂǇƉƌŽǀĞƚŽďĞƚŚĞĐĂƐĞƚŚĂƚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚion was much smaller 
than hitherto thought as this comparison is developed.  Lefebvre can be added to the 
list of those who have briefly looked for the philosophical influences in The Concept of 
Law, but are apparently not interested in the philosophy of J.L. Austin65. 
/Ŷ ůŝŐŚƚ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ŝŶƚĞůůĐƚƵĂů ƐǇŵƉĂƚŚŝĞƐ ŝƚ ŝƐ
unsurprisingly then, that, as mentioned in the first chapter, Nicos Stavropoulos claims 
ǁĞŚĂǀĞĂŶ “ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůďƵƌĚĞŶ ?ƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚŝƐĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?,ĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
Hart ?Ɛ ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚŶĞƐƐ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ
semantics to the theory of law places upon us an intellectual burden: we 
should try to work out the precise relation between semantics and legal 
ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŝŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ? ĂŶĚ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇ ƚŚĞ ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀe semantic views 
which drive it.66 
It remains striking that this burden has been discharged, at best, on a partial 
ĂŶĚƐĐĂŶƚďĂƐŝƐ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶůŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞĨĂŵĞŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ
                                                          
65 ŵŽƌĞƌĞĐĞŶƚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŽŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐThe Concept of Law ĐĂŶďĞĨŽƵŶĚ ŝŶƌŝĂŶ^ŝŵƉƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
work, Reflections on The Concept of law, ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?^ŝŵƉƐŽŶ ?ƐŵĞƌĐŝůĞƐƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨ
The Concept of Law offers some interesting insights, and perhaps the most useful, for the 
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐŽĨƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ĐĂŶďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ǁŚĞƌĞŚĞƚƌĂĐĞƐ “dŚĞĞůƵƐŝǀĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐŽĨ
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŝĚĞĂƐŝŶ The Concept of Law ? ?^ŝŵƉƐŽŶŵĞŶƚŝŽŶƐtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?WĞƚĞƌtŝŶĐŚĂŶĚĞǀĞŶ
Max Weber, but surprisingly, nowhere does he mention J.L. Austin. This is of particular interest 
since, more than once, he refers to J.L. Austin as one of the philosophical figures that had a 
ŐƌĞĂƚ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? ďƵƚ ŶŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ŚĞ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ  “ĞůƵƐŝǀĞ ? ůŝƐƚ ŽĨ
sources. Simpson (n 4) 89. 
66 Jules L Coleman (ed), ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ WŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚ P ƐƐĂǇƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ WŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚ ƚŽ  ‘dŚĞ ŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ
ůĂǁ ? (Oxford University Press, USA 2001), 61.  
 45 
 
notices that have appeared since its publication that point to the importance of 
linguistic philosophy in its production.  Thus J.L. Austin has been cited by most, if not 
Ăůů ? ůĞŐĂů ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ĂƐ ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ďĞĞŶ Ă ŵĂũŽƌ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŝĚĞĂƐ ?  /ŶĚĞĞĚ ,Ăƌƚ
himself, in the interview with David Sugarman previously referred to67, acknowledged 
that J.L. Austin had been very influential in his work. When asked about his intellectual 
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐŚĞƌĞƉůŝĞĚ ? “tĞůů ?ƵƐƚŝŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇ ?tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶƚŽƐŽŵĞĞǆƚĞŶƚ Q ?68. It is 
therefore surprising indeed that not more literature has been published about 
KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ >ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?Ɛ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŽŶThe Concept of Law, and about J.L. 
ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?tŚŝůƐƚƐŽŵĞŵŝŐŚƚĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ŝĚĞĂƐĂƌĞ
nowhere to be found in The Concept of Law, no such conclusion can be reached 
without first looking at the evidence, and this project has not so far been undertaken. 
And this is because almost everyone (including Stavropoulos, who has attempted to 
make good on the exhortation to understand the relation between semantics and 
ůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ )ĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŝŶĚĞƚĂŝůŽŶůǇŽŶƚŚĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚWittgenstein 
ŚĂĚŽŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? 
                                                          
67 Sugarman (n 27) 274. 
68 ^ƵŐĂƌŵĂŶ ?Ŷ ? ? ) ? ? ? ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬĐŽŵĞƐĂĐƌŽƐƐŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞ
clearly in the recording than in the transcript of the interview. Naturally, there are emotions 
that cannot be transcribed onto paper, and one such case was clearly when Sugarman asked 
 “zŽƵ ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ƵƐƚŝŶ ? ŚŽǁ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂů ǁĂƐ ŚĞ ? ? ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶ ďĞĨŽƌĞ ŚĞ ŚĂĚ ĨŝŶŝƐŚĞĚ ƚŚĞ
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ,ĂƌƚƐŝŵƉůǇƌĞƉůŝĞĚ “ǀĞƌǇ ?ǀĞƌǇ ? ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ǁŚĞŶĂƐŬĞĚ ŝĨŽŶĞǁĂƐƚŽĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĂ
league table of his influences, who would come at the top of that list he replied, without 
ŚĞƐŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? “: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ? ?KǆĨŽƌĚĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ ?KǆĨŽƌĚhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇWƌĞƐƐ ) ? ‘ ?> ? ?,Ăƌƚ/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁWĂƌƚ
dǁŽ P DĂũŽƌ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů /ŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐ  ?ĂƵĚŝŽ ) ?
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NVUGRLxRb58&index=2&list=PL3MAPgqN8JWiLdUqg
mrQMzhao6b-RrS49> accessed 10 January 2016, starting at minute 1:45. 
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/ƚ ŝƐ ŽĨ ĐŽƵƌƐĞ ŶŽ ƐĞĐƌĞƚ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ǁĂƐ ĨĂƐĐŝŶĂƚĞĚ ďǇ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ
great philosophy, Philosophical Investigations. Nicola Lacey, in her biography of Hart, 
ƌĞĐŽƵŶƚƐ ŚŽǁ  “DĂƌǇ tĂƌŶŽĐŬ ƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐ Śŝŵ  ‘ĐůƵƚĐŚŝŶŐ 'ĞŽĨĨƌĞǇ tĂƌŶŽĐŬ ĂŶĚ
ƐĂǇŝŶŐ ?  “/ ?ǀĞďĞĞŶƵƉĂůůŶŝŐŚƚ ?/ ?ǀĞďĞĞŶƵƉĂůůŶŝŐŚƚ ?/ĐĂŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬŽĨĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐĞůƐĞ ?
after reading Philosophical Investigations69. According to Robert Summers, in 
conversations Hart referred to Philosophical Investigations ĂƐ “ŽƵƌďŝďůĞ ?70. However, 
ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶŽŶůǇǀŝƐŝƚĞĚKǆĨŽƌĚ
once for a lecture, and it is not known that they ever even exchanged a word. That 
ƐĂŝĚ ? ŝƚ ŝƐǁŝĚĞůǇŬŶŽǁŶƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚĚĞƐƉŝƐĞĚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐĂƌƌŽŐĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ůŝŬĞůǇ
that he would never have established the philosophical rapport with Wittgenstein that 
he did with J.L. Austin, even if they had met.71 This may well provide one reason behind 
why he is keen to credit J.L. Austin as a philosophical influence on his work, but less 
ǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐŝŵƉĂĐƚ72.  Again, these matters will be the subject of 
exploration in subsequent chapters.  Notwithstanding the reason, however, the fact 
remains that Hart credits J.L. Austin, not Wittgenstein in The Concept of Law and this 
must surely then beg the question why it is that most legal philosophers focus on 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶThe Concept of Law, and almost none of them dedicate 
the same - or indeed any - attention to the philosophy of J.L. Austin. 
                                                          
69 Lacey (n 3) 140. 
70 ^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ?Z ?^ ? “, ?> ? ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐThe Concept of Law: Estimations, Reflections and a Personal 
DĞŵŽƌŝĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ? 
71 Lacey (n 3) 218-219.  
72 Sugarman (n 27) 268.  
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It is notable that it is J.L. Austin, and not Wittgenstein, who is the only 
philosopher to merit a quotation in The Concept of Law. Throughout his entire book, 
Hart does not quote anyone else. Intriguingly however, it is Wittgenstein who prompts 
the greatest degree of speculation regarding the influence he had on The Concept of 
Law.  Without wishing to presage subsequent chapters unduly, we can at least offer 
some opening speculation as to why this state of affairs exists.  First, it is rare to find 
a book about the Great Philosophers that does not mention Wittgenstein, and he will 
always, at the very least, warrant a chapter in any book about 20th Century 
philosophy73. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy says of Wittgenstein that he 
ǁĂƐ “ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůĂŶĚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůǁƌŝƚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞƚǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚ
ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?74.  However, J.L. Austin has not been afforded the same kind of recognition 
and his work has not hitherto achieved the same status as that of Wittgenstein, and 
far fewer people are familiar with his philosophy.  Wittgenstein published one work 
on philosophy, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus75, during his lifetime, and this text 
became the primary influence for the Vienna Circle. But after abandoning philosophy 
for ten years, Wittgenstein saw grave flaws in the Tractatus, and conceived a new 
                                                          
73 See, for example, Magee, B., The Great Philosophers (BBC; London, 1987), Dialogue 15; 
James Garvey and Jeremy Stangroom, The Story of Philosophy: A History of Western 
Thought (Quercus Publishing Plc 2012); Stephen Law, The Great Philosophers: The Lives and 
/ĚĞĂƐ ŽĨ ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?Ɛ 'ƌĞĂƚĞƐƚ dŚŝŶŬĞƌƐ (Quercus Publishing Plc 2013); Jeremy Stangroom and 
James Garvey, The Great Philosophers (Arcturus Publishing 2008). 
74 Robert Audi (ed), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (2nd edn, Cambridge University 
Press 1999) 976. 
75 Ludwig Wittgenstein and Luis Valdés M Villanueva, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (2nd 
edn, Tecnos 2003). 
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philosophy which he set out in Philosophical Investigations76, published 
posthumously.  J.L. Austin, on the other hand, did not publish much during his lifetime. 
His way of developing philosophy involved debates and discussions, and he was rarely 
ready to engage in writing77. Most of the works of J.L. Austin, to which we now have 
access, have been compiled by his students or colleagues. Even though the later 
Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin were both supporters of the same school of philosophy, 
Ordinary Language Philosophy, they had very different approaches to the practice and 
role of philosophy. It might therefore be argued that it is harder to engage with the 
philosophy of J.L. Austin, which is based around philosophical debates collated after 
his death than the work of Wittgenstein, which is presented in the form of a book with 
certain philosophical conclusions that serve to frame the narrative. This might well be 
why legal philosophers tend to focus their attention on the work of Wittgenstein, and 
not many engage with the philosophy of J.L. Austin. However, the purpose of this work 
                                                          
76 Ludwig Wittgenstein and translated [from the German] by G. E. M. Anscombe, Philosophical 
Investigations Philosophische Untersuchungen (3rd edn, Blackwell Publishers 1967). 
77 Fann, on the Preface to Symposium of J. L. Austin, ǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “,Ğ ?: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ )ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚŶŽ
books of his own and published only seven papers, which he was obliged to publish as 
condition of their being delivered.   ? Q )^ŽŽŶĂĨƚĞƌŚŝƐĚĞĂƚŚ ?ƚŚĞƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚƉĂƉĞƌƐ ?ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ
with three previously unpublished, were collected as Philosophical Papers by J.O. Urmson and 
' ?: ?tĂƌŶŽĐŬ ? ? K. T. Fann, Symposium on J. L. Austin (Routledge & K. Paul 1979), ix. Matson 
argueƐƚŚĂƚŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶƐĨŽƌ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŝĚĞƌĞĂĐŚĂŶĚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?ǁĂƐƚŚĂƚŚĞǁĂƐƐŽ
much more thorough. On the first day of the term he would read out the first two pages of 
Ayer's Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, in which the Argument from Illusion is 
summarized. Then he would begin to scrutinize it, sentence by sentence, often word by word, 
sometimes devoting three or four lectures to a single word. Two months later he might still 
be commenting on these two pages. So went the most exciting and entertaining, as well as 
most important, philosophical lecture course of the twentieth century." Matson, Book Review, 
Northwfst rev. 127 (1962). 
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is not to offer speculation as to why Wittgenstein has received more attention than 
J.L. Austin.  Regardless of this enquiry, the plain fact remains that the literature in 
ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŽKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŝƐƐƚŝůůƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐůǇƚŚŝŶŽŶ
the ground, and it is on this that the present research places its attention. 
There is, then, a remarkable gap in the current literature, and one that my 
thesis will attempt to fill. Indeed, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, this is 
precisely what I will offer in this thesis; that ŝƐ ? Ă ƌŽƵŶĚ ĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
philosophical influences, enabling an examination of the extent to which Ordinary 
>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ƐƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐĐĂŶďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶThe Concept of Law. I intend, that is, 
ƚŽŚĞůƉƐĂƚŝƐĨǇƚŚĞ “ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůďƵƌĚĞŶ ?ƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?and now Stavropoulos) has placed 
ƵƉŽŶƵƐ ?dŚĞƚŚĞƐŝƐǁŝůůĂůƐŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂƵŶŝƋƵĞŝŶƐŝŐŚƚŝŶƚŽ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶThe 
Concept of Law. Ɛ ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ? ŽƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ŚĂǀĞ ƚƌŝĞĚ ƚŽ ƚƌĂĐĞ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ
influence in The Concept of Law, but the same cannŽƚďĞƐĂŝĚĨŽƌ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?
In the end a conclusion might be formed to the effect that that even though J.L. Austin 
ĂŝĚĞĚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ^ĂƚƵƌĚĂǇ
morning group, and they even taught a seminar in Excuses together, he did not 
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐThe Concept of Law in any significant way. If this is the case, then this 
work will serve to eliminate the commonly held (though little discussed) suspicion that 
J.L. Austin played a part in The Concept of Law. However, it might come to light that 
not only is The Concept of Law a work influenced by Ordinary Language Philosophy 
generally, but tenets of J.L. Austin´s philosophy are present in The Concept of Law. 
Ordinary Language Philosophy cannot be seen as narrowly as only comprising 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ƐŝŶĐĞǁĞǁŝůů ĐŽŵĞƚŽƐĞĞ ƚŚĂƚǁŚŝůƐƚďŽƚŚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ
ĂŶĚ : ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ĐŽŵĞ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ƵŵďƌĞůůĂ ? ƚŚĞǇ ďŽƚŚ ŽĨĨĞƌ ƵŶŝƋƵĞ
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methodological insights. Moreover, this is an exciting time to rediscover The Concept 
of Law ŝŶůŝŐŚƚŽĨ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ĨŽƌŝƚƐĞĞŵƐƚŚĂƚ ŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƌĞŶĞǁĞĚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ
ŝŶ ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? tŚŝůƐƚ ŵĂŶǇ ƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵ
Ordinary Language Philosophy to be dead78, Martin Gustafsson, editor of the recently 
published book The Philosophy of J.L. Austin79 seeks to question such proclamations 
by noting, 
More importantly, the received view helps to confirm and strengthen a 
ǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚǀŝĞǁŽĨƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂƐĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇŽďƐŽůĞƚĞ ?&ŽƌǁĞĂůůŬŶŽǁ
 W ĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĞ ? W that Ordinary Language Philosophy, once so influential was 
methodologically flawed. And we all know  W ĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĞ ? W that even if How 
to Do Things With Words was a great achievement, the developments and 
revisions made by latter-day speech act theorists have made this 
ƉŝŽŶĞĞƌŝŶŐĞĨĨŽƌƚŽƵƚĚĂƚĞĚ ?KĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ŶŽŽŶĞĚĞŶŝĞƐƚŚĂƚƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐ
of considerable historical significance. We have to study it if we want to 
understand one important phase in the development of analytic 
                                                          
78 See T. P. USCHANOV ?ƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ? “dŚĞ^ƚƌĂŶŐĞĞĂƚŚŽĨKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ?ƌƚŝĐůĞ
Death of Ordinary Language Philosophy, http://www.helsinki.fi/~tuschano/writings/strange/ 
(last accessed 7/0812), this article has never been published since the author is not yet fully 
satisfied with it. See, Baz (n 21) 5 ?ǁŚĞƌĞǀŶĞƌĂǌǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “tŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵŽĨĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐ
philosophy, it is now widely held that Ordinary Language Philosophy has somehow been 
refuted or otherwise seriously discredited, and that it may therefore philosophically 
legitimatelǇĂŶĚƐĂĨĞůǇďĞŝŐŶŽƌĞĚ ? ? 
79 Gustaffson and Sorli (n 27). 
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philosophy. But is there really anything philosophically important to learn 
from him today?80 
Gustafsson concludes that if there was nothing to learn from J.L. Austin, all the authors 
that contributed to this new book would not have proclaimed otherwise in the 
numbers that they did. It is sƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ'ƵƐƚĂĨƐƐŽŶ ?ƐďŽŽŬŝƐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ
essays on J.L. Austin to have been published in the past 40 years. Around the same 
ƚŝŵĞǀŶĞƌĂǌƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚŚŝƐďŽŽŬ ? “tŚĞŶǁŽƌĚƐĂƌĞĐĂůůĞĚĨŽƌ PĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ
>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?81, which again focuses on the philosophy of J.L. Austin. Baz 
offers his view of Ordinary Language Philosophy and argues that the criticisms raised 
against it are unfounded. He identifies Searle, Grice and Soames as the three main 
philosophical opponents of Ordinary Language Philosophy, and he dedicates a few 
chapters to demystifying their criticisms. In his concluding remarks, Baz writes, 
 “ZĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƐƵĐĐĞĞĚŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐ KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ >ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ƚŚĞ ƚŚƌĞĞ
arguments we have considered have turned out to call, each in its own way, for an 
KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ZŽƵƚůĞĚŐĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?ĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨ
their Routledge Revivals series, republished the Symposium on J.L. Austin, which was 
originally published in 1979. This book is a collection of essays from well-known 
philosophers, many of whom knew Austin personally.  
 It is not clear however, why it was that Ordinary Language Philosophy stopped 
ďĞŝŶŐ Ă  “ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂů ŽƉƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ?82 in the first place. The 
                                                          
80 Gustaffson and Sorli (n 27) 2. 
81 Baz (n 21). 
82 Ushanov (n 77 ) ?ǁŚĞƌĞhƐŚĂŶŽǀǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “Currently, however, Ordinary Language Philosophy 
is not generally viewed as a legitimate intellectual option for philosophers, analytic or 
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question needs ƚŽďĞĂƐŬĞĚ PǁŚǇĚŝĚKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ “ĚŝĞ ? ?tŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ
the answer to that question (and there will be some attention paid to it in the 
following chapters), it seems that Philosophy is at a stage where it is willing to revisit 
Ordinary Language Philosophy, and my research fits neatly within this revival. My 
investigations will undoubtedly lead me to explore the ancestry of the ideas that 
dominated Oxford in the second part of the 20th Century, but this thesis is not 
intended as a work in legal history. Nor is it intended as a work in jurisprudence, even 
though I will cover the changes that were seen in doctrinal jurisprudence after the 
publication of The Concept of Law. Although I will touch upon these different areas, 
this thesis is ultimately a thesis on an aspect of philosophy applied to the subject of 
law, and so, in this sense, in the philosophy of law, focusing on whether Ordinary 
Language Philosophy was applied to law through The Concept of Law. 
 
The Circumstantial Case 
But what of the more ŐĞŶĞƌĂůƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬŝƐĂĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ
made within a new philosophical movement, or whether it is just a contribution to and 
development of the, then prevailing, theory of legal positivism? An initial few thoughts 
can be mentioned here to establish the ground for my detailed enquiry in later 
chapters.  For example, there is circumstantial reason for crediting the philosophical 
ƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ƐŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?ZƵƉĞƌƚŽƐƐĂŶĚWĞƚĞƌ^ƚƌĂǁƐŽŶǁĞƌĞ
chosen by Hart to review The Concept of Law prior to publication. Peter Strawson was 
                                                          
ŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ ?/ŶĨĂĐƚŝƚ ?ƐƐĂĨĞƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĞƌŐƐŽŶ ?ƐĂŶĚƌŝĞƐĐŚ ?Ɛ
vitalism, Ordinary Language Philosophy is the most deeply unfashionable of all the main 
currents of twentieth-century Western philoƐŽƉŚǇ ? ? 
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a renowned philosopher, and Rupert Cross a distinguished lawyer. The choosing of 
these two academics to review the final draft of The Concept of Law fits well with 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂŝŵƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƵƐǁŝƚŚĂďŽŽŬĚĞƐŝgned for the student of jurisprudence, but 
which would also be of use for those who are interested in the study of philosophy83. 
The circumstantial case is that, on a rudimentary level, if The Concept of Law is indeed 
just a book on rules, then there would have been no need to consult Peter Strawson 
prior to its publication.  But the circumstantial case is, of course, stronger than this.  
Thus the view has been expressed that The Concept of Law intended for law what The 
Concept of Mind set out to provide for philosophy of mind. Gilbert Ryle published The 
Concept of Mind in 1949, and many speculate that Hart named his work in a display 
not only of homage but also intellectual unity84. Thus Brian Simpson wrote:  
,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŝƚůĞ ĨŽƌ ŚŝƐ ďŽŽŬ ?The Concept of Law, echŽĞĚ ZǇůĞ ?ƐThe 
Concept of Mind, and so a starting point must be the assumption that The 
                                                          
83 ,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? )ǀŝ ?/ŶƚŚĞWƌĞĨĂĐĞ ?,ĂƌƚǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “dŚŽƵŐŚŝƚŝƐƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞƐƚƵĚĞŶƚŽĨ
jurisprudence, I hope it may also be of use to those whose chief interests are in moral or 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ŽƌŝŶƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŝ ůĂǁ ? ?In the interview with Sugarman (n 21) 
Hart mentions an amusing anecdote about how The Concept of Law came to be. According to 
Hart, soon after he was appointed as the Chair of Jurisprudence at Oxford his students threw 
a party which he attended. At said pĂƌƚǇ ?ŚŝƐƵŶĚĞƌŐƌĂĚƵĂƚĞƐƚƵĚĞŶƚƐƐĂŝĚƚŽŚŝŵ P “tŚĂƚǁĞ
ǁĂŶƚŝƐĂďŽŽŬĂďŽƵƚůĂǁ QǁŚĂƚůĂǁŝƐ ?zŽƵĐŽƵůĚǁƌŝƚĞƚŚĂƚďŽŽŬ ? ?ŶĚƐŽ ?ƐĂŝĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ŚĞĚŝĚ ?
Whether or not it was the comment from his undergraduate students that prompted Hart to 
write The Concept of Law, he maintained throughout his life that his main audience were the 
students of jurisprudence as well as future, and current, lawyers. 
84 >ĂĐĞǇ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞƐŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “ZǇůĞǁĂƐƚŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŶŐĨŝŐƵƌĞŝŶƐŚĂƉŝŶŐƚŚĞƚƵƌŶƚŽ
linguistic philosophy before the war, and his influential The Concept of Mind (1949) was 
echoed in his own The Concept of Law (1961). 
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Concept of law is both what the book is about and what makes it a 
philosophical enterprise85.  
ŐŽŽĚĚĞĂůŽĨZǇůĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĂƚŝfication of 
the theory that philosophical problems arise from misunderstandings about language. 
The Concept of Mind intended to prove that issues of ordinary language have in fact 
transcended the philosophy of language, and are now also dealt with in the philosophy 
of mind. Ryle has been immortalized by his attacks on Cartesianism. The Concept of 
Mind is an attack on the mind-body duality insofar as Ryle wanted to expose the 
 “ĚŽŐŵĂŽĨƚŚĞŐŚŽƐƚŝŶƚŚĞŵĂĐŚŝŶĞ ?86, and show that the metaphysical theory that 
people are composed of two separate and distinct entities is wrong. However, this 
was not his starting point. Ryle, who had long advocated and practiced Ordinary 
Language Philosophy, started with the intent of applying the principles of Ordinary 
Language Philosophy to a particular area, and for this he chose Mind.  As Julia Tanney, 
a leading Ryle scholar, wrote:  
Having produced various papers, responses, articles and discussion notes 
ŽŶƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ƐƉƌŽƉĞƌŐŽĂůƐĂŶĚŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ?ZǇůĞĚĞĐŝĚĞ  ? Q )ƚŚĞƚŝŵĞǁĂƐ
rigŚƚ ƚŽ  ‘ĞǆŚŝďŝƚ Ă ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĞĚ ƉŝĞĐĞ ŽĨ ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů ŚĂƚĐŚĞƚ-work 
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŶŐƐŽŵĞŶŽƚŽƌŝŽƵƐĂŶĚůĂƌŐĞƐŝǌĞĚ'ŽƌĚŝĂŶ<ŶŽƚ ? ?dŚƵƐ ?ZǇůĞ
went straight to The Concept of Mind demonstrating the method he had 
long, in his early papers, described and defended.87  
                                                          
85 Simpson (n 4) p.77. 
86 Ryle (n 39 ) ? ? ?ZǇůĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “/ƐŚĂůůŽĨƚĞŶƐƉĞĂŬŽĨŝƚ ?ǁŝƚŚĚĞů ďĞƌĂƚĞĂďƵƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ?ĂƐ “ƚŚĞ
dogma of the ghost in the macŚŝŶĞ ? ? 




ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ?88 ? ŝŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐ ŝƚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ  “ĂŶ ŝŶƋƵŝƌǇ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨǁŽƌĚƐ ?89, is the 
application of a determinate programme in the philosophy of language to law. It is 
intriguing, once again, that this has not hitherto been the subject of any sustained 
ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ ĞŶƋƵŝƌǇ ? /ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ĐůĞĂƌůǇ ŝŵƉůŝĞĚ ďǇ ŵŽƐƚ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĐƌŝƚŝĐƐ ? ĂŶĚ ĞǀĞŶ
supporters, that The Concept of Law ŝƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚůĞŐĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ?EŽǁ ?
if it is true that Hart was engaged in applying Ordinary Language Philosophy to law, 
the received view is surely a partial account of the project at best.  It is thus my 
intention to investigate whether Hart was, like Ryle, taking the principles of Ordinary 
Language Philosophy and showing them in application, in the area familiar to him  W 
ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐĂƐĞǁĂƐƚŚĞůĂǁ ?
Of course, many of those who read The Concept of Law ĂƌĞƵŶĂǁĂƌĞŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
philosophical background, and have likely never taken an interest in his earlier essays. 
In fact, Hart made his affiliations with Ordinary Language Philosophy clear throughout 
many of his papers, even though he does not mention this in The Concept of Law. 
Ordinary Language Philosophy is a way of doing philosophy, and if The Concept of Law 
was indeed an application of Ordinary Language Philosophy to Law, then he would not 
feel the need to explain this, in just the same way as Ryle, who did not explain in The 
Concept of Mind that such was his intention. Interestingly, according to Julia Tanney, 
Ryle faced the same conundrum. She wrote, 
                                                          
88 Hart (n 2) vii. 
89 Hart (n 2) vii. 
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Though many read The Concept of Mind, far fewer heard his papers or 
ƌĞĂĚŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐ ?,ĂĚƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞďŽŽŬŚĂĚĂĐůĞĂƌƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĂƚZǇůĞ ?Ɛ
ŵĞƚŚŽĚ ŽĨ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ǁĂƐ Ă ƚǇƉĞ ŽĨ  ‘ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů ĐĂƌƚŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ? ƚŚĞǇ ǁŽƵůĚ
have realised that Ryle did not construe the task of analysis as did the early 
Russell or Moore.90  
dŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ŵŝŐŚƚ ďĞ ƐĂŝĚ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵĂƐƚĞƌƉŝĞĐĞ ?The Concept of Law has achieved 
worldwide recognition, but his earlier papers have not been elevated to the same 
status. Many readers, including most students of jurisprudence, are neither exposed 
to his earlier works nor made aware of his philosophical background. It might be the 
ĐĂƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŝĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĂĚĞƌƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĂǁĂƌĞ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĂĐƚŝǀĞ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞnt with Ordinary 
Language Philosophy, they would seek to engage with the philosophy of language 
employed in The Concept of Law.   
Concluding Remarks 
dŚŽƵŐŚ ĂĐĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐĂů ǁŽƌůĚ ? ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ
subject of intense criticism since itƐ ĞĂƌůǇ ƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ? &ƌŽŵ ůĨ ZŽƐƐ ? ƌĞǀŝĞǁ ŽĨThe 
Concept of Law for the Yale Law Journal where he criticizes Hart for not understanding 
ŚŝƐ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ZŽƐƐ ? )ǁŽƌŬ91 ?ƚŽ ? ?<ŝŶŐ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨ,ĂƌƚĨŽƌŶŽƚǀŽůƵŶƚĞĞƌŝŶŐĂĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ
of the concept of law itself92, the early reviews though generally positive are highly 
                                                          
90 G. Ryle, Collected Essays 1929-1969 (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), vii. 
91 ZŽƐƐ ?Ŷ ? ? ) ? ? ? ? ?ZŽƐƐĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐŚŝƐƌĞǀŝĞǁďǇǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ P “dŚĂt the appreciation is not mutual 
is no reason why I should not express my high esteem for his work and my belief that we are 
ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƉĂƚŚ ? ? 
92   ? ?<ŝŶŐ ?Ŷ ? ? ) ? ? ? ?<ŝŶŐŐŽĞƐĂƐĨĂƌĂƐƚŽĞŶƋƵŝƌĞ P “tŚǇĚŽĞƐŚĞ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?,Ăƌƚ )ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂ
definition sŽƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ? ? 
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ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŽĨƐŽŵĞĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?tŚĂƚŝƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐŝƐƚŚĂƚ ?ĞǀĞŶĂƚ
ƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŽĨŝŶŝƚŝĂůƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇĐŽƵůĚƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ
have been dissolved had thĞ ƌĞǀŝĞǁĞƌƐ ŚĂĚĂŶĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů
background. It is important to recall that this view is supported by Summers who 
ĐůĂŝŵƐ ? ŝŶ ŚŝƐ ƌĞǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? ƚŚĂƚ ĂŶ ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů
context is essential to a proper understanding of The Concept of Law93. Though Hart 
continued to defend many of the views that he expressed in The Concept of Law for 
ǇĞĂƌƐƚŽĐŽŵĞ ?ĂƐĐĂŶďĞƌĞĂĚ ?ĂŶĚŶŽǁůŝƐƚĞŶĞĚƚŽ )ŝŶĂǀŝĚ^ƵŐĂƌŵĂŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ94, 
the lack of an official response to many of the criticisms is seen by many as an 
admission that Hart himself believed that his theory had flaws95. The publication of 
the Postscript, and its subsequent analysis and intense scrutiny by the leading legal 
theorists on Hart96, did, in many ways, muddy the waters with legal theorists providing 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĨŝŶĂůǁŽƌĚƐ ?dŚŽƵŐŚƐŽŵĞ ?ŶŽƚŵĂŶǇ ?ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚƚŚĞ
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂŶĚ ?ŵĂŝŶůǇ )tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶ
The Concept of Law, this is not the standard, eƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ? ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
work. More recently, the publication of the third edition of The Concept of Law, with 
its introduction by Leslie Green, brings with it the risk of further cementing the view 
of Hart as rule theorist, who, despite his philosophical background, did not employ 
                                                          
93 Cf Summers (n 37) 631. 
94 Sugarman (n 27). When asked about this philosophy, Hart articulated his views on The 
Concept of Law and claimed that they remain unchanged. 
95 &ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƐĞĞ>ĂĐĞǇ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ?ǁŚŽǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “/ŶůĂƚĞŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐ ? Q )ŚĞ was only too willing 
ƚŽĂĚŵŝƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞďŽŽŬŚĂĚŝƚƐĨůĂǁƐ ? ? 
96 An in-ĚĞƉƚŚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐWŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚĐĂŶďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŽůĞŵĂŶ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶ
of essays from prominent legal theorists is presented. Coleman (n 5). 
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linguistic philosophy in The Concept of Law. As noted in the Introduction to this thesis, 
it is for this reason that the first chapter in section B will address the work of Leslie 
Green. Before discussing the work of other legal theorists who did indeed believe that 
Hart employed linguistic philosophy principles in The Concept of Law, it is important 
to start by confronting the latest, and perhaps most prominent, contribution to the 
literature opposing the view that Harƚ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ >ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ
Philosophy. Not only will this focus our minds on the importance of understanding 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŚƌŽƵŐŚKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ďƵƚŝƚǁŝůůĂůůƵĚĞƚŽƚŚĞĚŝƐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ
ƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐŶĞǁŝŶtroduction.  
This section, section A, has served the purpose of introducing the thesis and 
giving some context to the time of publication and the reception of The Concept of 
Law. A case for Ordinary Language Philosophy has been put forward, and even those 
who disagree that Hart employed Ordinary Language Philosophy in The Concept of 
Law, must at least agree that there are considerable disparities in the literature and 
that no agreement has yet been reached. The views are in fact so varied and 
dispersed, that an account of all the different views on The Concept of Law would quite 
probably not be possible. What is however possible is to narrow this investigation into 
ƚŚĞĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ĨŽƌ
there are few who have commented on and investigated the extent to which Hart 
applied the teachings of J.L. Austin and Wittgenstein in The Concept of Law.  It is to 
this investigation that we must now turn, starting with the first chapter of section B, 



























In 2012, fifty one years after the original publication, Oxford University Press 
(henceforth OUP) published a new edition, the third edition, of The Concept of Law1. 
This latest edition includes a preface, extensive introduction and notes all written by 
Green2. As mentioned in section A, The Concept of Law3 was first published in 1961. 
Thirty-four years later, OUP invited Penelope A. Bulloch and Joseph Raz to review the 
notes that Hart had written before his passing and from it develop a postscript to The 
Concept of Law. The second edition of The Concept of Law with the added postscript 
edited by the two aforementioned legal theorists was published in 1994. This third 
edition is therefore the first edition of The Concept of Law without any new original 
ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůǁƌŝƚƚĞŶďǇƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?/ŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐ ?ŝƚǁĂƐ'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ
that justified a new edition. For obvious reasons, it would be negligent not to mention 
ŚŝƐ ǁŽƌŬ Žƌ ŚŝƐ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ? /Ŷ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ 'ƌĞĞŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ŝƐ ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ
rather unique since he is the only legal theorist whose work is analysed in this thesis 
                                                          
1 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Joseph Raz and Penelope A Bulloch eds, 3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2012). This edition was arguably published to mark the celebration of the 50th 
ĂŶŶŝǀĞƌƐĂƌǇŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ?ĂƐƉĞƌ'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐWƌĞĨĂĐĞƚŽThe Concept 
of Law. Hart (n 1) xi. Alongside the Third Edition, OUP also released a digitalized and re-
ŵĂƐƚĞƌĞĚ ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĂǀŝĚ ^ƵŐĂƌŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ůĞŶŐƚŚǇ ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ǁŝƚŚ ,Ăƌƚ ? dŚŽƵŐŚ ƉĂƌƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
interview had been transcribed, a full audio version had never been released. For further 
ĚĞƚĂŝůƐ ƉůĞĂƐĞ ƐĞĞ ĂǀŝĚ ^ƵŐĂƌŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ďůŽŐ ƉŽƐƚ ĨŽƌ KhW P  ‘/Ŷ ,ŝƐ KǁŶ sŽŝĐĞ P , ?> ? ? ,Ăƌƚ ŝŶ
ŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ĂǀŝĚ ^ƵŐĂƌŵĂŶ  ? KhWďůŽŐ ?  ?*Featured, 4 December 2012) 
<http://blog.oup.com/2012/12/h-l-a-hart-in-conversation-with-david-sugarman/> accessed 
16 January 2016. 
2 Green is the Professor of Philosophy of Law at Balliol College, Oxford. 
3 Hart (n 1). 
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that does not support the claim that The Concept of Law was embedded within 
Ordinary Language Philosophy. Nonetheless, assessment of his contribution will 
however provide greater depth to my argument, since the inclusion of such work will 
clearly demonstrate how vital it is to read The Concept of Law in light of Oxford 
Philosophy. Furthermore, the prestige associated with being credited with an 
introduction to what is arguably still the most important book in Anglo American 
jurisprudence, cannot be overlooked4. Indeed, because of this, in the future Green (as 
EŝĐŽůĂ >ĂĐĞǇ ƵƉŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ5) may well be regarded 
ĨŽƌĞŵŽƐƚĂƐĂƐĐŚŽůĂƌŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ?
ĂŶĚŝƚƐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇƌĞĐĞŶƚƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐƚŚĞsubject of the first chapter in 
ƚŚŝƐ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? dŚŽƵŐŚ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ 'ƌĞĞŶ ?Ɛ  “ŶŽƚĞƐ ? ƚŽ The Concept of Law, where he 
ĚŝƌĞĐƚƐƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌƚŽĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƉĂƉĞƌƐƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚĂďŽƵƚĞĂĐŚƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ?
would make a very interesting research project, it would not add much to the subject 
of this thesis. His notes will therefore be disregarded, and this chapter will mainly 
ĨŽĐƵƐŽŶ'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ6. The publication of the third 
                                                          
4 It is of note that in the cover of the new edition of The Concept of Law ƚŚĞƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞ “tŝƚŚ
ĂŶ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ďǇ 'ƌĞĞŶ ? ŚĂƐ ŶŽǁ ďĞĞŶ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ? dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ƉĂƌƚŝcularly relevant since the 
postscript, edited by Bulloch and Raz is not mentioned on the cover. 
5 EŝĐŽůĂ>ĂĐĞǇƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚŚĂƐƐŝŶĐĞƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐ
ŽŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?&Žƌ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?ƉůĞĂƐĞƐĞĞNicola Lacey, A Life of H. L. A. Hart: The 
Nightmare and the Noble Dream (Oxford University Press, USA 2004).  
6 ƐĂŶĂƐŝĚĞ ?ŝƚŝƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƚŚĂƚ'ƌĞĞŶǁƌŝƚĞƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŶŽƚĞƐƚŽThe Concept of Law 
ƚŚĂƚ “ŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚŽƐĞƌĞĂĚŝŶŐƐŚĂǀĞŶŽǁďĞĞŶƐƵƉĞƌƐĞĚĞĚĂŶĚŵĂŶǇ later books and articles 
ƚĂŬĞƵƉŚŝƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? )ǆŝ ?/ƚƐĞĞŵƐƚŚĂƚ'ƌĞĞŶŚĂƐŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨ
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŶŽƚĞ ?tŚĞƌĞĂƐ,ĂƌƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐEŽƚĞƐƚŽThe Concept of Law for the reader to have further 
guidance as to the philosophical and legal background to his arguments, Green has apparently 
understood these notes to be solely pointers for further reading. It is therefore unsurprising 
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ĞĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝƚƐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵction, begs the question of why 
it is that OUP felt the need to include an introduction to such a renowned and well-
known book. Green, who also contributed a new Preface7 to The Concept of Law, 
answers this question by stating that enough time has passed for The Concept of Law 
ƚŽ ŶĞĞĚ ĂŶ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ŚĞ ŝŶƚĞŶĚƐ ƚŽ  “ĨŽƌĞƐƚĂůů ƐŽŵĞ ŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐ8 ? ?
'ƌĞĞŶ ?Ɛ WƌĞĨĂĐĞ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞƐ ƚŚĞ ǀĂůƵĞ ĂŶĚ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ŚŝƐ ůŽŶŐ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ
highlights his work as of major importance in this new edition of The Concept of Law. 
ƐŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ?'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌƐĞůůŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŶĞǁƚŚŝƌĚĞĚŝƚŝŽŶ
of The Concept of Law. Even those who already own a copy of The Concept of Law 
might be tempted to purchase this new edition with a 41 page-long introduction 
                                                          
for Green to claim that these readings have now been superseded. What should have been 
made clear however is thaƚ ƵŶůŝŬĞ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐƐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ
ďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚƚŽŚŝƐŽǁŶĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ?'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƌĞĂĚŝŶŐƐĂƌĞĂŐŽŽĚƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ
reading into different interpretations, and criticisms, of The Concept of Law. 
7 ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĂĐĞŝƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ most well-ŬŶŽǁŶĂŶĚƋƵŽƚĞĚƉƌĞĨĂĐĞƐŝŶũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?KhW ?Ɛ
decision to add a preface by Green alongside it was an interesting one. It is also of note that 
Ă WƌĞĨĂĐĞ ŝƐ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ǁƌŝƚƚĞŶ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ďŽŽŬ ?Ɛ ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ? /ƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ ƚŽ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ Ă
PrefacĞ ďǇ ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ? ƵŶůĞƐƐ 'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ƐŽ
substantial to amount to a co-authorship of the book (which is doubtful). Furthermore, it 
ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚZĂǌĂŶĚƵůůŽĐŚǁƌŽƚĞĂĚĚĞĚĂŶ “ĞĚŝƚŽƌ ?ƐŶŽƚĞ ? ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂWƌeface) 
to the second edition. For information regarding the purpose of a Preface please see, 
 ‘ŶĂƚŽŵǇ ŽĨ Ă ŽŽŬ P dŚĞ ŽŶƚĞŶƚƐ ? AMŚƚƚƉ P ? ?ǁǁǁ ?ďĂƌďĂƌĂĚŽǇĞŶ ?ĐŽŵ ?ďŽŽŬ-
publishing/anatomy-of-a-book-the-contents> accessed 16 January 2016; Joanne Bolton and 
others,  ‘ŽŽŬ ĞƐŝŐŶ ? AMŚƚƚƉ P ? ?ǁǁǁ ?ƚŚĞďŽŽŬĚĞƐŝŐŶĞƌ ?ĐŽŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ƉĂƌƚƐ-of-a-book/> 
accessed 16 January 2016. 
8 /ŶŚŝƐƉƌĞĨĂĐĞ ?'ƌĞĞŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “ůƚŚŽƵŐŚThe Concept of Law needs no apology, after half a 
century it is no longer true that it needs no introduction. In the one that follows I highlight 
some main themes, sketch a few criticisms and, most important, try to forestall some 
misunderstanding of its project8 ? ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? )ǆŝ ?
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ĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?  Ɛ 'ƌĞĞŶ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ WƌĞĨĂĐĞ ? ŚŝƐ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ĂŶ
adaptation of an article published as a review of the second edition of The Concept of 
Law in the Michigan Law Review9 ?'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůĂƌƚŝĐůĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƚŽƵŐŚĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ
ŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ǁŝƚŚ'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƌĂŝƐŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůƌƵůĞƐ ?ƚŽďĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ//ĂŶĚ
/s ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ) ? KhW ?Ɛ ƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ 'ƌĞĞŶ ĂƐ Ă ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŽƌ ƚŽ The 
Concept of Law ǁĂƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞŚŝƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?'ƌĞĞŶ
ĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚŚĞŝƐŶŽƚŐŽŝŶŐƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌǁŝƚŚĂŶĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?
but rather merely highlight the areas where people tend to go wrong10. According to 
Green, there are three main reasons why people are led astray: firstly, Hart is writing 
in a philosophical manner, and as with many philosophical works, the problems he 
addresses are complex and the difference between truth and falsehood is easily 
missed. ,Ğ ŐŝǀĞƐ ĂƐ ĂŶ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  “ůĂǁĂŶĚ ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ĂƌĞ
ƐĞƉĂƌĂďůĞ ?ĨƌŽŵ “ůĂǁĂŶĚŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇĂƌĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ ? ?:ƵƐƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞ,ĂƌƚĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ
ĂƌĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ “ƐĞƉĂƌĂďůĞ ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚŚĞĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇare  “ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ ?11 
^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ? ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ ĂƌĞ ŶŽǁ ŽƵƚĚĂƚĞĚ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞďŽŽŬ ?Ɛ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ĨĞĞůƐ
 “ƌĞŵŽƚĞ ?12 ?dŚŝƌĚůǇ ?ƚŚĞĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƐĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŶŽƚƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ?'ƌĞĞŶĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐƚŚŝƐ
                                                          
9 'ƌĞĞŶ ? ‘dŚĞŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ>ĂǁZĞǀŝƐŝƚĞĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?DŝĐŚŝŐĂŶ>ĂǁZĞǀŝĞǁ ? ? ? ? ? 
10 Hart (n 1) xvii. 
11 Hart (n 1) xvi. 
12 /ďŝĚ ?dŝŵŽƚŚǇŶĚŝĐŽƚƚĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ƚŽĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚ'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐĂƌĞ
ŽƵƚĚĂƚĞĚ ?,ĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “dŚĞďŽŽŬŝƐĚƵƌĂďůĞŝŶĂŶŽƚŚĞƌǁĂǇ PŝƚƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞŶŽƚĚĂƚĞĚ ?dŚĞ
tone is dated. It is the sound of 1950s England. If you want a guide to the era milieu in which 
,ĂƌƚǁĂƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ?ǇŽƵĐĂŶĨŝŶĚ:ĞŶŶŝĨĞƌ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƵƚŽďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?ƐŬDĞEŽDŽƌĞ ? ?Luis Duarte 
Ě ?ůŵĞŝĚĂ ?:ĂŵĞƐZ ?ĚǁĂƌĚƐ ?ĂŶĚŶĚƌĞĂŽůĐĞƚƚŝ ?ĞĚƐ ) ? ZĞĂĚŝŶŐ,>,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ‘ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ
ůĂǁ ? (Hart Publishing 2013) 15. 
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to the fact that Hart wrote The Concept of Law with a particular audience in mind: the 
philosophically savvy person, who is intrigued by the nature of our major political 
institutions, and intrigued by the relation between morality and coercive force. 
However, this might not always be the actual reader nowadays. Green explains that 
the actual reader might be slightly confused, he writes: 
They imagine that a book on the theory of law will stand to law as a book 
on the theory of catering might stand to catering  W ĂŐĞŶĞƌĂů  “ŚŽǁ-ƚŽ ?
applicable to a range of different occasions13. 
'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŝƐĂĨĂŝƌŽŶĞ ?ŝŶƐŽĨar as there is still some confusion as to what 
,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ĂƌĞ ? Ɛ ǁŝůů ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ
discussed in section IV of this chapter on social rules, Hart is writing in a philosophical 
manner and some of his commentators, indeed including Green, have not understood 
ƚŚĞďƌĞĂĚƚŚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ƐǁŝůůďĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŶĞǆƚƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?
'ƌĞĞŶƚƌŝĞƐƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞďƵƚŐŝǀĞŶŚŝƐŽǁŶŝŶĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽŽƌĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĂůŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
philosophical perspective, hŝƐ ĂĚǀŝĐĞ ĐƌĞĂƚĞƐ ƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ
ĞĂƐŝůǇĚŝƐƐŽůǀĞĚŝĨŽŶĞǁĂƐƚŽƚĂŬĞŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?'ƌĞĞŶ ?Ɛ
other two comments raise some doubts as to their validity. It is not clear what Green 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐƚŽďĞ “ŽƵƚĚĂƚĞĚ ?ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ ?ĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨĂ “ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ
ƉĂƌŬ ?ƌƵůĞ ?ŽƌƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŐƌƵĚŐĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?ĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂƐ “ŽƵƚĚĂƚĞĚ ? ?14 
                                                          
13 Ibid. 
14 ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌƵůĞ  “ŶŽ ǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌŬ ? ǁŝůů ďĞ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ Ăƚ ƐĞǀĞƌĂů ƉŽŝŶƚƐ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?&Žƌ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐƌƵůĞŝŶThe Concept of Law please see 
Hart (n 1) 129. The example of the grudge informer can be found ŝŶ,>,Ăƌƚ ? “WŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞ ^ĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ >Ăǁ ĂŶĚ DŽƌĂůƐ ? ? ƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ŝŶ ,Ăƌƚ ? ƐƐĂǇƐ ŝŶ :ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ
Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) 49. 
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DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬǁĂƐƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚĂŵĞƌĞ ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐŐŽ ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŽŽƐŽŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞ
language to be considered gĞŶƵŝŶĞůǇ  “ƌĞŵŽƚĞ ? ? ŽŽŬƐ ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ ďǇ ŽƚŚĞƌ
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ĂƌŽƵŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƚŝŵĞ ? ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ZǇůĞ ?ƐThe Concept of Mind15, 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐPhilosophical Investigations16 ĂŶĚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐHow to do Things with 
Words17, have been understood so far without the need for an in-depth introduction 
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞŶƚ ? DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ĐůĞĂƌ ŚŽǁ ƚŚĞ ĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞ ?Ɛ
ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŵƵĚĚůĞĚǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ ?/ƚŝƐ
ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞǁŚŽǁĂƐĞǆƉĞĐƚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽk to give a concise 
explanation of how judges must act, or propose a theory of adjudication, might be 
disappointed when faced with a book that analyses The Concept of Law.18 However, 
no direct connection can be ascertained between their disappointment at Haƌƚ ?Ɛ “ůĂĐŬ
ŽĨƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůŚĞůƉ ?19 ĂŶĚƚŚĞŵŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇƚŚĂƚ'ƌĞĞŶŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ? 
It is with all these problems and misconception in mind that Green drafted this 
introduction to The Concept of Law ?,ĞĂŝŵƐƚŽĞǆĂŵŝŶĞ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶůĂǁĂŶĚƐŽcial 
rules, coercion and morality, and briefly look at some methodological issues. The first 
and third sections of this chapter will address issues identified by Green but which also 
ŚĂƉƉĞŶƚŽďĞƌĞĐƵƌƌŝŶŐ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇ ƚŚĞĞǆtent to 
which Hart relied on and was influenced by, OLP. The issues discussed in this section, 
                                                          
15 Gilbert, R. (2009). The Concept of Mind. Routledge. 
16 Wittgenstein, L., & Cumming, M. (1958). Philosophical investigations (Vol. 255). Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
17 Austin, J. L. (1975). How to do things with words (Vol. 1955). Oxford university press. 
18 Though it begs the question of whether a reader could really be disappointed when that is 
the title of the book.  
19 Hart (n 1) xvi. 
 67 
 
ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ǁŝůů ďĞ ƚŚĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ŽĨ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ŝŶ Ăůů ŽƚŚĞƌ
chapters in this thesis. The final section of this chapter will focus on a criticism that is 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƚŽ'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ŚŝƐǀŝĞǁŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐŽŶ ĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ? 
 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐDĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇŝŶThe Concept of Law 
dŚĞŝƐƐƵĞŽĨŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇŝƐƌĂŝƐĞĚŽĨƚĞŶƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐThe Concept of Law. 
Interestingly, even those who agree that Hart ?ƐďŽŽŬǁĂƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨ
language, such as Tony Cole and Nicos Stavropoulos20 ?ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ?
Even those who support the view that Hart was influenced by philosophy of language, 
disagree on the extent to which Hart applied its principles in The Concept of Law.  It 
ƐŚŽƵůĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĐŽŵĞĂƐůŝƚƚůĞ ?ŽƌŝŶĚĞĞĚŶŽƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŝƐŽŶĞĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
ƚŚĞŽƌǇƚŚĂƚ'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĞǆƉůŽƌĞƐŝŶƐŽŵĞĚĞƚĂŝů ?KŶĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĂƐƉĞĐƚƚŚĂƚŝƐ
ǁŝĚĞůǇ ĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂů ŝƐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ of The Concept of Law ĂƐ ĂŶ  “ĞƐƐĂǇ ŝŶ
ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ? ?,ĂƌƚĨĂŵŽƵƐůǇǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůĂǁǇĞƌǁŽƵůĚƌĞŐĂƌĚŚŝƐďŽŽŬĂƐ
an essay in analytical jurisprudence, but that it may also be regarded as an essay in 
descriptive sociology21. This is an assertion that many people have taken issue with, 
dating back to the first publication of The Concept of Law, for the lack of sociological 
work in its strictest sense. Green exemplifies this well when he writes: 
 
It is a funny sort of sociology that presents no fieldwork, no statistical 
modelling, and even few legal cases. 
                                                          
20 See chapters five and six, on Stavropoulos and Cole respectively. 
21 Hart (n 1) xi. 
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,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?'ƌĞĞŶĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐĞǆĂĐƚůǇǁŚǇ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŝƐlike descriptive sociology: 
 Q,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚ ?like descriptive sociological methods, holds itself 
responsible to the facts without taking any moral or political stand about 
them. Time and time again he appeals to his reader to use an informed 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐĂů ǁŽƌůĚ ƚŽ ƚĞƐƚ ƚŚĞ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ŽĨ ůĞŐĂů
philosophy. Are there really such things as legal rules? Look and see. Does 
every legal systeŵ ŚĂǀĞĂŶ ŝůůŝŵŝƚĂďůĞ ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶ ? >ŽŽŬ ĂŶĚ ƐĞĞ  ? Q ) dŚĞ
empirical basis of the book is no more sophisticated than that; but like 
descriptive sociology, it has an empirical basis. It does not begin with 
definitions or axioms and purport to derive necessary truths about law. It 
does not begin with moral claims about how law should be and infer 
conclusions about how law really is.22 
dŚŝƐůĞŶŐƚŚǇƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽĨƵůůǇŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞ'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚ ?,ĞŵĂŬĞƐĂǀĞƌǇ
ŐŽŽĚ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚ ŽĨThe Concept of Law ďĞŝŶŐ ĂŶ  “ĞƐƐĂǇ ŝŶ
ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ?ǁĂƐŶŽƚƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚŚŝƐďŽŽŬŝƐƚŽďĞƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐĂƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů
work in sociology. As Green rightly points out Hart undertakes no fieldwork or 
statistical modelling. What Hart intends to show is that he is going to look at different 
ƚǇƉĞƐŽĨ “ƐŽĐŝĂůƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?23 where the complicated relationships are best illustrated 
by looking at the words and expressions that we use to describe them. In that 
particular sense, where we are looking at social situations and their complex 
                                                          
22 Hart (n 1) xlv. 
23 Hart (n 1) vi. 
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ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬŵĂǇďĞƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐĂŶĞƐƐĂǇŝŶ  “ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ?24. 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨThe Concept of Law as offering us a deepened 
understanding of our practices, is at odds with his denial of the existence of Ordinary 
Language in The Concept of Law. He writes: 
Hart often tries to elicit our ordinary knowledge by asking how we would 
judge or classify certain things, and sometimes he does that by asking 
what we would say about them. Does that make his jurisprudence a 
branch of semantics?25 
Green continues by acknowledging that Hart was influenced, and saw himself as being 
ƉĂƌƚŽĨ ?ƚŚĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞƚŚĂƚĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚKǆĨŽƌĚŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?/ƚ ŝƐŐŝǀĞŶ
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ƚŚĂt Green is surprised at the 
lack of linguistic analysis present in The Concept of Law26. He writes: 
A few points are reinforced with linguistic distinctions. (Hart claims there 
ŝƐ Ă ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ďĞŝŶŐ  “ŽďůŝŐĞĚ ? ƚŽ ĚŽ ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ďĞŝŶŐ
 “ŽďůŝŐĂƚĞĚ ?ƚŽ ĚŽŝƚ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶĚŽŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ “ĂƐĂƌƵůĞ ?ĂŶĚ “ŚĂǀŝŶŐĂ
ƌƵůĞ ? ? )dŚĂƚ ?ƐĂďŽƵƚŝƚ ?27 
                                                          
24 /ƚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ŶŽƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŚĂƚ ŚŝƐ ďŽŽŬ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚ ĂƐ  “ĂŶ ĞƐƐĂǇ ŝŶ
descriptive sociology ? ?ǁĂƐƐŽŚĞĂǀŝůǇĐƌŝƚŝĐŝǌĞĚƚŚĂƚŝŶĂŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚĂǀŝĚ^ƵŐĂƌŵĂŶ,Ăƌƚ
clarifies that he should have said that  “it provides the tools for descriptive sociology, not that 
it is descriptive sociology. Sugarman (n 1) 289.  
25 Hart (n 1) xlvii. 
26 Hart (n 1) ǆůǀŝŝ ? 'ƌĞĞŶ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P  “&Žƌ Ăůů ƚŚĂƚ ? ǁŚĂƚ ŝƐ ŵŽƐƚ ƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐ ? ŐŝǀĞŶ ŝƚƐ ǀŝŶƚĂŐĞ ĂŶĚ
provenance, is how little linguistic analysis there is in dŚĞŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ>Ăǁ ?. 
27 ,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? )ǆůǀŝŝ ?'ƌĞĞŶĚŝĚĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĂƚůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ “ĐŽůŽƵƌƐƚŚĞƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ 




This assertion thereby stands in stark opposition to the position I argue for in this 
ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?tŚĂƚŝƐŵŽƌĞ ?ŝƚƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĨŽƌŐŽƚƚĞŶƚŚĂƚ'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐƌĞŵĂƌŬƐĨŽƌŵƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚe 
introduction to The Concept of Law, and will in all likelihood be taken at face value by 
new readers. As argued above, and in all other chapters in this section, Hart was 
indeed a great advocate of OLP, and its teachings are present in The Concept of Law 
ĂŶĚŐŽĨĂƌďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶďĞŝŶŐ “ŽďůŝŐĞĚ ?ĂŶĚ “ŽďůŝŐĂƚĞĚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ
nonetheless an important distinction, and one which Green overlooks and 
misunderstands as will be seen in the paragraphs to follow).  
One of the arguments used by legal theorists who wish to dismiss OLP and its 
influence in The Concept of Law, is that Hart himself pointed out the futility of the OLP 
enterprise28. Unsurprisingly, Green makes the same argument. Green argues that Hart 
believes that if we were to employ linguistic analysis to try and answer the question 
 “tŚĂƚŝƐ>Ăǁ ? ?ŝƚǁŽƵůĚƉƌŽǀĞƵƐĞůĞƐƐ ?,ĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “dŝŵĞĂŶĚƚŝŵĞĂŐĂŝŶ,ĂƌƚǁĂƌŶƐƵƐ
                                                          
Mind, but he claims that any good historian would be able to see past this and concentrate 
ŽŶƚŚĞƚƌƵĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐ27. He writes: 
 “ QĂŐŽŽĚŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶŽĨideas needs to look beyond the style to substance. There is a difference 
between what a philosopher thought he was doing, what he said he was doing, and what he 
ǁĂƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĚŽŝŶŐ ? ? 
28 For an example of a legal theorist who makes a very similar argument see Stephen Guest 
(ed), Positivism Today (Dartmouth Publishing Co 1996), 29- ? ? ?'ƵĞƐƚǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “ƵƚǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚ
be careful. If we leap to Chapter 9 we find him saying such things as the choice between two 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨůĂǁ ?Ă ‘ŶĂƌƌŽǁĞƌ ?ŶĂƚƵƌĂůůĂǁƚŚĞŽƌǇĂŶĚĂ  ‘ǁŝĚĞƌ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚƚŚĞŽƌǇ W the latter 
being his one) saying that the choice should not be determined as a matter of linguistic 
ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ?,ĞƐĂǇƐ  ‘WůĂŝŶůǇǁĞĐĂŶŶŽƚŐƌĂƉƉůĞĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐ ŝƐƐƵĞ ŝĨǁĞƐĞĞ ŝƚĂƐŽŶĞ
concerning the properties of linguiƐƚŝĐƵƐĂŐĞ ? ?'ƵĞƐƚ ?Ŷ ? ? ) ? ? ? 
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ŽĨƚŚĞĨƵƚŝůŝƚǇŽĨĂůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ?29 'ƌĞĞŶ ?Ɛ “ƚŝŵĞĂŶĚƚŝŵĞĂŐĂŝŶ ?ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽďĞ
reduced to one instance where Hart pointed out that linguistic analysis would not 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚĂŶƐǁĞƌ ?'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞĂƌĞ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŽŶĞ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ŝŶ The 
Concept of Law where Hart writes that linguistic analysis could not help us choose 
between a narrow and a broad concept of law. He writes: 
To try and choose between a broader and a narrower concept of law we 
ŶĞĞĚŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐƐ ? “ǁĞĐĂŶŶŽƚŐƌĂƉƉůĞĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞ
if we see it as one concerning the proprieties ŽĨůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐƵƐĂŐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?30 
This example is particularly relevant since it is used time and time again by those 
wishing to dismiss the claim that Hart was influenced by OLP. Taken out of context it 
would seem, as Green argues, that Hart is admitting that Ordinary Language 
WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŝƐ “ƵƐĞůĞƐƐ ? ?dŚŝƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶ ?ŽƵt of context, is so powerful that it seems to 
validate the claim that Hart did indeed dismiss OLP. It is perhaps for this reason that 
'ƌĞĞŶ ? ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ĨƵůůǇ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƵĂůŝǌĞ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶ ? dŚĞ
ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĨŽƌĂ “ďƌŽĂĚĞƌ ?Žƌ “ŶĂƌƌŽǁĞƌ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨůĂǁĂƌŝƐĞƐĨƌŽŵ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ
of Morals. What Hart is trying to convey is that even though there needs to be an 
understanding of morals in order to comprehend some of the existing laws, it should 
not be a prerequisite for all laws to be moral. He intends to make it clear that even 
though historically there has been a connection between law and morality, there can 
be legal rights and duties that have no moral justification or force31. For Hart, there is 
an imminent danger in adopting the view that there is a necessary connection 
                                                          
29 Hart (n 1) xlviii. 
30 Hart (n 1) xlviii. 
31 Hart (n 1) 206-209. 
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between law and morals. According to Hart this comes from the choice we have to 
ŵĂŬĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂĚŽƉƚŝŶŐĂ ‘ǁŝĚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚĂ ‘ŶĂƌƌŽǁĞƌ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽƌǁĂǇŽĨĐůĂƌŝĨǇŝŶŐƌƵůĞƐ32. 
&ŽƌĞŵŽƐƚ ƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂ  ‘ŶĂƌƌŽǁ ?ĂŶĚĂ  ‘ǁŝĚĞƌ ?concept of law must be 
ŵĂĚĞĐůĞĂƌ ?dŚĞ ‘ŶĂƌƌŽǁ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨůĂǁĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƐƐĞƐƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƐŽĨEĂƚƵƌĂů>ĂǁǇĞƌƐ ?
those who believe (according to Hart) that iniquitous law is not law, excluding 
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŵŽƌĂůůǇŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞƌƵůĞƐ ?dŚĞ ‘ǁŝĚĞƌ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨůĂǁĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐ  ‘ůĂǁ ?ƚŽďĞĂůů
rules that are valid by the formal tests of a system of primary and secondary rules, 
even if some of them defy the moral standards accepted by a society. He asserts that 
ƚŚĞ ‘ŶĂƌƌŽǁĞƌ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐƚŚĞ ‘ǁŝĚĞƌ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƚŚe adoption of a 
 ‘ǁŝĚĞƌ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨůĂǁǁŝůůůĞĂĚ us to fields of enquiry which will ultimately make us 
more capable of dealing with the dangers of morally iniquitous law. He ultimately 
holds that his concept of law is wider than its rival because everything that can be 
expressed with the rival can be expressed with his, but not vice versa. Hart writes, 
If we adopt the wider concept of law, we can accommodate within it the 
study of whatever special features morally iniquitous laws have, and the 
reaction of society to them. Hence the use of the narrower concept here 
must inevitably split, in a confusing way, our effort to understand both the 
development and potentialities of the specific method of social control to 
be seen in a system of primary and secondary rules. Study of its use 
involves study of its abuse.33 
                                                          
32 Hart (n 1) 209. 
33 Hart (n 1) 209. 
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Nevertheless Hart claims that the stronger reason for preferring the wider concept of 
ůĂǁ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚǁĞĂƌĞĂďůĞƚŽƚŚŝŶŬĂŶĚƐĂǇ  “dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ůĂǁďƵƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ŝŶŝƋƵŝƚŽƵƐ ?34, whereas 
otherwise we would be oversimplifying the multifarious moral issues that they give 
rise to. Older writers like Austin and Bentham, when they devised the separability 
thesis were worried with the danger of anarchy. Hart finds this worry to be overrated, 
but he believes that there is another form of oversimplification.  If we narrow our 
point of view and think only about the question of individual obedience we will 
overlook the bigger picture: the question of submission. This issue will give rise to 
important questions, which are too dangerous to be ignored35, like the question that 
confronted the post-war German Courts  ?ƌĞǁĞƚŽƉƵŶŝƐŚƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽĚŝĚĞǀŝůƚŚŝŶŐƐ
ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚďǇĞǀŝůƌƵůĞƐƚŚĞŶŝŶĨŽƌĐĞ ? ? ?36 Hart assumes that having a 
 ‘ǁŝĚĞƌ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ůĂǁǁŝůůĂůůŽǁƐƵƐ ƚŽĚĞĂů with these crucial issues, whereas the 
ĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ ‘ŶĂƌƌŽǁĞƌ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨůĂǁǁŝůůƐŝŵƉůǇďůŝŶĚƵƐƚŽƚŚĞŵ ?,ĂƌƚƚŚĞŶŐŝǀĞƐ
the example of German Informers who punished people for morally iniquitous 
reasons. They did something that went against all standards of morality. However, he 
says, it may be argued that morality also requires the punishment of people who did 
something forbidden by the state37 ? “dŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨnulla poena sine lege38 ? ?
It follows that if there needs to be a breakthrough in order to avoid something to be 
a greater evil than its sacrifice, the issues should be clearly identified. In other words, 
                                                          
34 Hart (n 1) 210.  
35 Hart (n 1) 211. 
36 Hart (n 1) 211. 
37
 ,ĂƌƚǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “/ƚŵĂǇďĞĐŽŶĐĞĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶŝŶĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ?ǁŚŽĨŽƌƐelfish end procured 
the punishment of others under monstrous laws, did what morality forbad; yet morality may 
also demand that the state should punish only those who, in doing evil, did what the stage at 
ƚŚĞƚŝŵĞĨŽƌďĂĚ ? ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ? ? 
38
 Hart (n 1) 211. 
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if the German Courts need to apply retrospective laws to punish those who did evil 
things when they were permitted by evil rules, then it is better for the issues to be 
clearly dealt with, than to ignore them completely. The adoption of positivism, with 
its theory that iniquitous law is still law, would offer no disguise for situations where 
choices between evils may have to be made. Hart writes, 
At least it can be claimed for the simple positivist doctrine that morally 
iniquitous rules may still be law, that this offers no disguise for the choice 
between evils which, in extreme circumstances, may have to be made39 
It is here worth recalling that linguistic philosophy is a philosophical school that 
approached traditional philosophical problems as rooted in the misunderstandings 
that people develop by forgetting what words actually mean in a language. Hart 
believes that many legal problems arise from a failure to identify the way in which 
some particular use of language deviated from some tacitly accepted paradigm, or 
where radically different forms of expressions were mistakenly assimilated to some 
familiar form. He emphasises this point in the Preface of Essays in Jurisprudence and 
Philosophy where he says that: 
(...) however sophisticated or profound, the workings of language could 
only yield significant results for jurisprudence where difficulties had arisen 
from a failure to identify the way in which some particular use of language 
deviated from some tacitly accepted paradigm or where radically different 
forms of expression were mistakenly assimilated to some familiar form40 
                                                          
39 Hart (n 1) 211. 
40 H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 5. 
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,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŝƐƚŚĂƚůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŝƐŽŶůǇƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚwhen the confusion lies 
ŝŶƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨĂǁŽƌĚ ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ŶĂƌƌŽǁĞƌ ?
ĂŶĚ ‘ǁŝĚĞƌ ?ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨůĂǁ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇǁŝůůŶŽƚďĞƵƐĞĨƵůŝŶƐŽůǀŝŶŐ
this issue. According to him, what is in play are the merits of both theories. It is 
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ? ǁŚĞŶ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǁŝĚĞƌ
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨůĂǁ ? ?,ĂƌƚƚĂŬĞƐŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƚŚĞŵĞƌŝƚƐŽĨ ďŽƚŚƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐďĞĨŽƌĞŵĂŬŝŶŐŚŝƐ
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ǇƚĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞ ‘Plainly we cannot grapple adequately 
with this issue if we see it as one concerning the proprieƚŝĞƐŽĨůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐƵƐĂŐĞ ? out of 
ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? 'ƌĞĞŶ ďŽǁĚůĞƌŝƐĞĚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌĚƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŚŝƐ ŽǁŶ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ
becomes more coherent. So, if we leap into Chapter IX, we can undersƚĂŶĚ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
explanation for the properties of linguistic usage being inadequate in this case; thus: 
Plainly we cannot grapple adequately with this issue if we see it as one 
concerning the proprieties of linguistic usage. For what really is at stake is 
the comparative merit of a wider and a narrower concept or way of 
classifying rules, which belong to a system of rules generally effective in 
social life. If we are to make a reasoned choice between these concepts, 
it must be because one is superior to the other in the way in which it will 
assist our theoretical enquiries, or advance and clarify our moral 
deliberations, or both41 
So, in this particular case linguistic analysis cannot provide any assistance.  Yet still in 
Chapter IX Hart explains that he finds linguistic philosophy important for it gives even 
skilled lawyers the map they were longing for  W ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ?ŝƚŚĞůƉƐƚŽĐůĂƌŝĨǇ “ƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƚŝĞƐ
                                                          
41 Hart (n 1) 209. 
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ǁĞƵƐĞƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐƚŽƚĂůŬĂďŽƵƚ ?42.  However, they are not adequate for solving any 
kind of legal problem which arises for any other reason, such as a difference in values 
or legal theory. Hart then explains that in these cases it is essential to identify the 
present conflicting points of view, for there then to be a reasoned argument directed 
to establishing the merits of the conflicting theories. This can be linked with the 
ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŵĂĚĞ ĂďŽǀĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǁŝĚĞƌ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŶĂƌƌŽǁĞƌ ? ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ? >ŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐ
philosophy could not yield great significance in solving the conflict between those two 
concepts given that the conflict did not arise because of a misunderstanding of the 
meaning of the word, but rather from a disparity in points of view. Therefore Hart took 
ŝŶƚŽ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ƚŚĞ ŵĞƌŝƚƐ ŽĨ ďŽƚŚ ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ? ƚŽ ƌĞĂĐŚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǁŝĚĞƌ ?
concept of law would be more adequate.  
Surely no-one imagines that Hart thought linguistic analysis could settle the 
question of whether he should dine in college this evening, or settle the question of 
what legislators should aim to achieve in drafting new statutory provisions, or even 
settle the question of who should succeed in judgment in a tort case before the courts:  
ŽŶůǇďǇŵŝƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚĞǆƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽǀĞƌ-generalization could Green establish 
that Hart admitted linguistic philosophy to be useless for the study of jurisprudence.  
DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ĂƐǁĞƐŚĂůůƐĞĞŝŶƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ
is more richly detailed, pluralistic and contextual than commentators allow is a further 
ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƵŶŝƚĞƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŚĞďŽŽŬǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇƚŚĂƚ/ĐŽŶtend it 
exemplifies. 
 
                                                          
42 Hart (n 1) 1.  
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The Issue of Law, Morals and Justice. 
ZĞůĂƚĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  “ǁŝĚĞƌ ? ĂŶĚ  “ŶĂƌƌŽǁĞƌ ? ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ? 'ƌĞĞŶ ŵĂŬĞƐ ĂŶ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐ
ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐůĂǁĂŶĚŵŽƌĂůƐ ?,ĞƉƌŽĐĞĞĚƐƚŽĐƌŝƚŝĐŝǌĞ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
theory on the basis of his understanding. It should be noted that this particular aspect 
ŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŝƐŶŽƚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶĨƵƚƵƌĞĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐ ?ƐŝŶĐĞŝƚǁĂƐŶŽƚĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚďǇĂŶǇ
of the other legal theorists commented on in Section B. It is however an area that is 
often challenged by legal theorists, and therefore of importance. According to Green, 
ƚŚĞĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶůĂǁĂŶĚŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƌƵůĞ-
ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ŝƐ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ  “ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ? ƐŝŶĐĞ ůŝŬĞ ĐĂƐĞs have to be treated alike43. 
According to the practice theory, for there to be a social rule there needs to be 
ĐŽŶĨŽƌŵŝƚǇĂŶĚĐŽŶƐƚĂŶĐǇŝŶƚŚĞƌƵůĞ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?,ĞĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚĚĞĨĞŶĚƐƚŚĂƚ
constancy is in itself a form of justice: 
Though the most odious laws may be justly applied, we have, in the bare 
notion of applying a general rule of law, the germ at least of justice44 
Green argues that according to the practice theory, there needs to be a constancy in 
application for general rules to exist. From this it follows that, according to Hart, the 
mere fact that tŚĞƌĞŝƐĐŽŶƐƚĂŶĐǇŽĨĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨŚŽǁ “ŽĚŝŽƵƐ ?ƚŚĞůĂǁ
might be) is in itself a form of justice. It also covers every law, even those that are 
 “ŚŝĚĞŽƵƐůǇŽƉƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ?45 ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐŽŶĞŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŝŐŐĞƐƚŵŝƐƚĂŬĞƐ
since constanĐǇ ŝŶĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŵŝŐŚƚďĞ ƐĞĞŶĂƐ  “ũƵƐƚ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨ ůĂǁƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƌĞ
                                                          
43 Hart (n 1) xxxvi. 
44 Hart (n 1) xxxvi, citing Hart (n 1) 206. 
45 Hart (n 1) xxxvi.  
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ŵŝůĚůǇƵŶũƵƐƚ ?ďƵƚŶŽƚůĂǁƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞ “ŽǀĞƌ W or under  W inclusive with respect to their 
justifying aims46 ? ?,ĞĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐ P 
After all, not everything that has the form of justice is a form of justice, 
any more than everything that has the form of a camel is a camel. Worse, 
norms of justice and norms of injustice need not differ in their forms. The 
ŶŽƌŵ “ŵĞŶĂŶĚǁŽŵĞŶĂƌĞƚŽďĞƉĂŝĚĞƋƵĂůůǇĨŽƌǁŽƌŬŽĨ “ĞƋƵĂůǀĂůƵĞ ?ŝƐ
a norm of justice. The ŶŽƌŵ “ŵĞŶĂŶĚǁŽŵĞŶĂƌĞƚŽďĞƉĂŝĚƵŶĞƋƵĂůůǇĨŽƌ
ǁŽƌŬŽĨĞƋƵĂůǀĂůƵĞ ?ŝƐĂŶŽƌŵŽĨinjustice ?dŚĞǇŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĨŽƌŵ ? ? Q )
/ƚƐĞĞŵƐĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚǁĞĐĂŶ ?ƚƚĞůůǁŚĞƚŚĞƌĂŶŽƌŵŝƐĂŶŽƌŵŽĨũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?Žƌ
injustice, or neither, on grounds of its form alone47. 
So, 'ƌĞĞŶĐůĂŝŵƐŝƚŝƐŶŽƚĞŶŽƵŐŚĨŽƌƚŚĞƌĞƚŽďĞ “ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? W there are norms that, even 
ŝĨ ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶĐǇ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ  “ũƵƐƚ ? ? ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ĐĂŶ ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ďĞ
interpreted in a different way. Even though these contingent connections between 
law and morality exist, it cannot follow from it that the legal validity of particular laws 
must observe any reference to morality or justice. There is no necessary connection 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŽĨ ůĂǁĂŶĚŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁŝůůƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚ  ‘morally 
iniquitouƐ ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ǀĂůŝĚ ĂƐ ůĞŐĂů ƌƵůĞƐ Žƌ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ?48. In Chapter IX Hart 
illustrates his point of view: 
Sometimes what is asserted is a kind of connection which few if any have 
ever denied; but its indisputable existence may be wrongly accepted as a 
sign of some more doubtful connection, or even mistaken for it. (...) But it 
                                                          
46 Hart (n 1) xxxvi. 
47 Hart (n 1) xxxvi. 
48 Hart (n 1) 268. 
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is possible to take this truth illicitly, as a warrant for a different 
proposition: namely that a legal system must exhibit some specific 
conformity with morality or justice, or must rest on a widely diffused 
conviction that there is a moral obligation to obey it.49 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŝĚĞĂŝƐƚŚĂƚĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƌĞŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞĂŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨŵŽƌĂůƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ
to comprehend some of the existing laws, it should not be a prerequisite for all laws 
to be moral. He intends to make it clear that even though historically there has been 
a connection between law and morality, there can be legal rights and duties which 
have no moral justification or force. For Hart, there is an imminent danger in adopting 
the view that there is a necessary connection between law and morals. According to 
,ĂƌƚƚŚŝƐĐŽŵĞƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐŚŽŝĐĞǁĞŚĂǀĞƚŽŵĂŬĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂĚŽƉƚŝŶŐĂ ‘ǁŝĚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚĂ





KŶĞĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇƚŚĂƚ'ƌĞĞŶĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŽŶ ?ĂŶĚŝƐŚŝŐŚůǇĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŽĨ ?ŝƐ
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůƌƵůĞƐ ?dŚŝƐĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇǁŝůůďĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶ
ĂůůĨƵƚƵƌĞĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐ ?ƐŝŶĐĞĂůůŽƚŚĞƌůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐĨŽĐƵƐŽŶŽŶĞĂƐƉĞĐƚŽƌŽƚŚĞƌŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
discussion on social rules50. Law is constructed of social rules, and these social rules 
                                                          
49 Hart (n 1) 185. 
50 This view of social rules has attracted a lot of criticism, particularly by Ronald Dworkin who 
argued that the practice theory of rules failed to deliver. See Ronald M Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously (Universal Law Publishing Co 2005), 48-58. 
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arise through social practice. According to Green, there are three main problems 
ƉĞƌƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƌƵůĞƐ P ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ ƌƵůĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ  ?ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛ
rules), there are accepted social practices that are not rules, and finally, citing a rule 
can be offered as a reĂƐŽŶĨŽƌŽŶĞ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽŚŝŵ ?ŶŽŶĞŽĨƚŚŝƐĨŝƚƐƚŚĞ
practice theory. He adds that the conception of social rules is not needed for the 
understanding of obligation: he gives as an example purchasing carbon offsets; 
someone can believe that they have an obligation to purchase carbon offsets without 
thinking that there is a common practice to do it51. Social rules are an important aspect 
ŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ĂŶĚĂĚĞĨĞĂƚŽƌƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇǁŽƵůĚƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ
ĚŝƐĐƌĞĚŝƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ? 'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐŝĨǀĂůŝĚǁŽƵůĚďĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐ ? 
Green, who starts his introduction by saying that one of the problems with the 
misinterpretations of The Concept of Law stemmed from people reading it without 
understanding that it is a philosophical approach to law rather than a practical one, is 
himself a victim of this misinterpretation. His comments regarding social rules show 
ĂŶƵŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞĚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚĨŽƌ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚĂŶĚŝƚƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶŚŝƐ
book52. In fact, on social rules PĞƚĞƌtŝŶĐŚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞƐĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌǀŝĞǁƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ?ŝŶŚŝƐ
book The Idea of Social Science53, ĂƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŽǁŶŶŽƚĞƐŝŶThe Concept of 
Law54 ?tŝŶĐŚ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐŽŶZƵůĞƐĂŶĚ,ĂďŝƚƐĂƌĞĂŶĂĚĂƉƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ
                                                          
51 Hart (n 1) xxii. 
52 As discussed above (cf text to footnote 27) Green believes that Hart employs very little 
linguistic analysis in The Concept of Law.    
53 Winch, P. (2002). The idea of a social science: And its relation to philosophy. Routledge. 
54 ,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ? ?/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐůǇ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚ,ĂƌƚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐtŝŶĐŚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶƚŚĞŶŽƚĞƐƚŽThe 
Concept of Law ?ŝŶ^ ƵŐĂƌŵĂŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁŚĞ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?,Ăƌƚ )ĐůĂŝŵƐƚŽŚĂǀĞŶĞǀĞƌƌĞĂĚtŝŶĐŚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ?
Hart says that he cannot be sure how influential Winch was in The Concept of Law, for despite 
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ideas in Philosophical Investigations55, and it is therefore important to understand 
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƌƵůĞƐ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ďĞƚƚĞƌ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ŝĨ ƌĞĂĚ ŝŶ ůŝŐŚƚ ŽĨ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ
teachings. This will be a recurring theme in this thesis, since all of the legal 
philosophers mentioned in the following chapters make reference to rule following 
ĂŶĚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?>Ğƚ ?ƐƐƚĂƌƚǁŝƚŚ'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ P “ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƌƵůĞƐ
ƚŚĂƚĂƌĞŶŽƚƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƌƵůĞƐ ) ?56. It is not clear whether Green 
is arguing that people might have their own rules, which are not social practices since 
ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƌƵůĞƐ ?ŽƌǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŚĞŝƐƌĞ-ŝƚĞƌĂƚŝŶŐǁŽƌŬŝŶ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ
there might be a consensus of independent conviction manifested in the concurrent 
practices of the group. Either way these issues can be easily addressed if we take into 
ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶďĞůŝ ǀĞƐƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐŶŽƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĨŽƌĂ
ƌƵůĞƚŽĞǆŝƐƚƐŽůĞůǇŝŶŽŶĞ ?ƐŵŝŶĚ ?ƌƵůĞŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨĂƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?&Žƌ
something to amount to a rƵůĞƚŚĞƌĞŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐǁŚŽ “ŽďĞǇĂƌƵůĞ ? ?ĂŶĚ
those who go against it; if a rule is something personal there is no way of checking if a 
rule is being obeyed or not. He claims that: 
                                                          
numerous discussions with him about social rules he never actually read his book. We can 
only but speculate why Hart referenced his work in the notes to The Concept of Law, but one 
possible explanatioŶŝƐƚŚĂƚtŝŶĐŚ ?ƐĞǆƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐŝĚĞĂ^ŽĐŝĂůZƵůĞƐŝƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ
ĞĂƐŝĞƌ ƚŽ ƌĞĂĚ ĂŶĚ ŐƌĂƐƉ ƚŚĂŶ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ?Oxford Academic (Oxford University Press), 
 ‘, ?> ? ? ,Ăƌƚ /ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ WĂƌƚ &ŽƵƌ P ,ĂƌǀĂƌĚ sŝƐŝƚ ĂŶĚ ǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ ǁŝƚŚ >ŽŶ &ƵůůĞƌ  ?ĂƵĚŝŽ ) ?
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TMcmFS1DhmE> accessed 16 January 2016. 
55 Ryle (n 15) 15. 
56 Hart (n 1) xxii.  
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It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which 
someone obeyed a rule (...) To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an 
order, to play a game of chess, are customs57 
>Ğƚ ?ƐƚĂŬĞƚŚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨĂŐĂŵĞŽĨĐĂƌĚƐ ?dŽtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶƚŚĞƌƵůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞŐĂŵĞŶĞĞĚ
to be known by the players (the social context), in order for there to be rules. Everyone 
has experienced, or seen, a child playing a game of cards for the first time: children 
tend to play in accordance to their own rules. They have their own personal 
interpretation and make everything accord with the rule. Would we still be able to say 
that the child was playing a game? Wittgenstein claims a problem would arise since 
we could not be able to determine if they were following the rules, everything could 
be made in accordance with the rule.  
The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, 
then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be 
neither accord nor conflict here.58 
This is the very idea that you cannot obey a rule privately. The concept of failing to 
obey a rule is inherent to the concept of following a rule. In Philosophical 
Investigations, Wittgenstein is trying to assert that obeying a rule is a practice. 
Thinking one is obeying a rule is quite different from actually obeying it59 ?^Ž ?'ƌĞĞŶ ?Ɛ
                                                          
57 Ludwig Wittgenstein and translated [from the German] by G. E. M. Anscombe, Philosophical 
Investigations Philosophische Untersuchungen (3rd edn, Blackwell Publishers 1967), ss. 199. 
58 Wittgenstein (n 55) ss. 201. 
59 Wittgenstein (n 55) ss. 199- ? ? ? ?tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “/ƚŝƐŶŽƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŚĂƚĞƌĞƐŚŽƵůĚ
have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there 
should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order was given or 
understood; and so on. To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of 
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objection that rules followed by a certain individual would not be accounted for in 
social practices is invalid  W ĂƚůĞĂƐƚĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ƌƵůĞ
that is only followed by one individual is not a rule. Wittgenstein then claims that we 
are trained to follow a rule, much like we are trained to obey orders. Here he gives 
the example of a rail track: the tracks are already set down, all the steps are already 
ƚĂŬĞŶ ?ƚŚĞƚƌĂŝŶũƵƐƚŐŽĞƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŵŽƚŝŽŶƐ ?dŚĂƚŝƐǁŚǇŚĞƐĂǇƐ P “tŚĞŶ/ŽďĞǇ a 
ƌƵůĞ ?/ĚŽŶŽƚĐŚŽŽƐĞ ?/ŽďĞǇƚŚĞƌƵůĞďůŝŶĚůǇ ?60 ,ĂƌƚĂƉƉůŝĞƐtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ
ƚŽůĂǁ ?ďǇŵĞĂŶƐŽĨƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůƌƵůĞƐ ? ?,ĞĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨ
social rules, making certain types of behaviour a standard is normal; it is (just) what 
we do. Society develops these social rules when there is a common practice accepted 
by convention. Whether or not a practice amounts to a social rule depends on an 
external statement of fact as to whether a given mode of behaviour has the features 
of a social rule, or if it is merely a result of convergent habits61 ?ǁŽƌŬŝŶ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨ
ƉĞŽƉůĞ  “ƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐ Ă ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ŽĨ ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
ĐŽŶĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐŽĨĂŐƌŽƵƉ ?62, would be considered a result of convergent habits, 
and therefore not a social rule. In sum, this answers the first criticism that Green posed 
ƚŽƐŽĐŝĂůƌƵůĞƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ďĞĨŽƌĞůĞĂǀŝŶŐ'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐĨŝƌ ƚĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŝƚŝƐǁŽƌƚŚĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶŐ
that he simply passes over without comment (or notice) the extensive post-
Philosophical Investigations literature on private rules, even though this literature is 
                                                          
chess, are customs  ?ƵƐĞƐ ?ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ) ? ? Q )ŶĚŚĞŶĐĞĂůƐŽ ‘ŽďĞǇŝŶŐĂƌƵůĞ ? ŝƐĂƉƌĂĐƚice. And 
to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 
 ‘ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞůǇ ? PŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŽŶĞǁĂƐŽďĞǇŝŶŐĂƌƵůĞǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĂƐŽďĞǇŝŶŐŝƚ ? ? 
60 Wittgenstein (n 55) ss. 219. 
61 Wittgenstein (n 55) ss. 109. 
62 Hart (n 1) xxii. 
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immediately called to mind by his remarks, and might be thought doubly important in 
light of its bearing on the work of the supposedly linguistic philosopher Hart. 
'ƌĞĞŶ ?Ɛ second criticism pertains to accepted social practices that are 
ŶŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞƐƐŶŽƚƌƵůĞƐ ?,ĞŐŝǀĞƐƚŚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨ “ƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶĂŶĚĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ
ŽĨ ƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐǁĂůůĞƚ ƚŽĂ ƌŽďďĞƌ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶƌĞƐŝƐƚŝŶŐ ?63.  This objection to 
social rules is very interesting, particularly the example given, since Hart tackles this 
very issue in The Concept of Law64 ?/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚǇ “ƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
ǁĂůůĞƚƚŽĂƌŽďďĞƌ ?ŵŝŐŚƚďĞĂƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞďƵƚŶŽƚĂƌƵůĞ ?ŝƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽƚĂŬĞĂ
slight diversion and ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐŽŶƚŚĞ
idea of obligation65 ĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞ Ă ŐŽŽĚ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ ŚŽǁ : ? > ?  ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ
informed The Concept of Law66.  Hart explains that there is a substantial difference, 
often overlooked, between  “ŚĂǀŝŶŐĂŶŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ  “ďĞŝŶŐŽďůŝŐĞĚ ? ?,Ăƌƚ claims 
that only once we analyse these two situations in context, will we be able to 
understand how one concept differs from another. This type of analysis is seen in the 
philosophy of J. L.  Austin. An exaŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚŝƐŝƐƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌA Plea for Excuses67, 
where he proposes to look at all the different circumstances in which we use the 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ “ĞǆĐƵƐĞƐ ? ?ƵƐƚŝŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
It is arguable that we do not use the terms justification and excuse as 
carefully as we might; a miscellany of even less clear terms, such as 
                                                          
63 Hart (n 1) xxii. 
64 Hart (n 1) 82. 
65 Hart (n 1) 82. 
66 dŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞǁŝůůďĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚĂŐĂŝŶŽŶŚĂƉƚĞƌƐĞǀĞŶ ? “ĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞŶŐůŽ-Saxon Realm ? ? 
67 :>ƵƐƚŝŶ ? ‘WůĞĂĨŽƌǆĐƵƐĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂŶĚ>ŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? 
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 “ĞǆƚĞŶƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? “ƉĂůůŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? “ŵŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŚŽǀĞƌƐƵŶĞĂƐŝůǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉĂƌƚŝĂů
ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƉĂƌƚŝĂů ĞǆĐƵƐĞ  ? Q ) ^ƵĐŚ ĚŽƵďƚƐ ŵĞƌĞůǇ ŵĂŬĞ ŝƚ ŵŽƌĞ
urgent to clear up the usage of these various terms.68  
J. L.  Austin proposed to look at different situations in which we use the word 
 “ĞǆĐƵƐĞƐ ? ĂŶĚanalysĞ ǁŚĞŶ ǁĞ ƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  “ĞǆĐƵƐĞ ? ? ĂŶĚ ǁŚĞŶ ĞǆĐƵƐĞƐ ĂƌĞ
ƉƌŽĨĨĞƌĞĚ ?,ĂƌƚƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞƐĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
investigation of ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐƵƐĞĚŝŶŚŝƐǁŝĚĞƌƚŚĞƐŝƐĂƐĂƌĞďƵƚƚĂůŽĨ
:ŽŚŶƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨůĂǁĂƐĐŽĞƌĐŝǀĞŽƌĚĞƌƐ ?dŽŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚ ?,ĂƌƚŐŝǀĞƐƚŚĞ
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨĂŐƵŶŵĂŶƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?,ĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “ŽƌĚĞƌƐƚŽŚĂŶĚŽǀĞƌŚŝƐŵŽŶĞǇĂŶĚ
threatens to ƐŚŽŽƚŚŝŵŝĨŚĞĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĐŽŵƉůǇ ? ?69 Hart writes that according to John 
ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚďĞĂŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨĂƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶǁŚĞƌĞŚĂƐĂŶŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽƌĂ
duty to hand over his money to A. According to the theory of coercive orders, the 
sovereign (in this case A) must be habitually obeyed and the orders must be general, 
ĂŶĚƉƌĞƐĐƌŝďĞĐŽƵƌƐĞƐŽĨĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĂŶĚŶŽƚƐŝŶŐůĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?dŚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞďĞŚŝŶĚ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
argument is that if B handed his money over to A, most people would agree that he 
was obliged to do it. Had he not handed over the money, he would be at risk of bodily 
ŚĂƌŵ ?/ƚǁŽƵůĚŚŽǁĞǀĞƌŶŽƚďĞĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞĨŽƌƵƐƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚŚĂĚĂŶ “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽƌĂ
 “ĚƵƚǇ ?ƚŽŚĂŶĚŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŵŽŶĞǇ70. So, Hart concludes that we need something else to 
explain the idea of obliŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?:ŽŚŶƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŝƐŶŽƚĐŽŵƉĞůůŝŶŐĞŶŽƵŐŚ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞƌĞ
are cases, such as the gunman case, that would clearly be misdescribed if we applied 
ŚŝƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?,ĂƌƚĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ “ďĞŝŶŐ
                                                          
68 Ibid, 3. 
69 Hart (n 1) 82. 
70 Hart (n 1) 82. 
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ŽďůŝŐĞĚ ?ƚŽĚŽƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ “ŚĂǀŝŶŐĂŶŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽĚŽŝƚ ?,ĂƌƚĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞƐŝƚŝŶ
ƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐǁĂǇ P “ďĞŝŶŐŽďůŝŐĞĚ ?ŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚ ?ĂƐŝŶƚŚĞŐƵŶŵĂŶƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ
is under the impression that he might be harmed or ill consequences might befall him 
if he fails to complǇǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞŽƌĚĞƌ ? dŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ  “ďĞŝŶŐŽďůŝŐĞĚ ? ƚŽĚŽ
something is a psychological one referring to the beliefs and motives with which an 
action was done71 ? /Ŷ ƚŚĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ĐĂƐĞ ? ŽĨ  “ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ĂŶ ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ƚŚĞ ďĞůŝĞĨƐ ĂŶĚ
motives do not necessarily coŵĞŝŶƚŽƉůĂǇ ?/ĨƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ “ŚĂƐĂŶŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚŝƐƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ
true whether or not he did it  W ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƵƉŽŶƐǁĞĂƌŝŶŐĂŶŽĂƚŚƉĞŽƉůĞ “ŚĂǀĞĂŶ
ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽƚĞůůƚŚĞƚƌƵƚŚŝŶĐŽƵƌƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐƌĞŵĂŝŶƐƚƌƵĞŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŽĨǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞǇ
comply with it or not. In addition to this, for there to be a social rule, there needs to 
be social pressure for the rule to be adhered to72 ?  ^Ž ? 'ƌĞĞŶ ?Ɛ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ  “ƚŚĞ
ĐŽŵŵŽŶĂŶĚĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐǁĂůůĞƚƚŽĂƌŽďďĞƌƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ
ƌĞƐŝƐƚŝŶŐ ? ? ŝƐ ĂŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ Ɛocial practice but is not a rule. As in the case described 
ĂďŽǀĞ ? ŝĨŚĂŶĚĞĚƚŚĞŵŽŶĞǇŽǀĞƌƚŽ ?ǁĞǁŽƵůĚƐĂǇŚĞǁĂƐ  “ŽďůŝŐĞĚƚŽĚŽƐŽ ? ?
However, if B managed to run away and not give the money to A, we would not say 
ƚŚĂƚŚĞǁĂƐ “ŽďůŝŐĞĚ ?ƚŽŚĂŶĚƚŚĞŵŽŶey over. There would be no social pressure for 
ƚŽĂĚŚĞƌĞƚŽƚŚĞ “ĐŽŵŵŽŶĂŶĚĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?ƐǁĂůůĞƚƚŽĂ
ƌŽďďĞƌ ? ?ZĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚŝƐ ?'ƌĞĞŶŵĂŬĞƐĂŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ
for a social rule to exist in order for us to understand the concept of obligation. As 
mentioned at the beginning of this section, he uses in particular the example of 
ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ?ůĞƚ ?ƐĐĂůůŚŝŵ )ǁŚŽďĞůŝĞǀĞƐƚŚĂƚŚĞŚĂƐĂŶŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞĐĂƌďŽŶ
                                                          
71 Hart (n 1) 83. 
72 Hart (n 1) 87. 
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offsets against air travel without supposing that there is a common practice of doing 
it. Significantly, what Green fails to understand is that, according to Hart, there is a 
ĐƌƵĐŝĂůĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ “ĨĞĞůŝŶŐŽďůŝŐĞĚ ?ĂŶĚ “ŚĂǀŝŶŐĂŶŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŵŝŐŚƚĨĞĞů
that he has a moral obligation to purchase carbon offsets against air travel, to prevent 
the destruction of the planet as we know it. However, there is no kind of external 
pressure (as Green writes, there is no common practice) for him to do it, and he in no 
way perceives that he would be criticized for failing to purchase carbon offsets; there 
ŝƐŶŽƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƚŽƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞĐĂƌďŽŶŽĨĨƐĞƚƐ ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ?ƐďĞůŝĞĨƐĂŶĚƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ
ĐŝǀŝĐ ĚƵƚǇ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ĞŶŽƵŐŚ ƚŽ ǁĂƌƌĂŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĞ  “ŚĂĚ ĂŶ ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? dŚŝƐ ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ
means that there would be no social rule, since he was under no obligation.   
'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐƚŚŝƌĚĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŝƐƚŚĂƚĐŝƚŝŶŐĂƌƵůĞĐĂŶďĞŽĨĨĞƌĞĚas a justification for 
ŽŶĞ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ŶŽƚŵĞƌĞůǇĂƐŝŐŶƚŚĂƚŽŶĞƐƵƉƉŽƐĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌ
it. This criticism is not clear, and as Green offers no more in explanation or support of 
it, it will not be addressed here. 
 
An Overview 
Throughout his lengthy introduction Green covers, and criticises, almost every 
ĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ĨƚĞƌĂůů ?'ƌĞĞŶƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂ ? ?ƉĂŐĞ-long introduction to HĂƌƚ ?Ɛ
book, which in itself only has 237 pages (excluding the Postscript). For the 
ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚŝƐ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ŽŶůǇĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ'ƌĞĞŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ
commented on. Rather ironically, The Concept of Law is part of the Clarendon Law 
Series, wŚŝĐŚ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽKhW ?ŝƐĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨďŽŽŬƐƚŚĂƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ “ĐŽŶĐŝƐĞ ?ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝďůĞ
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ŽǀĞƌǀŝĞǁƐ ŽĨ ŵĂũŽƌ ĨŝĞůĚƐ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ ůĞŐĂů ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ?73 ?  ,Ăƌƚ ŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ƉƌĂŝƐĞĚ KhW ?Ɛ
Clarendon series, and was glad that his work had been published under this successful 
OUP title74. It is not altogether clear why OUP opted to add an introduction to The 
Concept of Law ? ůĞĂǀŝŶŐ ƵƐ ǁŝƚŚ 'ƌĞĞŶ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ĂĨƚĞƌ  ? ? ǇĞĂƌƐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ
needs an introduction75. For those who believe the main premise of this thesis, that 
there is much to bĞ ŐĂŝŶĞĚ ďǇ ůŽŽŬŝŶŐ Ăƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ĂŶ K>W ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?
'ƌĞĞŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝƐĂƐƚĞƉŝŶƚŚĞǁƌŽŶŐĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĐĞŝƚĐĞŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚ
ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŝŶ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ůŝƚƚůĞ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ŽĨ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ŝŶ The 
Concept of Law. As discƵƐƐĞĚ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ?ĂůůŽƚŚĞƌ
works analysed in Section B are from legal theorists who take the philosophy of 
ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶƚŽƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂŶ
overview of the common criticisms of Hart from those who fail, or refuse to, 
ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂŶǇƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůĨŽĐƵƐŽƌŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ? 
dŚƌĞĞ ŵĂŝŶ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ P ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ? ƚŚĞ
relation between Law and Morals and the idea of social rules. These topics, bar law 
ĂŶĚŵŽƌĂůƐ ?ǁŝůůďĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶƚŚĞĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐƚŽĨŽůůŽǁ ?'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽŶ
,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ƌĞƐƚƐ ŽŶ ƚǁŽ ŵĂŝŶ ƚĞŶĞƚƐ P dŚĞ ŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ >Ăǁ ĂƐ ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ
ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĂůŽĨK>W ?dŚĞŝƐƐƵĞŽĨĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ sociology will be further 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚďǇdŽŶǇŽůĞ ŝŶ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐĞǀĞŶ ?ĂŶĚdŚĞ^ƉĂŶŝƐŚ ? ŝŶĐŚĂƉƚĞƌĞŝŐŚƚ ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
                                                          
73 As per the OUP website, accessible here: 
<https://global.oup.com/academic/content/series/c/clarendon-law-series-
cls/?cc=gb&lang=en&> accessed 17 January 2016. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Cf footnote no. 8. 
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ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĂůŽĨK>W ?ƚŚĂƚ ?ĂƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ?ŝƐƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨĂŵŝƐƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
words, will be alluded to in other chapters since it is a recurring criticism. The idea of 
ƐŽĐŝĂůƌƵůĞƐǁŝůůďĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚĂƚůĞŶŐƚŚŝŶĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ ? ?ŽŶŝǆĂŶĚDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ
















This chapter will focus on the work of Brian Bix, namely his book Language and 
Legal Determinacy1, published in 1993. This chapter is the first to focus on the work 
ŽĨ Ă ůĞŐĂů ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚ ǁŚŽ ďĞůŝĞǀĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ŝŶ The Concept of Law had a 
philosophical foundation and seeks to uncover how philosophy of language impacted 
ŽŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? &ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ >ĞƐůŝĞ 'ƌĞĞŶ ? ƌŝĂŶ ŝǆ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ Ă ǀĞƌǇ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ
interpretation of The Concept of Law2  in which Green claims that there is very little 
linguistic analysis in The Concept of Law3. Moreover, Brian Bix was one of the first legal 
ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ƚŽ ƉůĂĐĞ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ĨŽĐƵƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ŽĨ
language in The Concept of Law, and to conduct a serious investigation into the 
ůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐ ŝŶƚƌŝĐĂĐŝĞƐ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ? dŚŽƵŐŚ not the only legal philosopher to have 
ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚ ĂŶ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐ ? ŝǆ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ǁĂƐ ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ
before any of the other legal theorists whose work will be analysed in this thesis.4 
What is perhaps of greater significance, and the ƌĞĂƐŽŶǁŚǇŝǆ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚ
ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŝŶƚŚŝƐƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐƚŚĂƚŚŝƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬůĂǇƐƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚǁŽƌŬĨŽƌƚŚĞ
analysis of the work of the other legal theorists included in this section, for he touches 
                                                          
1 Brian Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy (Oxford University Press 1995). 
2 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Joseph Raz and Penelope A Bulloch eds, 3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2012). 
3 Cf Chapter three, Green and The Third Edition of The Concept of Law, text to footnote 26. 
4 ŶĚƌĞŝ DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ?Interpretation and Legal Theory, was originally published a year 
ďĞĨŽƌĞŝǆ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůůǇƌĞǀŝƐĞĚƐĞĐŽŶĚĞĚŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚŝŶ
2005. In the Preface to the Revised Edition Marmor states that he not only made substantial 
revisions to the chapters (including the clarification of some of the arguments), but has also 
ĂĚĚĞĚĂŶĞǁĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ĂƐĂƌĞƉůǇƚŽĐƌŝƚŝĐƐ ?^ ŝŶĐĞƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞƐDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐƌĞǀŝƐĞĚĞĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?
and not the first editioŶ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚŝƐ ǁĂƐ ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ ƐĞǀĞƌĂů ǇĞĂƌƐ ĂĨƚĞƌ ŝǆ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ? ŝǆ ?Ɛ
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ŝƐĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚŚĞƌĞĂƐƉƌĞĐĞĚŝŶŐDĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ ? Andrei Marmor, Interpretation And 
Legal Theory (2nd edn, Hart Publishing (UK) 2005). 
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upon the key point of philosophical engagement shared in common amongst all these 
ǁƌŝƚĞƌƐ ? ŶĂŵĞůǇ ƚŚĞ ŝƐƐƵĞ ŽĨ ŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ĂŶĚ ũƵĚŝĐŝĂů ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ?
Because of this, many of the philosophical issues discussed in this chapter will be 
further supplemented and refined in subsequent chapters, as other legal theorists 
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŝǆ ?ƐĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŝŵƉŽƐĞƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůĐĂƐƚ
ŽŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌĚƐ ?  /Ŷ ůŽŽŬŝŶŐ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƐĞƚ ŽĨ ǁƌŝƚĞƌƐĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚŝƐ ƉŽŝŶƚ ? ƚŚĞ
ƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶŝǆĂŶĚDĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ5 approach is most apparent. Even though they 
arrive at very different conclusions, both their approach to The Concept of Law and 
ƚŚĞŝƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐĂďŽƵƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬĂƌĞƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐůǇƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ?dŚĞƐĞƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐ
are perhaps due to the fact that both legal theorists graduated from Oxford, where 
they both completed their DPhil theses under the supervision of Joseph Raz6, and that 
a mere year apart7. However, this similarity and common history does not account for, 
and indeed makes more interesting, the different conclusions that they draw about 
The Concept of Law ?dŚĞƐĞƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ?ƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚǇƚŽĂŶĚƉŽŝŶƚƐŽĨĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞĨƌŽŵĞĂĐŚ
other offer further insight into how even legal theorists who were working on similar 
topics, at the same time, in the same institution, under the supervision of the same 
                                                          
5 Cf Chapter four. 
6 :ŽƐĞƉŚZĂǌǁĂƐŽŶĞŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĚŽĐtoral students, and was one of the only doctoral students 
ŽĨ,ĂƌƚƚŚĂƚĐĂƌƌŝĞĚŽŶ ?ĂƐEŝĐŽůĂ>ĂĐĞǇĐĂůůƐŝƚ ?ƚŚĞ “,ĂƌƚŝĂŶƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ? ?^ĞĞ>ĂĐĞǇ ?E ?A life 
H.L.A. Hart  W The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 162. ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ>ĂĐĞǇ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚZĂǌ “ǁĞƌĞƚŽŚĂǀĞĂĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞŝŵƉĂĐƚ
ŽŶƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨ,ĞƌďĞƌƚ ?ƐŝĚĞĂƐ ? ?/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐůǇ ?ƚŚĞĨŽƵƌůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐ
thesis were doctoral students of Joseph Raz. 
7 Both Brian Bix and Andrei Marmor, both at Balliol, received their D.Phil. in Law from Oxford 
University, in 1991 and 1990 respectively. Bix and Marmor both published their thesis, but 
only Marmor has so far published a revised second edition.  
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Professor, and with a similar approach to engaging with the source text, nonetheless 
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐĂŶĚĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶŝŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚŝŶŐǁĂǇƐ ?  
 It is clear from his introduction to his book that Bix wants to make a different 
contribution to the literature surrounding legal language and determinacy. Rather 
than writing a book on philosophy of language, Bix aims to give the reader a different 
insight by taking a distinctive approach: he will comment on the work of a few select 
legal scholars whilst taking philosophy seriously8. Bix himself does not endorse a 
particular philosophy of language, he merely aims to explain the philosophy of 
ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ďĞŚŝŶĚ ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ? ǁŽƌŬŝŶ ?ƐĂŶĚ DŽŽƌĞ ?Ɛ9. Though equally 
interesting and intriŐƵŝŶŐ ?ƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌǁŝůůŶŽƚĨŽĐƵƐŽŶŝǆ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŽƌŬŝŶ
ĂŶĚ DŽŽƌĞ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? ĨŽƌ ƚŚŝƐ ƉůĂŝŶůǇ ĚĞƉĂƌƚƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞƐĐŽƉĞ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ? &Žƌ ƚŚĞ
ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŵǇƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?/ǁŝůůĨŽĐƵƐƐŽůĞůǇŽŶŝǆ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨThe Concept of 
Law. InterestingůǇ ? ĂŶĚ ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝǆ ?Ɛ ŵĂŝŶ Ăŝŵ ŝƐ ƚŽ ƚĂŬĞ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ
seriously, Bix claims that his assertions about legal theory are sufficiently distinct from 
his interpretation of the philosophy of language that his comments and assertions 
about legal theory and legal language will still stand even if one were to disagree with 
                                                          
8 See Bix, Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993), 1-
 ?ǁŚĞƌĞŝǆ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ  “/ĚŽŶŽƚƉƵƚ ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ƚŚŝƐďŽŽŬĂƐĂ ƚĞǆƚĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨ
language. What I do claim is that I discuss legal theory in a way that tries to be serious about 
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ? 
9 Bix (n 1). Bix presents his arguments over six chapters, two of which are dedicated to Ronald 
ǁŽƌŬŝŶ ?ƐZŝŐŚƚŶƐǁĞƌdŚĞƐŝƐĂŶĚDŝĐŚĂĞůDŽŽƌĞ ?ƐDĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůZĞĂůŝƐŵƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ?,ŝƐ
final chapter is a conclusion of his argument, and trying to cohesively bring all his arguments 
ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? KǀĞƌĂůů ? ŚĂůĨ ŽĨ ŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐ ĂƌĞ ĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ ƚŽ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? ƚŚĞƌĞďǇ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ Ă
significant contribution to the literature in this area. 
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the philosophy of language which Bix attributes to them10 ?ŝǆ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ
can be split into two main areas: open texture and judicial discretion. These will be 
reflected in the two sections in this chapter. The first section of this chapter will focus 
ŽŶŝǆ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞŽĨ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ƐǁŝůůďĞƐĞĞŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ
ƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ŝǆ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚ ŽŶŽĨtĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇƚŽ ůĂǁ
and legal language has a great influence in his understanding of The Concept of Law, 
ĂŶĚŚŝƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĐĞŽŶũƵĚŝĐŝĂůĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?ŝǆĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚŽƵƚůŝŶĞƐĂ
ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĂƚŝĐĂŶĚĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
WaiƐŵĂŶŶ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ŝǆ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
application of open texture is at odds with the philosophy of language that he claims 
inspired Hart (i.e. Ordinary Language Philosophy), and it will be argued that his view is 
inconsistent with what Hart writes in The Concept of Law.  
dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌǁŝůůĨŽĐƵƐŽŶŝǆ ?ƐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶ
between the open texture of language and judicial discretion in The Concept of Law. 
According to Biǆ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵ that language is open textured will lead to his claim that 
there needs to be judicial discretion.  Ultimately however, Bix raises concerns about 
ƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞƚŽůĂǁ ?ĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚtĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ
                                                          
10 Bix (n 1) 2. Interestingly Cole claims that Hart, as Bix, in order to maximise the acceptability 
of his own argument, did not reference many philosophical sources nor was he clear about 
his methodology. Cf Chapter 6 text to n 51. Furthermore, Bix is apologetic for his non-
ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ĂƐŬŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌ ?ƐĨŽƌŐŝǀĞŶƐƐĨŽƌĂŶǇŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂnding of the later 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ?ĂƌŐƵĂďůǇĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂů ?ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ŝǆ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ?ZĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐŚŝƐƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞůĂƚĞƌ
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ŽĨ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ? ŚĞ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P  “ Q ŝƚ ŝƐ ŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂůůǇ / ǁŝůů ŽĨĨĞƌ ĂŶ
interpretation (or evaluation) of the later Wittgenstein with which some readers might 
disagree. To the extent that I have underestimated the difficulty of certain writings, or the 
ĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐǇŽĨĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĐůĂŝŵƐ ?/ĂƉŽůŽŐŝƐĞŝŶĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ ? ?
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is not applicable to the legal world, and raising doubts about the inevitability of judicial 
ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?/ƚǁŝůůďĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐĚƵĞƚŽŝǆ ?ƐĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ
,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞƚŚĂƚŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞ ŝƐƐƵĞƐŽĐĐƵƌ ?ƐŚŽƌƚƐƵŵŵĂƌǇŽĨ
ŝǆ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇwill be provided in the final section of this chapter. This will serve 
ƚŽ ďƌŝŶŐ ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ŝǆ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ƚŚŝƐ
chapter. 
 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨtĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?ƐKƉĞŶdĞǆƚƵƌĞŽĨ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ 
This first substantive section will focus on what is perhaps one of the most 
ĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂůƚŽƉŝĐƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ P,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚ ŽŶŽĨtĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨŽƉĞŶ
texture to law. Most legal theorists to have written on the issue agree that Hart's 
explanation of the core and penumbra of concepts can be traced back to Waismann's 
theory of open texture. After all, Hart says as much in the notes to The Concept of 
Law11 ?  ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ  “ŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ? ŝƐ ĂŶ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
tĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐǁŚĂƚŝƐŵĞĂŶƚďǇƚŚĞ “ŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ?ŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞǁŝƚŚ
regards to law, has been subject to much debate12. Due to the widespread controversy 
around this issue, it is perhaps unsurprising that most legal theorists who contributed 
to the literature on The Concept of Law allude to or impute wholesale to Hart an 
                                                          
11 Hart (n 2) 297. 
12 This issue is also discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, since both Andrei Marmor and 
Nicos Stavropoulos discuss this issue. &ŽƌƐŽŵĞ ŝŶƐŝŐŚƚ ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨ
open texture, see e.g. A Brian W Simpson, ZĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶ ‘dŚĞŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ>Ăǁ ? (1st edn, Oxford 
University Press 2011), 96. Nicola Lacey, A Life of H. L. A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble 
Dream  ?KǆĨŽƌĚ hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ WƌĞƐƐ ? h^  ? ? ? ? ) ?  ? ? ? ? ĂǀŝĚ >ǇŽŶƐ ?  ‘KƉĞŶ dĞǆƚƵƌĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ




is analysed as part of this thesis however, Bix and Marmor are perhaps the two who 
focus on this issue in the greatest depth. As mentioned, despite the fact that they both 
reach different conclusions, their scheme of analysis is similar in so far as they take 
ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ƚŽ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇĂŶĚƵŶƉŝĐŬtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŝŶThe 
Concept of Law - as will become apparent throughout this chapter and the next. 
EŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ?ŝǆ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƐƵĨĨĞƌƐĨƌŽŵƚǁŽŵĂŝŶƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ13 P&ŝƌƐƚ ?ŝǆƌĞĂĚƐ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
ďŽŽŬŝŶůŝŐŚƚŽĨǁŚĂƚŚĞĐĂůůƐĂ “ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĂƚŝĐĂŶĚĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?
but does not give enough detail to substantiate this claim. SeĐŽŶĚ ? ŝǆ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ
ůĞĂǀĞƐƉĂƌƚƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚĞǆƚƵŶĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ?ĂƐǁĞǁŝůůŐŽŽŶƚŽƐĞĞŶŽǁ ?ƐŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ?
these methodological mistakes are committed by all legal theorists whose work is 
analysed in this thesis.  
According to Bix, Hart claims that when legislation is enacted both the 
legislators and the public have a particular problem in mind. Bix uses the example of 
ƚŚĞƌƵůĞ “ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ?14. So, following this example, the rule would have 
                                                          
13 As introduced in ChaƉƚĞƌŽŶĞ ?ĂŶĚ ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ ŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌ ƚǁŽ ? ŝƚŶŽƚŽŶůǇŝǆ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚ
suffers from these two fundamental issues. All legal theorists whose work is presented in this 
thesis seem to follow a similar scheme of analysis, in so far as they commit the same 
methodological mistakes. 
14 This example was first used by Hart in his inaugural lecture at Harvard, later published by 
ƚŚĞ,ĂƌǀĂƌĚ>ĂǁƌĞǀŝĞǁ ?,>,Ăƌƚ ? ‘WŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ>ĂǁĂŶĚDŽƌĂůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? )
71 Harvard Law Review 593. Due to the prominence of the Hart-&ƵůůĞƌ ĚĞďĂƚĞ ? &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ
criticism of Hart is a recurring theme in the thesis. Lon Fuller, a natural lawyer and an avid 
critic of Hart, published Positivism and Fidelity to Law ĂƐĂ ƌĞƉůǇ ƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ,ŽůŵĞƐ ůĞĐƚƵƌĞ ?
Nicola Lacey notes how, in the leĐƚƵƌĞ ?&ƵůůĞƌǁĂƐ “ƉĂĐŝŶŐďĂĐŬĂŶĚĨŽƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞďĂĐŬŽĨƚŚĞ
ůĞĐƚƵƌĞŚĂůůůŝŬĞĂŚƵŶŐƌǇůŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚŚĞůĞĨƚƚŚĞůĞĐƚƵƌĞƚŚĞĂƚƌĞŚĂůĨ-way through the question 
ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĨĞǁĚĂǇƐĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞůĞĐƚƵƌĞ ?&ƵůůĞƌĚĞĐŝĚĞ ƚŽĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŽŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐůĞĐƚƵƌĞďǇǁĂǇŽĨ
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been enacted to address a particular problem, whatever that may be. When faced 
with this rule, according to Bix, one needs to think about why the rule was enacted 
and to invoke an image, or an example, which this rule was aimed at. Bix claims that 
ǁŚĞŶ ĨĂĐĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƌƵůĞ  “ŶŽ ǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌŬ ? ? ƚŚĞ ŝŵĂŐĞƐ ǁĞ would invoke 
ĂƌŽƵŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ? ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ  “ŶŽƌŵĂů ĐĂƌ ? ďƵƐ ? ĂŶĚ
ŵŽƚŽƌĐǇĐůĞƚƌĂĨĨŝĐ ?15 ?dŚĞƐĞ “ŶŽƌŵĂů ?ƚŚŝŶŐƐƚŚĂƚǁĞǁŽƵůĚĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞǁŝƚŚ ĞƌƵůĞĂƌĞ
ƚĞƌŵĞĚďǇŝǆĂƐ “ƚŚĞƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ?16. The issue will arise when we are faced with more 
unusual cases, such as the use of roller-skates, since if faced with such a situation, one 
would immediately acknowledge that this is a circumstance that does not fit the norm 
(or the paradigm). When dealing with these more unusual situations, according to Bix, 
we need to consider whether the case at hand would fit as an extension of the rule or 
general term. So, in the park example, we would need to consider whether or not 
roller-ƐŬĂƚĞƐĂƌĞĂŶĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ? ?dŚŝƐĐĂŶďĞĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚ ?ƐĂǇs Bix, by 
compiling a list of criteria that will allow us to evaluate and reach a conclusion as to 
whether or not roller-ƐŬĂƚĞƐĂƌĞĂŶĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ? ?ZĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŽƚŚŝƐ
example, Bix writes that similarly to cars they make noise (though at a lower level), 
and threaten safety and order (though in a much lower scale). On the other hand, they 
                                                          
an articůĞ ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ,ĂƌǀĂƌĚ >Ăǁ ZĞǀŝĞǁ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ? Lon L Fuller, 
 ‘WŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵĂŶĚ&ŝĚĞůŝƚǇƚŽ>Ăǁ PZĞƉůǇƚŽWƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ,Ăƌƚ ?,ĂƌǀĂƌĚ>ĂǁZĞǀŝĞǁ ? Lacey (n 6) 
197. This debate has generated myriad discussion over the years, so much so that 50 years 
on, in 2008, the New York University organised a conference with leading legal philosophers 
to revisit this debate. Amongst them were Nicola Lacey (widely regarded as a Hart scholar of 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞƐŝŶĐĞŚĞƌƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ) ?&ƌĞĚ^ĐŚĂuer and Jules Coleman. All 
articles have been published in volume 83 of the New York University Law Review journal. 
15 Bix (n 1) 9.  
16 Bix (n 1) 9. 
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are smaller and do not pollute the air.  Bix concludes that there are both similarities 
and dissimilarities, giving us reasons for and against the applicability of a general term. 
This, Bix says, is what Hart calls the "open texture" of rules, when situations arise that 
were not initially envisaged by the legislator17 ?  ,ĞŶĐĞ ? ŝǆ ?Ɛ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
explanation in The Concept of Law can be summed up as a paradigmatic and 
criteriological approach to meaning:  paradigmatic in so far as there is always a plain 
ĐĂƐĞ  ?Ă  “ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ? ) ƚŚĂƚ ƐĞƌǀĞƐ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ďĞŶĐŚŵĂƌŬ ĨŽƌ Ăůů ŽƚŚĞƌ ĐĂƐĞƐ  ?ŚĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ
paradigmatic); and criteriological, since with this plain case in mind, we need to 
consider a list of criteria which allows us to begin to evaluate whether some particular 
case would fit the original18 ?ZĞĂĚŝŶŐŝǆ ?ƐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚǇƚŽ>ŽŶ&ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ
ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐ19. In his response to ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐůĞcture, Fuller writes:  
The task of interpretation is commonly that of determining the meaning 
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůǁŽƌĚƐŽĨĂ ůĞŐĂů ƌƵůĞ ? ůŝŬĞ  “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ? ŝŶĂ ƌƵůĞĞǆĐůƵĚŝŶŐ
vehicles from a park. More particularly, the task of interpretation is to 
determine the range of reference of a word, or the aggregate of things to 
which it points20. 
                                                          
17 Bix (n 1) 9. 
18 Bix (n 1) 9. 
19 Ɛ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ŝŶ >ŽŶ> &ƵůůĞƌ ?  ‘WŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ĂŶĚ &ŝĚĞůŝƚǇ ƚŽ >Ăǁ P  ZĞƉůǇ ƚŽ WƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ ,Ăƌƚ ?
Harvard Law Review. Cf footnote Ŷ  ? ? ? &ƵůůĞƌ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ Ă ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ?ŝŶ ĂŶ
ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĚĞĨĞĂƚĂŶĚƌĂŝƐĞĚŽƵďƚƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?
20 &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ŷ ? ? ) ? ? ? ?&ƵůůĞƌĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ theory to 
be that interpretation of a rule lies in the meaning of individual words (Fuller (n 14) 662). He 
goes on to say that generally, when interpreting a rule, one does not give meaning to an 
individual word but rather interprets the sentence, the paragraph, or even the whole page. 
Ɛ ǁŝůů ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? &ƵůůĞƌ  ?ĂŶĚ ŝǆ ?Ɛ ) ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ  “ŽƉĞŶ
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In fact, the approach taken by Fuller and Bix resonates not with Waismann and his 
ƐĐŚŽŽů ŽĨ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ? ďƵƚ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ǁŝƚŚ &ƌĞŐĞ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? ǁŚŽ ƚŽŽŬ Ă ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ
approach to the subject of meaning21. According to Frege the extension of a statement 
is its truth value, and the extension of a concept or expression is the set of things that 
it applies to. So, for example, the extension of the term (or concept or expression) 
"cat" is the set of all cats in the world (either present, past or future). Every expression 
that has an extension has a sense, which amounts to the set of conditions whose 
existence in the world is necessary and sufficient for a proposition predicating the 
expression or term or concept to be true22 ?dĂŬŝŶŐŝǆ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨ “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ? ?ƵŶĚĞƌ
                                                          
ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ? ĂƐ ƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ŽĨ ĂŶ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ǁŽƌĚ ŝƐ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƌŽŽƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ
ŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ĐĨƚĞǆƚƚŽŶŽƚĞ 16).  
21 Gotlob Frege is seen as one of the most influential philosophers in the systematisation of 
the notion of meaning. Frege invented the symbolic language of modern logic, and introduced 
many ideas which to this day are influential in philosophy of language, one of them being his 
theory of sense and denotation. Alexander Miller, Philosophy of Language (2nd edn, 
Routledge 2007). 
22 In support of his claim that Hart takes a paradigmatic and criteriological approach to 
meaning, Bix quotes a passage from Gordon Baker, where he writes: "Gordon Baker claimed 
that Hart's argument is circular: Waismann's notion of "open texture" derives from his 
argument/assumption that a term's sense is constituted by the rules governing its application 
and that no rule can be formulated in such a way that the rule's application is never in doubt; 
given that indeterminacy of application is built into the idea of "open texture", it is not 
surprising to find it as one of the idea's consequences (...) Although this is not generally 
recognised, the notion of open texture makes sense only within a particular form of semantic 
theory...As a result it might well be impossible for Hart to incorporate it into his philosophy of 
law". Bix (n 1) 18. It is of note that Gordon Baker explicitly refers to the "term's sense". As 
mentioned, for Frege a term's sense is the set of conditions in the world that are necessary 
and sufficient for something to be true of the sentence which it expresses. This passage 
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the theory there must be necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a 
 “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ?  ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐŵĂŬŝŶŐŶŽŝƐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶŝŶŐƐĂĨĞƚǇĂŶĚŽƌĚĞƌƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ) ?/Ĩŝǆ
was indeed ĂůŝŐŶŝŶŐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ &ƌĞŐĞ ?Ɛ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŚŝƐ ǁŽƌŬ ƐĞĞŵƐ ƚŽ
indicate, there is a fundamental incompatibility between this claim and his earlier 
ĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐŽŶŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞĂƌĞĂŶĂƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨtĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?
Waismann renounced ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵĂŶĚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐŝŶƚŚĞdƌĂĐƚĂƚƵƐ23, he 
was not endorsing a Fregian account of meaning, but rather a much more (later) 
Wittgensteinian accountol ? dŚĞƐĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƌŝƐĞ ĚƵĞ ƚŽ ŝǆ ?Ɛ ŶŽǀĞů ĐůĂŝŵ ŽĨ Ă
 “ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĂƚŝĐ ĂŶĚ ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ?approach to meaning, a claim that he neither 
explains fully nor comprehensively tests against the evidence to see if it is feasible. 
/ŶŵǇǀŝĞǁ ?ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌŝǆ ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚ&ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ )ŵŝƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽŶ “ŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ?ŝƐƚŚĂƚ ?ƵŶůŝŬe Hart, who focuses on the understanding 
of the term "vehicle" in the context of a given rule, Bix focuses on the application of 
the term "vehicle" by itself, as emphasised by his reference to a "criteriological" 
approach to meaning.  Fuller is even more eǆƉůŝĐŝƚ ?ĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ “ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŽ
ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞƌĂŶŐĞŽĨƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽĨĂǁŽƌĚ ?24. There has been some confusion in the 
legal literature, as exemplified by the analysis of the works of both Bix and Marmor, 
between the concepts of open texture, vagueness and generality, despite their 
fundamental philosophical differences. Vagueness can be defined as the property of 
                                                          
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐ ƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵ ƚŚĂƚŝǆ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇǁĂƐƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ƚŽ&ƌĞŐĞ ?Ɛ
philosophy.  
23 BF McGuinness (ed), Friedrich Waismann - Causality and Logical Positivism (Springer 2011), 
15. 
24 Fuller (n 14) 662. 
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ĂŶĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŐŝǀĞƐƌŝƐĞƚŽ ?ďŽƌĚĞƌůŝŶĞĐĂƐĞƐ ?25, meaning that the expression or 
piece of language in question is neither indisputably applicable nor inapplicable. In 
other words, the term's extension is lacking in clarity. Jeremy Waldron provides a clear 
and concise explanation of vagueness in his paper Vagueness in Law and Language 
where he writes: 
A predicate P is vague if there are objects or instances x1, x 2, etc. 
within the domain of the normal application of terms of this kind such that 
users are characteristically undecided about the truth or falsity of "x, is P," 
"x2 is P," and they understand that indecision to be a fact about the 
meaning of P rather than about the extent of their knowledge of x 1, x2, 
etc. Example: "Blue"-colored is vague because, although the predicate is 
supposed to apply to and discriminate among color patches, most of us 
would hesitate about saying of certain shades of turquoise and lavender 
either that they were blue or that they were not blue. We would regard 
them as borderline cases, perhaps undecidable except by arbitrary 
stipulation. Our hesitation would not be because we had only had a 
glimpse of the patches in question and needed a closer look. We would 
say rather that even under optimal conditions of perception the meaning 
of the word "blue" did not determine an answer.26 
                                                          
25 Robert Audi, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge University Press 1995), 
945. 
26 Jeremy Waldron, California law review vagueness in law and language: Some philosophical 
issues (2015) 513. 
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tĂůĚƌŽŶŐŝǀĞƐƚŚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽůŽƵƌ “ůƵĞ ? ?ďƵƚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŽƚŚĞƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ ?
Let's take the example of the expression "a short man". When thinking of the term 
"short man", a few interesting questions may arise pertaining to its applicability27, for 
example: what is the maximum height that a man can have for him to be short? Is 
there a cut-off point after which the man is no longer short? The unanswerable nature 
of these questions is due to the vagueness of certain terms in our language28. This 
vagueness should be distinguished from generality. General terms are those that can 
apply to different objects, and/or different kinds of objects. For example, the term 
"person" can refer to many different people, and also to different kinds of people (it 
applies to both men and women)29 ?KƚŚĞƌŐĞŶĞƌĂůƚĞƌŵƐĂƌĞ “ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ? ? “ĚĞĂĚ ? ?ĂŶĚ
                                                          
27 Vagueness has been an issue for philosophers for centuries. The earliest report of such 
ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ǁĂƐ ŝĐĞƌŽ ?Ɛ  “ŚĞĂƉ ƉĂƌĂĚŽǆ ? ? ^ĞĞ, Roy A Sorensen, A Brief History of the Paradox: 
Philosophy and the Labyrinths of the Mind (Oxford University Press, USA 2003) 53. 
28 dŚĞ^ŽƌŝƚĞƐWĂƌĂĚŽǆĞǆĞŵƉůŝĨŝĞƐƚŚĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐƚǇƉĞŽĨǀĂŐƵĞŶĞƐƐ ? “
series of things could be arranged in such a way that the first consists of a large heap of grains 
of some kind and each subsequent member consists of grains of the same kind but contains, 
in each case, one less grain than the one before.... The last member, which consists of a single 
grain, is obviously not a heap. But if any member of the series is a heap, then it would surely 
remain so if just one grain were subtracted. The application conditions for the predicate 
["heap"] are not sharp enough to distinguish heaps from non-heaps on the basis of the 
difference of a single grain so if one member of a (suitably gradated) series is a heap, so is the 
next. Since the first member is certainly a heap, all the subsequent members are also, 
ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞůĂƐƚ ? ?>ŝŶĚĂƵƌŶƐ ? Vagueness: An investigation into natural languages and the 
Sorites paradox (Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991) 5. 
29 It is important to note that a term can be general and not vague. For example, the 
expression "Philosophy Lecturer" is a general expression (it can apply to a multitude of objects, 
or in this case to a multitude of individuals who happen to be philosophy lecturers), but it is 
not vague, since its application is definite, and it does not allow for borderline cases. The same 
is true of terms like "dog", "cat" or "car". 
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 “ĞŵƉƚǇ ? ?EŽne of these terms are vague: there are no borderline cases.  In turn, open 
texture is different from both generality and vagueness: Waismann referred to open 
texture as "the possibility of vagueness"30. A concept or expression is open textured 
when it is precise along some dimensions, but has not been considered in other 
dimensions. For any dimensions that it has not been considered, it is not clear what 
the application would be. Let's take the example of the term "mother". The term 
"mother" is not considered vague, as its application is definite, but it is however "open 
textured". It is open textured in the sense that human invention has opened new 
possibilities that have shown this term to be open textured. With the introduction of 
new technology that allows the harvesting of eggs, a new set of questions surrounding 
the use of the term "mother" have arisen: is the "mother" the person who carries the 
baby to term? Or is the "mother" the person who donated the egg? Or is the mother 
the person who raises the baby? When the term "mother" was first introduced, these 
different dimensions weren't considered, and there needs to be a fresh decision as to 
how the term is to be applied in these new dimensions. The possibility that both 
general definite terms and general vague terms can be open textured is sufficient to 
show that distinctions obtain amongst the three. 
tŝƚŚƚŚŝƐŝŶŵŝŶĚ ?ůĞƚ ?ƐƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽƚŚĞƚŽƉŝĐĂƚŚĂŶĚ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ǁŚĞŶ
dealing with a large group of people it would not be possible to give every individual 
particular instructions and guidance of conduct. It would be impractical, if not 
impossible, to enforce social control by addressing every single person individually. 
Legislation tends to therefore address groups of people, or refer to general situations 
                                                          
30 McGuiness (n 23) 15. 
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by using general terms31. In order to address large groups of people there need to be 
general rules, standards of conduct and principles32. In law, society has therefore 
made use of general terms in one of two distinct ways: legislation and precedent33. 
Many legal theorists argue that when compared with legislation, precedent can seem 
uncertain, unreliable and unclear. By its very nature, precedent does not give people 
a written description of the rule, and the ability to clearly recognise instances where 
it would be applicable34. There is a strong belief amongst the legal community, Hart 
                                                          
31 General terms are predicable of more than one object. Unlike singular terms they cannot 
be used as a grammatical subject, meaning that they cannot be replaced by individual 
variables. Robert Audi, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge University Press 
1995). 
32 Hart (n 2), 124. 
33 Hart compares precedent to giving examples, where there is minimal use of general terms, 
the case is decided on its merits and a decision is reached based on the specificities of the 
case. Unlike precedent, legislation needs to address a large number of people and deal with 
an unforeseeable number of diverse situations. The use of legislation, Hart argues, is more 
closely aligned with giving instructions where there will be maximum use of general terms. 
Hart (n 2), 125. 
34 Hart (n 2), 125. The iconic case of Donoghue v Stevenson illustrates this rather well. Not 
only was the modern concept of negligence in English law formulated in Donoghue v 
Stevenson, but it was also refined and stretched in the years that followed, in cases such as 
Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office and Hedley Byrne v Heller. In Donoghue v Stevenson the 
facts involved the claimant, Mrs Donoghue, drinking a bottle of ginger beer and finding a dead 
snail at the bottom of the bottle. Subsequently, Mrs Donoghue fell ill and sued the ginger beer 
manufacturer. Mrs Donoghue had no contractual relationship with the café (since it was her 
friend who placed the order), and her friend did not suffer any injuries. Furthermore, neither 
Mrs Donoghue nor the friend had any contractual relationship with the ginger beer 
manufacturer. Given that injuries resulting from defective products were generally claimed 
on the basis of a contract of sale, it could be reasonably expected that the ginger beer 
manufacturer would not be liable. Mrs Donoghue brought the case against Stevenson on the 
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argues, that legislation provides a much needed sense of clarity and certainty. 
According to Hart however, too much emphasis has been placed on the reliability and 
clarity that legislation provides when compared to precedent35. In most cases, when 
applying a general rule, there are no doubts as to its application. Were this not the 
case, general rules would lose their purpose. These cases are known as the "core", 
where the applicability of the rule is clear. There will however be cases, commonly 
known as "hard cases"36, where it is not clear whether a given rule applies or not. 
These cases are known as lying in the "penumbra". To illustrate this issue in The 
Concept of Law Hart gives the same example discussed above, of the rule "no vehicles 
in the park". Regarding this rule, Hart says that the aim of peace and quiet in the park 
is maintained at the cost of excluding certain things37. Hart suggests that the rule was 
enacted with the purpose of maintaining peace and quiet in the park, and so there are 
clear cases where no dispute will arise as to the applicability of the rule (e.g. in the 
case of cars, motor-bikes or buses). There would be no argument that, for the purpose 
of this rule, a car, a motorbike or a bus would be a vehicle. If however instead of a car, 
we give the example of roller-skates, it is not as intuitive whether or not these would 
                                                          
basis of negligence and duty of care, and in his judgement Lord Atkin established the 
neighbour principle (that one must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which 
ĐŽƵůĚƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇďĞĨŽƌĞƐĞĞŶĂƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŽŝŶũƵƌĞŽŶĞ ?ƐŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌ ) ?dŚĞƌĞ was no way for the 
defendants in all of these cases to foresee the court's decision, and, as Hart puts it, there was 
no law for an individual to apply "by himself, to himself".  
35 Hart's defence of the validity of legal precedent is perhaps unsurprising, particularly bearing 
in mind his career as a Barrister for the Chancery Court. 
36 ,>,Ăƌƚ ? ‘WŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ>ĂǁĂŶĚDŽƌĂůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?,ĂƌǀĂƌĚ>ĂǁZĞǀŝĞǁ
593. 
37 Hart (n 2) 129. 
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be considered a vehicle for the purpose of the rule38. It is not intuitive because the 
rule is open textured; it was never considered whether roller-skates were a vehicle for 
the purpose of this rule, as discussed at the beginning of this section. When enacting 
legislation, Hart says, we have two main handicaps: the relative ignorance of the facts, 
and the relative ignorance of the aim. There will be unforeseen dimensions, which 
were not taken into account when the rule was devised. These cases, unforeseen 
when the legislation was enacted, are those in which it is not clear whether a given 
situation will or will not be covered by a particular piece of legislation. So, in the case 
of the rule "no vehicles in the park", where our main aim was to keep the peace and 
quiet, until we consider this particular case (that of roller-skates) and a decision is 
made as to whether or not the use of roller-skates would impinge the peace and quiet 
in the park, there is no way of knowing whether or not "roller-skates" are a vehicle for 
the purpose of this rule.  
hƉƵŶƚŝůƚŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚŝǆ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚĐŽŶvoluted, would be reconcilable with 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌŝƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽĐůĂƌŝĨǇƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶŝǆ ?ƐǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ
of open texture, referring to a single term, and what I argue is Hart's point, the open 
texture of language. Supporters of a Fregean conception of logical meaning would 
support, as Bix seems to, the idea that even though there can be no explanation of 
the sense of a complex proposition, there can be an explanation of its component 
parts. This was defended by Wittgenstein in his earlier works, namely the Tractatus39. 
According to the earlier Wittgenstein, in order to understand a proposition, the only 
                                                          
38 Hart (n 2) 126. 
39 Norman Malcolm, EŽƚŚŝŶŐ /Ɛ ,ŝĚĚĞŶ P tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ŽĨ ,ŝƐĂƌůǇ
Thoughts (Blackwell Publishers 1988) 84. 
 107 
 
requirement is to understand the constituent parts of the relevant sentence. In other 
words, in order to understand the sentence "No vehicles in the park", we need to 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚŝƐŵĞĂŶƚďǇ ?ǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ ?ƉĂƌŬ ? ?ƚŽŐĞ ŚĞƌǁŝƚŚ “ŶŽ ?ĂŶĚ “ŝŶƚŚĞ ? ?
nothing more. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein writes, 
One name stands for one thing, another for another, and they are 
combined with one another. In this way the whole group - like a living 
picture - presents a state of affairs.40 
In his later philosophy, by which Bix claims Waismann and Hart were influenced, 
Wittgenstein takes a completely different approach to meaning. In fact, Wittgenstein 
goes against his earlier philosophy, and that of Frege and Russell, and claims that 
meaning is to be found in use, and there are countless different uses of what we call 
"symbols", "words, and "sentences". Wittgenstein illustrates the idea that concepts 
are not always bound by rules guiding their applicability in §80 of Philosophical 
Investigations41. Wittgenstein gives the example of disappearing chairs. The passage 
reads: 
                                                          
40 Ludwig Wittgenstein and Luis Valdés M Villanueva, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (2nd 
edn, Tecnos 2003) 4.0311 
41 Ludwig Wittgenstein and translated [from the German] by G. E. M. Anscombe, Philosophical 
Investigations Philosophische Untersuchungen (3rd edn, Blackwell Publishers 1967)  §80. Even 
ƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚǁĂƐtĂŝƐƐŵĂŶǁŚŽĐŽŝŶĞĚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “KƉĞŶdĞǆƚƵƌĞ ?ŝŶŚŝs article Verifiability (See 
Fredriech Waismann, Philosophical Papers (Brian McGuinness ed., Dordrecht and London 
1976)), many claim that he was heavily influenced by Wittgenstein in his thinking. Waismann 
worked closely with Wittgenstein for many years, and during his time at Oxford he was a great 
ƉƌŽŵƵůŐĂƚŽƌŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ĚŵŽŶĚƐĂŶĚŝĚŝŶŽǁǁƌŝƚĞ P  “ůƚŚŽƵŐŚŶŽƚ ƚŚĞ
most original of thinkers, Friedriech Waismann had the wonderful capacity of being able to 
sum up abstruse notions in a straightforward way and accessible language. For nearly a 
ĚĞĐĂĚĞ ? ŵŽƐƚůǇ ǁŝƚŚ ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ? ŚĞ ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ƚŚŝƐ ŐŝĨƚ ƚŽ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ
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I say "There is a chair". What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it 
suddenly disappears from sight? - "So it wasn't a chair, but some kind of 
illusion" - But in a few moments we see it again and are able to touch it 
and so on - "So the chair was there after all and its disappearance was 
some kind of illusion". - But suppose that after a time it disappears again - 
or seems to disappear. What are we to say now? Have you rules ready for 
such cases - rules saying whether one may use the word "chair" to include 
this kind of thing? But do we miss them when we use the word "chair"; 
and are we to say that we do not really attach any meaning to the word, 
because we are not equipped with rules for every possible application of 
it?42 
^Ž ?ĂƐtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐ ?ǁĞŚĂǀĞƌƵůĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƵƐĂŐĞŽĨĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚĞƌŵ ?Ğ ?Ő ? ?ĐŚĂŝƌ ? )
when we need them, and will create new rules whenever a new situation crops up, 
where due to its novel nature we don't yet have any established rules as to whether a 
certain concept will apply43. Hart did not refer to words and rules interchangeably, but 
                                                          
ŽƌĂĐƵůĂƌ ƵƚƚĞƌĂŶĐĞƐ ?ĚŝůŝŐĞŶƚůǇ ƚƌǇŝŶŐ ƚŽ ŽŶ ƚŚĞŵ ĂĨŽƌŵ ĂŶĚ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ? ? :ŽŚŶŝĚŝŶŽǁ ĂŶĚ
David Edmonds, WittgensƚĞŝŶ ?ƐWŽŬĞƌ (Faber & Faber Non-Fiction 2005), 126. It is therefore 
ŶŽƚƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚtĂŝƐŵĂŶŶŝƐĐƌĞĚŝƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ? ?ŵĂŶǇĐůĂŝŵ
ƚŚĂƚŚĞǁĂƐŚĞĂǀŝůǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ? 
42 Wittgenstein (n 41) §80. According to Baker and Hacker this is comparable to J.L. Austin's 
exploding goldfinch - reference Baker & Hacker p.178.  
43 This was an attack on Frege's conception of determinacy of sense. Wittgenstein both in the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and in Philosophical Investigations was highly critical of Frege's 
work, particularly his universalist views. (See Gordon P Baker and PMS Hacker, Analytical 
ŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇŽŶƚŚĞ ‘WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů /ŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? Ps ? ? PtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ PZƵůĞƐ ?'ƌĂŵŵĂƌƐĂŶĚ
Necessity (DA Information Services 1985) 178 & Audi (n 31) 328) 
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rather he referred to the rules that govern the applicability of concepts or words, 
which only make sense when looked at in the context of a sentence.  
ŝǆ ? ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ŚŝƐ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞƐ ŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ
language and claims that it is fundamentally different from the theory put forward by 
tĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?dŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝǆ ?ƐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞ ? ůĞƚ ?Ɛ ůŽŽŬĂƚThe Concept of Law, and the 
practical application of Bix's understanding of Hart's "open texture". A few pages into 
Chapter VII of The Concept of Law, Hart brings up the issue of a "toy motor-car 
ĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐĂůůǇƉƌŽƉĞůůĞĚ ?44. Following Bix's interpretation of Hart's theory, namely that 
open texture ultimately refers to whether a single concept applies or not, we would, 
like Bix, make a list of the similarities and dissimilarities between the plain case (the 
"motor-car") and the new case (the "toy motor-car electrically propelled"). Bix writes, 
We begin with a list of plain cases or the paradigm (the car) and then 
consider a list of criteria which allow us to begin to evaluate how similar a 
purported extension would be.45 
So, a toy motor-car electrically propelled would most likely make noise (much like a 
car but at a lower volume), and be disruptive to passers-by (like a car, but to a much 
lower extent).  We would then set this against the particular situations that the 
legislator was thinking of when proffering the rule46, namely that peace and quiet in 
the park was to be preserved. It is of note that under Bix's reasoning, we would 
consider the extension of a proposed new concept, like "electrically propelled toy-
car", and not a proposed new case. So, according to Bix's theory, the legislator would 
                                                          
44 Hart (n 2) 129. 




then make a decision based on the similarities and dissimilarities of the "electrically 
propelled toy-car" and the paradigm case (the "car"). Unsurprisingly then Bix 
concludes that following this logic, Hart's open texture would be irreconcilable with 
that of Waismann, since the use of "vehicles" such as bicycles (or electrically propelled 
toy cars) was far from unforeseeable.  
There is however a way of looking at this that is very much reconcilable, and 
ŝŶĚĞĞĚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĂƚŽĨtĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?ƐĂŶĚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂƐŝǆ
himself mentions were Hart's inspiration. Hart is, I claim, very clear in that he is not 
looking at concepts in isolation, but rather at concepts as part of rules. Let's apply this 
idea to the electrically propelled toy-car example. A general rule is enacted legislating 
that no vehicles are allowed in the park. For most cases, we understand this rule and 
are able to follow it (as per Wittgenstein's example of the "Chair", we can use this term 
even though we are not equipped with rules for every single application of it). There 
will however be other cases where its proper use is not clear. One of these cases might 
be that of an electrically propelled toy-car. What is uncertain in this case is not 
whether the particular concept "electrically propelled toy-car" is a "vehicle", but 
rather whether it would be a vehicle for the purpose of this rule. So, the confusion lies 
on what it means to say a vehicle for the purpose of this rule. As mentioned, according 
to Hart, when enacting new laws, legislators have two main handicaps: their relative 
ignorance of the facts (due to unforeseen cases, such as the electrically propelled toy-
car), and their relative ignorance of the aim (due to the fact that we have not yet 
looked at these aims in conjunction with the unforeseen cases). When establishing 
the rule "no vehicles in the park", our general aim was clear, but we did not foresee 
such circumstances as those of children wanting to play, and deriving pleasure from 
 111 
 
playing, with electrically propelled toy-cars. In this particular case, the rule's general 
aim of "peace and quiet in the park" would need to be set against the pleasure that 
some children would gain from playing with such electrically propelled toy-cars. It is 
due to the fact that our aim is unclear, that rules are open-textured. So, the open-
texture stems not from the fact, as Bix contends, that it is unclear whether "electrically 
propelled toy cars" are a vehicle, but whether they are a vehicle for the purpose of 
this rule, since the legislator might decide to relax the requirement of peace and quiet, 
to allow the happiness of children who enjoy playing with electrically propelled toy-
motor cars47. As Hart writes, 
When the unenvisaged case does arise, we confront the issues at stake 
and can then settle the question by choosing between the competing 
interests in the way which best satisfies us. In doing so we shall have 
rendered more determinate our aim, and shall incidentally have settled 
the question as to the meaning, for the purpose of the rule, of a general 
word.48  
So, analysing Hart's thesis in light of Waismann's and Wittgenstein's teachings brings 
about a much more coherent explanation of Hart's work. Moreover, it illustrates that 
Hart's theory, as it is claimed throughout this thesis, was indeed influenced by OLP 
and analysing his work under this light not only provides us with a more plausible 
interpretation, but allows us to see Hart's work at its full potential. 
 
                                                          
47 Hart (n 2) 129. 
48 Ibid.  
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The issue of Judicial Discretion 
This second substantive section of the chapter will focus on the issue of judicial 
ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ǁŝůůďĞĐŽŵĞĐůĞĂƌ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŶĞǆƚ ĨĞǁ ƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚƐ ?ŝǆ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽf 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨ “ŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ?ĨŽůůŽǁƐĨƌŽŵ ?ĂŶĚŝƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚďǇ ?ŚŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ
judicial discretion.  It is clear throughout Law, Language and Legal Determinacy that 
ƚŚĞ ŵĂŝŶ ĨŽĐƵƐ ŽĨ ŝǆ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ŝƐ ũƵĚŝĐŝĂů ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ  ?ĂĨƚĞƌ Ăůů ? ŚŝƐ ďŽŽŬ ŝƐ ĂďŽƵƚ legal 
determinacy49 ) ?ĂŶĚŝǆ ?ƐƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚďǇŚŝƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶũƵĚŝĐŝĂů
ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ? ǀĞŶ ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ŵŽƐƚ ŽĨ ŝǆ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ŝƐĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŝƐƐƵĞ ŽĨ ŽƉĞŶ
ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ? ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ ƐŽ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚ ŝŶĨŽƌŵƐ ŝǆ ?Ɛ ǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ũƵĚicial 
ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?ŝǆƉƵƚƐĨŽƌǁĂƌĚƚǁŽŵĂŝŶĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞĂŶĚ
ǀŝĞǁƐŽŶũƵĚŝĐŝĂůĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ PĨŝƌƐƚůǇƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚŵŝƐĂƉůŝĞƐtĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?ƐŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ?ĂŶĚ
ƐĞĐŽŶĚůǇƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶũƵĚŝĐŝĂůĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶĂƌĞĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŽŶhis views 
ŽŶ ŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ďƵƚ ƐŝŶĐĞ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǀŝĞǁƐ ŽŶ ŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ĂƌĞ ĨůĂǁĞĚ ƐŽ ĂƌĞ ŚŝƐ
ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚũƵĚŝĐŝĂůĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƐĞƚǁŽƉŽŝŶƚƐǁŝůůďĞĚĞĂůƚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚƵƌŶ ?>Ğƚ ?Ɛ
ĨŝƌƐƚĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚŝǆ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ?ƐŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ?ŝǆĂƚƚƌŝďutes to Hart 
Ă “ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂŶĚƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĂƚŝĐ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽŵĞĂŶŝ Ő ?ƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚůǇĚĞƌŝǀĞĚĨƌŽŵ
tĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ50 ? Ɛ ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ŝǆ ?Ɛ
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ĐƌĞĂƚĞƐ ŶĞǁ ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ĂŶĚ ƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŽƵůĚ
otheƌǁŝƐĞŶŽƚĞǆŝƐƚ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝǆ ?ƐŽǁŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,ĂƌƚůĞĂĚƐŚŝŵƚŽĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞŝƐĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚĂƚƌƵĞĂĚĂƉƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨtĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?Ɛ
theory. According to Bix, Hart applied a theory about general language (i.e. 
                                                          
49 In the introduction to his book Bix is clear about the focus of his book being judicial 
discretion, and legislative choices. Bix (n 1) 2-3. 
50 Cf text to footnote 15. 
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tĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?Ɛ  “ŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ? )ƚŽ ůĞŐĂů ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ĂŶĚĂƐĂ ƌĞƐƵůƚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŶŽƚŝĐĞĂďůĞ
ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐĂŶĚƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ŝǆ ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚůĂǇ
ŶŽƚ ŝŶƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐĂƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ďƵƚǁŝƚŚƐŚŽǁŝŶŐŚŽǁůĞŐĂůƌƵůĞƐ  “ĂƌĞ  ?ĂŶĚ
should be) applŝĞĚ ?51. To that end, Bix contends, Hart was not precise in his use of 
tĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ŽĨƚĞŶƵƐŝŶŐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚĞƌŵƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ  “words, sentences and rules52 ? 
interchangeably. This imprecise use of words, according to Bix, is a telling sign of the 
tension of adapting a theory about general language to legal language53. This is an 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ďƵƚŽŶĞƚŚĂƚ/ĐůĂŝŵŝƐƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨŝǆ ?ƐŽǁŶ ?ŵŝƐ )ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ
ŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?
>Ğƚ ?ƐƐƚĂƌƚǁŝƚŚŝǆ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚƵƐĞƐƚĞƌŵƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ “ǁŽƌĚƐ ?ƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞs and 
ƌƵůĞƐ ?54 interchangeably. As explained in the first section of this chapter, Bix conflates 
the concepts of open texture and vagueness. The distinction between claiming that 
rules are open textured, and that the general terms that we use to communicate to 
                                                          
51 Bix (n 1) 18 
52 Bix (n 1) 18. 
53 ŝǆ  ?Ŷ  ? )  ? ? ? ŝǆ ĚŽĞƐ ĂůƐŽ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ words, sentences and rules 
ŝŶƚĞƌĐŚĂŶŐĞĂďůǇŵŝŐŚƚƌĞĨůĞĐƚĂŶ “ŝŶĞǆĂĐƚŶĞƐƐ ŝŶƚƌĂŶƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐĂŶ ŝĚĞĂ ?ŶŽƚďĞŝŶŐƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇ
ĐĂƌĞĨƵů ŝŶ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ ?Ɛ ĚŽŵĂŝŶ Žƌ ƐĐŽƉĞ ? ?dŚŽƵŐŚ Ă ďŽůĚ ĂŶĚ ƵŶƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂƚĞĚ
argument, Brian Simpson makes a similar remark in his book Reflections on The Concept of 
Law. ,Ğ ŶŽƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ ŝŶĞǆĂĐƚŶĞƐƐ ? ĂŶĚ ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌƐ  ?ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ  “ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ
ŐĂŵĞƐ ? ? “ŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ? ?ĨĂŵŝůǇƌĞƐĞŵďůĂŶĐĞƐ ? )ĂƌĞƚǇƉŝĐĂůŽĨĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ
ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ? ^ŝŵƉƐŽŶ ŶŽƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽƵůĚ ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ďĞ ĚƵĞ ƚŽ  “ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂů ŝŶĚŽůĞŶĐĞ Žƌ
ƐůŽƉƉŝŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ? ?^ŝŵƉƐŽŶ ?Ŷ ? ? ) ? ? ?/ƚŝƐĂƌŐƵĞĚ ŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƚŚĂƚ
Hart was indeed clear on his views on Open Texture, and his work can be interpreted 
coherently. Moreover, in the notes to The Concept, Hart directs the reader to two of his earlier 
pieces where he mentions the idea of open texture and develops his thoughts further. Hart 
(n 2) 297. 
54 Bix (n 1) 18. 
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large groups of people are vague, is a significant one, particularly for the topic at hand. 
If, as Bix suggests, Hart was referring to the vagueness of general terms, then it should 
follow that Hart should always refer to words, and not confuse these with sentences 
and rules. However, it is argued that Hart was not referring to the vagueness of 
general terms, but rather to the open texture of language. It therefore follows that 
,ĂƌƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƵƐĞƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐ “ǁŽƌĚƐ ?ƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞƐĂŶĚƌƵůĞƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĐŚĂŶŐĞĂďůǇ ?ƌĂther he 
refers to words (which can be general terms), sentences (which might employ general 
terms), and rules (which might employ general terms too) as instances where we can 
see how language ŝƐ ŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞĚ ? /Ĩ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŝƐ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚ ĂƐ ĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐ ƚŽ 
general language, as Hart himself claims it is55, this is not an issue. 
^ŝŶĐĞŝǆ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚ ?ǁĞĐĂŶŶŽǁĨŽĐƵƐŽŶŝǆ ?ƐƐĞĐŽŶĚ
claim regarding judicial discretion. As mentioned, Hart believes that language is open-
textured, and that there will be situations where a fresh choice will need to be made 
between alternatives. This is where judicial discretion comes into play: according to 
                                                          
55 dŚĞƌĞĐĂŶďĞŶŽƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĨŽƌĚŝƐĐƌĞĚŝƚŝŶŐŝǆ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽƉĞŶ
ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞƚŽůĞŐĂůůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĂŶĚƌƵůĞƐ ?ƚŚĂŶĨƌŽŵ,ĂƌƚŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ?ĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝǆ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨ
ŚŝƐ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ )ǁŽƌŬǁĂƐŝŶĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞ ?/ƚ ŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŽŶŽƚĞŝǆ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ
after extracts of this chapter were published as part of an article, H.L.A. Hart sent him a letter. 
In this letter, in which Bix claims that Hart was sympathetic to much of what he had written, 
,ĂƌƚƐĂŝĚ P “/ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇĚŝĚnot think I was saying something applicable only to the language of 
statutes or rules or statutory interpretation etc. My view was (and is) that the uses of any 
language containing empirical classificatory general terms will, in applying them, meet with 
ďŽƌĚĞƌůŝŶĞ ĐĂƐĞƐ ĐĂůůŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ ĨƌĞƐŚ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ŽƉĞŶ
ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ? ? ?ŝǆ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ?dŚŝƐůĞƚƚĞƌŐŽĞƐƚŽƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌ ŚŝŵƐĞůĨĚŝĚŶŽƚĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚǁŚĂƚŝǆ
ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂƐďĞŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶ ‘ŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ? ?EŽƚǁŝƚŚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚŵŝŐŚƚŶŽƚ
ĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƐƉƌŽŵƵůŐĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌĞŝƚŚĞƌ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐůĞƚƚĞƌƚŽŝǆǁŝůůŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇƌĂŝƐĞ
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚŚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ? 
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Hart, there will be situations where judges will be called upon to make fresh decisions. 
According to Bix, Hart makes a circular argument, for not only does judicial discretion 
ŽĐĐƵƌĂƐĂĚŝƌĞĐƚƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞ “ŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ?ŽĨƌƵůĞƐ ?ďƵƚŝƚŝƐĂůƐŽƐŽůĞůǇũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚďǇ
the open texture of rules. However, Bix claims that Hart failed to prove that there is 
something inherent to legal language that means that rules are open textured, but 
rather that Hart claims that there are good reasons for us to interpret legal rules in 
that way.56 Bix intimates that Hart was trying to justify his own belief - that judicial 
discretion is of benefit - through the employment of the theory of open texture57. 
Moreover, Bix is unclear as to why the open texture of rules would necessarily lead to 
judges having to exercise discretion. Towards the end of the chapter Bix asserts that: 
Hart had not been completely clear in his description of the situation in 
ǁŚŝĐŚ ũƵĚŐĞƐ ŵƵƐƚ ƵƐĞ ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ? ƌĞ ƚŚĞƌĞ  ‘ŐĂƉƐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? ƌƵůĞƐ ? Žƌ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ŚĂǀĞ  ‘ƌƵŶ ŽƵƚ ? ĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇ ? Žƌ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ
meanings of the relevant materials have simƉůǇ  ‘ĨĂĚĞĚ ? ƐŽ ŵƵĐŚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ
periphery that they no longer determine a particular answer or 
                                                          
56 ŝǆ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P  “,Ăƌƚ ŚĂĚ ŶŽƚ ƉƌŽǀĞŶ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌe of language that judges must have 
discretion; rather, he gave reasons why legal texts should be interpreted in a way that leave 
ũƵĚŐĞƐ ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ? ? ŝǆ  ?Ŷ  ? )  ? ? ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ? ŝǆ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ǁĂƐŶ ?ƚ
concerned with presenting a theory ŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ZĂƚŚĞƌ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂŝŵǁĂƐƚŽƐŚŽǁŚŽǁůĞŐĂů
ƌƵůĞƐ “ĂƌĞ ?ĂŶĚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ )ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ?ŝǆ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ?,ĞĂƐƐĞƌƚƐƚŚŝƐ ŝŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨŚŝƐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞǁĂƐŶŽƚĂĐƵƌĂƚĞ ? 
57 ^ŽŵĞůĞŐĂůǁƌŝƚĞƌƐĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ time at the Chancery Bar had an impact on 
his views on judicial discretion.  
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interpretation (and, by inference, a range of impermissible answers and 
interpretations)?58 
ŝǆ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵĐĂŶďĞĞĂƐŝůǇĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞĚďǇůŽŽŬŝŶŐĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?/ŶThe Concept of Law, 
Hart writes: 
  QƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨďŽƌĚĞƌůŝŶĞĐĂƐĞƐŝƐĨŽƌĐĞĚƵƉŽŶŽƵƌĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐ
shows that the assumption that the several instances of a general term 
must have the same characteristics may be dogmatic.  Very often the 
ordinary, or ĞǀĞŶƚŚĞƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ?ƵƐĂŐĞŽĨĂƚĞƌŵŝƐƋƵŝƚĞ ‘ŽƉĞŶ ?ŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚ
does not forbid the extension of the term to cases where only some of the 
normally concomitant characteristics are present.59 
Hart is not talking about rules or laws or statutes. Hart is talking about general terms. 
And when we use general terms, which are very frequently used in legislation, we will 
ĂůǁĂǇƐĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌďŽƌĚĞƌůŝŶĞĐĂƐĞƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵŝƐƋƵŝƚĞ “ŽƉĞŶ ? ?KŶĐĞ
ĂŐĂŝŶ ? ŝǆ ?Ɛ ŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ũƵĚŝĐŝĂů ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶŝƐ ƐǇŵƉƚŽŵĂƚŝc of his deeper 
misunderstanding of open texture.  As mentioned throughout this chapter, Hart was 
referring to a characteristic of language, not just of rules and certainly not specific to 
legal language. In fact, in the notes to The Concept of Law, Hart refers to 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĂƌĞĂ60. In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein 
ŵĂŬĞƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ “ŐĂŵĞ ? ?dŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ “ŐĂŵĞ ?ŝƐŶŽƚďŽƵŶĚĞĚŝŶĂŶǇ
ǁĂǇ ?ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚǁĞĐŽƵůĚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ŐĂŵĞ ? ? 
                                                          
58 Bix (n 1) 25. 
59 Hart (n 2) 15. 
60 Hart (n 2) 297. 
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ǁĞĂƌĞĂůůƐƚŝůůĂďůĞƚŽƵƐĞƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ŐĂŵĞ ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŚĞŵ61 ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽ ‘ƌƵŶŶŝŶŐŽƵƚ ?
of law, or language, or rules. That is not what Hart, and certainly Wittgenstein and 
tĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ǁĞƌĞ ƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐ ƚŽ ? tŚĞŶ Ă ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ƚĞƌŵ ŝƐ ĂƉůŝĞĚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ ŶŽ  ‘ƌŝŐŝĚ ?
boundaries drawn from the beginning. When applying a rule that contains general 
terms, the one who is called upon to answer has to make a choice. There is no 
boundary, but you can draw one if you need to. And this is precisely what Hart means 
when he says that the one who is called upon to answer makes a decision as to 
whether a new line of cases should be added. When that decision is made a boundary 
ŝƐĚƌĂǁŶ ?ƵƚƚŚŝƐŝŶŶŽǁĂǇŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ ‘ŐĂƉƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞůĂǁƚŚĂƚŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞ
filled. For Hart claims that if we wanted we could draft legislation in such a way that 
no doubts as to the application of the rule would exist. However, we benefit from this 
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐŽĨ ‘ŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ? ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇǀŝƐŝďůĞŝŶƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŐĞŶĞƌĂůƚĞƌŵƐ ?
since it allows a fresh decision to be made whenever it is needed.  
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐďĞŚŝŶĚǁŚǇƌƵůĞƐǁŝůůĂůǁĂǇƐƐƵĨĨĞƌĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐ “ŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ?
of language is of vital importance for understanding this need for a fresh decision. As 
mentioned, according to Hart there are two major handicaps when one is trying to 
legislate some conduct of human behaviour through general standards of conduct: 
 “ŽƵƌƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƐ ?ĂŶĚ “ŽƵƌƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇŽĨƚŚĞĂŝŵ ?62. In 
                                                          
61 Wittgenstein (n 41 ) ? ? ?tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “ Q&Žƌ/can ŐŝǀĞƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ‘ŶƵŵďĞƌ ?ƌŝŐŝĚ
limits in this way, that is, use thĞǁŽƌĚ “ŶƵŵďĞƌ ?ĨŽƌĂƌŝŐŝĚůǇůŝŵŝƚĞĚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ?ďƵƚ/ĐĂŶĂůƐŽ
use it so that the extension of the concept is not closed by a frontier.  And this is how we use 
ƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ŐĂŵĞ ? ?&ŽƌŚŽǁŝƐƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨĂŐĂŵĞďŽƵŶĚĞĚ ?tŚĂƚƐƚŝůůĐŽƵŶƚƐĂƐĂŐĂŵĞ
and what no longer does?  Can you give the boundary?  No.  You can draw one; for none has 
ƐŽĨĂƌďĞĞŶĚƌĂǁŶ ? ?ƵƚƚŚĂƚŶĞǀĞƌƚƌŽƵďůĞĚǇŽƵďĞĨŽƌĞǁŚĞŶǇŽƵƵƐĞĚƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ŐĂŵĞ ? ? ) ? 
62 Hart (n 2) 125. 
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other words, Hart claims that we do not live in a world where everything is certain, 
and therefore cannot know in advance all the situations that may eventually come 
about. There are questions that go beyond our language. But Hart is not so bold as to 
assert that there is no way in which a system of rules could be in place whereby the 
meaning of a rule would be so strictly construed that the application of a rule is never 
in question. If we take Bix's Fregian account of language, where he claims that judges 
could make a "list" with similarities and dissimilarities of particular instances, and then 
decide whether a concept could be considered an extension of the paradigm, it could 
be conceivable that the meaning of a particular concept could be frozen, so that a 
general term would have the same meaning in every case. Taking Bix's interpretation 
of open texture, this would be a plausible, and even relatively easy, way to settle the 
issue of open texture. Hart, whose theory I argue is completely different from that 
presented by Bix, is against the idea of "necessary and sufficient conditions" that when 
present would mean the term could be applied properly in every instance of the rule. 
Hart is not oblivious to the fact that the meaning of a general term could be frozen 
and used in the same way irrespective of context; he does however make his views 
clear in Chapter VII of The Concept of Law. Hart argues that formalists holds this exact 
view, and that it would be possible, though not desirable, to freeze the meaning of a 
rule so that its general terms had the same meaning in every possible instance63. This 
ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĚŽŶĞ ďǇ ĂƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ  “ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ŶĞĐĞƐ ĂƌǇ ? ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ
extensions of a general term. Hart writes, 
                                                          
63 Hart (n 2) 129. 
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The vice known to legal theory as formalism or conceptualism consists in 
an attitude to verbally formulated rules which both seeks to disguise and 
to minimize the need for such choice, once the general rule has been laid 
down. One way of doing this is to freeze the meaning of the rule so that 
its general terms must have the same meaning in every case where its 
application is in question. To secure this we may fasten on certain features 
present in the plain case and insist that these are both necessary and 
sufficient to bring anything which has them within the scope of the rule, 
whatever other features it may have or lack, and whatever may be the 
social consequences of applying the rule in this way. (...) The 
consummation of this process is the jurists' heaven of concepts'.64 
dŚĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ “ŚĞĂǀĞŶŽĨĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ?ǁĂƐĞĐŚŽĞĚďǇĂŶĂƌƚŝĐůĞ,ĂƌƚǁƌŽte years after 
The Concept of Law, which can provide us with greater clarity regarding what Hart 
really meant by the above quotation. Around 1969, after his resignation from the Chair 
of Jurisprudence at Oxford, Hart was working on a paper on about Jhering's legal 
philosophy, entitled "Jhering, Heaven of Concepts65". In his paper, Hart firmly states 
                                                          
64 Hart (n 2) 129-130. 
65 ,> ,Ăƌƚ ?  ‘:ŚĞƌŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ,ĞĂǀĞŶ ŽĨ ŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ĂŶĚ DŽĚĞƌŶ ĂůǇƚŝĐĂů :ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?
Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 265.This paper was published in 1983 as part of the 
book Essays in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy. Also, see Nicola Lacey, A Life of H. L. A. 
Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (Oxford University Press, USA 2004), 302, where 
she writes: "In 1969, he (i.e. Hart) was also working on a paper on the late nineteenth-century 
German jurist Jhering's contribution to jurisprudence - a paper for which he had to do a 




that the lack of a translation of Jhering's work to English is an "intellectual tragedy66". 
Given Hart's praise of Jhering's work, it is hardly a coincidence that Hart refers to 
formalism as "the jurists' heaven of concepts". In this paper, Hart explains Jhering's 
ĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĞƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ?ŽǀĞƌ-simplification of real life applications of legal rules67.  
According to Hart, Jhering thought that the belief that we could consider concepts "in 
abstract" without looking at the legal consequences of a legal rule or concept was 
absurd68. Hart links Jhering's legal philosophy with his own when he says that Jhering 
understood that concepts are open, and when an unforeseen situation arises there 
must be a fresh choice as to whether adapting the concept to this new circumstance 
would lead to socially desirable ends. Jhering ridiculed the idea of rules so detailed 
that they would provide juristic specifications for the decision of all possible cases69. 
It is of note that on multiple occasions in the paper Hart makes reference to The 
Concept of Law, and his own teachings, on this matter70. Moreover, he makes 
reference to J.L. Austin and Wittgenstein's philosophy as "being free of 
Bergriffsjurisprudenz in Jhering's sense71". Referring to Waismann's concept of open 
                                                          
66 Hart (n 65) 1. 
67 Hart (n 65) 266. 
68 Hart (n 65) 266. 
69 Hart (n 65) 270. 
70 Hart (n 65) 271. 
71 Hart (n 65) 374. Bergriffsjurisprudenz can be directly translated as conceptual jurisprudence, 
and it refers to the idea that there can be a logical application of concepts to judicial decisions. 
Following this conceptual jurisprudence there would be no room for judicial discretion, since 
the judge would at every stage be bound by rules so detailed that they would govern every 
course of action. 
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texture, who in the paper Hart calls "a close adherent of Wittgenstein"72, Hart says 
that it illustrates how ordinary language philosophy is relevant to jurisprudence and, 
even though their writings were not about law, it has a lot to offer the jurisprudential 
world73.  
If Hart's theory is interpreted, as it is suggested throughout this thesis, through 
ordinary language philosophy, particularly by taking into account Waismann's and 
Wittgenstein's insights, then Bix's argument has no foundation. As argued, 
interpreting Hart's theory as a true adaptation of Waismann's teachings, one would 
reach the conclusion that Hart refers to open texture and not vagueness. Moreover, 
the issue of open texture arises due to a relative ignorance of the facts, and a relative 
ignorance of the aim, when a legislator enacts a rule. So, disputes over whether a 
concept or a situation falls under a particular rule do not arise because the general 
concept itself is unclear in all situations where it is applied, but rather because it is 
unclear whether the particular situation being presented was considered when the 
rule was enacted, and therefore until it is considered our aim in this area is 
indeterminate.  This is what Hart meant by unforeseen situations. So, just like 
tĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?Ɛ ŝŵĂŐĞŽĨĐĂƚƐŐƌŽǁŝŶŐƚŽŐŝŐĂŶƚŝĐƐŝǌĞƐ ?ĂŶĚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐƚŽĂ
                                                          
72 Hart (n 65) 271. 
73 Hart (n 65)275. Interestingly, Lacey expresses broadly the same opinion in her book. 
Moreover, she claims that Hart was prevented from following Wittgenstein's teachings due 
to "an impatience with what he saw as Wittgenstein's scandalously obscure written style", 
and "a loyalty - perhaps even a desire to please and win admiration from - J.L. Austin". Lacey 
(n 6) 219. This is hard to understand given his outright praise for Ordinary Language 
Philosophy (particularly Wittgenstein's and J.L. Austin's contribution) in Jhering, Heaven of 
Concepts. As mentioned, on multiple occasions Hart refers to The Concept, indicating that his 
theory was inspired by the teachings of these two language philosophers. 
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chair that keeps disappearing, Hart comments on the case of law by suggesting that 
there are situations that arise that had not been considered in the past. In conclusion, 
it is not that Hart did not believe that it would be possible to artificially minimise the 
ŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨ “ŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ?ŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ĂŶĚƌĞĚƵĐĞũƵĚŝĐŝĂůĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƚŝƐƚŚĂƚŚĞĚŝĚ
not believe this to be a good, helpful or beneficial thing to do.  
 
Overview 
 ŝǆǁĂƐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƚŽĞŵďƌĂĐĞ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐŝŶThe 
Concept of Law, and try to understand them in light of the theories that inspired them. 
All legal theorists whose work is discussed in the next chapters of these thesis, except 
for Marmor74 ?ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶŝǆ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂŶĚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚŝƐĂƌĞĂŽĨƚŚĞůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ?
As mentioned in the introduction, though his conclusions are flawed, his attempt to 
shed some light on ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ďĞ ƵŶĚĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ ? >ŝŬĞ ŵĂŶǇ ůĞŐĂů
ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ?ŝǆ ?ƐŵĂŝŶĨŽĐƵƐǁĂƐƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞŽĨũƵĚŝĐŝĂůĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇǁŚĞƚŚĞƌũƵĚŐĞƐ
ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĂďůĞƚŽĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƌƵůŝŶŐƐ ?/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĞǆƉůŽƌĞ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ
on judicial discƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?ŝǆƵŶĚĞƌƚŽŽŬĂŶŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌǇ
ŽĨ ŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚ ŝƚ ǁŝƚŚ tĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? ŝǆ ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ
tĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇǁĂƐŽŶůǇĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞƚŽŐĞŶĞƌĂůůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?dŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚtĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ
wrote about general languaŐĞ ?ĐŽƵƉůĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŝǆĐůĂŝŵƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨtĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇƚŽďĞŝŵƉƌĞĐŝƐĞ ?ŚĞĚĞƚĞĐƚƐƐŽŵĞ “ƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ?ŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
of the theory to law), leads him to conclude that open texture is not applicable to legal 
                                                          
74 This could potentially be given to the proximity in publication (as mentioned, Bix and 
DĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐďŽŽŬǁĞƌĞƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚĂŵĞƌĞǇĞĂƌĂƉĂƌƚ ) ?
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language. Regarding judicial discretion, Bix claims that since it is so closely linked with 
,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǀŝĞǁƐŽŶƚŚĞŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞŽĨ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? ŝƚ ŝƐŵŽƌĞĂƐƐĞƌƚĞĚ ƚŚĂŶĂƌŐƵĞĚ ĨŽƌ ?
Since Hart claims that open texture is a characteristic of language, it follows that 
judicial discretion will be inevitable. Bix disagrees with this claim, and argues that Hart 
did not present a convincing enough argument as to why judicial discretion should be 
allowed.  
  EŽƚĞǀĞŶ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ůĞƚƚĞƌ ?ĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŚŝƐ ƚŚĞŽƌǇǁĂƐŶŽƚĂďŽƵƚƌƵůĞƐŽƌ ůĞŐĂů
language, but rather about a characteristic of language, dissuaded Bix who still claims 
ƚŚĂƚ ŚŝƐ ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŝƐ ŵŽƌĞ ĚĞĨĞŶƐŝďůĞ ? dŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ŝǆ ?Ɛ
ĐůĂŝŵƐ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ĐůŽƐĞůǇ ĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĚ ? ĂŶĚ Ă ǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ŵƵĐŚ ŵŽƌĞ
compatible with what Hart himself said his work was about, was presented. It is argued 
that this view, which is compatible with Ordinary Language Philosophy and the 
different sources that Hart claim inspired his work, makes much better sense of The 
Concept of Law.   
 The next chapter will focus on the work of Andrei Marmor, whose book was 
ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚĂŵĞƌĞǇĞĂƌĂĨƚĞƌŝǆ ?Ɛ ?DĂƌŵŽƌ ?ǁŚŽǁĂƐŝǆ ?ƐĨĞůůŽǁĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞĂƚKǆĨŽƌĚ
during their doctorates, holds different but related views to those of Bix and will be 
















&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐŵǇĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝĂŶŝǆ ?ƐLanguage and Legal Determinacy1 in 
the last chapter, I now turn to focus on the work of Andrei Marmor who puts a similar 
ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐƵƉŽŶƚĂŬŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ?dŚĞĐŚŽŝĐĞƚŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞ
Marmor as the fourth chapter in this thesis is made principally for two reasons: it 
preserves the chronological order of subjects in this section, since ŶĚƌĞŝDĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ
work2 ǁĂƐƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚĂĨƚĞƌƌŝĂŶŝǆ ?Ɛ3 ?ďƵƚŵŽƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚůǇDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁŝůůĂůůŽǁ
ƵƐƚŽůŽŽŬĐůŽƐĞƌĂƚƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞŽĨ “ŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ?ŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ
ŽĨĂůĞŐĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌǁŚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐƚŚĞƚŚĞƐŝƐƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐThe Concept of Law4 was 
ŐƌĞĂƚůǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ƐƐĞĞŶŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ
ǁŝƚŚŝǆ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ĂŶĚĂƐǁŝůůďĞƐĞĞŶŝŶĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐƚŽĨ ůůŽǁ ?Ğ ?Ő ? ?ŽůĞ5 and the Beyond 
the Anglo Saxon Realm6, Marmor picks out one specific aspect of Haƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚŚĞ
ǁŝƐŚĞƐƚŽĂŶĂůǇƐĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ PƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ?Ɛ
ǁŽƵůĚďĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚĂƐ ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨŝǆ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ
ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇǁŝůůĐƌĞĂƚĞƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐe arise had 
ŚĞƚĂŬĞŶĂŵŽƌĞŚŽůŝƐƚŝĐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚŝŶĚĞĞĚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ?ǁŽƌŬ7. These 
                                                          
1 Brian Bix and Professor Brian Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy (Oxford University 
Press 1995). 
2 Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory (2nd edn, Hart Publishing (UK) 2005). 
3 Cf Chapter four footnote 4. 
4 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Joseph Raz and Penelope A Bulloch eds, 3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2012) chapter VII. 
5 See Chapter seven, Tony Cole. 
6 See Chapter eight, Beyond the Anglo-Saxon Realm.  
7 DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ? ?ƚƚŚĞƐƚĂƌƚŽĨƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ?ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ “tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶŽŶ&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĂ
ZƵůĞ ? ?DĂƌŵŽƌǁƌŝƚĞƐ P  “EĞĞĚůĞƐƐ ƚŽ ƐĂǇ ?Ă ĨƵůů ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ Ĩ ƚŚŝƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ




tensions and inconsistencies will be highlighted throughout this chapter in order to 
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĂƚĂŵŽƌĞŚŽůŝƐƚŝĐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁŽƵůĚĞůŝŵŝnate such 
ƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚƌĞǀĞĂůĂŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĚĞƉƚŚƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? 
 dĂŬĞŶĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞ ?DĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ?ǁƌŝƚƚĞŶĂƐĂĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨǁŽƌŬŝŶ ?ƐƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐ
sting argument8, focuses on the work of a number of legal theorists such as Raz and 
Fish.9 This breadth is, ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŶŽƚƉĞƌƚŝŶĞŶƚĨŽƌƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ĂŶĚDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐŵĂŝŶĂŝŵ
 ?ƉƌŽǀŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐƐƚŝŶŐ “ƐƚƵŶŐŶŽŽŶĞ10 ? )ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐŚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽƚŚĞƌ
ůĞŐĂů ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ? ǁŽƌŬ ǁŝůů ďĞ ĚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚ ƐŝŶĐĞŝƚ ŐŽĞƐ ďĞǇŽŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŽƉĞ ŽĨ ŵǇ
argument. Instead, whaƚŝƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝƐDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĂŶĚƚŚĞǁĂǇ
ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐŚŝƐĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ĂŶĚǁŝƚŚŝƚ>ĞŐĂůWŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵŝƚƐĞůĨ ?/Ŷ
ƐŚŽƌƚ ?DĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŽŶƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ )
                                                          
Marmor is referring to WiƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƌƵůĞ-following, discussed in sections 143-
242 of Philosophical Investigations. It would not be expected of Marmor to provide a full 
explanation of the arguments presented in Philosophical Investigations, but what might be 
said of any philosophy, is probably even more true in the case of Philosophical Investigations: 
ƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐŝŶtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂƌĞƐŽŝŶƚĞƌƚǁŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐŶŽƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽŝƐŽůĂƚĞ
any single part of the book and disregard its connections to other parts. Furthermore, it is not 
clear why Marmor informs the reader of this shortcoming, for presumably the observation 
could have reasonably been omitted. This issue is not particular to Marmor, as will be seen in 
Chapter seven, where Tony Cole takes a similar ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŽĨ “ƉŝĐŬŝŶŐĂŶĚĐŚŽŽƐŝŶŐ ?ƉĂƌƚƐŽĨ
: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇƚŚĂƚŚĞĨĞĞůƐƐƵŝƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ? ?^ĞĞŚĂƉƚĞƌƐĞǀĞŶ, text to footnote 56.) 
8 DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ?/ŶƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽŚŝƐďŽŽŬ ?DĂƌŵŽƌǁƌŝƚĞƐŽĨǁŽƌŬŝŶ ?ƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůŝĚĞĂ P
 “>ĂǁĂƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂtion calls into question the main tenets of its positivist rival, in substance as 
well as method. This book sets out to re-examine positivism in the light of this interpretative 
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ? ? DĂƌŵŽƌ  ?Ŷ  ? )  ? ?/ƚ ŝƐ ďĞǇŽŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŽƉĞ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ƚŽ ĚĞĂů ǁŝƚŚ DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ
ŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽǁŽƌŬŝŶ ?ƐƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐƐƚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƚŚŝƐǁŝůůŶŽƚďĞĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚŝŶĂŶǇĚĞƚĂŝů ? 
9 Marmor (n 2) 108.  
10 Marmor (n 2) 108. 
 127 
 
legal positivist ƐĞƉĂƌĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?/ƚŝƐDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
 “ůĂǁĂƐŝƚ ŝƐ ?ĨƌŽŵ “ůĂǁĂƐŝƚŽƵŐŚƚƚŽďĞ ? ?ŝƐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇďǇ,ĂƌƚŝŶThe 
Concept of Law through the introduction of the distinction between so-ĐĂůůĞĚ “ĞĂƐǇ ?
ĂŶĚ “ŚĂƌĚ ?ĐĂƐĞƐ11 ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽDĂƌŵŽƌ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌǇ
of open texture, itself embedded within a particular philosophy of language, gives the 
separability thesis a conceptual foundation separate from legal positivism. In virtue of 
being conceptually independent from legal positivism, the separability thesis can 
stand on its own merits, and not as a positivistic conception, and is therefore 
defensible from the criticism arising from anti-positivistic legal theorists. Marmor 
chooses to preƐĞŶƚŚŝƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞďĂĐŬĚƌŽƉŽĨ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
theory, as presented in the Hart-Fuller debate12 ?DĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŽŶ,ĂƌƚƌĞĂĚƐĂƐĂ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨůĞŐĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ
numerous reĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƚŽ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁŝůůĞŵĞƌŐĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? 
KŶĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ŶƵĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ĂďƐĞŶƚ ĨƌŽŵ ŽƚŚĞƌ ůĞŐĂů
ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ? ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ DĂƌŵŽƌ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞƐ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƌƵůĞ-
ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŝŶ ƐŽŵĞ ĚĞƚĂŝů ? DĂƌŵŽƌ ?s discussion is advantageous for the 
advancement of my thesis since it will allow us to understand the way in which 
                                                          
11 DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ŷ ? )DĂƌŵŽƌǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƚĞŶĞƚƐŽĨůĞŐĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵŝƐŝƚƐŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽŶ
the conceptual ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶůĂǁĂƐŝƚŝƐĂŶĚůĂǁĂƐŝƚŽƵŐŚƚƚŽďĞ ? ?DĂƌŵŽƌĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ
this distinction is embedded in the Separability Thesis. For further reference see HLA Hart, 
 ‘WŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ^ĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ >Ăǁ ĂŶĚ DŽƌĂůƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ƐƐĂǇƐ ŝŶ :ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ 
Philosophy 49, 606. 
12 ƐŝǆďĞĨŽƌĞŚŝŵ ?DĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐŵĂŝŶĨŽĐƵƐŝƐ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞPositivism and Fidelity to Law (Lon 




Marmor reads and understands Wittgenstein. By explaining his understanding of 
Wittgenstein, we can clearly see where his misunderstandings lie and so identify the 
ŝŵƉĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŚĂƐŽŶŚŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?/ŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǁĂǇ
ƚŚĂƚ DĂƌŵŽƌ ƐĞĞŵƐ ƚŽ ĂŶĂůǇƐĞ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? ŚĞ ƉŝĐŬƐ ŽƵƚ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐPhilosophical Investigations and analyses them in isolation13.  It cannot 
ďĞĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŚĂƚŽƚŚĞƌůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐŝǆ ?ĨŝŶĂůůǇŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ
in the same way, but given that their methodology is very similar, and that (as I claim) 
they therefore commit the same methodological mistakes, there is some plausibility 
ŝŶ ƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƐĞůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨƉĂƌƚƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ƚŚĂƚ
ĂĨĨĞĐƚƐƚŚĞŝƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŚŽůĞƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽƚŚĞŝƌƐĞůĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨ
ƉĂƌƚƐ ŽĨ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ and explanation of 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇǁŝůůďĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? 
There will again be two substantive sections to this chapter: the first section 
ǁŝůůĨŽĐƵƐŽŶDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ “ĞĂƐǇ ?ĂŶĚ “ŚĂƌĚ ?ĐĂƐĞƐ ?ĂůƐŽŬŶŽǁŶ
as thĞĐŽƌĞĂŶĚƉĞŶƵŵďƌĂŽĨĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ?dŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞŵĂŝŶĨŽĐƵƐŽĨDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ- 
ĂĨƚĞƌĂůůŝƚŝƐĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ “EŽĂƐǇĂƐĞƐ ?14 ? ?ĂŶĚŝƚǁŝůůƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞďĞƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂů
ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƐĞĐƚŝŽŶǁŝůůĨŽĐƵƐŽŶDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ
Hart ?ƐĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨ ůĞŐĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ůĞŐĂůĨŽƌŵĂůŝƐŵ ?dŚŝƐƐĞĐƚŝŽŶǁŝůů ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞ
ƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐŽĨĂŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐƉĂƌƚƐŽĨďŽƚŚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂŶĚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶ
isolation and will give some indication of the problems to follow. The final section will 
ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌďǇƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŽDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐŽǁŶĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶĂŶĚĂƐƵŵŵĂƌǇŽĨŚŝƐ
                                                          
13 Ludwig Wittgenstein and translated [from the German] by G. E. M. Anscombe, Philosophical 
Investigations Philosophische Untersuchungen (3rd edn, Blackwell Publishers 1967). 
14 Marmor (n 2) 108. 
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ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ŚŽǁ ŚŝƐ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ůŝŶŬ ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? WĞƌŚĂƉƐ ĚƵĞ ƚŽ DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ ĨŽĐƵƐ ŽŶ
&ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ? DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ŝƐ
somewhat disparate and lacks a coherent approach. This will in turn mean that the 
critical commentary I make in different sections in this chapter might not immediately 
flow or connect in a way that is fluid and cohesive.  I join up these various strands later 
in thĞĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŝŶĂĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐŽǀĞƌĂƌĐŚŝŶŐŵĞƚŚŽĚĂŶĚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? 
 
On Easy and Hard Cases 
 DĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ “ĞĂƐǇ ?ĂŶĚ “ŚĂƌĚ ?ĐĂƐĞƐŝƐĚŽŶĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨ
ŽŶĞŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŚĂƌƐŚĞƐƚĐƌŝƚŝĐƐ ?>ŽŶ&ƵůůĞƌ ?/ƚŝƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐŚŽƉĞƚŚĂƚďǇĚĞĨeating 
ŽŶĞŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŚĂƌƐŚĞƐƚĐƌŝƚŝĐƐŚĞǁŽƵůĚŝŶƚƵƌŶĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚǁŽƌŬŝŶ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
theory15, but this idea is merely speculative in nature since Marmor is not explicit 
regarding his methodology or wider ambition. As Green and Bix before him, Marmor 
ƌĞĂĚƐ,ĂƌƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂŶŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚŚĞŚŽůĚƐ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ) ?
ďƵƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŐŝǀĞĞŶŽƵŐŚĚĞƚĂŝůŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂŶĚŝƚƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
theory for his case to be compelling (even claiming that a full account of 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ďĞǇŽŶĚ ŚŝƐ ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞ16). When testing his 
ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĐĂƐĞ ĂƐ Ă ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ? ŚĞ ůĞĂǀĞƐ ůĂƌŐĞ ƉĂƌƚƐ ŽĨ ŚŝƐ
argument and premises unexplained, and thereby creates new problems and tensions 
in the underƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ƚŚĂƚ  ?ĂŐĂŝŶ ) ǁŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ŽĐĐƵƌ ŚĂĚ DĂƌŵŽƌ
ƉƵƌƐƵĞĚ Ă ŵŽƌĞ ŚŽůŝƐƚŝĐ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? ůů ƚŚĞƐĞ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ǁŝůů ďĞ
                                                          
15 Ɛ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ďĞǇŽŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŽƉĞ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ƚŽ ĚĞĂů ǁŝƚŚ DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ ŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ
DworŬŝŶ ?ƐƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐƐƚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƚŚŝƐǁŝůůŶŽƚ be addressed in any detail. 
16 Marmor (n 2) 112. Cf footnote no. 7 above. 
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addressed in turn in the paragraphs to follow. In his commentary Marmor focuses on 
&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞtŽƌld War II memorial tank. Though lengthy, it is important to 
ƌĞĂĚ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐƉĂƐƐĂŐĞŝŶĨƵůůĨŽƌĂĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨ&ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ
DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ ?ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?&ƵůůĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
What would Professor Hart say if some local patriots wanted to mount on 
a pedestal in the park a truck used in World War II, while other citizens, 
regarding the proposed memorial as an eyesore, support their stand by 
the "no vehicle" rule? Does this truck, in perfect working order, fall within 
the core or the penumbra? Professor Hart seems to assert that unless 
words have "standard instances" that remain constant regardless of 
context, effective communication would break down and it would become 
impossible to construct a system of "rules which have authority." If in 
every context words took on a unique meaning, peculiar to that context, 
the whole process of interpretation would become so uncertain and 
subjective that the ideal of a rule of law would lose its meaning.17 
 ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽDĂƌŵŽƌ ?&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŝƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚƌĞĞŵĂŝŶĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐŽŶ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
theory18: 
A. That interpreting a legal rule is a matter of interpreting the concept-words19 it 
deploys 
                                                          
17 Fuller (n 12) 663-664. 
18 Marmor (n 2) 99. 
19 /ƚ ŝƐ ƵŶĐůĞĂƌ ǁŚǇ DĂƌŵŽƌ ƵƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ  “ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ-ǁŽƌĚƐ ? ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƌĞ
estaďůŝƐŚĞĚƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇŽĨ “ŐĞŶĞƌĂůƚĞƌŵƐ ?Žƌ “ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ? ?dŚŝƐƚĞƌŵƐĞĞŵƐƚŽďĞ
used exclusively by Marmor. This terminology is in stark contrast to essentialist or definitional 
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B. That interpretation of concept-words in legal rules is determined by ordinary 
use of these terms in natural language 
C. That the meaning of concept-words is insensitive to the particular legal-
context in which these words are meant to function. 
DĂƌŵŽƌĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐŵĂŝŶĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵǁĂƐƚŚĂƚĨŽƌ,ĂƌƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĂƌƵůĞŝƐ
always a matter of determining its purpose, and the purpose can only be ascertained 
ŝŶůŝŐŚƚŽĨǁŚĂƚƚŚĞƌƵůĞŝƐƚŚĞƌĞƚŽƐĞƚƚůĞŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉůĂĐĞ ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “ŽƵŐŚƚ ?
ŝƐ ĚĞĐŝĚŝŶŐ ǁŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƌƵůĞ  “ŝƐ ? ) ? Ǉ ďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐ ĚŽǁŶ &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐ ŝŶƚŽ  ? ŵĂŝŶ
assumptions, Marmor hopes to address them each in turn and invalidate them all. The 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵǁŝƚŚDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝƐƚŚĂƚďǇŝƚĞŵŝǌŝŶŐ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŝŶƚŚŝƐŵĂŶŶĞƌ ?
his own analysis becomes disjointed and nonsensical, and his defence of Hart suffers 
in similar manner.  
The first point Marmor addresses is point  ? “ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ-words 
is insensitive to the particular legal-context in which these words are meant to 
function20 ? ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽDĂƌŵŽƌ ?&ƵůůĞƌŝƐŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŶƚŽĂƐƐƵŵĞƚŚĂ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ-words 
need to have the same meaning irrespective of context. In other words, Marmor 
claims that the meaning of concept-words varies depending on the wider context. To 
illustrate his point, he gives the example of the concept-ǁŽƌĚ “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ? ?ĂŶĚĐůĂŝŵƐ
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƌĞĂƐŽŶǁŚǇƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƌƵůĞ “ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ?
                                                          
ideas of the meaning of concepts, and plays an important part in framinŐDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐǀŝĞǁĂƐ
will be seen in the paragraphs to follow. 
20 Mamor (n 2) 100. 
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ƐŚŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĂƐ “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ?ĨŽƌŵŽƚŽƌŝŶƐƵƌĂŶĐĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ21. According 
to Marmor, Hart is not claiming that concept-words should have the same meaning in 
ĞǀĞƌǇĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĂ “ĐŽƌĞ ?ŽĨ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?dŚĂƚŝs, there are some 
 “ĐŽƌĞ ?ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵĐĂƐĞƐ )ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĚŝƐƉƵƚĞĂƐƚŽƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
the concept-ǁŽƌĚ ?Ğ ?Ő ? “ŝĨĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐŝƐĂǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ?ĂŵŽƚŽƌĐĂƌŝƐŽŶĞ ?22). Marmor affirms 
that Fuller is against this view, as Fuller claims that according ƚŽ,ĂƌƚĂƚĞƌŵ ?ƐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ
ŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞŝŶĞǀĞƌǇĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ ?&ƵůůĞƌǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “ƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ
of interpretation would become so uncertain and subjective that the rule of law would 
lose its meaning23 ? ) ?^ Ž ?DĂƌŵŽƌŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚƐ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐƚŽ mean that if, for example, 
an electric bicycle, was considered a vehicle for the purpose of a particular rule, it 
would be considered a vehicle for the purpose of any rule.  So far, Marmor presents a 
logical and defensible argument. The difficulty lies with his understanding of the so-
ĐĂůůĞĚ  “ĐŽƌĞ ? ĐĂƐĞƐ ? >Ğƚ ?Ɛ ƐƚĂƌƚ ǁŝƚŚ DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂŶĚŝƚƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ “ĞĂƐǇ ?ĂŶĚ “ŚĂƌĚ ?ĐĂƐĞƐ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ
are two types of legal case: the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ “ĞĂƐǇĐĂƐĞƐ ?24 where the judges will be able 
                                                          
21 DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ? ?DĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞĐĂŶďĞŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚĨƵƌ ŚĞƌďǇƵƐŝŶŐĂƌĞĂů-life example. 
The Road Traffic Act 1998 article 143 requires of every person who uses a motor vehicle on 
the road to have, at least, third party liability insurance. However, electric bicycles are not 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ “ŵŽƚŽƌǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐƌƵůĞ ?ůĞŐĂůůǇƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚƚŽƉĞĚĂů
bicycles). This does not mean that for the purpose of anŽƚŚĞƌƌƵůĞ ?Ğ ?Ő ? “ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ
ƉĂƌŬ ? )ĂŶĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐďŝĐǇĐůĞǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂ ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ?^Ž ?ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ-word could 
have different extensions depending on context. 'Electric bikes: The rules', (8 March 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/electric-bike-rules> accessed 3 April 2016 
22 Hart (n 4) 126. 
23 Fuller (n 12) 664. 
24 DĂƌŵŽƌŶŽƚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐ “ĞĂƐǇ ?ĂŶĚ “ŚĂƌĚ ?ĐĂƐĞƐŵŝŐŚƚďĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇŵŝƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ?ĂƐ
ƉĞƌZĂǌ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ŝƐŶŽƚƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨ ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůĞĨĨŽƌƚ
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to identify the law and apply it without any extraneous reference, such as to its 
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ?ĂŬŝŶƚŽ “ůĂǁĂƐŝƚŝƐ ? ) ?ĂŶĚ “ŚĂƌĚĐĂƐĞƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞũƵĚŐĞƐǁŝůůŶĞĞĚƚŽŵŽĚŝĨǇĂŶĚ
ĐƌĞĂƚĞŶĞǁůĂǁ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĂůŵŽĨ “ůĂǁĂƐŝƚŽƵŐŚƚƚŽďĞ ? ) ?dŚĞŵŽdification to or creation 
ŽĨŶĞǁůĂǁƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶ “ŚĂƌĚĐĂƐĞƐ ?ŝƐ ?ĨŽƌDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ĂŬŝŶƚŽŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŽ “ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚ ?ĂƌƵůĞ ?
dŚĞĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚůŝĞƐŝŶŚŝƐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
core and penumbra of concepts has so far been gravely misunderstood, since its 
ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŽ “ĂŚŝŐŚůǇƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚĞĚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĂŶĚůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?25, namely 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ26 ?ŚĂƐŶŽƚďĞĞŶƚĂŬĞŶŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?ǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?DĂƌŵŽƌ
writes: 
                                                          
required to decide the legal case, but rather with the application of the legal rule. Marmor (n 
 ? )  ? ? ? /ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐůǇ ? DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  “ĞĂƐǇ ? ĂŶĚ  “ŚĂƌĚ ? ĐĂƐĞƐ ĨŽůůŽǁƐ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ
ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂƐŝǆ ?Ɛ ?ŝŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐDĂƌŵŽƌƵƐĞƐƚŚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞ ƌƵůĞ “ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ
ŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ?ƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶŚŝƐƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ? 
25 Marmor (n 2) 96. As it was mentioned in Chapter 2, Brian Bix (cf Chapter 3) holds a similar 
view, in so far as he claims that legal theorists have misunderstood legal philosophy for they 
failed to take the philosophy ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ?,ĞƐĂǇƐ P “/ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇŝŶĂǁĂǇƚŚĂƚ
ƚƌŝĞƐƚŽďĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĂďŽƵƚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ŝǆ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ?^ ƚĞĨĂŶŽĞƌƚĞĂ ?ƐĞĞ^ ƚĞĨĂŶŽĞƌƚĞĂ ? ‘ZĞŵĂƌŬƐ
ŽŶĂ>ĞŐĂůWŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚDŝƐƵƐĞŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ>ĂƚĞƌWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?^^ZEůĞctronic Journal, 514-
515) makes reference to the work of Andrei Mamor, as he notes that he was the first legal 
theorist to put forward the positivist argument from Wittgenstein. Regarding this, he writes: 
 “dŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĂŝŵƐƚŽƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶthesis is inconsistent with the account of 
rule-ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĨŽƵŶĚŝŶtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ĂŶĚŚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚǁĞŚĂǀĞƚŽƌĞŶŽƵŶĐĞ
this philosophy if we want to make a case for interpretativism. But the philosophy we are 
asked to rejoice is quite significant, so the argument from Wittgenstein, if tenable, will prove 
to be powerful and persuasive weapon that legal positivism can wield against 
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝǀŝƐŵ ? ?/ƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ^ƚĞĨĂŶŽĞƌƚĞĂƉƌŽĐĞĞĚƐƚŽĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚDĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ
ƵƐĞŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?s philosophy.  
26 ,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ? ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞĚ ?DĂƌŵŽƌĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉĂƐƐĂŐĞ ?ƋƵŽƚĞĚĂďŽǀĞ )ŚĂƐďĞĞŶŐƌĞĂƚůǇ
ŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ?ĂŶĚƉƌŽƉŽƐĞƐĚĞĨĞŶĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶďǇĨŝƌƐƚ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐƚŽĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐƚŚĂƚ
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dŚĞŐŝƐƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐŵĂǇďĞƐƵŵŵĞĚƵƉĂƐĨŽůůŽǁƐ PƚŚe formulation of 
legal rules in natural language makes their meanings depend, primarily, on 
the meanings of the concept-words used in these formulations. Since the 
meaning of a concept-word consists in (inter alia) its use, there must 
always be standard instances in which the application of the concept-word 
is unproblematic.27 
tŚĞŶ ĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐ  “ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ-ǁŽƌĚƐ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁŝůů ďĞ ĐĂƐĞƐ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐ
unproblematic, where we know how to apply the concept-word. These cases, Marmor 
argues, fall under what HaƌƚĐĂůůƐƚŚĞ “ĐŽƌĞŽĨŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?28. There will however be cases 
                                                          
have been put against it, and then demonstrate that it is based on the philosophy of 
Wittgenstein. In the same paragraph, Marmor states that the distinction between easy and 
hard cases is entailed by the distinction between law as it is and law as it ought to be, as 
ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚďǇ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉĂƐƐĂŐĞ ?KŶĞĐĂŶƚŚĞƌĞfore safely assume that Marmor is intending to 
ĚĞĨĞŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  “ĞĂƐǇ ? ĂŶĚ  “ŚĂƌĚ ? ĐĂƐĞƐ ďǇ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐ ŝƚ ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ
philosophy of the later Wittgenstein. 
27 Marmor (n 2) 96.  
28 DĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵuse, which Marmor himself italicises in his book, is of 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŝŶĐĞŝƚŝƐĂĐůĞĂƌƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƵƐĞƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ
whereby he claims that the meaning of concepts is shown in their use. Wittgenstein writes: 
 “&ŽƌĂlarge class of cases  W though not for all  W ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚǁĞĞŵƉůŽǇƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?ŝƚ
ĐĂŶďĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚƚŚƵƐ PƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨĂǁŽƌĚŝƐŝƚƐƵƐĞŝŶůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? ?tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ŷ ? ? ) ? ? ? ?
WĞƚĞƌ^ƚƌĂǁƐŽŶ ?^ƚƌĂǁƐŽŶ ?W ?& ? “ZĞǀŝĞǁŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐĞŝŶ ?ƐWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů/ŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?Mind 
LXIII (1954), 73) explĂŝŶƐƚŚŝƐďǇƐĂǇŝŶŐ P “/ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ƚŚĞŶ ?ŽĨŐĂǌŝŶŐĂƚƚŚŝƐ ŽǀĞƌƐŝŵƉůĞƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŽĨ
language, with its attendant assimilations, we are to look at the elements of language as 
instruments. We are to study their use. Only so can we solve our conceptual problems. 
VaƌŝĂŶƚƐŽŶ ‘ƵƐĞ ?ŝŶtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶĂƌĞ ‘ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ? ‘ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ? ‘ƌŽůĞ ? ‘ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? Q )dŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂů
aim is clear enough: to get us away from our fascination with the dubious relation of naming, 




where it is unclear whether or not a concept-word is applicable, and these fall under 
the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ “ƉĞŶƵŵďƌĂŽĨŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? ?ĂŶĚŵĂƌŬƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ “ĞĂƐǇ ?ĂŶĚ
 “ŚĂƌĚ ? ĐĂƐĞƐ ? ^Ž ? ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞƌe is a general agreement as to the concept-ǁŽƌĚ ?Ɛ
applicability, i.e., the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ “ĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌĐĂƐĞƐ ?29, the case falls under the category of 
 ‘ĞĂƐǇ ? ? /Ŷ ƚŚĞƐĞĐĂƐĞƐ ƚŚĞĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĂƌĞĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇ ƌĞĐƵƌƌŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŶŽ
doubts as to the applicability ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐĂů ƌƵůĞ ? ƚŚƵƐ ƚŚĞǇ ĨĂůů ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ  “ĐŽƌĞ ŽĨ
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? ?ůůŽƚŚĞƌƐĂŵŽƵŶƚƚŽĂ “ĐƌŝƐŝƐŝŶĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?30, where it is not clear if 
the general word or expression should apply or not, the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ “ŚĂƌĚ ?ĐĂƐĞƐ ? “,ĂƌĚ
ĐĂƐĞƐ ?ĂƌĞƚŚŽƐĞƚŚĂƚĨĂůůƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞ “ƉĞŶƵŵďƌĂŽĨŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? ?/ŶĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ
ƚŽ DĂƌŵŽƌ ?  “ĞĂƐǇ ? ĂŶĚ  “ŚĂƌĚ ? ĐĂƐĞƐ ĂƌĞ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƌĞĐƚ ƌĞƐƵůƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ-
words31. He writes, 
 QƐŝŶĐĞŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ-words in our language are actually vague or 
open-textured, their application to the facts will always involve some 
borderline cases 
tŚĂƚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐĐŽŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƌĞŵĂƌŬŝƐƚŚĂƚ ?ĂƐĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞĂŶĚŵƵĐŚ
ůŝŬĞŝǆ ?ŚĞĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽƵƐĞƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐ “ǀĂŐƵĞ ?ĂŶĚ “ŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞĚ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĐŚĂŶŐĞĂďůǇ ?
hŶůŝŬĞ ŝǆ ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ ŵŝƐƵnderstanding is not due to a philosophical 
ŽǀĞƌƐŝŐŚƚďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŽŚŝƐĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ “ŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ?ŝƐŶŽŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶĂŶĞǆƚƌĞŵĞ
version of vagueness and should therefore be disregarded. According to Marmor, 
even words that are not vague could potentially ďĞ ƐŽ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚŝƐ  “ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ
                                                          
29 Marmor (n 2) 126. 
30 Marmor (n 2) 127. 
31 Marmor (n 2) 126. 
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ǀĂŐƵĞŶĞƐƐ ?ŝƐǁŚĂƚ “ŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ?ĚĞŶŽƚĞƐ32. As discussed in chapter four33, there is 
Ă ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  “ǀĂŐƵĞŶĞƐƐ ? ĂŶĚ  “ŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ? ? dŽ
briefly recap, vagueness is the property of concepts that ŐŝǀĞƐ ƌŝƐĞ ƚŽ  “ďŽƌĚĞƌůŝŶĞ
ĐĂƐĞƐ ? ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂŐŝǀĞŶĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽƌĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŝƐ ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌŝŶĚŝƐƉƵƚĂďůǇĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞ
ŶŽƌ ŝŶĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞ ? KƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŚĂŶĚ ŝƐ ǁŚĂƚ tĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ĐĂůůƐ  “ƚŚĞ
ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ǀĂŐƵĞŶĞƐƐ ? ?  DĂƌŵŽƌ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƐ  “ŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ? ƚŽ ŵĞan that all 
concepts are in fact vague34 ? ƐŝŶĐĞ ĞǀĞŶ ƚŚĞ ŽŶĞƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ ďĞ
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚǀĂŐƵĞƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ǀĂŐƵĞŶĞƐƐ ? ?ĂƌĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŝŶŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ
given that there is a possibility of them being vague. In sum, according to Marmor, 
open texture is just an extreme version of vagueness, and therefore does not need to 
be distinguish from, or analysed as a different concept than vagueness. This leads 
DĂƌŵŽƌƚŽĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ “ĂůůƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐŝŶŽƵƌůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĂƌĞǀĂŐƵĞ ?35. Notwithstanding 
                                                          
32 DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ? ?DĂƌŵŽƌǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “ǀĞŶƚĞƌŵƐǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞŶŽƚ ǀĂŐƵĞĂƌĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇƐŽ ?ƐŝŶĐĞ
one can always imagine circumstances where there would be irresolvable disagreements in 
ũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚ ĂƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌĚ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ? :ĞƌĞŵǇ tĂůĚƌŽŶ ƐĞĞŵƐ ƚŽ ŚŽůĚ Ă ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ǀŝĞǁ
ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ǀĂŐƵĞŶĞƐƐ ďĞŝŶŐ ŝŶĞůŝŵŝŶĂďůĞ ? tĂůĚƌŽŶ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P  “ ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ŚĂǀĞ
speculated that vagueness is in principle ineliminable because it is possible to envisage 
puzzling borderline cases for every predicate we define. This possibility was labelled "open 
ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ?ďǇ&ƌŝĞĚƌŝĐŚtĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ? ?Jeremy Waldron, California law review vagueness in law and 
language: Some philosophical issues (2015) 522. 
33 Chapter four, Brian Bix on Judicial Discretion, text to footnote 28.  
34 DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ŷ  ? )  ? ? ? ?DĂƌŵŽƌǁƌŝƚĞƐ ?  “dŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƚĞƌŵ ?ĐŽŝŶĞĚďǇtĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ) ŝƐŵĞĂŶƚƚŽ
designate the possibility of vagueness. Even terms which are not vague are potentially so, 
since one can always imagine circumstances where there would be irresolvable 
ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐŝŶũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚƐĂƐƚŽƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂďŝů ƚǇ ? ? 
35 DĂƌŵŽƌ  ?Ŷ  ? )  ? ? ? ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P  “/Ĩ ǁĞ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ǀĂŐƵĞŶĞƐƐ ƚŽŵĞĂŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ŽĨ
applying a word there are irresolvable disagreements in judgement over certain areas of its 
application, then it is obviously true that most concept-ǁŽƌĚƐĂƌĞǀĂŐƵĞ ? ? 
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the iŵƉĂĐƚŽĨƐƵĐŚĂĐůĂŝŵ ?DĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐĐŽŶĨůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƚǁŽĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů
concepts also blinds him to the possibility of a concept being open textured, but not 
ǀĂŐƵĞ ? >Ğƚ ?Ɛ ƚĂŬĞ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  “ŵŽƚŚĞƌ ? ? /Ĩ / ƉŽŝŶƚ ƚŽ ĂǁŽŵĂŶ ĂŶĚ ƐĂǇ P  “dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ŵǇ
ŵŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?ƚŚe use of the word mother is quite definite. I am indicating that the woman 
ǁŚŽ/ĂŵƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐƚŽŝƐŵǇŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŝƐŶĞŝƚŚĞƌĂĚĞŐƌĞĞ
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǁĂǇĂƐ ?ůĞƚ ?ƐƐĂǇ ?ďĂůĚŶĞƐƐ36 is a matter of degree), neither is it a 
relative ƚĞƌŵ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǁĂǇĂƐ “ƚĂůů ?Žƌ “ŚĞĂǀǇ ?37 ) ?dŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ
is open textured, and there are new situations revealed through technological 
advances that have highlighted its open textured nature, but it is nonetheless not 
vague and its application may be definite in many situations, including new ones38. 
Marmor dismisses open texture in one paragraph, and does not give it any further 
thought throughout his chapter. The reasoning behind this outright dismissal of open 
texture as a version of vagueness, is that Wittgenstein would have found this 
                                                          
36 ĂůĚŝƐĐůĂƐƐŝĐĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨĂ “ǀĂŐƵĞ ?ƚĞƌŵ ?^ŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽŚĞŚĞĂƉƉĂƌĂĚŽǆ ?ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞůĂƐƚ
chapter  W cf Chapter Four  W Brian Bix on Judicial Discretion, footnote 28), if a person with n 
hairs on his head is bald, so is a person with n+1 hairs. So how many hairs would it take for a 
person to stop being bald? Baldness is a matter of degree. Unlike absolute terms (such as 
 “ĚĞĂĚ ? ) ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĚĞŐƌĞĞƐŽĨďĂůĚŶĞƐƐ ?KƚŚĞƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐĂƌĞ “ǇŽƵŶŐ ? ? “ĨĂƚƚǇ ? ? “ŐŽŽĚ
ƐƚƵĚĞŶƚ ? ? 
37 ŽŶĐĞƉƚƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ “ƚĂůů ?Žƌ “ŚĞĂǀǇ ?ĂƌĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŝŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ-dependent. For 
example, someone who is 4 feet tall might think that somĞŽŶĞ ǁŚŽ ŝƐ  ? ĨĞĞƚ ƚĂůů ŝƐ  “ƚĂůů ? ?
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞǁŚŽŝƐ ?ĨĞĞƚƚĂůů ?ŵŝŐŚƚĨŝŶĚƚŚĂƚƐĂŵĞ ?ĨĞĞƚƚĂůůƉĞƌƐŽŶ “ƐŚŽƌƚ ? ?dŚĞƐĂŵĞ
ĂƉƉůŝĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ  “ŚĞĂǀǇ ? ? &Žƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ǁŚĞŶ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ Žƌ ŶŽƚ Ă ďĂďǇ
elephant is heavy, one could say that it is heavy (if we are thinking of lifting it), but it is not 
heavy (if we are comparing it to a full grown elephant).  
38 For further clarification see Chapter Four, Brian Bix, text to footnote 26. 
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distinction largely irrelevant, and would not have employed it either39. Marmor notes 
that more important than the distinction between open texture and vagueness, is 
distinguishing between vagueness and family resemblance (possibly due to the 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ĂŶĚDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐĂŝŵƚŽůŝŶŬŝƚƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ )40. 
According to Marmor, family resemblance implies that the phenomena in question 
ĂƌĞ  “ůŝŶŬĞĚ ƚŽ ĞĂĐŚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ďǇ ŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?41. Family 
resemblance would present a variety of instances that might not present one single 
thing in common, but be connected by different and complex similarities. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, being aware of the distinction between these three related, 
albeit different, philosophical concepts is important. However, it is also important to 
ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ĐŚŽƐĞ ƚŽ ĞŵƉůŽǇ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇ  “ŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ? ? ĂŶĚ ŽŶĞ
ƐŚŽƵůĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞďĞŐŝŶďǇƚĂŬŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ?ĂŶĚexplore whether 
                                                          
39 This is a convoluted  argument, whereby Marmor claims that:  “tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ǁŽƵůĚ
ƐƵďƐĐƌŝďĞƚŽƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐŝŶŽƵƌůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĂƌĞĂƚůĞĂƐƚƉŽƐƐŝďůǇǀĂŐƵĞ ? Q )
yet one would be on safe ground presuming that he would not have attached great 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞƚŽƚŚŝƐĨĂĐƚ ? ?DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ? ?KŶĞĐŽƵůĚĂƌŐƵĞƚhat claiming that Hart employed 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ  “ĞĂƐǇ ? ĂŶĚ  “ŚĂƌĚ ? ĐĂƐĞƐ ŝƐ Ă ŵƵĐŚ ŵŽƌĞ ƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů
ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂŶĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚĨƌŽŵĂŶĂĚĂƉƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŵƵĐŚ ůĞƐƐĞƌ
ŬŶŽǁŶtĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ? 
40 Marmoƌ  ?Ŷ  ? )  ? ? ? ? dŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ  “ĨĂŵŝůǇ ƌĞƐĞŵďůĂŶĐĞ ? ǁĂƐĨŝƌƐƚ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ďǇ
Wittgenstein in The Blue Book. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Blue and brown books (HarperCollins 
Publishers 1980) 17. Family resemblance is also discussed in Philosophical Investigations, 
wherĞ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P  “I can think of no better expression to characterize these 
similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a 
family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in 
the same way.  W ŶĚ/ƐŚĂůůƐĂǇ P ?ŐĂŵĞƐ ?ĨŽƌŵĂĨĂŵŝůǇ ? ?tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ŷ ? ? ) ? ? ? ? 
41 Marmor (n 2) 102. 
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Hart was indeed employing an adaptation of the theory of open texture42 ?DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ
ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ĨĂŵŝůǇƌĞƐĞŵďůĂŶĐĞ ?ƚŽǁŚĂƚǁĂƐĐůĞĂƌůǇƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽ by Hart 
as open texture creates tension, namely in the fact that Marmor did not know whether 
he should claim that the core and penumbra of concepts were due to vagueness or 
family resemblance, merely stating that either would support the theory of a core and 
penumbra of meaning43. This is hardly a sound, conceptually independent, theory 
through which the separability thesis can be justified and defended. 
 DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ŝƚŝƐŚĂƌĚƚŽƐĞĞŚŽǁDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǀĂŐƵĞŶĞƐƐĂŶĚĨĂŵŝůǇ
ƌĞƐĞŵďůĂŶĐĞ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞƐ &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛtheory. If anything, it supports 
&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚthe interpretation of concept-words is determined by ordinary 
use (premise B), and insensitive to the particular legal-context in which these words 
ĂƌĞŵĞĂŶƚƚŽĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƉƌĞŵŝƐĞ ) ?&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞ ?&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨ
                                                          
42 It is important to note that Hart does make reference to the concept of family resemblance 
in the notes to page 15 of The Concept of Law, even though Marmor fails to mention it, and 
we can therefore be reasonably confident that Hart knew the difference between family 
resemblance and open texture and opted to refer to them both at different stages and 
regarding different aspects of his theory. Hart makes reference to family resemblances when 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐŐĞŶĞƌĂůƚĞƌŵƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ůĂǁ ? ?,ĂƌƚǁŝƐŚĞĚƚŽĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞƚŚĂƚ ŝŶƚŚĞ
ŵƵůƚŝƚƵĚĞ ŽĨ ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƐ ǁŚĞƌĞ ǁĞ ƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌĚ  “ůĂǁ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ
instances in question have one single thing in common, but because there are lots of different 
complex connections between them. It is however unsurprising that someone as enthusiastic 
as Hart was about Philosophical Investigations would know the distinction between open 
texture and family resemblance (see Introduction (Chapter 1, Introduction, text to footnote 
34). 
43 DĂƌŵŽƌ  ?Ŷ  ? )  ? ? ? ?DĂƌŵŽƌǁƌŝƚĞƐ P  “dŚƵƐǁĞĐĂŶƐĞĞƚŚĂƚǀĂŐƵĞŶĞƐƐ ?ŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ?ĂŶĚ
family resemblance all support the thesis that concept-words we employ must have a core of 
meaning, that is, standard examples which manifest agreement in judgements about the 
ǁŽƌĚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ? 
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the World War II memorial tank would be considered a vehicle for the purpose of the 
ƌƵůĞ  ?ƐŝŶĐĞ ŝƚ ĨĂůůƐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞ  “ĐŽƌĞ ? ) ?ĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚƌĞƐƵůƚ ŝŶĂƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇƵŶũƵƐƚƌƵůŝŶŐ ?
MĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚŝƐƌĞĂĚƐ P 
 QƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐŶŽŶĞĞĚƚŽĚĞŶǇ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶƐŽŵĞƵŶƵƐƵĂůĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĂ ũƵĚŐĞ
might face the possibility that the application of a rule to a given case in 
keeping with the core of the pertinent concept-word would lead to 
unacceptable results, and hence decide that even an ordinary automobile 
ǁĂƐŶŽƚĂ “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƌule at hand.44 
^Ž ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ŝƚŝƐƐŽůĞůǇĂƚƚŚĞũƵĚŐĞ ?ƐĚŝ ĐƌĞƚŝŽŶƚŽĚĞĐŝĚĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ
or not the application of a given rule results in an unfair judgement, and the 
meaning of the concept-word should therefore be modified to allow for an 
exceptioŶ ?DĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇƌĞƐƵůƚƐŝŶĂĐŽŶǀŽůƵƚĞĚ ?ŝĨŶŽƚ
ƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚ ƵŶĞƚŚŝĐĂů ? ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ůĞŐĂů ƌƵůĞƐ ? ǀĞŶ ƚŚŽƵŐŚ DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ
ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ŝƐ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚ ĨƌŽŵ ŝǆ ?Ɛ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚ
different, Marmor and Bix nonetheless commit exactly the same methodological 
mistake. Like ŝǆďĞĨŽƌĞŚŝŵ ?DĂƌŵŽƌƌĞĂĚƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐŽŶŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ
as relating to the open texture of individual concepts rather than the open 
texture of language, and therefore legal rules45. Since this was explained at 
length in the previous chapter, it will only be explained in connection with 
&ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŚĞƌĞ ? ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ tĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ? Ă ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŝƐ ŽƉĞŶ-textured 
when it has been considered along some dimensions, but has not been 
                                                          
44 Marmor (n 2) 100. 
45 Cf. Chapter four, Brian Bix, text to footnote 36. 
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considered in others. This is ǁŚǇ tĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  “ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ
ǀĂŐƵĞŶĞƐƐ ? ?KŶƚŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞ,ĂƌƚŐŝǀĞƐƚŚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞƌƵůĞ “ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ
ƉĂƌŬ ? ?ĞŶĂĐƚĞĚƚŽŬĞĞƉƉĞĂĐĞĂŶĚƋƵŝĞƚ ŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ?dĂŬŝŶŐƚŚŝƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ
clear that motorised vehicles (such as cars, motorcycles and buses) are vehicles 
for the purpose of the rule. It is important to stress that they are vehicles for the 
purpose of this particular rule, and it does not mean that in the context of a 
different legal rule they would still be deemed vehicles (even though it is likely 
that they would).  
When enacting this rule, our aim was clear, but we did not foresee, and had not 
yet encountered, circumstances such as those which Fuller refers to, for example the 
World War II memorial tank. The question then arises as to whether a tank used in 
World War II, still in perfect working condition, to be mounted on a pedestal in the 
park, would be considered a vehicle for the purpose of the rule. The issue here is 
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƚƌƵĐŬŝƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂ “ŵĞŵŽƌŝĂů ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŶŽt falling within the scope 
ŽĨƚŚĞƌƵůĞ )ŽƌĂ “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ? ?ĐŽǀĞƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞĂĨŽƌĞŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚƌƵůĞ ) ?/ŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐ ?ƚŚŝƐ
particular situation had not yet been encountered, and the meaning of vehicle for the 
purpose of this rule, specifically whether or not it wouůĚĞǆƚĞŶĚƚŽĂ “ŵĞŵŽƌŝĂů ? ?ŚĂĚ
not yet been decided. As Hart writes in the postscript to The Concept of Law, 
 QǁŚĞŶƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝƐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌĂŐŝǀĞŶƌƵůĞĂƉƉůŝĞƐƚŽĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĐĂƐĞ
the law fails to determine an answer either way and so proves to be 
partialůǇ ŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞ ? ^ƵĐŚ ĐĂƐĞƐ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ŵĞƌĞůǇ  “ŚĂƌĚ ĐĂƐĞ  ? ?
controversial in the sense that reasonable and informed lawyers may 
disagree about which answer is legally correct, but the law in such cases 
is fundamentally incomplete: it provides no answer to the questions at 
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issue in such cases. They are legally unregulated and in order to reach a 
decision in such cases the courts must exercise the restricted law-making 
ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚ/ĐĂůů “ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ? ? 
According to this interpretation, the judge does not decide that following the standard 
ĐĂƐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞ “ĐŽƌĞ ? )ŝƐƵŶĨĂŝƌ ?ĂƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚďǇDĂƌŵŽƌ46), but rather that a fresh decision 
needs to be made because this novel case had never been considered. It is yet to be 
decided whether a tank, in perfect working condition, that is going to be put on a 
ƉĞĚĞƐƚĂů ŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ŝƐĂ  “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ?ŽƌĂ  “ŵĞŵŽƌŝĂů ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƌƵůĞ ? /Ĩ ŝƚ
ǁĞƌĞ ƚŽ ďĞ ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ŝŶĚĞĞĚ Ă  “ŵĞŵŽƌŝĂů ? ? ƚŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ůĂǁƐ
ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ “ŵĞŵŽƌŝĂůŵŽŶƵŵĞŶƚƐ ?ǁŽƵůĚĂƉƉůǇ47. This explanation would address not 
ŽŶůǇƉƌĞŵŝƐĞŽĨ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽƉƌĞŵŝƐĞĂŶĚ ? 
                                                          
46 Cf text to footnote 44. 
47 Jeremy Waldron makes an interesting point ĂďŽƵƚƚŚŝƐǀĞƌǇŝƐƐƵĞ ?,ĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “ŶĂŵďƵůĂŶĐĞ
is not a borderline case of a vehicle; if anything it is a paradigm case of vehicle. We call for an 
ambulance precisely because we need a vehicle to transport the sick person. There are some 
imaginable instances where the need for flexibility and the existence of borderline cases go 
together. Lon Fuller's example of the veterans who want to place a Second World War jeep 
on a plinth as a monument in the park is an example of this, inasmuch as we may hesitate 
about whether to call the immobilized shell of a jeep a vehicle. But we must not make the 
mistake of assuming that the vagueness of natural language predicates matches our 
ƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇĂďŽƵƚǁŚĂƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĚŽŶĞŝŶĨƵƚƵƌĞŽƌƵŶĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚĐĂƐĞƐ ? ?tĂůdron 
 ?Ŷ ? ? ) ? ? ? ?tĂůĚƌŽŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁŽŶƚŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞĐŽƵůĚ ?ĂŶĚƐŚŽƵůĚ ?ďĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĚ ?>ĞŐĂůƌƵůĞƐĚŽŶŽƚ
ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŝƐŽůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ,ĂƌƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŚĞŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƚŝĐĂůƌƵůĞ “ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ?ŝŶ
isolation. There is legislation covering emergency vehicles (such as an ambulance). In case of 
emergency, ambulances have special exemptions. So, if a person were to drive an ambulance 
ĨŽƌĂ ũŽǇƌŝĚĞĂƌŽƵŶĚĂƉĂƌŬ ? ƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚďĞ ŝŶďƌĞĂĐŚŽĨ ƚŚĞ  “ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ?ƌƵůĞ ?
However, if someone were to drive the same ambulance to attend to an emergency, then, 




tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ŽĨ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŬĞǇƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ
interpretation of Hart is to be found in his interpretation of Wittgenstein. It should be 
ŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚDĂƌŵŽƌĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐŚŝƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇƚŽƌĞĨƵƚĞƉƌĞŵŝƐĞ
 ?  “ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝŶŐ Ă ůĞŐĂů ƌƵůĞ ŝƐ Ă ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ-words it 
ĞŵƉůŽǇƐ ? ?DĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽŶtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŽŶ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐŽŶ
rule-following. According to Marmor, Wittgenstein thought of the relation between a 
rule and its application as internal to language. In other words, understanding a rule 
entails being able to detail which actions are in accordance with it. Marmor writes, 
  QƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚĞŬĞǇƚŽƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ?ŝƐƚŚĂƚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚ
of the relation between a rule and its application as a grammatical one, 
that is, one which is internal to language. To understand a rule is to be 
able to specify which actions are in accord with it (and which would go 
against it), just as to understand a proposition is to be able to specify its 
truth conditions.48  
ƐǁĞŚĂǀĞƐĞĞŶŝŶŝǆĂŶĚDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ĂŶĚǁŝůůƐĞĞagain in the work of 
the other legal philosophers discussed in this thesis, the idea presented is that, 
according to Wittgenstein, to understand a rule one needs to be able to specify which 
actions would be in accordance with it, and which actions would go against it49.When 
                                                          
exempt by relevant emergency services legislation. Emergency Vehicles, 'UK emergency 
vehicles' (3 April 2016) <http://www.ukemergency.co.uk/blue-light-use/> accessed 4 April 
2016 
48 Mamor (n 2) 114.  
49 ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƌƵůĞ  ?ŚĞƌ  ‘ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ ŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ? )ĞŶƚĂŝůĞĚ
being able to detail, in the standard situation, what would count as a vehicle. Marmor writes, 
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ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƌƵůĞ  “ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ ŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ? ?ďŽƚŚDĂƌŵŽƌĂŶĚŝǆƐĞĞŵƚŽďĞůŝĞǀĞ
ƚŚĂƚŝĨŽŶĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƐƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ? ?ŽŶĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĂďůĞƚŽƐƉĞĐŝĨǇŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?
ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ “ĐŽƌĞ ?ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ŽĨ ‘ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ? ?ŚĞŶĐĞĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚ ŶŐƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌ interpretation. 
dŚĞƵƐĞŽĨ “ƚƌƵƚŚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ “ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ ? ?ŝƐ
ŝŶƚƌŝŐƵŝŶŐ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƐŝŶĐĞŝƚƌĞƐŽŶĂƚĞƐŶŽƚǁŝƚŚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌǁŽƌŬ ?ďƵƚǁŝƚŚ
his earlier philosophy found in the Tractatus50. Given the context, a discussion about 
rule-following as clarified in Philosophical Investigations ? ƚŚĞ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ  “ƚƌƵƚŚ
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ƐĞĞŵƐ ŵŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚ51 ? /Ŷ ƚŚĞ ĞĂƌůǇ ƐƚĂŐĞƐ ŽĨ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ĐĂƌĞĞƌ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ
culminated with the publication of the Tractatus52, he was a supporter of Logical 
Positivism. Wittgenstein followed the teachings of Frege and Russell53, and, like Frege, 
                                                          
 “/ŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐ ?ŝƚŵĂŬĞƐŶŽƐĞŶƐĞƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚŽŶĞŚĂƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚĂƌƵůĞŝĨŽŶĞĐĂŶŶŽƚŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇ
ƚŚĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞŝŶĂĐĐŽƌĚǁŝƚŚŝƚ ? ?DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ŷ ? )  ? ? ? 
50 Ludwig Wittgenstein and Luis Valdés M Villanueva, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (2nd 
edn, Tecnos 2003).Marmor expressed this view earlier in the chapter when referring to the 
ƌƵůĞ “ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ? ?Marmor (n 2) 114. 
51 /ƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƐŽƚŽŽĚŽĞƐƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ ‘ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĂƌƵůĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇ
to specify its instances just as understanding a proposition is to be able to specify its truth 
conditions ? ?WůĂŝŶůǇtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŚĂƐĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚ
such an ability. 
52 Ibid. 
53 In the preface to the Tractatus, Wittgenstein expresses his gratitude to both Frege and 
ZƵƐĞůů ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ  “ƐƚŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŵǇ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐ ? ? Timothy Endicott alludes to the connection 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ&ƌĞŐĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂŶĚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐĞĂƌůǇǁŽƌŬŝŶ ŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞ “WƵƚƚŝŶŐ/ŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ
ŝƚƐ ƉůĂĐĞ ? ? ,Ğ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P  “dŚĞŶ ŚŽǁ ĚŽ ǁĞ ĐůĂƐƐŝĨǇ ƚŚĞ Ő ŶĞƌĂůŝƚǇ ŽĨ DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ
understanding a rule? He proposes that there is a quite sensible notion of completeness: "one 
has a complete grasp of a rule, if under normal circumstances, one is able to specify which 
acts are in accord with the rule . . .  " (153). Wittgenstein drew on this notion of "normal 
circumstances", and it was valuable for his purpose of clearing away the incoherent notion of 
complete understanding that he attributed to his earlier philosophy and to Gottlob Frege. ?
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he held the view that the meaning of a sentence was defined by its truth conditions. 
He writes, 
4.024 To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is 
true.54 
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein held that a proposition is whatever can be held to be 
ƚƌƵĞŽƌĨĂůƐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚŝƐĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞĚŽĨƚƌƵĞƉƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ
to philosophy did however change during his life, resulting in a radically different 
philosophy of language, as explained in his final book Philosophical Investigations55. It 
is this later philosophy that Marmor believes influenced Hart, and from which Hart 
borrowed some key philosophical insights about rule following. Interestingly, one of 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐŵĂŶǇĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽŚŝƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐŝŶƚŚĞTractatus was in regard to his 
views of propositions. In Philosophical Investigations he questioned his previous claim 
that propositions are whatever can be held true or false by saying that the belief that 
knowing a proposition is knowing whether it is true or false, would require us to have 
independent concepts of truth and falsity. Only by having these concepts of truth and 
falsity, independent from the proposition itself, could we judge whether something 
was or was not a proposition56. Given this realisation, in Philosophical Investigations 
                                                          
Timothy A. O. Endicott, 'Putting interpretation in its place' (1994) 13(4) Law and Philosophy 
451.  
54 Wittgenstein (n 50) 63.  
55 Wittgenstein (n 13). In the Preface to Philosophical Investigations ?tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “&Žƌ
since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I have been forced 
ƚŽƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞŐƌĂǀĞŵŝƐƚĂŬĞƐŝŶǁŚĂƚ/ǁƌŽƚĞŝŶƚŚĂƚĨŝƌƐƚďŽŽŬ ? ?Wittgenstein (n 13) vii. 
56 Wittgenstein (n 13). For further insights, see Norman Malcolm, Nothing Is Hidden: 




set of conditions, or general truth conditions, for propositions57. To illustrate this 
ƉŽŝŶƚ ?ůĞƚ ?ƐƚĂŬĞtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨ “,ĞĐĂŶǁĂůŬ ?58. This sentence will mean, 
and can be understood as, different things depending on when it is uttered. For 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ǁŚĞŶƐĂŝĚŝŶƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽĂƚŽĚĚůĞƌ ? “,ĞĐĂŶ ǁĂůŬ ?ŵŝŐŚƚďĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚĂƐ
 “ŚĞŚĂƐůĞĂƌŶĞĚƚŽǁĂůŬ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁŚĞŶĐůŝŵďŝŶŐĂŵŽƵŶƚĂŝŶ ?ŝĨƐŽŵĞŽŶĞƐĂŝĚ “,Ğ
ĐĂŶǁĂůŬ ? ?ƚŚŝƐŵŝŐŚƚďĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚĂƐ “ŚĞŝƐŶ ?ƚƚŝƌĞĚ ? ?/ŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?ǁĞ
can therefore see that this expression can be understood as different things, such as: 
 “ŚĞŚĂƐůĞĂƌŶĞĚƚŽǁĂůŬ ? ?Žƌ “ŚĞŝƐŶ ?ƚƚŝƌĞĚ ? ?Žƌ “ŚĞ ŚĂƐƉĞƌŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŽǁĂůŬ ? ?Žƌ “ŚŝƐůĞŐ
ŝƐ ŚĞĂůĞĚ ?59. According to Wittgenstein, it would be impossible to have truth 
conditions that could articulate the myriad of uses and understandings of the 
ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ “,ĞĐĂŶǁĂůŬ ? ?EŽƌŵĂŶDĂůĐŽůŵĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐƚŚĂƚ P 
                                                          
57 Wittgenstein (n 13). 
58 This example was given by Wittgenstein in The Blue and Brown Books. Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
dŚĞ ůƵĞ ĂŶĚ ƌŽǁŶ ŽŽŬƐ P WƌĞůŝŵŝŶĂƌǇ ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů /ŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
(Harpercollins College Div 1980) 114. 
59 DĂůĐŽůŵ  ?Ŷ  ? ? )  ? ? ? ? ^ĞĞ ĂůƐŽ :ŽŚŶ DĐŽǁĞůů ?Ɛ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚ ? ŚĞ ŝƐ ŝŶ ĂĐĐŽƌĚ ǁŝƚŚ EŽƌŵĂŶ
DĂůĐŽůŵ ǁŚĞŶ ŚĞ ƐĂǇƐ P  “dŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ Ăƚ ƌŝƐŬ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂŽĨ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ďĞŝŶŐ ƚŚƵƐ ĂŶĚ ƐŽ ĂŶǇǁĂǇ ?
whether or not we choose to investigate the matter in question, and whatever the outcome 
of any such investigation. That idea requires the conception of how things could correctly be 
said to be anyway  W whatever, if anything, we in fact go on to say about the matter; and this 
notion of correctness can only be the notion of how the pattern of application that we grasp, 
when we come to understand the concept in question, extends, independently of the actual 
outcome of any investigation, to the relevant case. So if the notion of investigation-
independent patterns of application is to be discarded, then so is the idea that things are, at 
least sometimes, thus and so anyway, independently of our ratifying judgment that that is 
ŚŽǁƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ ? ?John McDowell, Mind, value, and reality (Harvard University Press 2001), 221. 
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Wittgenstein warns us against the assumption that there is such a thing as 
 ‘ƚŚĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞƐĞƚŽĨĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĨŽƌĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐǁĂůŬŝŶŐ ?dŚŝƐŝŵƉůŝĞƐƚŚĂƚ
there are no general truth coŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞ ‘,ĞĐĂŶǁĂůŬ ? ?60
So, there are no truth or falsity conditions that can tell you, for every individual 
circumstance, whether or not the sentence is true. Had Marmor understood 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂŶĚĂƉƉůŝĞĚŝƚĐŽƌƌĞĐƚůǇ ƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ĂƐŚĞĐůĂŝŵƐ
to) he would not have reached the conclusion that there are criteria (or general truth 
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ )ƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŶĞĞĚƐƚŽĨƵůĨŝůƚŽďĞĂ “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ? ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ƚŚŝƐŵŝŐŚƚ
have led Marmor to consider and correctly interpret WĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ŽƉĞŶ
texture. There are no criteria for the concept-word vehicle, rather, there are some 
cases, as discussed, where the fresh decision simply needs to be made because a 
particular dimension of a rule was not yet encountered (such as the World War II 
memorial tank)61. 
 
Easy Cases and Legal Formalism 
In his defence of legal positivism, Marmor also aims to clarify the mistaken 
ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ “ĞĂƐǇ ?ĐĂƐĞƐĂƌĞƐŽŵĞŚŽǁƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽůĞŐĂůĨŽƌŵĂůŝƐŵ ?ǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚ
the detail of this discussion might seem petty, what is perhaps of more importance is 
DĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ “ĞĂƐǇ ?ĐĂƐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚŚŝƐĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨůĞŐĂů
positivism. According to Marmor, legal formalism holds that the application of rules 
                                                          
60 Malcolm (n 56) 165. 
61 Cf text to footnote 39 above. 
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to facts is a matter of logical inference, expressible in terms of analytical truths62. An 
analytical truth is a statement that is made true by its very meaning, and therefore 
underlines a specific kind of relationship between two rules or expressions, that 
DĂƌŵŽƌĐĂůůƐĂ “ƌƵůĞ-ƌƵůĞ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ63 ?dŽŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞ “ƌƵůĞ-ƌƵůĞ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?DĂƌŵŽƌŐŝǀĞƐ
ƚŚĞ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ  “ďĂĐŚĞůŽƌ A? ƵŶŵĂƌƌŝĞĚ ŵĂŶ ? 64. He argues these 
concepts have a semantic relationship, in other words, you only need to know the 
definition ŽĨ  ‘ďĂĐŚĞůŽƌ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞdefinition of  ‘ƵŶŵĂƌƌŝĞĚ ŵĂŶ ? ƚŽ ŬŶŽǁ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ
ƉƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ƚƌƵĞ ? ^Ž ? ƐŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ  “ďĂĐŚĞůŽƌ A? ƵŶŵĂƌƌŝĞĚ ŵĂŶ ? ŝƐ ŶŽƚ
concerned with the application of rules, but rather with the semantic relationship 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ?ŝƚĨŽůůŽǁƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŝƐĂ “ƌƵůĞ-ƌƵůĞ ?ƌĞůationship. The importance of 
this lies in the fact that Marmor claims that critics of Hart, namely those who associate 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇǁŝƚŚũƵĚŝĐŝĂůĨŽƌŵĂůŝƐŵ ?ĚŽƐŽďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨ ĂŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨǁŚĂƚĂŶ
analytical truth, and a rule-rule relation is65. According to Marmor, the distinction 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ “ĞĂƐǇ ?ĂŶĚ “ŚĂƌĚ ?ĐĂƐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶďŽŶĞŽĨĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽĐƌŝƚŝĐŝǌĞ
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇĨŽƌďĞŝŶŐƚŽŽĨŽƌŵĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ?ŝƐŶŽƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚ “ƌƵůĞ-ƌƵůĞ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ďƵƚ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌǁŝƚŚ “ƌƵůĞ-ǁŽƌůĚ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?hŶůŝŬĞƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵĞƌ ? “ƌƵůĞ-ǁŽƌůĚ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐĚŽŶŽƚ
                                                          
62 Marmor (n 2) 98. 
63 DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ?WůĞĂƐĞŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽ “ƌƵůĞ-ƌƵůĞ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌ
literature, and therefore it is assumed that this is a term coined by Marmor himself. 
64 Regarding a priori knowledge, traditionally there are three classes of statements: logical 
ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŵĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůƚƌƵƚŚƐ ?dŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ “ůůďĂĐŚĞůŽƌƐ
ĂƌĞƵŶŵĂƌƌŝĞĚ ?ĐŽŵĞƐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?&ŽƌĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĐůĂƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?Žď,ĂůĞĂnd Crispin Wright 
(eds), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Blackwell Publishers 1999) 334. 
65 DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ?DĂƌŵŽƌĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ “ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌŝƚŝƐƚŚĂƚĐŽŶŶĞĐƚƐĂƌƵůĞƚŽŝƚƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
ĐĂŶŶŽƚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚŽĨůŽŐŝĐŽƌĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐŝƚǇ ? ?,ĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐƚŚŝƐƚŽbe even more perplexing given that 
Hart himself vehemently criticised judicial formalism.  
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denote a logical inference, but rather refer to use. To illustrate the difference between 
ƚŚĞƐĞƚǁŽƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?DĂƌŵŽƌŐŝǀĞƐƚŚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨ “ƌĞĚ ? ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƵŶůŝŬĞ
the relation between the concept Bachelor and Unmarried Man (a purely semantic 
relation66 ) ?ǁŚĞŶƐŽŵĞŽŶĞƐĂǇƐ “ƚŚŝƐŝƐƌĞĚ ? ?ƚŚĞŽŶůǇǁĂǇŽĨũƵƐƚŝĨǇŝŶŐƚŚŝƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶ
is by appealing to the meaning of red, to how the word red is used in English, making 
ƚŚŝƐĂ “ƌƵůĞ-ǁŽƌůĚ ?ŬŝŶĚŽĨƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ?tŚĞŶĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐǁŚĂƚĂ “ƌƵůĞ-ǁŽƌůĚ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶŝƐ ?
he gives the following example: 
^ƵƉƉŽƐĞƐŽŵĞŽŶĞŝƐƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐĂƚĂƌĞĚŽďũĞĐƚŝŶĨƌŽŶƚŽĨŚŝŵ ?ƐĂǇŝŶŐ P “dŚŝƐ
ŝƐƌĞĚ ? ?tŚĞŶĂƐŬĞĚƚŽũƵƐƚŝĨǇŚŝƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶ ?ŽŶĞĐĂŶŽŶůǇĂƉƉĞĂůƚŽa rule 
about how a word is used in English67 
At this stage, one has to ask whether it would be plausible, in a commonplace 
conversation, to appeal to a rule about how red is used if we were asked what red is. 
I would venture that the answer given by most of us, if faced with such a question, 
mighƚďĞŵŽƌĞĂŬŝŶƚŽ P “ŽǇŽƵŶŽƚƚŚŝŶŬƚŚŝƐŝƐƌĞĚ ?tŚĂƚĚŽǇŽƵƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚĐŽůŽƵƌŝƐ
 ?ƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ƌĞĚ ŽďũĞĐƚ ) ? ? tĞ ǁŽƵůĚ ƚƌǇ ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ǁŚĞƌĞ ŽƵƌ
disagreement lies, rather than appeal to a rule ĂďŽƵƚŚŽǁ “ƌĞĚ ?ŝƐƵƐĞĚŝŶŶŐůŝƐŚ ?dŚĞ
more likely circumstance would therefore be to point to a different object with a 
similar colour and try to ascertain the reason for the disagreement. If the 
ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽůŽƵƌ  “ƌĞĚ ? ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐ ? ǁĞ ŵŝŐŚƚ ũƵƐƚ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŽ ĂŐƌĞĞ ƚŽ
disagree. It is in fact hard to imagine how one would articulate a rule for how the word 
 “ƌĞĚ ?ŝƐƵƐĞĚŝŶŶŐůŝƐŚ ?/ƚ ŝƐƵŶĐůĞĂƌǁŚĞƚŚĞƌDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞƌƵůĞĂďŽƵƚ
                                                          




how a word is used ŝŶŶŐůŝƐŚǁĂƐĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨ
meaning. On one hand, interpretiŶŐƚŚŝƐĂƐĂƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁŽƵůĚ
ƐĞĞŵ ůŽŐŝĐĂů ? ƐŝŶĐĞ DĂƌŵŽƌ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŽ ďĞ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ68 ?ǇĞƚŽŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŚĂŶĚDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƐŽĂƚ ŽĚĚƐǁŝƚŚ
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ƚŚĂƚ ŚŝƐ ŝŶƚĞƌƉretation is hard, if not impossible, to 
ƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůĞǁŝƚŚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌǁŽƌŬ ?
tŚĞŶǁĞƐƚĂƌƚƚŽƵŶƉŝĐŬDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ƌƵůĞ-ƌƵůĞ ?ĂŶĚ “ƌƵůĞ-ǁŽƌůĚ ?
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ǁĞ ƐƚĂƌƚ ƚŽ ƐĞĞ ŚŽǁ ŝƚ ƌĞƐŽŶĂƚĞƐ ǁŝƚŚ <ĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐ ĂŶĚ ƐǇŶƚŚĞƚŝĐ
propositions69. To ĨƵůůǇ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ǁĞ ǁŝůů ƌĞŝƚĞƌĂƚĞDĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  “ƌƵůĞ-ƌƵůĞ ? ĂŶĚ  “ƌƵůĞ-ǁŽƌůĚ ? ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
According to Kant, analytic propositions, to which Marmor alludes, are true by virtue 
of their meaning70. In other words, the truth of the relevant proposition is knowable 
ũƵƐƚďǇŬŶŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶƚǁŽƌĚƐ ?>Ğƚ ?ƐƚĂŬĞƚŚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ƉƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ  “KƉŚƚŚĂůŵŽůŽŐŝƐƚƐ ĂƌĞ ĚŽĐƚŽƌƐ ? ? ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ĂƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƚƌƵƚŚ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ
proposition by knowing the meaning of Ophthalmologist and doctor. This is what 
Marmor calls a rule-rule relation. Synthetic propositions on the other hand relate to 
                                                          
68 Marmor (n 2) 98. 
69 DĂƌŵŽƌĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌǁŝƚŚĂĨƵůůĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŚŝƐ  “ƌƵůĞ-ƌƵůĞ ?ĂŶĚ  “ƌƵůĞ-
ǁŽƌůĚ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚĚŽĞƐŶŽt make reference to wider literature. Due to the absolute lack of 
ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐ ƚŽ  “ƌƵůĞ-ƌƵůĞ ? ĂŶĚ  “ƌƵůĞ-ǁŽƌůĚ ? ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ƚŽ ĨƵůůǇ
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞ ǁŚĂƚ DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ ƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ďĞŚŝŶĚ ƚŚĞƐĞ ǁĞƌĞ ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƚĂŬŝŶŐ ŝŶƚŽ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ
DĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐĞǆƉůĂnation and wider context, it is assumed that Marmor is referring to synthetic 
and analytic propositions. 
70 Robert Audi, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge University Press 1995) 26. 
Analytic statements are a priori (knowable without empirical evidence) and necessary (could 
not be false).  
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ƚŚĞ “ǁŽƌůĚ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌƚƌƵƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĚĞƉĞŶĚĂŶƚŽŶŚŽǁƚŚĞŝƌŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƌĞůĂƚĞƐƚŽ
the world. Using the previous example, the ƉƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ “ĂǀŝĚŝƐĂŶKƉŚƚŚĂůŵŽůŽŐŝƐƚ ?
will only be deemed true if David is actually an Ophthalmologist. This kind of relation 
is termed by Marmor as a rule-world relation. According to Marmor, Judicial 
Formalism relies on rule-rule relations, such as ƚŚĞ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ  “Ăůů ďĂĐŚĞůŽƌƐ ĂƌĞ
ƵŶŵĂƌƌŝĞĚ ?71. However, he argues that the kind of relation exposed by Hart with 
 “ĞĂƐǇ ?ĐĂƐĞƐĐĂŶŶŽƚĨĂůůƵŶĚĞƌĨŽƌŵĂůŝƐŵƐŝŶĐĞŝƚŝƐŽĨƚŚĞƌƵůĞ-world kind. Once more, 
DĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐƉƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĂƐĂĚĞĨĞŶƐĞŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?
ŝƐ ŝŶ ƐƚĂƌŬ ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ƚŽ ŚŝƐ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ďĞƚƚĞƌ
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ72. As discussed, this distinction is 
ŶŽƚŽŶĞƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌǁŽƌŬ ? ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌŝŶ<ĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ?&ƌĞŐĞ ?Ɛ ?
ĂƌŶĂƉ ?ƐĂŶĚ ŝŶYƵŝŶĞ ?Ɛ ůĂƚĞƌǁŽƌŬ73. The use theory of meaning, attributed to the 
later Wittgenstein and the OLP movement, is very much against this view of meaning 
as an abstract object; for ordinary language philosophers meaning is understood as 
use within social behaviour74. In fact, as mentioned throughout this thesis, 
                                                          
71 dŚŝƐ ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ŝƐ ƚĂŬĞŶ ƚŽ ďĞ ůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇ ƚƌƵĞ ƐŝŶĐĞ  “ŝƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ŵĞƌĞůǇ ƚƌƵĞ ĂƐ ŝƚ ƐƚĂŶĚƐ ?ďƵƚ
ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐƚƌƵĞƵŶĚĞƌĂŶǇĂŶĚĂůůƌĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ŵĂŶ ?ĂŶĚ “ŵĂƌƌŝĞĚ ? ?^ĞĞĂďŽǀĞŶŽ ? ? ? ?
339.  
72 Marmor (n 2) 96. To recap, Marmor quotes the passage from The Concept of Law where 
,ĂƌƚŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞƐƚŚĞƌƵůĞ “ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ? ?ĂŶĚĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƉĂƐƐĂŐĞ “ĞƉŝƚŽŵŝǌĞƐ
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?ŽŶƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŽĨĞĂƐǇĂŶĚŚĂƌĚĐĂƐĞ  ?,ĞŐŽĞƐŽŶƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶŚŽǁ,ĂƌƚŚĂƐ
been gravely misunderstood, for many disregard the fact that it is embedded within a 
sophisticated philosophy of language, namely that of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein (as per 
Philosophical Investigations).  
73 Audi (n 70) 26.  




Philosophical Investigations stood very much against a received dogmatic view of 
language, and against the logical approach exhibited by the Wittgenstein himself in 
the earlier Tractatus75.  
/ƚŝƐƵŶĐůĞĂƌǁŚǇDĂƌŵŽƌ ?ǁŚŽŝƐƐŽŬĞĞŶƚŽĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨ
 “ĞĂƐǇ ?ĂŶĚ “ŚĂƌĚ ?ĐĂƐĞƐŝƐĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚŝŶĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ
apply the same logic here. This is particularly surprising given that he discussed 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ “ŚĂƌĚ ?ĐĂƐĞƐ ?dŚŝƐĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ
really does lend itself to a Wittgensteinian analysis of language as per the Notes to The 
Concept of Law where Hart himself references WittgenstĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ76. Once again, 
DĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽĨĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŝƐƐƵĞƐŝŶŝƐŽůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĂŚŽůŝƐƚŝĐ
approach to The Concept of Law ĐƌĞĂƚĞƐƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐǁŚĞŶƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
ǁŽƌŬ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƐŝŵƉůĞ PǁĞǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĂďůĞƚŽƵƐĞŐeneral terms in our 
ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ŝĨ ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĞƌĞŶ ?ƚ ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ǁŚĞƌĞ ǁĞ Ăůů ŬŶĞǁ ǁŚĂƚ ǁĞ ǁĞƌĞ ƚĂůŬŝŶŐ
about. These are the plain cases, that are constantly recurring; the cases that we learn 
about when learning how to use a rule or language. As Wittgenstein writes: 
Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the question 
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌĂƌƵůĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶŽďĞǇĞĚŽƌŶŽƚ ?WĞŽƉůĞĚŽŶ ?ƚĐŽŵĞƚŽďůŽǁƐŽǀĞƌ
it, for example. That is part of the framework on which the working of our 
language is based (for example, in giving descriptions)77.  
                                                          
75 Wittgenstein (n 50). 
76 ,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ? ?,ĂƌƚǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶŝŶPhilosophical Investigations (esp. i, ss.208 -38) 
makes many important observations concerning the notions of teaching, and folůŽǁŝŶŐƌƵůĞƐ ? ? 
77 Wittgenstein (n 50) ss. 240. 
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If there were no new cases, no new situations arising every day due to technological 
advances or unforeseen circumstances, then language would not be open textured 
and we could indeed have formalistic legal system. However, this is not the case, and 
ŝƚŝƐŝŶĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚĂƚŚĞŽƌǇĐŽƵůĚďĞ “ŚĂůĨ ?ĨŽƌŵĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ?/ƚĞŝƚŚĞƌĂĚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽƚŚĞ
ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨůĞŐĂůĨŽƌŵĂůŝƐŵ ?ŽƌŝƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇĐůĞĂƌůǇĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ ? 
 
Overview 
DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ŽŶ ,Ăƌƚ ŝƐ Ɛeen as a positive one, 
having even been invited to republish his book as a revised second edition a few years 
ĂĨƚĞƌ ŝƚƐ ŝŶŝƚŝĂů ƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? dŚĞ ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ĨŽƌ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ĂƐ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ
thesis was not only because he is one of the few legal philosophers who attempt to 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ďƵƚ ĂůƐŽďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚ
illustrates the major theoretical conclusion reached throughout this thesis, that all 
ůĞŐĂů ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ǁŚŽ ? ƐŽ ĨĂƌ ? ŚĂǀĞ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚ ƚŽ ƚĂŬĞ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůosophy seriously 
ŚĂǀĞ ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞƐ ? Ɛ ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ? DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŝƐ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƐŽ ĨĂƌ ĂƐ ŚĞ ƵƐĞƐ &ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ĂƐ Ă ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ƚŽ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ŚŝƐ
ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? dŚŝƐ ŝŶ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ŝƐ ĂŶ ŝŶƚƌŝŐƵŝŶŐ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? Ǉ ƚĂŬŝŶŐ &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ
account and attempting to answer his criticisms, instead of providing his own 
ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĨŽƌŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ŚĞŝƐďŝŶĚŝŶŐŚŝŵƐĞůĨƚŽ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵĂŶĚ
methodology. Moreover, instead of taking a holistic approach to The Concept of Law, 
Marmor gives us a number of disconnected remarks, and fails to see the connections 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŵ ?DĂƌŵŽƌĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ĂŶĚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ?ǁŽƌŬŝŶĂǀĞƌǇĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů
(perhaps even lawyer- like) way. Instead of reading their work as a holistic piece of 
writing, as a theory or thesis or sustained argument, Marmor unpicks the specific 
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sections that he wishes to focus on and ignores or disregards or merely passes over 
the teaching that comes before and after it. This approach is particularly clear with 
regards ƚŽŚŝƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ “ĞĂƐǇ ?ĂŶĚ “ŚĂƌĚ ?ĐĂƐĞƐĂƐƚǁŽƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ ?ƵŶƌĞůĂƚĞĚŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?
ƐŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ?DĂƌŵŽƌ ?ƐƐƚĂƌƚůŝŶŐĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĂĨƵůůĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƌƵůĞ-following in 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐPhilosophical Investigations would go far beyond his competence is 
surprisŝŶŐ PƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐŝŶtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂƌĞƐŽŝŶƚĞƌƚǁŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐŶŽƚ
possible to isolate any single part of the book and disregard its connections to the 
other. Kripke78, (a firm critic of Wittgenstein, with whose opinions of Wittgenstein I do 
not agree in any other respect) put the matter skilfully when he wrote that: 
It should be borne in mind that Philosophical Investigations is not a 
systematic philosophical work where conclusions, once definitely 
established, need not to be re-argued. Rather the Investigations is written 
as a perpetual dialectic, where persisting worries, expressed by the voice 
of the imaginary interlocutor, are never definitively silenced. Since the 
                                                          
78 See Kripke, A. On rules and private language (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
dŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƌŝƐŶŽƚĞŶĚŽƌƐŝŶŐ<ƌŝƉŬĞ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌŝƐ<ƌŝƉŬĞ ?Ɛ
work going to be explored in this work. Peter Hacker argues along the same lines when he 
ƐĂǇƐƚŚĂƚ P “dŚĞŵƵůƚŝƉůŝĐŝƚǇĂŶĚĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŽĨƐƵďũĞĐƚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂůůǇĂďƌƵƉƚũƵŵƉŽĨƚŽƉŝĐ
to topic, as well as he Bemerkungen style of writing, give the book the appearance of a 
collection of aperçus on a variety of sometimes related, sometimes apparently wholly 
independent themes. This is misleading. The book has a twofold unity, methodological and 
thematic. The methodological unity is obvious: the book is informed by a consistent vision of 
the character of philosophical problems and of the methods of dealing with them. The 
thematic unity is given by the concern with the nature of language and linguistic 
representation. The investigation of subjects in philosophical psychology are largely (though 
ŶŽƚ ĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞůǇ ) ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĂŶĚ ƚĂĐƚŝĐĂů ŵŽǀĞƐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ Ă ŐƌĂŶĚ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ? ^ĞĞ  “tŝƚƚĞŶŐƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ
WůĂĐĞŝŶdǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚĐĞŶƚƵƌǇĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ?KǆĨŽƌĚ PůĂĐŬǁĞůůWƵďůŝƐŚĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
 155 
 
work is not presented in the form of a deductive argument with definitive 
thesis as conclusions, the same ground is covered repeatedly, from the 
point of view of various special cases and from different angles, with the 
hope that the entire process will help the reader see the problems rightly79 
Kripke makes evident in this passage what many others have explained in their work: 
Philosophical Investigations was written in a spiral, and the arguments are all 
ŝŶƚĞƌƚǁŝŶĞĚ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇ ƌĞǀŝƐŝƚĞĚ ? /ƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚĂďůĞ ƚŚĂƚ DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ
approach to Philosophical Investigations raises some concerns. Particularly so since 
the sections on rule following in Philosophical Investigations have been widely 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞĚĞǀŽƚĞĚƚŽtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌǁŽƌŬ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞ
are multiple interpretations of what Wittgenstein ?Ɛ ƌĞĂů ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ŝĚĞĂƐ ǁĞƌĞ ?
Though no definite conclusion can be reached as to whether this is the same 
methodological mistake committed by other legal theorists, namely Bix and 
^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ǁŚĞŶŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŚƌŽƵŐŚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ŝŶůŝght of the fact 
ƚŚĂƚ Ăůů ƚŚƌĞĞ ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ƐƉĞĂŬ ŽĨ  “ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ǁŚĞŶ ƚĞƐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ Ă
concept, it would be fair to argue that they might have adopted a similar approach to 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?/ŶƐƵŵ ?ŝƚŝƐƚŚĞŝƌŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚ
ůĞĂĚƐƚŚĞŵƚŽŵŝƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŝĚĞĂƐŝŶThe Concept of Law80. The next chapter will 
                                                          
79 Kripke (n 78) 20. Interestingly, the same can be said of The Concept of Law. 
80 This is not to say that had they understood Wittgenstein correctly, they would have fully 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? dŚŝƐ ŝƐƐƵĞ ǁŝůů ďĞ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŶĂů ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?
chapter eight, where it will be argued that even though the legal theorists in question 




focus on the work of Nicos Stavropoulos, who contributed to Jules Coleman ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
Postscript81. ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ƚĂŬĞƐ ǇĞƚ Ă ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ŶŽƚ ŽŶůǇ ƐŝŶĐĞ he reads 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐƐ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚĞďĞůŝĞǀĞƐƚŚĂƚǁŽƌŬŝŶǁĂƐ
ƌŝŐŚƚ ?ĂŶĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇĚŽĞƐŝŶĚĞĞĚƐƵĨĨĞƌĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ “ƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐƐƚŝŶŐ ? ?
                                                          
81 Jules L Coleman (ed), ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ WŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚ P ƐƐĂǇƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ WŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚ ƚŽ  ‘dŚĞ Concept of 

















This chapter will foĐƵƐŽŶEŝĐŽƐ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞŽŶ
Hart1. Unlike Bix and Marmor, Stavropoulos takes a rather different approach to The 
Concept of Law2. Stavropoulos still advocates that The Concept of Law was, to some 
extent, influenced by philosophy of language (hence his work being mentioned), yet 
ŚĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ŝŶ ŚŝƐ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ĂƐ Ă ŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů
enterprise3 ?/ŶĨĂĐƚ ?^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ǁŽƌŬďƌŝŶŐƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ƐŝŶĐĞ
ŚĞĞǆƉůŽƌĞƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬĨƌŽŵĂstarting point that is in stark contrast to that of all the 
other legal theorists whose work is analysed throughout this thesis. Moreover, 
^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐĂƌŐƵĞƐ ?ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŝǆ ?ƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚǁĂƐŝŶĚĞĞĚ “ƐƚƵŶŐ ?ďǇǁŽƌŬŝŶ ?ƐƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐ
sting4. Despite these contrasts, ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?/ĂŝŵƚŽƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?
                                                          
1 Nicos Stavropoulos is an Associate Professor of Legal Theory at Oxford University. 
Stavropoulos was a doctorate student at Oxford in the 1980s, alongside Marmor, Bix and 
'ƌĞĞŶ ? ^ĞĞ  ‘>ĞŐĂů WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ŝŶ KǆĨŽƌĚ AN ĂďŽƵƚ hƐ AN^ŽŵĞ ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?
<http://www2.law.ox.ac.uk/jurisprudence/history.htm> accessed 15 December 2015. It is of 
note that Stavropoulos acknowledges and thanks Joseph Raz for comments on earlier drafts 
of this piece. 
2 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Joseph Raz and Penelope A Bulloch eds, 3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2012). 
3 ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ŵĂŝŶůǇ ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŝŶ ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ŚŝƐ
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ? ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƉƵƌƐƵŝƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
 “ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?of law is a metaphysical enquiry, and Hart  “ŐŽĞƐŽŶ ƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ƚŚĞƉůĂĐĞŽĨ ƐƵĐŚ
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů ĞŶƋƵŝƌǇ ? ?Jules L Coleman (ed), ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ WŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚ P ƐƐĂǇƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ
WŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ>Ăǁ ? KǆĨŽƌĚhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇWƌĞƐƐ ?h^ ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ?^ ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ĐůĂŝŵ
is unique, since even though there are other legal philosophers that claim that Hart is looking 
ĨŽƌ ĞůƵĐŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ  “ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? ŽĨ ůĂǁ ? ŶŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŵ ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ǁŝƚŚ
metaphysics quite in the same way as Stavropoulos does. 
4 Stavropoulos concludes his work by saying:  “ƉƌŽƉĞƌĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨ,ĂƌƚǁŽƵůĚŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐŚŽǁŝŶŐ
how the facts of endemic disagreement on which Dworkin relies can be adequately explained 
ďǇƚŚĞƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐƐƚŚĂƚĚƌŝǀĞƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨůĂǁ ?ĂƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐƐƚŚĂƚŐŝǀĞƐƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƐŽĨĂĐƚƵĂl 
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thesis, despite the differences his work exhibits from the other scholarship examined 
here, is nonetheless finally subject to the same methodological oversights that are to 
be found throughout the relevant literature, to similarly damaging effect.   
In common with the legal theorists before him, Stavropoulos focuses sharply 
ŽŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ĂŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞƐĞ ŝŶ ŝƐŽůĂƚŝŽŶ  W and again this 
ĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ĐƌĞĂƚĞƐ ƚensions and problems for the 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚ ?ŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ ?ǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚĞǆŝƐƚ5. Stavropoulos presents 
ƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌǁŝƚŚĂƵŶŝƋƵĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ PŚĞĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂŝŵǁĂƐ
to expose the nature of law, procuring an answer to metaphysical questions6. 
                                                          
usage the role of individuating the concepts used, and identifies determinacy with collective 
certainty. It that can be showed the record will be taken out of the sting. For the record, I 
ƚŚŝŶŬ ŝƚ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ?ďƵƚƐĂǇŝŶŐǁŚǇǁŝůůŚĂǀĞ ƚŽǁĂŝƚ ĨŽƌĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶ ? ?ŽůĞŵĂŶ  ?Ŷ  ? )  ? ? ?
Ronald Dworkin starts his book, >Ăǁ ?Ɛ ŵƉŝƌĞ ?by criticising many legal theorists (Hart 
included) for insisting that  ‘ůĂǁǇĞƌƐĂůůĨŽůůŽǁĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂĨŽƌũƵĚŐŝŶŐƉƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ
ŽĨůĂǁ ? ?ZĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ǁŽƌŬŝŶŝƐĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŽĨƚŚĞZƵůĞof Recognition since he claims 
that due to the fact that the Rule of Recognition is a social rule, it is not possible for people to 
engage in debates about what the law is if they all have to be in agreement to identify the rule 
of recognition (due to its status as a social rule). Ronald M. Dworkin, >Ăǁ ?ƐEmpire (3rd edn, 
Fontana Press 1986) 45. Full discussion of the semantic sting and its implications is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but will nevertheless be ruled out (though implicitly) by this thesis. 
5 Cf Chapter four, Brian Bix on Judicial Discretion, and Chapter five, Andrei Marmor on easy 
ĐĂƐĞƐ ? ŽƚŚ ŝǆ ĂŶĚ DĂƌŵŽƌ ƉŝĐŬ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ĂƌĞĂƐ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ  ?ŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ĂŶĚ ũƵĚŝĐŝĂů
discretion) and analyse them in isolation. It is argued that not having a holistic approach 
caused the serious misunderstandings discussed in previous chapters. 
6 ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽŶĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ “dŚĞNature of 
>ĞŐĂůdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ? /ƚƐŚŽƵůĚŚŽǁĞǀĞƌďĞŶŽƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƉŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚ ƚŽ The Concept of Law was 
ŚĞĂǀŝůǇĞĚŝƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŝƚŝƐŝŶƉĂƌƚƐƵŶĐůĞĂƌ ?ƐZĂǌĂŶĚƵůůŽĐŚ ?ƚŚĞĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?ǁƌŽƚĞ P “ƚ
times the text itself was incoherent. Often this might have must have been the result of a 
misreading of a manuscript by the typists, whose mistakes Hart did not always notice. At other 
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Coloured by this unusual starting point Stavropoulos proceeds to interrogate the same 
ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ĂƐ ŝǆ ĂŶĚ DĂƌŵŽƌ ĚŝĚ ďĞĨŽƌĞ Śŝŵ ? ŶĂŵĞůǇ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
methodology7 and the open texture of language.  
^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? work was publŝƐŚĞĚ ĂƐ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ :ƵůĞƐ ŽůĞŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
Postcript8. After the publication of the second edition of The Concept of Law, with the 
ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚ ?ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĨŝŶĂů
words. Jules Coleman edited a book, ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐWŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚ9 that, as the name indicates, 
focused solely on the Postscript to The Concept of Law10. Stavropoulos contributed a 
                                                          
times it was no doubt due to the natural way in which sentences get mangled in the course of 
ĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽďĞƐŽƌƚĞĚŽƵƚĂƚƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůĚƌĂĨƚŝŶŐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĞĚŝĚŶŽƚůŝǀĞƚŽĚŽ ? ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? )ŝǆ ?
It is of note that ŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚ,ĂƌƚǁƌŝƚĞƐŽĨ “ƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? ? “ĂŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?ĂŶĚĂůƐŽ “Ă
ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞǁŝůůďĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚĂƚůĞŶŐƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŶĞǆƚƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?
and I will argue against the view that Hart was pursuing an investigation into the nature of 
law. 
7 Cf Chapter seven ?ŽůĞĂŶĚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶThe Concept of Law. Cole draws some 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐ ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĂǀĞ ƐŽŵĞ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ
^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ǁŽƌŬ ? 
8 Coleman (n 3).  
9 Coleman (n 3). ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ Postcript, edited by Jules Coleman, had amongst its contributors: 
Joseph Raz, Timothy Endicott, Nicos Stavropoulos, Jules L. Coleman, Scott Shapiro, Andrei 
Marmor, Brian Leiter and Jeremy Waldron. Originally published in 2001, it was the first 
comprehensiǀĞĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞƚŚĂƚĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚĞǀĞƌǇĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚ
to The Concept of Law. 
10 According to Leslie Green, the postscript to The Concept of Law is the only one about which 
a whole book has been written. Hart (n 2), 325. Unfortunately Hart never fully finished writing 
the response to his critics that was so eagerly awaited by the legal community. Joseph Raz and 
WĞŶĞůŽƉĞƵůůŽĐŬǁĞƌĞƚĂƐŬĞĚǁŝƚŚƌĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ĂŶĚƉƵƚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌǁŚĂƚŝƐŶŽǁ
known as the Postscript to The Concept of Law. Interestingly, as Jules Coleman writes, the 
ƉŽƐƚƐĐƌŝƉƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŶŽƚŽŶůǇĂƐŝƚ “ƐĞƚƐŽƵƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽǁŽƌŬŝŶ ?ďƵƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚĂůƐŽ
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƵƐǁŝƚŚĂƚŽŽůĨŽƌŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůƚĞǆƚ ? ?ŽůĞŵĂŶ ?Ŷ ? ) ?ǀ ?/ƚŝƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂďůĞ
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chapter entitled ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐƐ, which is the topic of this chapter. For Stavropoulos, 
ƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐƐŵĞĂŶƐ “ŶŽŶ-trivial, often controversial claims regarding the structure and 
nature of language and the character of concepts.11 ? Ɛ ƚŚĞ ƚŝƚůĞ ƌŝŐŚƚůǇ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ? 
,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ^ĞŵĂŶƚŝĐƐis an investigation into the semantic doctrines that Hart employed in 
The Concept of Law. According to ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ǁĞĂƌĞƵŶĚĞƌĂŶ “ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůďƵƌĚĞŶ ?
ƚŽĨŝŶĚ “ƚŚĞƉƌĞĐŝƐĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐĂŶĚůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛthought, and 
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇƚŚĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐǀŝĞǁƐǁŚŝĐŚĚƌŝǀĞŝƚ ?12. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
not everyone agrees with StavropŽƵůŽƐ ?ĐůĂŝŵ ?ĂŶĚĂĐŚŝĞĨŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚŽĨ ƚŚĞǀŝĞǁ ŝƐ
>ĞƐůŝĞ'ƌĞĞŶǁŚŽĂƌŐƵĞƐ ?ĂƐǁĞŚĂǀĞƐĞĞŶ ?ƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐThe Concept of Law was not a 
semantic enterprise13 ? ŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚŝƐ ? ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞĨĂĐĞ ůĞĂǀĞƐ
little doubt as to his methodology, and he recognizes that Hart was inspired by the 
                                                          
whether a postscript less than 30 pages long can provide us with such a tool, or whether Hart 
himself set out with that objective, but nonetheless it is of great importance that the legal 
community thought that such a tool was needed. 
11 Coleman (n 3) 60. DĞƐƉŝƚĞŶŽƚǀĞƌǇĨŝƚƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?
definition of semantics is perhaps not surprising given that from the outset he claims that Hart 
is look at the nature of law, seeking a metaphysical interpretation of law. Though he claims 
that Hart thought the study of words was important for the study of law, this is true insofar 
ĂƐ ,Ăƌƚ ŝƐ ůŽŽŬŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ  “ĚĞĞƉĞƌ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?  ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  “ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ŽďũĞĐƚƐ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁŽƌĚƐ
ĂƉƉůǇ ?11 ? hůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ? ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŝŶ semantics stems from his 
ƋƵĞƐƚƚŽƵŶĐŽǀĞƌĂ “ĚĞĞƉĞƌŝůůƵŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨŽƚŚĞƌŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ? 
12 Coleman (n 3) 61. 
13 Cf Chapter three, Leslie Green and the third edition of The Concept of Law. 
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semantic doctrine of Ludwig Wittgenstein14, and to some extent by J.L. Austin15. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, despite his brief mention of J.L. Austin, Stavropoulos  also 
ignores the extent to which J.L. Austin had impact in The Concept of Law, opting to 
ƌĞůǇ ƐŽůĞůǇ ŽŶ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ  ?ĂŶĚ ĞǀĞŶ ƚŚĞŶ ? ŽŶůǇ ŝŶ Ă ǀĞƌǇ ĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ
manner). It is therefore surprising to find that Stavropoulos understands The Concept 
of Law to be a metaphysical enterprise, in which HaƌƚŚŽƉĞƐƚŽƵŶĐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ “ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?
of law. 
 ƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇƐƚĂƚĞĚ ?^ ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐĐŚŽŽƐĞƐƚŽĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚǁŽŵĂŝŶĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
ƚŚĞŽƌǇ P ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ŽĨ  “ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ
language. Despite acknowledging that Hart might have relied on other semantic 
insights in The Concept of Law ?^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĞƚǁŽĂƌĞĂƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐƉŚǇ
ĐůĞĂƌůǇ ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐ ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ16. These are the two 
                                                          
14 As previously noted, Ludwig Wittgenstein had two distinct philosophical phases, during 
which he endorsed two different philosophies. For clarity therefore, Stavropoulos is referring 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ůĂƚĞƌ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ŵĂŝŶůǇ ĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞĚ ŝŶ > ? tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ? WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů
Investigations (Great Britain: Blackwell, 1953). 
15 In H.L.A Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 274, 
,ĂƌƚĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ “ŵŽƐƚŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ?ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶĐĂŶďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶ,ŽǁƚŽĚŽƚŚŝŶŐƐ
with words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). 
16 Coleman (n 3)  ? ? ? :ƵƐƚŝĨǇŝŶŐ ŚŝƐ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ? ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P  “/ ƚŚŝŶŬ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƚǁŽ
ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ĂƌĞ ŵŽƌĞ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ƚŽ ŚŝƐ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ĂŶĚ ŵŽƌĞ ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ƚŽ
ǁŽƌŬŝŶ ?ƐƐƚŝŶŐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ  WĂŶĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚǀŝƌƚƵĂůůǇĂůůŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĚĞĨĞŶĚĞƌƐǁĂŶƚƚŽĚĞĨůĞĐƚ  W 
than his early commitment to speech-ĂĐƚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂŶĚŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝǀĞĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? ?
^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ŚĂĚ ĂŶ  “ĞĂƌůǇ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ? ƚŽ ƐƉĞĞĐŚ-act analysis is an 
interesting one if one takes into account that a few paragraphs prior Stavropoulos mentioned 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚǇĞĂƌƐĂĨƚĞƌThe Concept of Law, Jhering Heaven of Concepts (HLA Hart, 
 ‘:ŚĞƌŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ,ĞĂǀĞŶ ŽĨ ŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ĂŶĚ DŽĚĞƌŶ ŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů :ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ƐƐĂǇƐ ŝŶ
Jurisprudence and Philosophy 265.), where Hart acknowledged the ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
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areas that will be explored in depth in this chapter. Though briefly alluded to by Bix, 
^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇǁŝůů ĂůůŽǁĂŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ
topic, in turn to be revisited in the next Chapter, and this thematic treatment here 
constitutes part I of the chapter17. On the other hand, the issue of open texture has 
been discussed at length in the two previous chapters, since both Bix and Marmor 
ĨŽĐƵƐ ŽŶ ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐƐƵĞ ? ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ǁŝůů ĂůůŽǁ ƵƐ ƚŽ ǀŝĞǁ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ĨƌŽŵ
another perspective, and will further illustrate the need for a holistic approach if we 
ĂƌĞƚŽĨƵůůǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŝĚĞĂƐ ?dŚĞ ŝƐƐƵĞŽĨƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞǁŝůůďĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŽŶ
part II of this chapter. Though a lot of the discussion in part II will repeat and reinforce 
ground covered earlier in the thesis, it will serve the purpose of illustrating how even 
legal philosophers who read The Concept of Law in very distinct ways commit the same 
underlying methodological mistakes.  
 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐDĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůpproach 
 dŚĞĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁŝůůŝŶĨŽƌŵŚŝƐĐůĂŝŵƐĂďŽƵƚ
HĂƌƚ ?Ɛ “ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ?ŝƐƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞǁĂƐĂŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůŽŶĞ ?/ŶŽƚŚĞƌ
words, Stavropoulos imagines that rather than looking for the concept of law, Hart 
was looking for the nature of law. Stavropoulos writes: 
                                                          
ǁŽƌŬ ? /ƚ ŝƐ ? ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ƚŚŝƐ  “ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚŶĞƐƐ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐƐƚŽƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨůĂǁ ? ?ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚďǇ,ĂƌƚŝŶJhering, that places us 
upon an intellectual burden. Stavropoulos apparenƚ ƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶĐĞ ƚŽ ĚĞĂů ǁŝƚŚ : ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŵŝŐŚƚ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĂŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĞĂƐǇǁŝƚŚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?Ɛ
ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌKŶĞ ?ƚŚŝƐƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŝƐǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚ
in the literature, with very fĞǁůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐŚŝƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?
17 Cf Chapter seven ?ŽůĞĂŶĚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶThe Concept of Law. 
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 ? Q ) ƚŚĞ ƋƵĞƐƚ ĨŽƌ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶs is not exclusively about language but it is 
ŵĞĂŶƚƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ PǁĞǁĂŶƚƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞ ‘ůĂǁ ? ?ĨŽƌ
example, so that we can know what counts as legal, and thereby so that 
we can discover certain important properties about things legal  W so that 
we can an insight, that is, into the nature of law18. 
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĨŽĐƵƐŽŶĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞconcept of law is done with 
the view of uncovering properties of things legal, and ascertaining what the nature of 
law is. Interestingly, Stavropoulos also claims that though the quest for definitions is 
meant to provide metaphysical knowledge, when Hart discusses the meaning of ´law´ 
he (i.e. Hart) is adamant that linguistic rules cannot settle metaphysical questions. 
Stavropoulos writes: 
It is important to note, nevertheless, that whenever he (i.e. Hart) discusses 
ƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ůĂǁ ? ?ŚĞŝƐĂĚĂŵĂŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐƌƵůĞƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ǁŽƌĚ ?Ɛ ƵƐĞ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ĂůŽŶĞ ƐĞƚƚůĞ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ
ĂďŽƵƚůĂǁ ?ƐŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?dŚĞƌĞƐĞĞŵƐƚŽďĞ ?therefore, a tension: on the one 
hand, Hart professes to seek metaphysical insight from the way words are 
used; on the other, he says that rules governing use will not take us far 
enough in the metaphysical inquiry19.   
Stavropoulos acknowledges the weakness of his argument (even though he tries to 
pin this on Hart). On the one hand, Stavropoulos aims to show that Hart was pursuing 
a metaphysical enterprise, but on the other hand he is faced with tensions in the 
                                                          
18 Coleman (n 3) 63-64. 
19 Coleman (n 3) 69. 
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ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĞ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ Ăble to dissolve. In the next few 
paragraphs, I will demonstrate that had Stavropoulos not adopted the view that Hart 
was pursuing a metaphysical enterprise, such tensions would not have arisen. To 
support and frame his argument, Stavropoulos uses the following quotation from The 
Concept of Law: 
^ŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ QĂĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĂǁŽƌĚ QŵĂǇŵĂŬĞĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚƚŚĞůĂƚĞŶƚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ
which guides our use of a word, and may exhibit the relationships between 
the type of phenomena to which we apply the word and other 
phenomena. /ƚŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŝƐ ‘ŵĞƌĞůǇǀĞƌďĂů ?Žƌ ‘ũƵƐƚ
ĂďŽƵƚ ǁŽƌĚƐ ? ? ďƵƚ ƚŚŝƐ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ŵŽƐƚ ŵŝƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ
ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚŝƐŽŶĞŝŶĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƵƐĞ ?ǀĞŶƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƚƌŝĂŶŐůĞĂƐĂ ‘ƚŚƌĞĞ-
ƐŝĚĞĚƌĞĐƚŝůŝŶĞĂƌĨŝŐƵƌĞ ? ?ŽƌƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ ĂŶĞůĞƉŚĂŶƚĂƐĂ ‘ƋƵĂĚƌƵƉĞĚ
ĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌƐďǇŝƚƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝĐŬƐŬŝŶ ?ƚƵƐŬƐ ?ĂŶĚƚƌƵŶŬ ? ?
instructs us in a humble way both to the standard of use of these words 
and about the things to which the words apply. A definition of this familiar 
type does two things at once. It simultaneously provides a code or formula 
translating the word into other well-understood terms and locates for use 
the kind of thing to which the word is used to refer, by indicating the 
features which it shares in common with a wider family of things and those 
which mark it off from others of that same family. In searching for and 
ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐƵĐŚĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐǁĞ ‘ĂƌĞůŽŽŬŝŶŐŶŽƚŵĞƌĞůǇĂƚǁŽƌĚƐ QďƵƚĂůƐŽĂƚ
ƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƚŝĞƐǁĞƵƐĞǁŽƌĚƐƚŽƚĂůŬĂďŽƵƚ ? ?20 
                                                          
20 Coleman (n 3) 63-64. The quote was extracted from Hart (n 2) 14. 
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Stavropoulos interprets Harƚ ?ƐƉĂƐƐĂŐĞƚŽŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐǁĞƐĞĞŬĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐ
not only to provide greater clarity about the language that we use, but rather to gain 
metaphysical knowledge21. He gives the example of law: we want to define law so that 
ǁĞĐĂŶĨŝŶĚŽƵƚǁŚĂƚ “ĐŽƵŶƚƐĂs legal22 ? ?ƚŚĞ “ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐ ?ŽĨůĞŐĂůƚŚŝŶŐƐĂƌĞ ?ŝŶƐƵŵ, 
what is the nature of law23. Stavropoulos bases his metaphysical claim on this passage 
of The Concept of Law ?  Ƶƚ Ă ĐůŽƐĞƌ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶ ƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĂƚ
^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ĐůĂŝŵ- that Hart was swaying towards a metaphysical approach - is 
unfounded. It is of particular importance, and the key to understanding this passage, 
ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƚǁŽ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ  ‘ŵĞƌĞůǇ ǀĞƌďĂů ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ũƵƐƚ ĂďŽƵƚ ǁŽƌĚƐ ? ĂƌĞ ŝŶ ƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶ
marks. Upon closer inspection it transpires that, as per the notes to The Concept of 
Law, ,ĂƌƚďŽƌƌŽǁĞĚƚŚĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ “ŵĞƌĞůǇǀĞƌďĂů ?ĨƌŽŵZŝĐŚĂƌĚZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ24. In his 
                                                          
21 Cf text to footnote 18. 
22 ZĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ Ă ƉƵƌƐƵŝƚ ĨŽƌ Ă ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ? ,Ăƌƚ ŶŽƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  “ƚŚĞ ĚĞĞƉ
perplexity that has kept alive this question, is not ignorance or forgetfulness or inability to 
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĞƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ůĂǁ ?ĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ ? ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ?dŚŝƐƉĂƐƐĂŐĞĨƌŽŵ
The Concept of Law ŝƐŝŶĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽ^ ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ĐůĂŵƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽŬŶŽǁ
ǁŚĂƚ “ĐŽƵŶƚƐĂƐůĞŐĂů ? ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?,ĂƌƚĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞƐƐĞǀĞƌĂůƉĂŐĞƐŽĨŚŝƐĨŝƌƐƚĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƚŽƚŚŝƐǀĞƌǇ
ŝƐƐƵĞ ?,ĂƌƚǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “dŽƚŚŝƐunending theoretical debate in books we find a strange contrast in 
the ability of most men to city, with ease and confidence, examples of law if they were asked 
ƚŽĚŽƐŽ ? ? Q )dŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ ?ĂƚůĞĂƐƚŝŶŽƵƚůŝŶĞ ?ŚŽǁƚŽĨŝŶĚŽƵƚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŝƐ
laǁŝŶŶŐůĂŶĚ Q ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? 
23 Ibid, 63-64. 
24Hart, who worked closely with J.L. Austin, places particular importance in the meaning of 
ǁŽƌĚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ƚŽ ƉĂǇ ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĚĞƚĂŝů ? ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĐĂƐĞ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ
quotation marks. In the extensive notes section for this page in The Concept of Law, directs 
ƵƐƚŽƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽĨZŝĐŚĂƌĚZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ “ĨŽƌĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůŵŽĚĞƌŶǀŝĞǁŽŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵƐĂŶĚĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ
ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ? ) ? 
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book Definition25, Robinson provides an account of what definitions are, and how they 
should be used. I do not intend to comment on RobŝŶƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? ĨŽƌ ŝƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ŐŽ
beyond the scope of this thesis, but merely use it to gain insight into why Hart said 
ƚŚĂƚĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŶŽƚ ‘ŵĞƌĞůǇǀĞƌďĂů ? ?,ĂƌƚďŽƌƌŽǁĞĚƚŚĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ‘ŵĞƌĞůǇǀĞƌďĂů ?
from RoďŝŶƐŽŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ZŽďŝŶƐŽŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? 
Some persons consider word-thing definition and the study of word-thing 
definition worthless enterprises. Such matters, they feel, are merely 
verbal and give no important knowledge. We should disregard words and 
give our attention to things.26 
Robinson then goes against the stated view, and explains why there is always 
important knowledge to be gained by comprehending a definition. This is exactly what 
,ĂƌƚĚŽĞƐǁŚĞŶŚĞŐŝǀĞƐƚŚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌŝĂŶŐůĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ĞůĞƉŚĂŶƚ ? ?,ĂƌƚŝƐƚƌǇŝŶŐ
to show that definitions relate to things and that there is knowledge to be gained even 
ďǇƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĐŽŵŵŽŶƉůĂĐĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?/ĨǁĞƚĂŬĞ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ
an elephant, as Hart explains, we can see that definitions can instruct us in two distinct 
ways: the standard of use of the words, and the things to which words apply to. Firstly, 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐĂŶĞůĞƉŚĂŶƚĂƐĂ “ƋƵĂĚƌƵƉĞĚĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌƐďǇŝƚƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ
ƚŚŝĐŬ ƐŬŝŶ ? ƚƵƐŬƐ ĂŶĚ ƚƌƵŶŬ ? ? ĂůůŽǁƐ ƵƐ ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ǁŚĂƚ ĂŶ ĞůĞƉŚĂŶƚ ŝƐ ? tŚĞŶ
speaking to someone who has never seen an elephant, and does not know what the 
                                                          
25 Richard Robinson, Definition (Oxford University Press 1962).  
26 RoďŝŶƐŽŶ ?Ŷ ? ? ) ? ? ?ƐƋƵŽƚĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?,ĂƌƚǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “Even the definition of a triangle as a 
 ‘ƚŚƌĞĞ-ƐŝĚĞĚƌĞĐƚŝůŝŶĞĂƌĨŝŐƵƌĞ ? ?ŽƌƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶĞůĞƉŚĂŶƚĂƐĂ ‘ƋƵĂĚƌƵƉĞĚĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚ
ĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌƐďǇŝƚƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝĐŬƐŬŝŶ ?ƚƵƐŬƐ ?ĂŶĚƚƌƵŶŬ ? ?ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐts us in a humble way both 




ǁŽƌĚ “ĞůĞƉŚĂŶƚ ?ƐƚĂŶĚƐĨŽƌ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ǁŚĂƚĂŶĞůĞƉŚĂŶƚŝƐŽƌ ůŽŽŬƐůŝŬĞ ) ?ŐŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞŵƚŚŝƐ
definition of elephant will go some way towards helping them understand what an 
elephant is, and the instances in which we call something an elephant. Thus, as Hart 
writes, instructing us about the things to which words apply27.  Moreover, by 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ĞůĞƉŚĂŶƚ ? ƵƉŽŶƐŝŐŚƚŽĨĂŶĞůĞƉŚĂŶƚƚŚĞǇ
ǁŽƵůĚďĞĂďůĞƚŽĞǆĐůĂŝŵ P  “ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐĂŶĞůĞƉŚĂŶƚ ? ?^Ž ?ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇ ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƐ
about the things to which words apply but they also instructs us about the standards 
of use (i.e. when to apply  W or not - the word or concept.  Robinson further explains 
ƚŚĂƚŝĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚŵĞĂŶƐ ‘ƚŚŝƐƚŚŝŶŐ ?ƚŽĂŶǇƉĞrsons at any time, there must be a rule or 
custom that guides their use of the word. According to Robinson, 
Even when we are somewhat familiar with the thing before we learn the 
definition, the definition may give us new knowledge of the thing in that 
it abstracts it and sets it off from the rest of the world in a way which we 
probably had not done before unless we already had some other word for 
that thing.28 
Thus a definition is not merely about language in so far as words relate to things in 
reality. By taking into account the idea that words relate to the world, and are not 
merely abstract entities, it becomes clear that study of a definition can help to provide 
knowledge about the world. So, a definition is two-ĨŽůĚ P ŝƚ ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƐ ƵƐ ĂƐ ƚŽ  ‘ƚŚĞ
standard oĨƵƐĞ ? ?ĂŶĚĂůƐŽ ‘ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŐƐƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǁŽƌĚĂƉƉůŝĞƐ ? ?&Žƌ,ĂƌƚŝƚŝƐ
ĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŵŝƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ?ƚŽƚŚŝŶŬŽĨĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ ‘ŵĞƌĞůǇǀĞƌďĂů ?Žƌ ‘ũƵƐƚ
                                                          
27
 Hart (n 2), 14. 
28 Robinson (n 25), 33. 
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ĂďŽƵƚǁŽƌĚƐ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŶŽƚŽĨƵƐĞ ?/ŶĨĂĐƚ ?ǁŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚŝƐƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽƐŚŽǁŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƚ is 
ŐƌŽƐƐůǇŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŶƚŽĂƐƐƵŵĞƚŚĂƚĂĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŝƐ  ‘ŵĞƌĞůǇǀĞƌďĂů ? ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŝƐ
how humans communicate and therefore words are used in relation to things29. As 
,ĂƌƚǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “ůůŽĨƵƐĂƌĞƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐŝŶƚŚŝƐƉƌĞĚŝĐĂŵĞŶƚ PŝƚŝƐĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇƚŚĂƚŽĨ
tŚĞŵĂŶǁŚŽƐĂǇƐ ? “/ĐĂŶƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĂŶĞůĞƉŚĂŶƚǁŚĞŶ/ƐĞĞŽŶĞďƵƚ/ĐĂŶŶŽƚĚĞĨŝŶĞ
it30 ? ?dŚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌŽĨƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞ ‘ŵĞƌĞůǇǀĞƌďĂů ? ?Žƌ ‘ũƵƐƚĂďŽƵƚǁŽƌĚƐ ? ?
is that people will ignore the knowledge that can be obtained from them. There is 
some knowledge to be gained, even by definitions of words that we are familiar with. 
,ĂƌƚŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚŝƐǁŝƚŚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽĂĨĂŵŽƵƐ^ƚƵŐƵƐƚŝŶĞƉĂƐƐĂŐĞ P “tŚĂƚƚŚĞŶŝƐ
time? If no one asks me I know: if I wish to explain it to one that asks I know not31 ? ?
ThŽƵŐŚŵŽƐƚŽĨƵƐǁŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚĂŶƐǁĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ‘ǁŚĂƚƚŝŵĞŝƐŝƚ ? ? ?ǁŚĞŶ
asked to define what time is most of us would probably struggle. Moreover, as 
ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ŝƐ ƉƵƌƐƵŝŶŐ Ă ŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů ĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ32, 
focusing on the nature ŽĨ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ? ŐŽĞƐ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ŚŝƐ ĞĂƌůŝĞƌ ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ  “ƚŽŽŬ
ƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐ ŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ ? ĨƌŽŵ : ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ĂŶĚ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ33. As discussed in previous 
chapters, supporters of Ordinary Language Philosophy, as endorsed by J.L. Austin and 
Wittgenstein, believe that the significance of concepts is fixed by linguistic practices34. 
                                                          
29 Ibid, 29. 
30 Hart (n 2) 14. 
31 Hart (n 2) 14. 
32 Cf footnote 18. To reiterate, StavropouůŽƐǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “ƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚĨŽƌĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐŝƐŶŽƚĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞůǇ
ĂďŽƵƚůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞďƵƚŝƚŝƐŵĞĂŶƚƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? 
33 Coleman (n 3) 59. 




In short, they claim that (many) philosophical puzzles can be resolved if philosophers 
take into account the actual use of words or concepts35.  As discussed in Chapter Two36 
of this thesis, Ordinary Language Philosophers hold that most philosophical problems 
can be solved by looking at the everyday use of words. Moreover, as Mulhall says, 
Ordinary Language Philosophers are suspicious of philosophical discourse that aims at 
uncovering the essence of a particular aspect of reality37. There will therefore be 
tensions in trying to apply ordinary language philosophy to uncover the nature of 
concepts. It does therefore not come as a surprise that Stavropoulos acknowledges 
that there are tensions with this approach (even though he presents it as a criticism 
ŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ )38. If Stavropoulos was right in his assumption that Hart was indeed 
pursuing a metaphysical approach, he would then be entirely correct in his criticism. 
There is however no evidence ƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ “ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐĞƐƚŽƐĞĞŬŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůŝŶƐŝŐŚƚĨƌŽŵ
ƚŚĞǁĂǇǁŽƌĚƐĂƌĞƵƐĞ ?Ě ? ? ?ƋƵŝƚĞƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ
is more damning of himself than Hart. 
 /ŶƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚ ĨŽƌƚŚĞ  “ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?ŽĨ ůĂǁ ?^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚĞŵƉůŽǇƐ
ǁŚĂƚŚĞĐĂůůƐ “ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞŶŽƚďĞŝŶŐǀĞƌǇĐůĞĂƌŽŶǁŚĂƚŝƐŵĞĂŶƚďǇ
this terminology39. According to Stavropoulos, Hart argued that the classical mode of 
                                                          
35 As immortalised bǇ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƐĂǇŝŶŐ P  “ŽŶ ?ƚ ůŽŽŬ ĨŽƌ ŝƚƐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? ůŽŽŬ ĨŽƌ ŝƚƐ ƵƐĞ ? ?
Wittgenstein (n 14) ss. 43. 
36 Chapter Two, The Case of Ordinary Language Philosophy, text to footnote 22. 
37 BBC, 'Ordinary language philosophy, in our time - BBC radio 4' (BBC, 7 November 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b03ggc19> accessed 8 April 2016, starting 17:04. 
38 Cf text to footnote 19. 
39 ŽůĞŵĂŶ  ?Ŷ  ? )  ? ? ? ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P  “tŚĂƚ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŝƐ ? ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ŝƐ ŶŽƚ
altogether clear. I will not try to give a comprehensive answer to this question here, but only 
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definition per genus et differentiam is not suitable in the case of law, and therefore a 
new method needs to be employed, in this case conceptual analysis. Stavropoulos 
ůŝŶŬƐƚŚŝƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽĨĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐǁŝƚŚŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐƐ ?ďǇĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƚŚĞ “ƉƌŽůŽŐƵĞƚŽ
ŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐƐ ? ?ƐŝŶĐĞŽŶĞŶĞĞĚƐ ƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚĐŽƵŶƚƐĂƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐďĞĨŽƌĞ ŝƚƐ
nature can be ascertained40. Moreover, Stavropoulos claims that this method of 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐ ƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ ?  “ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂůůǇ ?ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ
ĂŶĚƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?ǇĞƚ ‘ĚĞĨĞĂƐŝďůĞ ?ŝŶƐƉĞĐŝĂůĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?41. Even though Stavropoulos 
acknowledgĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ŶĞǀĞƌ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŚŝƐ ƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ŚĞĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
arguments regarding easy and hard cases meant that this doctrine is fairly attributed 
to him42 ?/ƚŝƐŽĨŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĂŶĚƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŝƐĂůƐŽ
applied by Bix43, Marmor44 and, as will be seen in the chapters to follow, by the 
^ƉĂŶŝƐŚ ?  ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƵŶůŝŬĞ ŚŝƐ ƉƌĞĚĞĐĞƐƐŽƌƐ ŚĞƌĞ ? ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
conception of analysis is aimed at the folk theory45. Significantly, Stavropoulos bases 
                                                          
ƐŬĞƚĐŚĂĨĞǁĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ? ?/ƚŝƐŶŽƚĐůĞĂƌĨƌŽŵ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŚĞĐŚŽƐĞŶŽƚƚŽ
provide a comprehensive answer, or whether he is not clear on the terminology and therefore 
does not attempt a definition. 
40 Coleman (n 3) 69.  
41 Coleman (n 3) 65. 
42 Coleman (n 3) 65. ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ  “ŝƐĂŐĞŶƵŝŶĞƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐ
doctrine that is intended to replace the old doctrine of severally necessary and jointly 
ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? 
43 Cf Chapter four, Brian Bix on Judicial Discretion, text to footnote 21. 
44 Cf Chapter five, Andrei Marmor and Easy Cases, text to footnote 38. 
45 Coleman (n 3) 70, footnote 25. Folk psychology presents itself as a common sense theory 
that underlies everyday explanations of human behaviour. This theory focuses on so-called 
ŵĞŶƚĂů ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ  “ďĞůŝĞĨƐ ? ?  “ĚĞƐŝƌĞƐ ? ?  “ĨĞĂƌ ? ?ĂŶĚ  “ŚŽƉĞ ? ?&ŽůŬ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŝƐĂŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŽĨ
social practices, that includes being able to ascribe these mental states to ourselves and 
others. The folk psychology theory can be seen as a conceptual framework. A conceptual 
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his approach on FƌĂŶŬ :ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ƐDefence of Conceptual Analysis46, and indeed 
:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŝƐƚŚĞŬĞǇƚŽƵŶůŽĐŬŝŶŐ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ĐůĂŝŵƐ
ĂďŽƵƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ47 ? dŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ ŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ :ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
methodology (and even his turn of pŚƌĂƐĞ )ĂŶĚ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
ǁŽƌŬ ?^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ǁŽƌŬĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĞŵĂŝŶĐůĂŝŵƌƵŶŶŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚŝƐ
                                                          
framework is the cognitive capacity allows us to interpret and frame particular conscious and 
ƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?>Ğƚ ?ƐƚĂŬĞƚŚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƐŽŵĞŽŶĞǁŚŽŝƐĚƌŝǀŝŶŐĂŶĚŶŽƚŝĐĞƐƚhat the 
ĐĂƌ ŝŶ ĨƌŽŶƚ ƐƚŽƉƐ ǁŚĞŶ Ă ůŽůůŝƉŽƉ ŵĂŶ ƐƚĂŶĚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƌŽĂĚ ǁŝƚŚ Ă  “^dKW ? ƐŝŐŶ ? tŝƚŚŽƵƚ Ă
conceptual framework, the person observing this phenomenon would be unable to 
understand why the man stepped onto the road, and why the driver stopped. Supporters of 
folk psychology believe that there is a conceptual framework that perceives and can interpret 
ƚŚĞƐĞĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞƐďǇĂĐƋƵŝƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƉĞƌƚŝŶĞŶƚĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ZĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨ ĨŽůŬ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P  “,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ is a specific and highly 
ĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂůǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂŝŵƐĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ĨŽůŬƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ? ?^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐŐŽĞƐ
on to argue that Hart might have been against this idea since his theory was aimed at lawyers, 
and not any folk. He does also acknowledŐĞƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ “ǁŽƵůĚƉƌŽďĂďůǇďĞŚŽƐƚŝůĞƚŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂ
that the folk must have theories, rather than unreflective mastery of the cŽŶĐĞƉƚƐƚŚĞǇƵƐĞ Q ?
Coleman (n 3) 71. However, he argues that this distinction is fictitious, and that we can 
therefore attribute a version of the folk theory to Hart. Nonetheless, he notes that Joseph Raz 
ĂƐƐƵƌĞĚŚŝŵƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŚŽƐƚŝůĞƚŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ “ĨŽůŬƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ƚŽŽ ?ŽůĞŵĂŶ ?Ŷ ? ) 
71, footnote no. 27).   Even though in parts Stavropoulos is at times hesitant in his claim, 
ŶŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞƐƐŚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĚĞƉĞŶĚƐƵƉŽŶĂŶĚďĞŐŝŶƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ
that Hart is presenting a variant of the folk theory. 
46 Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis (Oxford 
University Press 1998). 
47 &ƌĂŶŬ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚŚŝƐǁŽƌŬƐŝǆǇĞĂƌƐĂĨƚĞƌ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉĂƐƐŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚŝƚ ŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĨĂŝƌƚŽ
assume that Hart was unfamiliar with his work even when writing the postscript to The 
Concept of Law. It is perhaps for this reason that though referenced throughout his paper, 
^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ŶĞǀĞƌ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ŝƐ ƵƐŝŶŐ :ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ŐŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĞ
ƐƚƌŽŶŐůŝŶŬƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂŶĚ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ?ŝƚŝƐĨĂŝƌƚŽĂƐƐƵŵĞ
ƚŚĂƚ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐǁĂƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ƐǁŽrk. 
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ƚŚĞƐŝƐ PƚŚĂƚůĞŐĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐƌĞĂĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬin terms of a particular theory or idea, 
but then present it with insufficient detail, and without compelling defence, which 
results in ůĂƌŐĞƉĂƌƚƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬbeing left unexplained and creates considerable 
ƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ  ?ƐƵƌŵŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ŝŶĐŚŽĂƚĞ ? ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ Ă
muddled methodology, and so on). This was made clear in the two previous chapters, 
ǁŚĞƌĞ ďŽƚŚ ŝǆ ĂŶĚ DĂƌŵŽƌ ƚƌŝĞĚ ƚŽ ĂŶĂůǇƐĞ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ƐŽůĞůǇ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞŝƌ
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ƐǁŝůůďĞƐĞĞŶ ?^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐ
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?Ɛ thesis on conceptual analysis, and 
this ill-matched perspective inevitably creates considerable problems for the 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ  ?ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŚĂƐ ĂůƌĞĂĚǇ ďĞĞŶ ŵĂĚĞ ĐůĞĂƌ ďǇ
Stavropoulos himself regarding metaphysics). As mentioned, one of ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?
ĐůĂŝŵƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨĂ
concept we first need to understand the concept itself. On this issue, Jackson writes: 
Although metaphysics is about what the world is like, the questions we ask 
when we do metaphysics are framed in a language, and thus we need to 
attend to what the users of the language mean by the words they employ 
to ask their questions48.  
According to Jackson, there is a strong connection between metaphysics and 
conceptuaů ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? :ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ? ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů
ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ĂŝŵƐ Ăƚ ƵŶĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  “ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? ŽĨ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ǁŚĂƚ  “ĐŽƵŶƚƐ ? ĂƐ ďĞŝŶŐ
                                                          
48 Jackson (n 45) 30. 
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ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶĂŶĚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĂƐƵƐĞ49. 
:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ďƵŝůĚƐ ƵƉŽŶ ƐŽŵĞ ŽĨ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐ ? ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ďǇ
weaving the concept of family resemblances within his theory50, but it is a much more 
elaborate, and altogether different method of analysis from that of Wittgenstein and 
J.L. Austin. Following :ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚƵƐĞ ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ
language as a source of theoretical knowledge51. Thus, according to Stavropoulos 
,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ Ăŝŵ ǁĂƐ ƚŽ ďƵŝůĚ Ă  “ĚĂƚĂďĂƐĞ ? ? ƵƐŝŶŐ ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ŝŶ ƵƐĞ ĂƐ  “ĚĂƚĂ ?52. 
However, Stavropoulos goes on to argue that the raw data cannot support the analysis 
on its own, for it will need sifting and ordering to ensure that linguistic mistakes are 
eliminated from the data set. Ultimately, according to Stavropoulos, actual usage 
feeds into our conceptual analysis to give an idealised benchmark of correctness in 
the application of terms53. Stavropoulos does not give any examples of how the 
database or the sorting and ordering actual usage would work in practice, perhaps 
because even Stavropoulos is doubtful as to the application of the theory he attributes 
to Hart.  Stavropoulos writes: 
                                                          
49 /Ŷ Ă ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚǇ ǁŝƚŚ ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ǁŽƌŬ ? :ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŝƐƚŽĞǆƚƌĂĐƚǁŚĂƚĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨǁŚĂƚcounts ĂƐ<ŝƐ ? “ĨƌŽŵŝŶƚƵŝƚŝŽŶƐ
ĂďŽƵƚŚŽǁƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĐĂƐĞƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚwill eventually reveal their concept of K-Hood. 
Jackson (n 45) 32.  
50 Jackson claims that he will not revive the paradigm case argument since he acknowledges 
that cases will not have one particular thing in common, but a multitude of connections. 
Jackson (n 45) 34.  
51 Coleman (n 3) 72. 
52 Coleman (n 3) 72. 
53 Coleman (n 3) 75. 
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It is not clear that the process of idealisation that I describe is coherent 
and workable54. 
Rather ironically, this disarming admission leads Stavropoulos to the conclusion that 
Haƌƚ ?Ɛ ƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ  “ƐŚĂƌĞĚ ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ ? ŝƐ ŽďƐĐƵƌĞ ? ĂŶĚ ŶŽƚ ƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶƚ ƚŽ
users55 ?ŶĂƉƉƌĂŝƐĂůŽĨ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁŽƵůĚďĞďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞƐĐŽƉĞŽĨƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ĂŶĚ
Ă ĨƵůů ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚƌŝĐĂĐŝĞƐ ŽĨ ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ  “ĨŽůŬ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?
wouldŶ ?ƚ ƐĞƌǀĞ ŝƚƐ ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŵĞŶƚ ? dŚŽƵŐŚ ŝƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ĞǀĞŶ
ƐƚƌĂŝŐŚƚĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ? ƚŽ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ĞǀĞƌǇ ĂƐƉĞĐƚ ŽĨ ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
conceptual analysis, the summary provided above is enough to pick out in bold terms 
^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ŵŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? /Ŷ ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ĂŶĚ ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉŽŝŶƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ
therefore both illuminating and elucidatory to focus on a different approach to 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƐĨĂƌŵŽƌĞĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƐĐŚŽŽůŽĨƚŚŽƵŐŚƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ
philosophical movement to which he subscribed in Oxford in the 1950s and 1960s, 
ĂŶĚ ďǇ ƚŚŝƐ ŵĞƚŚŽĚ ĚƌĂǁ ŽƵƚ ƐŽŵĞ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?
project. 
 Robert Summers (who, as mentioned in the first chapter56, worked closely with 
Hart) wrote an interesting article in 1966 on Conceptual Analysis57. Summers credits 
Hart, Glanville Williams, Ronald Dworkin and others with ushering in a new era of 
                                                          
54 Coleman (n 3) 75. 
55 ŽůĞŵĂŶ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ? “,ŝƐƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐƌƵůĞƐĂƌĞƚŽŽƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŽďĞƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶƚƚŽƵƐĞƌƐ ? Q ? )
Given that the rules Hart was after are criteria, rather than scientific definitions, the result is 
that he is, after all, trying to articulate shared criteria, notwithstanding the fact that such 
ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂĂƌĞŶŽƚƐŚĂƌĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƵƐĞƌƐďĞŝŶŐĂǁĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŵ ? ?
56 Chapter two, text to footnote 48. 
57 ZŽďĞƌƚ^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ? ‘dŚĞEĞǁŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů:ƵƌŝƐƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? )  EĞǁzŽƌŬhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ>ĂǁZĞǀŝĞǁ ? 
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ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂůũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ?ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞƐĞ “ŶĞǁ ?ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂůũƵƌŝƐƚƐ
speak of conceptual analysis this phrase is synoŶǇŵŽƵƐǁŝƚŚ “ĂŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ
ŽĨǁŽƌĚƐ ?ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇƵƐĞĚďǇůĂǇŵĞŶŽƌƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐŝŶĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚůĂǁ58. Moreover, 
ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ?ƚŚŝƐ “ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?ŝƐŶŽƚĐŽŶĨŝŶĞĚƚŽĂƐŝŶŐůĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇďƵƚƚŽŵǇƌŝĂĚ
ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ  “ďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐ ĚŽǁŶ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ? ĚŝĨĨerentiating related concepts, 
correlating and/or unifying related concepts, classifying them in some way, and 
ĐŚĂƌƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ Q59 ? ? DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ? ĂƐ ^ƵŵŵĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞ ?
,ĂƌƚǁĂƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶĂŶĚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐŶĞǁǁĂǇŽĨĚoing philosophy. 
Contrary to what Stavropoulos goes on to claim in his article, this new way of doing 
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŝŶǀŽůǀĞĂ “ĚĂƚĂďĂƐĞ ?Žƌ “ƐŽƌƚŝŶŐĚĂƚĂ ?ĂŶĚĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŶŐůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐ
mistakes, but quite the opposite. Thus, in stark opposition to the Tractatus, in 
Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein does not advocate for a constructive theory 
of meaning, rather claiming instead that in order to understand a concept or a 
ƉƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ǁĞ ŵƵƐƚ  “ůŽŽŬ ĂŶĚ ƐĞĞ ?60. In short, Ordinary Language Philosophers 
wanted to get back to the basics, not create or reify complex theory, since they 
believed that many philosophical problems could be dissolved if one simply took into 
account the ordinary use of expressions. In turn, and in exact sympathy, when Hart 
                                                          
58 Summers (n 56) 867. 
59 Summers (n 56) 867. 
60As mentioned, the relevant passage of Philosophical Investigations was quoted by Hart in 
the notes to The Concept of Law ?ǁŚĞƌĞ,ĂƌƚǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ĂŐĂŵĞ ?
ŚĞƐĂŝĚ ? ‘ŽŶ ?ƚƐĂǇƚŚĞƌĞmust ďĞƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĐŽŵŵŽŶŽƌƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĐĂůůĞĚ ‘ŐĂŵĞƐ ? ?
but look and see whether there is anything in common at all. For if you look at them you will 
not see anything common to all but similarŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ?ĂŶĚĂǁŚŽůĞƐĞƌŝĞƐĂƚƚŚĂƚ ? ? ?
Hart (n 2) 280. 
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refers ƚŽƚŚĞ “ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ?ƵƐĞŽĨĂŶĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ŚĞŝƐŶŽƚƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŽĂĨŽůŬƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ďƵƚ
ũƵƐƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  “ƐƚŽĐŬ ?ƵƐĞ ?Žƌ ƚŚĞ  “ƌĞŐƵůĂƌ ? ƵƐĞŽĨ ĂŶĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ61. We are all able to 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨŽƵƌ  “ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ? ŝŶĂ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ǁĞ ůĞĂƌŶƚŚĞ  “ƐƚŽĐŬ ?
uses of a word. There are situations where we simply know what a concept or general 
term means. As Hart writes,  
There will be plain cases constantly recurring in similar contexts to which 
ƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐĂƌĞĐůĞĂƌůǇĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞ  ? ‘/ĨĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ŝƐĂǀĞŚŝĐůĞa 
motor-ĐĂƌŝƐŽŶĞ ? ) Q62 
^Ž ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĂŝŶĂŝŵŝŶŚŝƐďŽŽŬǁĂƐƚŽƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚďǇ “ůŽŽŬŝŶŐĂŶĚƐĞĞŝŶŐ ?ǁĞǁŽƵůĚ
find situations where the concept law is used and no doubts are felt as to its 
applicability. There will however, as Hart notes, be situations where it is unclear 
whether the term will apply or not, the so-called borderline cases. Hart himself says 
ƚŚĂƚ “ QƚŚĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĚŽƵďƚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĞ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌ )ǁŝůůĂůƐŽ
find here, is only a secondary concern of the book63 ? ? 
Legal Indeterminacy, Social Rules and Open Texture 
 Stavropoulos dedicates the second part of his article to a discussion on legal 
indeterminacy, covering both social rules and the open texture of language64. These 
                                                          
61 'ŝůďĞƌƚZǇůĞ ? ‘KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?dŚĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůZĞǀŝĞǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
62 Hart (n 2) 126. 
63 Hart (n 2) 17. 
64 The issue of open texture of language issue has been discussed by both Bix and Marmor in 
ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐ ?ďƵƚ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ŝŶ ůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚŚŝƐ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ?
ƚĂŬĞƐ Ă ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ tĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?
arguments are, in part, dense and complex and for that reason it is important to quote 
 178 
 
two issues will be addressed in turn. Stavropoulos raises a serious concern regarding 
,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ĂŶĚ ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇ ƌƵůĞƐ ? ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ,Ăƌƚ
explains the nature of law as being dependent on two types of rules, primary and 
ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ,Ăƌƚ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ĂƌĞ ƵŶŝƚĞĚ ďǇ  “Ă ƐĞƚ ŽĨ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ŶĞĐĞssary and 
sufficient for the existence of a legal system65 ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚŝƚ
ŝƐĂƚƚŚŝƐƐƚĂŐĞƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ “ĐĂƐŚĞƐƚŚĞƐĞŵĂntic cheque drawn at the beginning of his 
ďŽŽŬ ? ?ǁŚĞŶŚĞĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐŶŽƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĚĞĨŝŶĞůĂǁĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ “necessary and 
sufficient conditions66 ? ?^Ž ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?,ĂƌƚŶĞǀĞƌƌĞĂůůǇĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐƚŚĞ
nature of law due to his own account of indeterminacy which restricts and qualifies 
his analysis of law as a union of primary and secondary rules. As will be seen, this is 
ŶŽƚ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ŵĂŝŶĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐůĞŐĂůŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇ ?ƐŝŶĐĞŚĞŐŽĞƐŽŶƚŽ
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĂŶĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĐƌŝƚŝĐŝǌĞ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƐƚŽŚĂƌĚĐĂƐĞƐ ?ƐŶŽƚĞĚĂƚƚŚĞ
ďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ  “ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ
ĂŶĚƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?ůŝĞƐŝŶŝƚƐƌĞĐƵƌƌĞŶĐĞĂƐĂƚŚĞŵĞŝŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ǁŽƌŬ ?ĂŶĚƐŚŽƵůĚ
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞďĞĨƵůůǇĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞĚŚĞƌĞ ?Ɛ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐŶŽƚĞƐ ?,ĂƌƚƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽ  “ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ
ĂŶĚ ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ? ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ĂŶĚ ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇ ƌƵůĞƐ ? Đcording to 
Stavropoulos it is inconsistent to claim that law cannot be analysed in terms of 
                                                          
ƉĂƐƐĂŐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƚĞǆƚ ŝŶƚŚĞĨŽŽƚŶŽƚĞƐƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌĨƵůůǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƐ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?
argument and the subsequent criticism. 
65 Coleman (n 3) 91. 
66 ŽůĞŵĂŶ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ?KŶƚŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞ ?^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽĨĐŽŶĐĞptual analysis 
yields a specification of the nature of law in terms of the union of two kinds of rule. He 
expressed that union in terms of a set of conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence 
of a legal system. Had he left it at that, all his early talk about the impossibility of analysis in 




necessary and sufficient conditions, but then claim that there is a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for something to be a legal system67.  It should be clarified that 
ǁŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚǁƌŝƚĞƐŝƐƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƚǁŽminimum conditions necessary and 
ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ Ă ůĞŐĂů ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? 68. Hart does not define a set of 
conditions for the definition of law, rather he sets out two minimum conditions for a 
ůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŽĞǆŝƐƚ ?^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚĚƵĞƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇ ?
ŝŶ ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ĐĂƐĞƐ  “Ăůů ĐůĂŝŵƐ ŽĨ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů ŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇ ĂďŽƵƚ ůĂǁ ŵĂǇ ĨĂŝů69 ? ? >Ğƚ ?Ɛ
ĞǆĂŵŝŶĞƚŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞŝŶŵŽƌĞĚĞƚĂŝů ?/ƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽf primary 
ĂŶĚ ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇ ƌƵůĞƐ ƚĂŬĞƐ ƉůĂĐĞ ďĞĨŽƌĞ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ
language. On the issue of primary and secondary rules, Hart writes: 
There are therefore two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for 
the existence of a legal system. On the one hand, those rules of behaviour 
ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞǀĂůŝĚĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ƐƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂŽĨǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇŵƵƐƚ
be generally obeyed, and, on the other hand, its rules of recognition 
specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and 
adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌďǇŝƚƐŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ? Q )dŚĞĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĂůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵĞǆŝƐƚƐ
                                                          
67 ŽůĞŵĂŶ  ?Ŷ  ? )  ? ? ? ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P  “,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽd of conceptual analysis yields a 
specification of the nature of law in terms of the union of two kinds of rule. He expressed that 
union in terms of a set of conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ? 
68 Hart (n 2) 126. 
69 Coleman (n 3) 91. 
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is therefore a Janus-faced statement looking both towards obedience of 
by ordinary citizens and to the acceptance of official behaviour.70 
So, according to Hart there are two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for 
the existence of a legal system: there are rules of behaviour that must be generally 
obeyed, and the officials responsible for enforcing these rules of behaviour must 
recognise them and accept them as being legal rules of behaviour. We could use traffic 
lights as an example. Any driver recognises a red light as a sign that he needs to stop. 
/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚŝƐ ?ŝĨĂĚƌŝǀĞƌĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƐtop at a red light and a policeman observes this 
behaviour, the policeman will generally issue the driver with, at least, a penalty notice. 
In this case there is a rule of behaviour that is generally obeyed (here, stopping at a 
red light), and the officials responsible for enforcing this rule recognise it as a legal 
rule (e.g. if spotted, the perpetrator will face some kind of punishment). Legal rules 
exist in so far as they are recognised as such. If drivers started disregarding traffic 
lights, and officials did not recognise the traffic signs regulations as an enforceable 
legal rule71 ?ŝƚǁŽƵůĚƐƚŽƉďĞŝŶŐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƐƵĐŚ ?>Ğƚ ?ƐƚĂŬĞƚŚ ůĞŐĂůƌƵůĞĨŽƌďŝĚĚŝŶŐ
the keeper of a place of public resort to permit drunkenness in the house as an 
example. In the United Kingdom it is illegal for the keeper of a place of public resort 
to permit drunkenness in the house72. Though this is a valid legal rule that could be 
                                                          
70 Hart (n 2) 116-117. Please note that Stavropoulos indicates this page of The Concept of Law 
as the one containing an explanation regarding necessary and sufficient conditions, and we 
can therefore be confident that he was referring to this passage.  
71 As set out by The traffic signs regulations and general directions 2002. 
72 Further, under the Licensing Act 2003, section 140, it is an offence to allow disorderly 
conduct and under section 141 it is an offence to sell alcohol to an intoxicated person. 
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enforced by court officials, ordinary people do not acknowledge this rule as being a 
legal rule (or so the newspapers lead us to believe). The lack of arrest of pub owners 
for the drunkenness of their clients would also lead us to believe that officials do not 
recognise this as a law either. It is fair to say that in this instance the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the existence of a social rule were not fulfilled and this rule 
(i.e. the keeper of a public place cannot resort to permit drunkenness in the house) is 
not currently enforced.  It is fair to say that in this instance the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the existence of a social rule were not fulfilled and this rule (i.e. the 
keeper of a public place cannot resort to permit drunkenness in the house) is not 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ƚŽďĞĂ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ?ǀĂůŝĚ ůĞŐĂů ƌƵůĞ ?ƐŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ ?,Ăƌƚ ?s two 
minimum conditions for the existence of a legal system do not suffer from open 
texture or vagueness. They are conditions that apply to rules of behaviour, and 
therefore even though the rules might be open-textured, the conditions themselves 
are not. 
 ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŵŝŐŚƚďĞƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚŽŚŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨŽƉĞŶ
texture. According to Stavropoulos, Hart claims that all rules are indeterminate, as are 
all concepts. From this it follows that there are two main sources of legal 
indeterminacy P ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĂů ŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇ ŽĨ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ  ?ŝ ?Ğ ?  “ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨůĂǁĂƌĞŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞ ?73 )ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĂůŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇŽĨƌƵůĞƐ ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ?ƚŚĞ
ƌƵůĞƐůĂǁĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐŝŶ ?74 ) ?^ ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐŽŶĨůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƚǁŽƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ
of indetermiŶĂĐǇ ? ŵĂŝŶůǇ ĐŽŶƚĞƐƚŝŶŐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇ ŽĨ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ĂŶĚ
                                                          
73 Coleman (n 3) 90. 
74 Coleman (n 3) 90. 
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indeterminacy of rules interchangeably75.  Interestingly, Stavropoulos, much like Bix 
and Marmor, claims that for Hart there is an issue of classification. According to 
Stavropoulos, the indeterminacy in rules and general terms stems from an uncertainty 
of the extension of a particular expression or rule76. So, Stavropoulos argues, Hart is 
arguing from an epistemic shortcoming: there is a possibility of uncertainty regarding 
the application of a certain rule or expression. Furthermore, Stavropoulos thus claims 
that Hart attempts to draw metaphysical conclusions framed in epistemic terms. 
Stavropoulos argues that when there is uncertainty as to the application of a certain 
rule or expression, there is no certainty as to how things in the world are arranged. 
So, according to Stavropoulos wheŶ ĨĂĐĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ Ă  ‘ŚĂƌĚ ? ĐĂƐĞ  ?Ğ ?Ő ? whether roller-
skates are a vehicle for the purpose of the rule) we are faced with an epistemic 
shortcoming (we are unclear on whether or not roller-skates are vehicles). This 
epistemic premise, Stavropoulos argues, will then result in a metaphysical conclusion: 
the question of whether (in the current example) roller-skates are a vehicle for the 
purpose of the rule has no determinate answer. Stavropoulos writes:  
It is important to emphasize that Hart is not simply saying that there are 
ĞĂƐǇ ĂŶĚ ŚĂƌĚ ĐĂƐĞƐ ? ,Ğ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ƐŝŵƉůǇ ƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ‘ƉůĂƚŝƚƵĚĞ ? ƚŚĂƚ
uncertainties in the application of words are inevitable; rather, he draws 
fƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉůĂƚŝƚƵĚĞ ? ƚŚĞmetaphysical implication that in cases of 
                                                          
75 Coleman (n 3) 90.  
76 ŽůĞŵĂŶ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ?^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “ŽƚŚƌƵůĞƐŽŶƚŚĞŽŶĞŚĂŶĚĂŶĚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐĂŶĚ
concepts on the other have extensions or ranges of application. Indeterminacy consists in 
there being no fact of the matter as to whether an expression or rule is applicable to certain 
ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ? ? 
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uncertainty here is no fact of the matter as to how things in the world are 
arranged, as to whether some metal is gold or a certain sort of behaviour 
is negligent.77 
^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐůŝƚƚůĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽThe Concept of 
Law ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐŵĂŝŶůǇĂĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?
&Žƌ ƚŚŝƐ ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ŝƚ ŝƐ ŚĂƌĚ ƚŽ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ƐŽŵĞ ŽĨ ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐ ǁŝƚŚ
objectivity. It would be fair to conclude however that like Marmor and Bix, 
^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨůĞŐĂůŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇ ?ĂŶĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽƉĞŶ
ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ƐĞĞŵƐŵŽƌĞĂůŝŐŶĞĚƚŽ&ƌĞŐĞ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŚĂŶ
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐŽƌK>W ?^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ůŝŬĞŚŝƐƉƌĞĚĞĐĞƐƐŽƌƐ ?ŝƐƉƌĞŽĐĐupied with 
the issue of extension of a general concept and whether or not it is applicable 
to a particular situation. Stavropoulos writes: 
Why should Hart think that certainty or uncertainty, our ease or difficulty 
or generally our ability to tell when an expression applies, would imply 
anything at all as to whether the expression does apply? Why should we 
think that what we know about the future has any implication as to what 
ĐŽƵŶƚƐĂƐǁŚĂƚ ?ƐŝŶŝƚ ?ƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĂƚŵŽǀĞĨƌŽŵŽƵƌĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŝĐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ
in respect of a proposition to metaphysical conclusions that concern the 
ƉƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƚƌƵƚŚĂŶĚĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇƐĞĞŵŶŽƚ ?ĂƐĂŐĞŶ ƌĂůŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?ƚŽďĞ
valid. We may be uncertain as to whether life ever existed in Mars, but 
                                                          
77 Coleman (n 3) 95. 
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this is no reason to think that there is no answer to the question of 
whether it did78. 
dŚŝƐƉĂƐƐĂŐĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ?^ ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐĞĞŵƐƚŽŚĂǀĞƐŽŵĞƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐ
ǁŝƚŚ DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ ? ŶĂŵĞůǇ ƚŚĂƚ ďŽƚŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŵ ƐĞĞŵ ƚŽ ĂůůƵĚĞ ƚŽ  “ƚƌƵƚŚ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?79. 
Stavropoulos is conflating the application of a general term or rule to a particular 
ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ďĞŝŶŐ  “ƚƌƵĞ ? ? KƵƌĞĂƐĞ Žƌ ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǇ Žƌ ŽƵƌ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů
ability to tell when an expression applies only matters in as far as a decision needs to 
be made as to whether a particular instance is covered by a rule or not. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, Ordinary Language Philosophy disagrees with the idea that 
there are truth or falsity conditions that can tell you for every individual circumstance 
whether or not a sentence is true (or in this case whether or not a rule is applicable to 
a particular instance). 
 ƐŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂǁĂǇƚŽŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ
on rule following thĂƚŝƐŵƵĐŚďĞƚƚĞƌĂůŝŐŶĞĚǁŝƚŚtĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ?
ǁŚŝĐŚ ĞǀĞŶ ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐ ĂƐ ĂŶ ŝŶƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐ ŽŶ ůĞŐĂů
ŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇ ? 'ŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ůĞŶŐƚŚǇ ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ
provided in both Chapter 3 and 4, only an abridged version will be provided here. Hart 
is concerned with, practically, how rules are followed. According to Hart, a lot of 
                                                          
78 Coleman (n 3) 94. 
79 See Chapter five, Andrei Marmor and Easy Cases, ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ  “KŶ ĂƐǇ ĂŶĚ ,ĂƌĚ ĂƐĞƐ ?. 
^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P  “dŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ ƚŚĂt correctness is constituted by evidentiary relations to 
exemplars is as problematic as the general inference from premises to metaphysical 
ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ ? ? 
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criticism is unfairly placed on precedent rather than legislation, with many arguing 
that legislation provides a mƵĐŚ ŵŽƌĞ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂŶ ƉƌĞĐĞĚĞŶƚ ? ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
discussion on open texture is an illustration of the issues that arise with the use of 
legislation, which will invariably make use of general terms, where there is sometimes 
uncertainty as to whether a general term will apply or not. Applying the insights of 
K>W ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐŽŶƌƵůĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ?ǁĞĂƌĞƚĂƵŐŚƚŚŽǁƚŽĨŽůůŽǁ
rules. Following rules is a practice. There are general agreements as to what 
constitutes following a rule and going against it. There will however be situations, 
unforeseen situations, where we are unsure as to whether a particular general term 
applies or not. In this situation a fresh decision will need to be made, in the case of 
law by a judge, as to whether or not the particular situation is covered by the rule. 
Stavropoulos, like his predecessors, seems to analyse open texture in relation to 
particular concepts rather than rules.  This is emphasised by his criticism of Hart for 
using indeterminacy of language and ŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇ ŽĨ ƌƵůĞƐ ŝŶƚĞƌĐŚĂŶŐĞĂďůǇ ? >Ğƚ ?Ɛ
ƚĂŬĞ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨ “ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ? ?tŚĞŶĨĂĐĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ
World War II memorial tank, our indecision as to whether or not a World War II 
memorial tank would be a vehicle for the purpose of the rule does not stem from the 
criteria providing unequivocal support or not (as Stavropoulos seems to indicate). 
Under normal circumstances, ordinary language users would probably agree that a 
tank would be a vehicle for the purpose of the rule. If an individual decided to go for 
ĂĐĂƐƵĂůƚĂŶŬƌŝĚĞŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ?ǁĞǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞŶŽŚĞƐŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂ “ƚĂŶŬ ?ŝƐ
a vehicle for the purpose of this ƌƵůĞ ? dŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ  “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ? ďǇ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ŽƉĞŶ
textured in that way. The issue arises due to the fact that this was an unforeseen 
situation not considered when the rule was enacted. The very reason why our ease of 
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application does matter is not a metaphysical one, but a rather practical one. A judge, 
when faced with this situation, would have doubts as to whether a memorial tank 
would be considered a vehicle for the purpose of this rule. This is not a metaphysical 
doubt, or a doubt about how the world is designed, but rather a doubt as to whether 
in this instance the tank is a vehicle or a memorial. 
erview 
 Stavropoulos attributes to Hart a metaphysical interpretation of law. 
According to Stavropoulos, Hart is looking to provide an insight into the nature of law. 
Unsurprisingly, Stavropoulos encounters numerous issues with his interpretation of 
,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ work, such as tensions in attributing a metaphysical approach to Hart (both in 
terms of uncovering the nature of law, and in Stavropoulos ? understanding of legal 
indeterminacy) ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĞĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐƚŽĂŶŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂĐǇŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇƚŽĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
issues that he proposes to address in The Concept of Law. In much the same vein as 
Bix and Marmor, Stavropoulos analyses The Concept of Law with reference to a 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚŚĞŚŽůĚƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞĂŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ) ?/Ŷ
trying to apply his view of The Concept of Law, he leaves large parts unexplained and 
ĐƌĞĂƚĞƐƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐƐƚĂƌƚƐ
ŚŝƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐďǇĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƐƚǇůĞŽĨĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŚĞ
acknowledges that Hart is indebted to semantics, and was particularly influenced by 
KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐĂůŝŐŶƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐǁŝƚŚ&ŽůŬ
Theory, a theory that emerged years after the publication of The Concept of Law. 




conceptual analysis, and questions its validity.  It is fair to say that if the first section 
of StaǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ƉĂƉĞƌ ǁĂƐ ĚĂŵŶing enough, the second section on Legal 
/ŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇ ?ƚĂŬĞŶĂƚĨĂĐĞǀĂůƵĞ ?ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐ
in The Concept of Law. According to Stavropoulos, Hart draws metaphysical 
conclusions from epistemic questions, and fails to provide a satisfactory account of 
ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ůĞŐĂů ŝŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇ ? 'ŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĂƚ ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞ ŐŽĂů ǁĂƐ ƚŽ
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĞƵŶƐƵŝƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƐĞŵĂŶƚŝĐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŽǀĂůŝĚĂƚĞǁŽƌŬŝŶ ?Ɛ
criticism, his harsh comments were perhaps to be expected. Throughout this chapter 
ŝƚǁĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚŚŽǁĞǀĞƌƚŚĂƚ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇǁĂƐĚĞĞƉůǇĨůĂǁĞĚ ?
ĂŶĚŚĞĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂƚƌƵĞĂŶĚĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐŝŶThe Concept 
of Law.  
 The next chapter will focus on the work of Tony Cole. Unlike the legal theorists 
whose work was discussed in the previous chapters, Cole focuses on the impact of J.L. 








ŽůĞĂŶĚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶThe 







Following Nicos StavrŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ŵĞƚĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨThe Concept of 
Law, Chapter 7 will focus on an unpublished paper by Tony Cole1 ? ŽůĞ ?Ɛ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ?
entitled Doing Jurisprudence Historically: Interpreting Hart through J. L. Austin2, has to 
date only been published on the Social Science Research Network website3. It is 
perhaps uncommon to include an article, arguably still in its early stages and not 
having been submitted to the scrutiny of a peer-reviewed paper, as the subject of a 
chapter in a doctoral thesis. However, in the introduction to this thesis I claimed to 
examine all contributions to the literature regarding the philosophical influences and 
ŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ ŝŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐThe Concept of Law4. It would therefore be irresponsible not to 
inĐůƵĚĞŽůĞ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌ ?ĂŶĂƌƚŝĐůĞǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂǁĞůů-established academic 
research website and accessible to all. Moreover, even though still only a working 
paper, Cole is the only legal theorist to date who claims to provide an in-depth analysis 
                                                          
1 Tony Cole is currently a senior lecturer at the University of Brunel. The research paper 
discussed in this thesis was made available online during his time at Warwick University.  
2 dŽŶǇŽůĞ ? ‘ŽŝŶŐ:ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇ P/ŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝŶŐ,ĂƌƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? )
Warwick School of Law Research Paper 2010/28, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1715178> accessed 12/09/2015. This 
paper was first published on the 26th November 2010, and subsequently amended by the 
author and re-published on the 22nd April 2011. 
3 The Social Science Research Network (SSRN) is a website used for the rapid of publication of 
research started in 1994. Academic Papers in a PDF format can be uploaded to the website by 
any author, and can be subsequently downloaded by any user. Articles available through the 
SSRN website are not peer reviewed in any way. Authors update and change the text 
whenever they like.  
4 Hart HLA, The Concept of Law (Joseph Raz and Penelope A. Bulloch eds, 3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2012) 
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ŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶŚĂĚŽŶƚŚĞŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ,ĂƌƚĞǆƉŽƐĞĚ
in The Concept of Law5.  
 ŽůĞ ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞƐ ǁŚĂƚ ŚĞ ĐĂůůƐ Ă  “ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇ ĂǁĂƌĞ ? ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ůĞŐĂů
theory.6 According to Cole, not much attention is paid nowadays to reading the works 
of legal philosophers on their own terms, rather, they are read to find answers to 
contemporary debates. Cole argues that it is time to approach jurisprudential works 
 “ĨƌŽŵĂƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŚĂƚƐĞĞƐƚŚĞŵĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐǀĂůƵĞŝŶƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?7. Cole claims that 
ƚŚĞƌĞĐĂŶďĞŶŽďĞƚƚĞƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ƚŚĂŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ?ĚƵĞ ƚŽ ŝƚƐƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝƚǇĂŶĚ
                                                          
5 ŽůĞ  ?Ŷ  ? )  ? ? /ƚ ŝƐ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
involvement with the OLP movement at Oxford had impact in his book, numerous times 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŽůĞŵĞŶƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĞĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ŽƚŚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉ
with J. L. Austin as well as their academic dealings, have been well documented in the 
literature. See, K Fan (ed), Symposium on J. L. Austin (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1969).  
6 Cole (n 2) 2-3. As stated in Chapter One, Introduction, one of the aims of this thesis is to 
emphasise the importance of a reading of The Concept of Law that is historically aware, 
similarly to what Cole is proposing. In the next few paragraphs it will be argued however that 
ŽůĞĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƐƵĐĐĞĞĚŝŶƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĂŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇĂǁĂƌĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ? 
7 ŽůĞ  ?Ŷ  ? )  ? ? ŽůĞ ƐƚĂƌƚƐ ŚŝƐ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ďǇ ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ?  “Ăny reader approaching contemporary 
jurisprudence for the first time could be forgiven for concluding that serious thought about 
ƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨůĂǁƐŝŵƉůǇĚŝĚŶŽƚĞǆŝƐƚƉƌŝŽƌƚŽ, ?> ? ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉŝŽŶĞĞƌŝŶŐǁŽƌŬŽŶƚŚĞƚŽƉŝĐŝŶƚŚĞ
 ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐĂƐǁĞĞƉŝŶŐĂƐsumption, and one that should be taken seriously. Cole quotes 
a series of undergraduate jurisprudence textbooks where he claims that very few pages, if 
any, are dedicated to the work of Bentham and Austin. Even though it can be argued, as Cole 
indeed does, that only a few pages are dedicated to Austin and ĞŶƚŚĂŵ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ŝƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ
ŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŽŶůǇĂĨĞǁƉĂŐĞƐĂƌĞƚŚĞŶĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŽŽ ?ǁŝƚŚŵŽƐƚďŽŽŬƐŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŽ
ĐŽǀĞƌĂǁŝĚĞƌĂŶŐĞŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ?/ĨǁĞƚĂŬĞ: ?t ?,ĂƌƌŝƐ ?ďŽŽŬĂƐĂŶĞǆample (see 
J. Harris, Legal Philosophies 2nd edition  (OUP 2004)), out of 300 pages, 7 pages are dedicated 
ƚŽƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ? ?ƚŽĞŶƚŚĂŵĂŶĚ ? ?ƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ŝƚĐĂŶďĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚĂƉƌŽƉĞƌ
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĚĞŵĂŶĚƐĂŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ŽƌĂt the very least an awareness, 
of Austin and ĞŶƚŚĂŵ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? 
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reach has inspired many and been the subject of numerous articles and books. Despite 
,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ĂŶĚŚŝƐǁĞůů-known affiliation with J. L. 
Austin and the Ordinary Language Philosophy Movement, Cole claims that many still 
ƌĞũĞĐƚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐŝŶfluence on Hart. Cole continues to make the ambitious claim that 
by revisiting and in some cases rectifying our understanding of J. > ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ŝƚƐ
influence upon The Concept of Law will be understood, and many methodological 
questions that attach to that book will be answered. Cole writes: 
/ƚǁŝůůďĞĂƌŐƵĞĚŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ŝŶ
COL, and the releǀĂŶĐĞŽĨƵƐƚŝŶĨŽƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ
is mistaken. That is, that commentators rejecting the influence of Austin 
upon Hart have based their conclusions upon serious misunderstandings 
ŽĨƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŽŶĐĞƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽod correctly, its 
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĐĂŶŝŶĚĞĞĚďĞƚƌĂĐĞĚŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?ƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
work can be used to resolve ongoing disagreements over the 
jurisprudential methodology in COL, as a supplement to the meagre 
insights into the methodology that Hart himself provides8. 
Despite his bold claim, throughout this chapter it will become clear that Cole commits 
the same methodological mistakes as all the other legal theorists before him. Firstly, 
Cole does not give any details to corroborate his claims. As per the passage quoted 
above, Cole claims that he will read The Concept of Law, and resolve ongoing 
ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ďǇ ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝŶŐ ƐŽŵĞ ŽŶŐŽŝŶŐ ŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐ ĂďŽƵƚ : ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
philosophy. Unfortunately, throughout his article Cole fails to quote The Concept of 
                                                          
8 Cole (n 2) 4. 
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Law, preferring to make reference to numerous other publications by Hart. So, despite 
ŐŝǀŝŶŐŚŝŵƐĞůĨƚŚĞƚĂƐŬŽĨƵŶĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇwithin The Concept of 
Law, he fails to even quote The Concept of Law. Secondly, his approach creates 
artificial problems that could be avoided if he employed the standard view of what 
KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŝƐ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĂƚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁĂƐ ?>ŝŬĞŽƚŚĞƌůĞŐĂů
theorists, Cole is fixed on a particular esoteric and under-analysed interpretative 
methodological claim (in this instance, that of J. L. Austin being a supporter of 
Phenomenology), and therefore fails to establish his claimed outcomes. I propose to 
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĂƚŚĂĚƚŚĞƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬďĞĞŶĂĚŽƉƚĞd, 
ƚŚĞĂƌƚŝĨŝĐŝĂůƉƌŽďůĞŵƐĐƌĞĂƚĞĚďǇŽůĞ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁŽƵůĚŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌĞǆŝƐƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ
would indeed then be able to resolve ongoing disagreements over jurisprudential 
methodology in The Concept of Law.  
 The first section of this chapter will focus on what Cole refers to ĂƐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
rejection of Ordinary Language Philosophy (which curiously is one of the few matters 
upon which Cole claims that Hart is in agreement with J. L. Austin), as well as some 
ƌĞŵĂƌŬƐŽŶǁŚĂƚŽůĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐĂƐ “ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ-ďŽƵŶĚĞĚŶĞƐƐ ?. The second section will 
ĨŽĐƵƐ ŽŶ ŽůĞ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ? ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ŽŶ ŽůĞ ?Ɛ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ
,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ŝƐ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞĨƵůůǇ  “ŽďƐĐƵƌĞ ?9. The final section will be dedicated 
ŽůĞ ?Ɛ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ  ‘ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ ? ŽĨ ŚŝƐ ďŽŽŬĂƐ ĂŶ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ŝŶ  “ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ
ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ? ?10 
 
                                                          
9 Cole (n 2) 3. 
10 Cole (n 2) 58-63.  
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Tracing Phenomenology in the work of Hart and J. L. Austin 
 ŽůĞƐĞƚƐŽƵƚƚŽĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŚŽǁĂŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁŝůů
ŚĞůƉƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌƚŽďĞƚƚĞƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐThe Concept of Law. As has been discussed 
throughout this thesis, and is noted by Cole in several parts of his chapter, J. L. Austin 
and Hart were not only colleagues but close friends and it is therefore only natural 
that J. L. ƵƐƚŝŶǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌing that 
The Concept of Law was conceived during the period of ascendancy of the Oxford 
Philosophy movement11. However, despite this clear connection, and despite 
ŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƚŽ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ŶŽƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞǁŽƌŬ
had yet beĞŶ ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶ ƚŽ ĨƵůůǇ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ : ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
teachings fŝůƚĞƌĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ ? ĂŶĚ ŚĂĚ ĂŶ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽŶ ? ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ12. This is what Cole 
                                                          
11 Cole (n 2) 4.  
12 ŽůĞ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ?ŽůĞŵĞŶƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶƐǁŚǇƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŚĂƐŶ ?ƚďĞĞŶǁŝĚĞůǇ
considered, and its inflƵĞŶĐĞƚƌĂĐĞĚŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ŝƐƚŚĂƚŚŝƐǁŽƌŬŝƐŶŽƚǁŝĚĞůǇŬŶŽǁŶ ?ůĞƚ
ĂůŽŶĞƌĞĂĚ ?ďǇƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽĂƌĞŶ ?ƚĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ŝŶƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚŽĨƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?DĂƌƚŝŶ
Gustafsson, one of the editors of The Philosophy of J. L. Austin, mentions that though 
importanƚ ? : ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ǁĂƐ ƐŽŽŶ ĨŽƌŐŽƚƚĞŶ ĂĨƚĞƌ ŚŝƐ ƉĂƐƐŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ŚĂƐ ŽŶůǇ ƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ
started to re-ĂƉƉĞĂƌ ?,ĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “/ŶƚŚĞĨŽƌƚŝĞƐĂŶĚĨŝĨƚŝĞƐ ?ƵƐƚŝŶǁĂƐĂƌĞǀĞƌĞĚ ?ĨĞĂƌĞĚ ?ĂŶĚ
deeply controversial figure. In the sixties and seventies, he was posthumously dethroned. And 
ƚŚĞŶŚŝƐǁŽƌŬŐƌĂĚƵĂůůǇ  “ƐůŝĚ ŝŶƚŽĂ ƐƚĂƚĞŽĨ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĂďůĞ ƐĞŵŝ-ŽďƐĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?  ?ƌĂƌǇ  ? ? ? ? P ? ? )  W
ĂƌŐƵĂďůǇƚŚĞǁŽƌƐƚĨĂƚĞƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞĨĂůůĂƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůĐŽƌƉƵƐ ? ?DĂƌƚŝŶ'ƵƐƚĂĨƐƐŽŶĂŶĚZŝĐŚĂƌĚ
Sorly (eds), The Philosophy of J. L. Austin (OUP 2011), 3 ?/Ĩ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŝƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ
semi-ŽďƐĐƵƌĞďǇƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ?ŝƚŝƐŶŽƚƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚůĞŐĂůĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐĂƌĞŶ ?ƚĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌǁŝƚŚŚŝƐ
philosophy. What is surprising though is that no legal academic, until Cole, made the effort to 
understand the ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚ : ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŚĂĚ ŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĚĞƐƉŝƚĞŵĂŶǇŽĨ
them either mentioning it in passing or dismissing it outright.  
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proposes to do13. He approaches this undertaking in a novel way: he picks out a single 
quotation from J. L. ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐĨĂŵŽƵƐƉĂƉĞƌ ?A Plea for Excuses14, and claims that a close 
analysis of this quotation (with reference to other work by J. L. Austin) will allow 
conclusions to be drawn and similarities to be picked out between Hart and J. L. 
ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŽĨƉŝǀŽƚĂůŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŝŶŽůĞ ?ƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞŝƚŝƐ
important to quote it here in full despite its length. The full quotation reads, 
 First, words are our tools, and as a minimum we should use clean tools: 
we should know what we mean and what we do not, and we must forearm 
ourselves against the traps that language sets us. Secondly, words are not 
(except in their own little corner) facts or things: we need therefore to 
prise them off against the world, to hold them apart from and against it, 
so that we can realise their inadequacies and arbitrariness, and can re-
look at the world without blinkers. Thirdly, and more hopefully, our 
common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found 
worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth making, in the 
lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more 
numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the 
survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and 
reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up 
                                                          
13 ŽůĞ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ?ŽůĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “dŚĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽĨƵƐƚŝŶ ƵƉŽŶ,ĂƌƚŚĂƐ ?ŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ďĞĞŶǁŝĚĞůǇ
recognised and discussed before, however no clear consensus has been reached as to the 
degree to which Hart retained Austin-ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚǀŝĞǁƐĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŽĨǁƌŝƚŝŶŐK> ? ? 
14 John L Austin, "A plea for excuses: The presidential address." (1956)  Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 1. 
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in our armchairs of an afternoon  W the most favoured alternative 
method.15 
Cole makes a series of assertions ĂďŽƵƚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚŝƐƉĂƐƐĂŐĞ ?ŵĂŶǇ
of which will be discussed in the paragraphs to follow, but there is one particular claim 
that deserves more meticulous attention: that of J. L. Austin being a supporter of 
WŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ?ĞĨŽƌĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŽůĞ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƚ
ŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽĚŝƐĐƵƐƐǁŚĂƚŽůĞ ?ƐƵŶĚerstanding of Phenomenology is16. According 
ƚŽŽůĞ ?ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝƐƚƐĚƌĂǁĂƐŚĂƌƉĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ “ƌĞĂů ?ǁŽƌůĚĂŶĚƚŚĞ
world as we, as human beings, experience it. We can therefore only gain knowledge 
                                                          
15 ƵƐƚŝŶ  ?Ŷ  ? ? )  ? ? ? ? /ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐůǇ ?ƌŝĂŶ^ŝŵƉƐŽŶŵĞŶƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚŝƐƉĂƐƐĂŐĞ P  “dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ
many examples in The Concept of Law ŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇǁŚŝĐŚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞƐŝŶ
this passage. It is impossible to say whether it was Austin or Hart, or both of them, who 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚƚŚŝƐǀŝĞǁ ?^ŝŵƉƐŽŶĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉĂƐƐĂŐĞŝƐĂ “ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŽĨĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
,ĂƌƚĂŶĚƵƐƚŝŶ ? ?ƌŝĂŶ^ ŝŵƉƐŽŶ ?ZĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶdŚĞŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ>Ăǁ ?KhW ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ
to Simpson, J. L. ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŽthe Aristotelian Society in 1956 (which has 
been published as A Plea for Excuses), was the product of an interdisciplinary approach with 
,Ăƌƚ ?&ƌŽŵƚŚŝƐĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚZŝŐŚƚƐ ?,ĞƌďĞƌƚ
Hart, "The ascription of responsibility and rights." (1948) Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
SŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ? ) ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐůĂƚĞƌĚŝƐŽǁŶĞĚďǇ,Ăƌƚ ?^ĞĞ^ŝŵƉƐŽŶ ?Ŷ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?&ƌŽŵ^ŝŵƉƐŽŶ ?ƐďƌŝĞĨ
comment on this passage, it seems to indicate that rather than seeing J. L. Austin as a great 
inflƵĞŶĐĞŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ŚĞďĞůŝĞǀĞƐƚŚĂƚďŽƚŚ,ĂƌƚĂŶĚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ
thoughts resulting in what is presented in The Concept of Law.  
16 Defining our field of enquiry is always important, but particularly so in the case of 
phenomenology ƐŝŶĐĞĂƐ<ŽĐŬůĞŵĂŶ ?ƐǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “/ŶĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƐǇƐƚĞŵ
Žƌ ƐĐŚŽŽů ĐĂůůĞĚ  “ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚ ďǇ Ă ĐůĞĂƌůǇ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ďŽĚǇ ŽĨ ƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐ ?
Phenomenology is neither a school nor a trend in contemporary philosophy. It is rather a 
movement whose proponents, for various reasons, have propelled it in many directions, with 
ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŽĚĂǇ ŝƚ ŵĞĂŶƐ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ƚŽĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?Robert Audi (ed), The 
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 1999) 664. 
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ŽĨƚŚĞ “ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ? ?ŽƌŚŽǁƚŚŝŶŐƐĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽƵƐ ? but we can never gain knowledge of 
the real world (that underlies the phenomena). So, Cole concludes that for 
phenomenologists the questions relating to the nature of the real world need to be 
disregarded, since there is no conceivable way of understanding what this real world 
actually is17 ?dŚĞƉĂƐƐĂŐĞ  “ǁŽƌĚƐĂƌĞŶŽƚ  ?ĞǆĐĞƉƚ ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶ ůŝƚƚůĞĐŽƌŶĞƌ ) ĨĂĐƚƐŽĨ
things18 ? ? ŝƐ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚ ďǇ ŽůĞ ƚŽ ŵĞĂŶ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŽƌĚƐ ƉŽƐĞ ĂŶĞŽ-Kantian block or 
interference between the speaker and the world. Moreover, we should not impose 
on J. L. Austin a view of direct realism since it is not clear whether he would advocate 
that we can view objects in the world-as-is19 ? ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ŽůĞ ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
understanding of truth, where true involves a reference to the world, is such that it 
ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ƌĞĨĞƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  “ĂĐƚƵĂů ǁŽƌůĚ ? ? ďƵƚ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  “ǁŽƌůĚ ĂƐ ŝƐ ?20. This is a 
particularly interesting claim, especially given that Cole acknowledges that it is one 
that has received little attention21 ?^Ž ?ďǇŚŝƐŽǁŶĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ŽůĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝon of 
                                                          
17 Cole (n 2) 28. 
18 cf Cole (n 2). 
19 Cole (n 2) 28. 
20 Cole (n 2) 30. 
21 Cole (n 2) 28. It is important to note that though not the mainstream interpretation of J. L. 
ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ŽůĞ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŝƚŚĂƐƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚ “ůŝƚƚůĞĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐŵŝƐůeading. It is 
ƚƌƵĞƚŚĂƚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞůĞŐĂůĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŶŽƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚƌĂǁŶƚŽƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƵƐĞ
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ  “ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ?  ?ŽĨ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ƐŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƐƐĂŐĞ ŝƐ ƋƵŽƚĞĚ ŝŶ The 
Concept of Law), but there is relevant literature in the area of philosophy on this subject. There 
are a number of articles investigating the relation between Ordinary Language Philosophy and 
Phenomenology, most of which have been published in academic journals dedicated to the 
study of Phenomenology. For literature in ƚŚŝƐĂƌĞĂƐĞĞĞ ?Ő ?:ĂŵĞƐ&,ĂƌƌŝƐ ? “EĞǁ>ŽŽŬĂƚ
ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ >ŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐ WŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ?WŚŝůŽƐŽƉ Ǉ ĂŶĚWŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ
 ? ? ? ? DĂƌũŽƌŝĞ tĞŝŶǌǁĞŝŐ ?  “WŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ĂŶĚ KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ > ŶŐƵĂŐĞ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ?
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ƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ?ĂƐĂŚŝŶƚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞǀŝĞǁƐŽŶ
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ?ŝƐĂŶŽǀĞůĐůĂŝŵĂŶĚŐŽĞƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚǀŝĞǁŽŶ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
Ordinary Language Philosophy. It would therefore be expected that Cole would 
ĚĞĨĞŶĚ ? Žƌ ŝŶ ƐŽŵĞ ǁĂǇ ĂƌŐƵĞ ĨŽƌ ƚŚŝƐ ǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ : ? > ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƌĞ
mainstream view22 ĂĚŽƉƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ŽůĞ ?Ɛ ůĂĐŬŽĨ ĂŶ
argument in support of his methodological claim is then surprising. At no point in his 
article does he actually pinpoint exactly where it is apparent that J. L. Austin held these 
ǀŝĞǁƐ ?ĂƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉĂƐƐĂŐĞƋƵŽƚĞĚĂďŽǀĞĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ? ?ĂŶĚ
a one line assertion about J. L. Austin and his concept of truth. This is a flaw that we 
have found in the works of the other legal theorists whose work is discussed in 
previous chapters, whereby they ascribe a methodological claim or commitment to 
 “KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ >ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?  ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŐŽĞƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ
understanding in philosophy of OLP), and do not explain or substantiate their claims 
through evidence from the relevant texts in any way.  
So, the question remains as to whether or not J. L. Austin was a supporter of 
Phenomenology. In 1965 when Symposium on J. L. Austin23 was published, J.O. 
Urmson and G.J. Warnock24 ĐĂůůĞĚĨŽƌĂĨĂŝƌƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬďǇĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŶŐ
                                                          
Metaphilosophy 116, Herbert SpiegelbĞƌŐ ?  “>ŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐ WŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ P :ŽŚŶ > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ĂŶĚ
ůĞǆĂŶĚĞƌWĨĂŶĚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? )dŚĞŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨƚŚĞWŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůDŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? 
22 As discussed in Chapter Six, Nicos Stavropoulos and the Metaphysical Approach, the 
mainstream view held on this issue is that Ordinary Language Philosophers are suspicious of 
philosophical discourse that aims at uncovering the essence of a particular aspect of reality.  
BBC, 'Ordinary language philosophy, in our time - BBC radio 4' (BBC, 7 November 2013). 
23 Fan (n 5). 
24 Urmson and tĂƌŶŽĐŬǁĞƌĞ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐĂƚKǆĨŽƌĚ ?dŚĞǇďŽƚŚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂŶĚ
ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌƐĨŽƌƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂĨƚĞƌŚŝƐĚĞĂƚŚ ? 
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that Austin himself did provide explanations, though in less ostentatious ways than 
those trying to understand his work, about his theses and these should be taken to 
mean just what they say25. In a way, Urmson and Warnock were already standing 
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂŵďŝƚŝŽƵƐƌĞĂĚŝŶŐƐŽĨ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚƚƌǇƚŽŝŶĨĞƌŵĞĂŶŝŶŐďĞǇŽŶĚǁŚĂƚ
ŝƐ ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ƚŚĞƌĞ ? tƌŝƚŝŶŐ ŽŶ : ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌĚ  “ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ? ? ^ŝŵŽn 
Glendinning26 writes: 
 QƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽƚŚĞwords of ordinary life is intended to be, as such, a 
return to the world of ordinary life. This is, as Austin notes himself, best 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ĂƐ ĂŶ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ ƚŽ ƉƵƌƐƵĞ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ĂƐ  ‘ůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐ
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ?/ƚ is, that is to say, an attempt to find a way of getting 
back in philosophy to the native land of an understanding that is not 
dominated by traditional prejudices about, for example, the primary data 
for a theory of perception or meaning or whatever.27 
                                                          
25 Fan (n 5) 48. Stuart Hampshire claims that 2 theses could be attributed to Austin: a strong 
and a weak one. The strong thesis holds that methodological reasons can be found for every 
application of a word/term, whereas the weak thesis holds that there is no single and exclusive 
programme for the application of a word/term. See Fan (n 5) 35. Urmoson and Warnock 
defend AuƐƚŝŶďǇĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŶŽƐƵĐŚ “ƐƚƌŽŶŐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ĐŽƵůĚďĞĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?
dŚĞǇ ǁƌŝƚĞ P  “>ĂƌŐĞ ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶ ĂƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƚŚŽƐĞ  “ƐƚƌŽŶŐ ? ƚŚĞƐĞƐ ƚĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ ďǇ
Hampshire he (sic Austin) would certainly have regarded, besides repudiating them, as 
ǁŽƌƚŚůĞƐƐ ?  ? Q ) Ƶƚ ƵƐƚŝŶ ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ŐĂǀĞ ? ŝŶ ŵƵĐŚ ůĞƐƐ ĂŵďŝƚŝŽƵƐ ƚĞƌŵƐ ? ŚŝƐ ŽǁŶ
ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?tŚǇƐŚŽƵůĚƚŚĞŶƚŚĞƐĞŶŽƚďĞƚĂŬĞŶĂƐŵĞĂŶŝŶŐũƵƐƚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƐĂǇ ? ? ?^ĞĞ&ĂŶ
(n 5) 48) 
26 Dr. Simon Glendinning is a Reader of European Philosophy at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science. 
27 Gustafsson and Sorly (n 12) 49. 
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J. L. Austin, in common with other ordinary language philosophers, was not concerned 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ “ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ? ?ŽƌǁŝƚŚĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐŽƵƌĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?/ŶĨĂĐƚ ?Ă
ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇ ĂǁĂƌĞ ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ : ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ  ?ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŽůĞ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŽ
make) would have to be coloured by the fact that J. L. Austin stood against the views 
on sense-ĚĂƚƵŵĂŶĚƚŚĞ “ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůǁŽƌůĚ ?ŚĞůĚďǇƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ƵĐŚĂƐ ?: ?ǇĞƌ ?/Ŷ
fact, J. L. Austin and A. J. Ayer had numerous arguments about their differing views in 
philosophy. Of these encounters, Mary Warnock recounts: 
He (i.e. Austin) wanted to puncture any overarching theories about 
perception which would necessitate the introduction of such terms as 
 “ƐĞŶƐĞ-ĚĂƚƵŵ ?ƚŽƐƚĂŶĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀŝŶŐ ?ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ-using person, 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞ “ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ?ǁŽƌůĚ28 
These discussions were later the subject of a series of lectures delivered by J. L. Austin 
which resulted in the book Sense and Sensibilia29, published posthumously. In fact, 
there is arguably no greater statement that J. L. Austin could have made against 
 “ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ?ƚŚĂŶŚŝƐůĞĐƚƵƌĞƐŽŶƐĞŶƐĞĚĂƚĂ30 ?: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶƚŚŝƐƐƵďũĞĐƚ
ĂƌĞŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚďǇŚŝƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ “ƌĞĂů ?ĂŶĚ “ŶŽŶƌĞĂů ?31, which he proposes 
to examine in Lecture VII. He concludes his Lecture by claiming that there is no general 
ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽŶƚŽĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚ “ƌĞĂů ?ĨƌŽŵ “ŶŽŶƌĞĂů ? ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ƌĞĂů ?
is used in a variety of different contexts, and works differently depending on what the 
speaker has in mind. Thus we should undersƚĂŶĚƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ƌĞĂů ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
                                                          
28 Mary Warnock, A Memoir People & Places (Duckbacks, 2000). 
29 John L. Austin and Geoffrey J. Warnock, Sense and Sensibilia (OUP, 1964). 
30 Cf Austin (n 14). 
31 Austin (n 14) 77. 
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context in which the speaker utters the word. Given that the context in which the 
word is uttered is crucial for the understanding of its meaning, philosophising about 
ƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ƌĞĂů ? ?ŽƌĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞnature of reality, in some abstract way 
will not produce any valuable results. Accordingly J. L. Austin finishes the lecture by 
ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ “ĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚǁĞĂƌĞŶŽƚŝŶĨĂĐƚĂďůĞƚŽĚƌĂǁŝƐ W to put it politely  W 
ŶŽƚǁŽƌƚŚŵĂŬŝŶŐ ?32.  
Interestingly, ĞǀĞŶ ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ŽůĞ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ : ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ǁĂƐ
affiliated with phenomenology, he (i.e. Cole) claims that Hart himself never referred 
to phenomenology as such33 ?,ĂƌƚĨĂŵŽƵƐůǇƋƵŽƚĞĚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉĂƐƐĂŐĞĨƌŽŵA Plea 
for Excuses34, but quoted the sentence before J. L. Austin makes reference to 
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶƌĞĂĚƐ P 
 QĂƐ WƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ : ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ƐĂŝĚ ?  ‘Ă ƐŚĂƌƉĞŶĞĚ ĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐ ŽĨ ǁŽƌĚƐ ƚŽ
sharpen our perception of the phenomena35 
                                                          
32 AuƐƚŝŶ  ?Ŷ  ? ? )  ? ? ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ŝĨ ŵŽƌĞ ƉƌŽŽĨ ǁĂƐ ŶĞĞĚĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ůĂĐŬ ŽĨ ĂĨĨŝůŝĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ
WŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ?ƐƵĐŚĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĐĂŶďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŚŝƐůĞĐƚƵƌĞŽŶ “dŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨĂǁŽƌĚ ? ?/Ŷ
this lecture, Austin explained the equivocations that can arise from people asking the 
 “ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨǁŽƌĚƐ ? ?ƵƐƚŝŶƐĂǇƐƚŚĂƚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌŐŽĂůƚŽ “ŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝƐĞ ?ĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?
ĞŶĚƵƉĂƐŬŝŶŐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚ “ŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ-in-ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ? ?ƵƐƚŝŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “DĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ
ŽĨƚŚĞĨĂůůĂĐǇĐĂŶďĞĨŽƵŶĚ PƚĂŬĞ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨ “ƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ? W we try to pass from such 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ “,ŽǁǁŽƵůĚǇŽƵĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĂƌĞĂůƌĂƚĨƌŽŵĂŶŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƌǇƌĂƚ ? ?ƚŽ “ǁŚĂƚŝƐĂƌĞĂů
ƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?ĂƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŵĞƌĞůǇŐŝǀĞƐƌŝƐĞƚŽŶŽŶƐĞŶƐĞ ? ?:ŽŚŶ> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Philosophical Papers 
(OUP, 1970), 26.  
33 Cole (n 2) 43. 
34 Austin (n 14). 
35 Hart (n 4) vi, quoting J. L. Austin, 'A plea for excuses' [1971] Philosophy and Linguistics 80. 
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According to Cole, Hart purposefully left out the sentence about linguistic 
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ?ƐĂƌĞŵŝŶĚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞĨƵůůƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚĨƌŽŵ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƌĞĂĚƐ P 
In view of the prevalence of the slogan 'ordinary language', and of such 
names as 'linguistic' or 'analytic' philosophy or 'the analysis of language', 
one thing needs specially emphasizing to counter misunderstandings. 
When we examine what we should say when, what words we should use 
in what situations, we are looking again not merely at words (or 
'meanings', whatever they may be) but also at the realities we use the 
words to talk about: we are using a sharpened awareness of words to 
sharpen our perception of, though not as the final arbiter of, the 
phenomena. For this reason I think it might be better to use, for this way 
of doing philosophy, some less misleading name than those given above -
- for instance, 'linguistic phenomenology', only that is rather a mouthful36. 
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ŽůĞ ? ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ƋƵŽƚĞĚ ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉĂƐƐĂŐĞ ŝŶA Plea for 
Excuses in The Concept of Law, but purposely quoted the sentence that immediately 
ƉƌĞĐĞĚĞƐƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐŝŶǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ37 (leaving out this last part), provides 
strong evidence that Hart did not want openly to endorse phenomenology. 
Consequently, Cole admitƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ ŶŽ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ŝŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚ
provide ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĞŶĚŽƌƐĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ38. Despite this, Cole 
ŶĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ?his approach to jurisprudence in The 
                                                          
36
 Austin (n 14) 4.  
37 Cole (n 2) 43. 
38 Cole (n 2) 43. ŽůĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “ QƚŚĞƐĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƌĞŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞƚŽĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽ
him a theoretiĐĂůĞŵďƌĂĐĞŽĨĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƌĞƐĞŵďůŝŶŐƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ? 
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Concept of Law resonates with some of the phenomenological philosophical 
principles, namely his views on  “ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ-ďŽƵŶĚĞĚŶĞƐƐ ?39. Regarding language-
boundedness, Cole refers to an article Hart wrote in 1948 (13 years before the 
publication of The Concept of Law), entitled Ascription of Responsibility and Rights40. 
Cole argues that in this article Hart puts forward the view that due to the unique 
characteristics of legal language, only lawyers can adequately make use of it. From this 
it follows, for Cole, that legal language will only ever allow us to have a view of the 
 “ůĞŐĂůǁŽƌůĚ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚ ƚŚĞ  “ƌĞĂůǁŽƌůĚ ? ?^o, Cole argues that, in a parallel with J. L. 
ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?,ĂƌƚĚƌĂǁƐĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ “ůĞŐĂůǁŽƌůĚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ “ƌĞĂů
ǁŽƌůĚ ? ?ƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ?ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶĂŝŵŽĨƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐŝƐƚŽĚŝƐĐƵƐƐThe Concept 
of Law, however to better illustrate ŽůĞ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ŽƌƐĞĞŵŝŶŐůĂĐŬƚŚĞƌĞŽĨ ?ŝƚ
ŝƐ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽĚŝǀĞƌŐĞĂŶĚĞŶƚĞƌƚĂŝŶĂƚ ůĞĂƐƚƐŽŵĞ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĞĂƌůŝĞƌ
piece, Ascription of Responsibility and Rights41.  /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ Ăŝŵ ǁĂƐ ƚŽ
demonstrate that we attach claims of responsibility to claims of action, in the same 
way that legal consequences attach to legal pronouncements42. Hart wishes to make 
                                                          
39 Cole, text to footnote 155. 
40 Herbert Hart, "The ascription of responsibility and rights" (1948) Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society. It is of note that all the articles mentioned by Cole regarding the influence 
ŽĨKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁĞƌĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚďǇDŽƌŝƐtĞŝƚǌŝŶ
his article on Ordinary Language Philosophy. See Morris Weitz, "Oxford philosophy" 
(1953) The Philosophical Review 187. 
41 Hart (n 40). 
42 Hart (n 40) 271.   “DǇŵĂŝŶƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŝŶƚŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞŝƐƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂl analysis 
of the concept of human action has been inadequate and confusing, at least in part because 
ƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƌŵ “,ĞĚŝĚ ŝƚ ?ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇĚĞƐcriptive 




ƵƐĞ ŽĨ : ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞƐ ƚŽ ŵĂŬĞƚŚĞ ĂŵďŝƚŝŽƵƐ ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŚĂƚ the 
concept of a human action is defeasible and ascriptive.  As part of the wider discussion, 
Hart touches lightly on the issue of vagueness of legal concepts. He starts from the 
premise that most people are familiar with the fact that in England judges are not 
provided with a list of legal criteria to ĚĞĨŝŶĞ  “ƚƌĞƐƉĂƐƐ ? Žƌ  “ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ? ? ZĂƚŚĞƌ ? ƚŚĞ
judge has discretion to decide, by reference to past cases and precedent, whether the 
ĨĂĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĐĂƐĞĚŽŝŶĚĞĞĚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ “ƚƌĞƐƉĂƐƐ ?ŽƌĂ “ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ? ?/ƚŝƐƚŚŝƐǀĂŐƵĞŶĞƐƐ
of legal concepts, Hart argues, that makes it impossible for us to speak of necessary 
and sufficient conditions. According to Cole, the claim that judges have discretion to 
decide cases based on the facts presented to them highlights the constraints 
presented by language. Due to the vagueness of concepts, judges have wide discretion 
regarding how legal concepts are to be applied to individual situations, and, according 
ƚŽŽůĞ ?ƚŚŝƐƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ŝŶ ůĞŐĂůĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŚĂǀŝŶŐŶŽ “ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ?43.  
ŶĚƐŝŶĐĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŚĂǀĞŶŽ “ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ? ?ŽůĞƐĂǇƐ ?ŝƚĨŽůůŽǁƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ
ŶŽ “ĞǆĂĐƚĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂůĞŐĂůĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚŽŶĞŝŶŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?44. Cole 
writes, 
  QďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽ “ǀĞƌďĂůƌƵůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂůĞŐĂůĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ
into other terms or one specifying a set of necessary and sufficient 
                                                          
ŝƐŚŝƐ ?ŝƐƚŽĂƐĐƌŝďĞƌŝŐŚƚƐŝŶƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ? ? Hart (n 40) 271. This was such an ambitious claim, that 
Hart refused to re-publish this paper as part of a collection. See Nicola Lacey, The nightmare 
and the noble dream: A life of HLA Hart  ?KhW ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚŝƐŵĂŬĞƐŽůĞ ?ƐĐŚŽŝĐĞƚŽƵƐĞƚŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞ
as proof that Hart still held these views at the time of the publication of The Concept of Law 
interesting. 
43 Cole (n 2) 163. 
44 Cole (n 2) 166. 
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conditions, there is also no means of finding an exact correlation between 
a legal expression and one in ordinary language45.  
dŽ ĐŽƌƌŽďŽƌĂƚĞ ƚŚŝƐ ĐůĂŝŵ ŽůĞ ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă
concept cannot be ĂŶƐǁĞƌĞĚ “ďǇƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨĂǀĞƌďĂůƌƵůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ
legal expression into other terms or one specifying a set of necessary and sufficient 
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?46 ?ŽůĞ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚďĞĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝĨŚĞǁĂƐŵĞƌĞůǇĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ
there is no way we could straightforwardly explain in ordinary language what a legal 
concept meant, without resorting to common law examples. However, what Cole 
ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ  “ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ůĞŐĂů ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ƵƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ǁŽƌĚƐ ĂƐ ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ
English, it constitutes a specialized language, not directly translatable into ordinary 
ŶŐůŝƐŚ ?47. Cole argues that individuals with no legal training can therefore never 
ƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇƵƐĞůĞŐĂůƚĞƌŵƐ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇĚŽŶŽƚƉŽƐƐĞƐƚŚĞ “ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ? ?
This is a perversion of Harƚ ?Ɛ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ? ƉƵƌƐƵĞĚ ďǇ ŽůĞ ƚŽ Ĩŝƚ ŚŝƐ ĂƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŚĞĂƐĐƌŝďĞd to J. L. Austin before him).  
,Ăƌƚ ŶĞǀĞƌ ŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŽ ĂƌŐƵĞ ƚŚĂƚ ůĞŐĂů ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ? ĨŽƌŵŝŶŐ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ Ă  “ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐĞĚ
ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? ?ǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĂďůĞƚŽďĞĐŽƌƌĞĐƚůǇƵƐĞĚďǇůĂǇŵĞŶ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶ- and 
this is why it is so important to understand what his aim in writing this article was - is 
that there are cases outside the law courts where utterances in ordinary language are 
similar to legal cases, in some respects. Hart claims that there are cases where the 
ǁŽƌĚƐĚĞƌŝǀĞƚŚĞŝƌŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƌŽŵůĞŐĂůŽƌƐŽĐŝĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ “ŵŝŶĞ ? ? “ǇŽƵƌƐ ? ?
                                                          
45 Cole (n 2) 166. 
46 Hart (n 40) 173. 
47 Cole (n 2) 166. 
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 “ŚŝƐ ? ?,ĂƌƚĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚďǇƚŚĞƵƚƚĞƌĂŶĐĞŽĨƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ “ƚŚŝƐŝƐǇŽƵƌƐ ?Žƌ “ƚŚŝƐŝƐ
ŚŝƐ ? ǁĞ ŽĨƚĞŶ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ ďƵƚ ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ  “ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵŽƌ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ Ă ƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?48. 
Responsibility and Rights are not descriptive features, but are ascribed to human 
beings, and these are dependent on social rules. Hart gives the example of someone 
ǁŚŽŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐĂŶĚũƵĚŐĞƐƚŚĂƚ “^ŵŝƚŚŚŝƚŚĞƌ ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞƚŚĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌŝƐĂƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐ
responsibility to Mr. Smith. However, this ascription is defeasible since if, in light of 
new facts, the observer actually reaches the conclusion that it was an accident, he 
must judge again since his ascription of responsibility is no longer right in light of the 
new events. Wherein lies the difference between the social context and the legal one. 
In a social context the observer has the duty to judge again in light of new facts since, 
unlike the judge, his ascription of responsibility need not be final.  The reason why 
Hart says that even though we use sentences to perform an action, or ascribe 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ƚŚĞƐĞ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ  “ƉŽǁĞƌ ? ĂƐ ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ũƵĚŐĞ ŵĂŬĞƐ Ă
decision, is due to the legal character of jƵĚŝĐŝĂůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?dŚŝƐŝƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƌŽŵŽůĞ ?Ɛ
ĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨůĂǇŵĞŶŶŽƚŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĞ “ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ? ?ZĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ
exactly this issue, in his book about Hart, MacCormick writes: 
The very terms like intent or intention in which the criminal law is framed 
by legislators and applied by judges and lawyers are key terms for 
philosophers. These terms are used in the context of a social practice that 
gives them sense and that is publicly available for scrutiny and analysis.49  
                                                          
48 Hart (n 40) 185. 
49 Neil MacCormick, HLA Hart (Stanford University Press, 1981), 27. 
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Laymen use legal terms on a daily basis, and some of these terms originated in every-
day language and only after were they applied to legislation, or legal-speak. Therefore, 
ŽůĞ ?ƐĨŝŶĂůĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨǁŽƌĚƐĐĂŶ ‘ƐŚĂƌƉĞŶŽƵƌĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞ
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ? ?ƚŚĞƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂƌĞƐŽůĞůǇƚŚŽƐĞŽĨƚŚĞůĞŐĂůǁŽƌůĚ ?50, cannot 
be right.  
KŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐDĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ 
ƚǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƐƚĂŐĞƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŽůĞŵĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ?
Žƌ ůĂĐŬ ƚŚĞƌĞŽĨ ? &ƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƌƚ ? ŽŶ ƉĂŐĞ  ? ? ŽůĞ ŵĂŬĞƐ ƌ ĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  “ŵĞĂŐre 
ŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ ŝŶƚŽ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ ?51 ? ďƵƚ ŚĞ ĞǆƉůŽƌĞƐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇŝŶĚĞƉƚŚŝŶƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ?dŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚĂƐƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
methodology in The Concept of Law has become evident throughout this thesis, with 
all legal theorists whose work was discussed in previous chapters in this section 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ?/ĨǁĞƚŚŝŶŬďĂĐŬƚŽƚŚĞ
ĨŝƌƐƚĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŝŶƚŚŝƐƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?>ĞƐůŝĞ'ƌĞĞŶƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇǁĂƐ
not based in any philosophy of language52. In the two chapters that followed, it 
became apparent that Brian Bix and Andrei Marmor support the view that further 
ŝŶƐŝŐŚƚŝŶƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇĐĂŶďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ53. Finally, 
Nicos StavropouloƐ ?put forward the view that we can find some interesting insights 
                                                          
50 Cole (n 2) 170. 
51 Cole (n 2) 4. 
52 Cf Chapter Three, Leslie Green and the third edition of The Concept of Law, text to footnote 
27. 




ŝŶƚŽ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ĂŶ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ &ŽůŬ dŚĞŽƌǇ ? tŚĂƚ ŝƐ ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ŵŽƐƚ
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚŝŶŐ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ ƚŽ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ? ĂƐ
mentioned in previous chapters, ƚŚĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ůĞŐĂů ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ
acknowledge the wider philosophical literature in this area (unless it supports their 
own viewpoint), and dismiss without any explicit consideration insights provided by 
other legal theorists54. Cole follows the same scheme of analysis, not acknowledging 
ƚŚĞ ǁŝĚĞƌ ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ? ĂƉĂƌƚ ĨƌŽŵ DĂƚŝĂƐ ŽĚŝŐ ?Ɛ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ  ?ƚŚŝƐ ŝŶ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ŽĨ ŚŝƐ ŽǁŶ
view)55. According to Cole, even though there is mention of the importance of 
                                                          
54 ƌŝĂŶ ŝǆ ?Ɛ, Andrei DĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ EŝĐŽƐ ^ƚĂǀŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ? ǁŽƌŬ Ăůů ƉƌĞĐĞĚĞ >ĞƐůŝĞ 'ƌĞĞŶ ?Ɛ
introduction to the Third Edition of The Concept of Law ?'ŝǀĞŶ>ĞƐůŝĞ'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐƐƚƌŽŶŐŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶ
to the suggestion that there is any kind of linguistic analysis in The Concept of Law, and given 
how restricted the literature is in this area, it would have been expected for him to at least 
acknowledge differing views. As an aside, Brian Simpson makes an insightful comment about 
academics disregarding criticisms or differing views. Simpson himself wrote an article 
ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ/ŶĂƵŐƵƌĂů>ĞĐƚƵƌĞŝŶƚŚĞ>ĂǁYƵĂƌƚĞƌůǇZĞǀŝĞǁ ?ƌŝĂŶ^ŝŵƉƐŽŶ ? ‘dŚĞŶĂůǇƐŝƐ
ŽĨ >ĞŐĂů ŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? >YZ ? ) ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŚĞ ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚ ŶŽ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ? KŶ ƚŚŝƐ ? ŚĞ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P
 “dŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ĂŶ ŽĚĚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĂĐĂĚĞŵǇ ŽĨ Ɛŝŵply ignoring critical writings, sometimes 
perhaps because they are thought to be rubbish, but sometimes because those criticised 
ĐĂŶŶŽƚƚŚŝŶŬŽĨĂƌĞƉůǇ ? ?^ĞĞ^ŝŵƉƐŽŶ ?Ŷ ? ? ) ? ? ? 
55 ŽůĞ ?Ɛ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ƌĞƐŽŶĂƚĞƐ ǁŝƚŚ DĂƚǇĂƐ ŽĚŝŐ ?Ɛ ǀŝĞǁƐĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚ ŝŶ ŚŝƐ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
Jurisprudence: Its relation to Philosophy  ?DĂƚǇĂƐŽĚŝŐ ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ:ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ P/ƚƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ
Philosophy (2011) 41 Acta Juridica Hungarica 1).This is unsurprising since Cole references this 
article at numerous points throughout his chapter. Matyas Bodig argues that Hart 
purposefully kept some distance from any philosophical school of thought, to ensure that his 
theory is autonomous from any philosophy (which is why, Matyas claims, it is so hard to ever 
truly ascertain the connection between his work and that of J. L. Austin and Wittgenstein). 
>ŝŬĞŽůĞ ?DĂƚǇĂƐĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐŽŵĞƐƉĞĐŝĨĐĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞĂ
ďĂĐŬĚƌŽƉŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐĂŶĚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ďƵƚ,ĂƌƚŶĞǀĞƌĨƵůůǇĞŵďƌĂĐĞĚKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ
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language, many arguments put forward by Hart lack any kind of observation about 
language and its use56 ?ŽůĞƚŚĞƌĞďǇĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐƚŽ,ĂƌƚĂ “ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŽďƐĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?57. 
Cole writes,  
                                                          
56 Ibid ?ŽůĞĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚĨŽƌŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
the philosophical foundations of The Concept of Law, springs from the approach to philosophy 
ĐŽŵŵŽŶŝŶKǆĨŽƌĚŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ŽůĞƋƵŽƚĞƐDŽƌƌŝƐtŝĞŝƚǌ ?Oxford Philosophy (1953) 62 Phil 
Rev. 187, 208, ǁŚĞƌĞ ŚĞ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ  “dŚĞŝƌ  ?ŝ ?Ğ ? KǆĨŽƌĚ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ) ŵĂŝŶ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ŝƐ ƐŽůǀŝŶŐ
particular, recognized philosophical problems, and for the most part they avoid 
ŵĞƚĂƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ? ? ŽůĞ ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚ ĨŽƌ  “ƚŚĞ
ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇŽĨũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ? ?ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌƚŚŝƐŵĞĂŶƐ ?ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞĨŽƵŶĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚǁŝƚŚŝŶŚŝƐ
close-ŬŶŝƚ ŐƌŽƵƉ ŽĨ  “KǆĨŽƌĚ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ? ? dŚŝƐ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ ŽůĞ ?Ɛ ůĂĐŬ ŽĨ
understanding of the philosophy of language that he proposes to analyse and trace in The 
Concept of Law ?&ŝƌƐƚůǇ ? ŝƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŶŽƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚDŽƌƌŝƐtĞŝƚǌǁƌŽƚĞ ƚŚĞĂƌƚŝĐůĞŽŶ  “KǆĨŽƌĚ
WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚĞŶKǆĨŽƌĚWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇǁĂƐĂƚŝƚƐƉƌŝŵĞ ?ĂŶĚĂƐtĞŝƚǌ ?Ŷ ? ? ? ? ? ? )ƉƵƚ
ŝƚ P “It is inevitable, with such a geographical grouping as this, that the question should arise 
whether the work of these philosophers constitutes a movement of some sort; and, indeed, 
ƚŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂŐŽŽĚĚĞĂůŽĨĨƵƐƐĂďŽƵƚŝƚďŽƚŚŝŶƐŝĚĞĂŶĚŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŽĨKǆĨŽƌĚ ? ?tĞŝƚǌŚĂĚũƵƐƚ
spent a year at Oxford, and was trying to figure out what Oxford Philosophy was all about. At 
ƚŚĞ ƚŝŵĞ ǁŚĞŶ tĞŝƚǌ ǁƌŽƚĞ ŚŝƐ ƉĂƉĞƌ ?  “ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌƐ ? ? Žƌ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ǁŚŽ ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ďĞůŽŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
exclusive Oxford group led by J. L. Austin, had little idea of what went on in the Saturday 
Meetings and their approach to philosophical problems. This might therefore not be the ideal 
ƐŽƵƌĐĞĨŽƌŽůĞ ?ƐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚŝŶƚŽKǆĨŽƌĚWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?KǆĨŽƌĚWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ?ĂǀŽŝĚĂŶĐĞŽĨ
 “ŵĞƚĂƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ ? ?ŝƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƌŽŵĂĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽŶŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ?DŽreover, part 
of their methodology is this avoidance of metaphilosophical discussions, for they do not focus 
ŽŶ ƚŚĞ  “ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? ŽĨ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ? ? tĞŝƚǌ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ KǆĨŽƌĚ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ĨŽůůŽǁ Ă ƵŶŝƋƵĞ
methodology of enquiring into the meaning and use of words rather than their nature given 
that they believe this to be a more fruitful approach to solving the problems of philosophy. 
ŽůĞ ?Ɛ ƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďŽƵƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐůĂĐŬŽĨĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ?ĂŶĚŚŝƐŵŽƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƌĞŵĂƌŬ
ĂďŽƵƚKǆĨŽƌĚWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ?ůĂĐŬŽĨĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĨŽƌƚhe matter, demonstrates a significant gap in 
his knowledge of their revolutionary approach to philosophy. 




theoretical insights are buried in the midst of rambling digressions, and prominent 
praise of the importance of analytic clarity stands uncomfortably beside an obscure 
and barely explicated methodology58.  
Cole puts forward two possible reasons for the methodological obscurity: Hart 
could have either hoped to enhance the wider acceptability of his arguments by not 
advocating a particular methodology, or he could have simply not have been sure 
what the appropriate methodology would be for a work in jurisprudence59. The former 
claim was initially put forward by Matias Bodig in an article published in 2001, where 
ŚĞĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚƐƚƌŝǀĞĚĨŽƌ “ĂŬŝŶĚŽĨƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ?ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů )ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ60 ? ?dŚŝƐ
 “ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ?ǁŽƵůĚƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐĐŽƵůĚďĞũƵĚŐĞĚ
on its own merits, rather than on the merits of the philosophical theories which it 
ĞŵďŽĚŝĞƐ ?dŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌĐůĂŝŵ ?ƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚǁĂƐŶ ?ƚƐƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇƚŽ
use, is an interesting one but one that Cole does not expand or justify further. As bold 
a claim as this requires some explanation, but unfortunately none is provided. As 
discussed in previous chapters, a considerable number of legal theorists, and more 
generally readers of The Concept of Law, might be inclined to agree with Cole that 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇǁĂƐƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚŽďƐĐƵƌĞ ? This has been clearly evidenced in earlier 
chapters in this section, particularly chapter three and chapter six. In fact, Brian 
Simpson in his rather damning book about The Concept of Law, makes his views on 
                                                          
58 Cole (n 2) 3. 
59 Cole (n 2) 6.  
60 Bodig (n 55) 21. 
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,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĞůƵƐŝǀĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĐůĞĂƌ61. However, none of these legal theorists goes as far as 
ŽůĞ ?ƚŽĂƐƐĞƌƚƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚǁĂƐŶ ?ƚƐƵƌĞĂƐƚŽǁŚĂƚƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇǁŽƵůĚ
be for a work in jurisprudence. One would have thought that Hart, who wrote a book 
of such intended significance, based on lectures delivered as early as 1954, and which 
was at least six years in the making, would have decided on the appropriate 
methodology to use before publication62 ?ƐǁŝƚŚŽůĞ ?ƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽWŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ?
ŽůĞ ?Ɛ ďĂƌĞůǇĞǆƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐĂďŽƵƚ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚůŽŐǇ ĨƵƌther illustrate the 
main claim put forward in this thesis: legal theorists, such as Cole, put forward an 
ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?,ĂƌƚǁĂƐŶ ?ƚƐƵƌĞǁŚŝĐŚŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇǁŽƵůĚďĞŵŽƐƚĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ) ?ĚŽ
not explain that assumption fully or with enough detail, leaving large parts 
unexplained (in this case, Cole did not articulate or defend his claim at all), and 
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ĐƌĞĂƚĞ ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ĂŶĚ ƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ ǁŚĞŶ ƚƌǇŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ?
ŽůĞ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĞǆĞŵƉůĂƌǇŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝŶƉŽŝŶƚ ? 
The first problem that Cole encounters is a significant one, and is caused by 
ƚŚĞ ŝŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐǇ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŚŝƐ ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ŝŶĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ
                                                          
61 Simpson (n 15 )  ? ? ? ?ƌŝĂŶ^ŝŵƉƐŽŶŚĂƐĂĐŚĂƉƚĞƌĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ  “dŚĞůƵƐŝǀĞ^ŽƵƌĐĞƐŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
ideas in The ŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ>Ăǁ ? ?ZĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐŽŶůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŐĂŵĞƐ ?^ ŝŵƉƐŽŶ
ǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ĂĐĂƐĞĐĂŶďĞŵĂĚĞĨŽƌƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚŝƚŵĂǇŚĂǀĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚŚŝƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ?/ƚŝƐ
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ^ŝŵƉƐŽŶ ? ŶŽƚ ĐůĞĂƌ ŝŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ or not he was actually 
ĂůůƵĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? ^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ? ǁŚĞŶ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐ ĨĂŵŝůǇ ƌĞƐĞŵďůĂŶĐĞƐ ? ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ
ǁŚŝĐŚ,ĂƌƚƋƵŽƚĞƐƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƉĂƐƐĂŐĞƐĨƌŽŵtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶƚŚĞŶŽƚĞƐƚŽThe Concept 
of Law, ^ŝŵƉƐŽŶ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  “ŚĞ  ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ,Ăƌƚ ) ŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ  “ĨĂŵŝůǇ
ƌĞƐĞŵďůĂŶĐĞ ? ?ďƵƚŵĂŬĞƐǁŚĂƚŝƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƉŽŝŶƚ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚ
Hart makes essentially the same point, Simpson goes on to add that to a certain extent it might 
have been more likely that hĞǁĂƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ “dŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨĂ ǁŽƌĚ ? ?
62 Lacey (n 42) 219. 
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ĂŶĚŽůĞ ?ƐŽǁŶĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚƚƌĂĐŝŶŐ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶThe Concept of Law would 
help clarify, and even resolve, ongoing disagƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŽǀĞƌ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĐŚŽƐĞŶ
methodology63 ? ŽůĞ ?Ɛ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŚŝƐ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ǁŝůů ďƌŝŶŐ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ĐůĂƌŝƚǇ ƚŽ
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐThe Concept of Law sits uncomfortably with his earlier claim that Hart himself 
might not have been sure of what methodology he wished to employ. The tension 
ĂƌŝƐŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶŐ ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŝƐ ĞǀŝĚĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ  ? ?ŝŝ ) ŽĨ ŽůĞ ?Ɛ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ
ǁŚĞŶŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ŽůĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? 
 Qŝƚ ŝƐ ďĞǇŽŶĚ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƐƉĂƌƐĞŶĞƐƐ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
statements in COL precludes any absolutely certain attribution to Hart of 
a particular methodological approach. Moreover, although Hart clearly 
used the analysis of language in his work, he did not himself write on 
philosophy of language, with the exception of very early pieces. It is 
unavoidable, then, that there will be no conclusive evidence in any of 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐƐƚŚĂƚŚĞŚĞůĚĂŐĞŶƵŝŶĞůǇƵƐƚŝŶŝĂŶǀŝĞǁŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĂƚƚŚĞ
time he wrote the COL.64 
But halfway through his article, Cole changes the aim of the piece from clarifying some 
engrained methodological misunderstandings, to attempting to demonstrate that 
ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ  “ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŽĨ : ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞƚƌĂĐĞĚ
back to both works preceding The Concept of Law ĂŶĚƚŚĞďŽŽŬŝƚƐĞůĨ ?dŚŝƐ “ƉŝĐŬĂŶĚ
ĐŚŽŽƐĞ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ǁŚĞƌĞďǇ,ĂƌƚĐŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞĐŚŽƐĞŶǁŚŝĐŚƉĂƌƚƐŽĨKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ
Philosophy he wanted to apply in The Concept of Law, is a peculiar scheme for analysis 
                                                          
63 cf Cole (n 2). 
64 Cole (n 2) 37. 
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ŽĨĞŝƚŚĞƌ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐŽƌ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ĂŶĚŽŶĞǁŚŝĐŚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƐŝƚĐŽŵĨŽƌƚĂďůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚe 
doctrine of Ordinary Language Philosophy. Plainly this does not invalidate the claim 
that Hart drew inspiration from other sources, which he undoubtedly did. As discussed 
throughout this thesis, Ordinary Language Philosophy, much more than a theory is a 
way of doing philosophy65. Moreover, many supporters of ordinary language 
philosophy did not attempt to articulate what they were doing, or what methods of 
analysis they were employing, as they simply did it (as might be imagined under the 
rubric of the posŝƚŝŽŶ ) ? Ɛ ZǇůĞ ǁƌŽƚĞ ?  “ƉƌĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ
ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ƚĞŶĚƐ ƚŽ ĚŝƐƚƌĂĐƚ ƵƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?66.  The 
second problem that Cole encounters is his own conception of how a work in Ordinary 
Language Philosophy (or a work influenced by the philosophy of J. L. Austin) would be 
ƐŚĂƉĞĚ ? /Ŷ ƚŚĞ ůĂƐƚ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŚŝƐ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ǁŚĞƌĞ ŽůĞ ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞƐ ĂŶ  “ƵƐƚŝŶŝĂŶ
:ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?ŝƚďĞĐŽŵĞƐĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽŚŝŵ ?ĂŶǇĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ
ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĂƐ ĚĞĞŵĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ  “ƵƐƚŝŶŝĂŶ ? ŝŶ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ǁŽƵůĚ ŶĞĞĚ ƚŽ ƌĞƐĞŵďůĞ
                                                          
65 ĚĂŵ>ĞŝƚĞŐŝǀĞƐĂŶŝŶƐŝŐŚƚĨƵůƐƵŵŵĂƌǇŽĨƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚǁŚĞŶŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “ QŚĞ ?ƵƐƚŝŶ )
did not offer a general critical theory of epistemological theorizing or of the intellectual 
motivations that lead to it. Instead, he subjected individual arguments to piecemeal criticism, 
patiently showing how things go awry in conception, motivation, argumentation and plain 
fact. The work was incremental, but the goal was radical: to reduce large edifices to rubble. 
ƐŚĞƉƵƚŝƚƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƐĞŶƐĞĚĂƚƵŵƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ? “ƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƉŽůŝĐǇŝƐƚŽŐŽďĂĐŬƚŽĂŵƵĐŚ
ĞĂƌůŝĞƌƐƚĂŐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŽĚŝƐŵĂŶƚůĞƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞďĞĨŽƌĞ ŝƚŐĞƚƐŽĨĨƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚ ? ? ?ZŝĐŚĂƌĚ
Sørli, The Philosophy of J. L. Austin (Martin / Gustafsson and Richard Sorli eds, Oxford 
University Press 2011) 78. 
66 'ŝůďĞƌƚZǇůĞ ? ‘KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?dŚĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůZĞǀŝĞǁ ? ? ?, 331. Ryle writes: 
 “tĞƌƵŶ ?ĂƐĂƌƵůĞ ?ǁŽƌƐĞ ?ŶŽƚďĞƚƚĞƌ ?ŝĨǁĞƚŚŝŶŬ a lot about our feet. So let us, at least on 
alternate days, speak instead of investigating the concept of causation. Or, better still, let us, 
ŽŶƚŚŽƐĞĚĂǇƐ ?ŶŽƚƐƉĞĂŬŽĨŝƚĂƚĂůůďƵƚũƵƐƚĚŽŝƚ ? ? 
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something that J. L. Austin himself would have published67. Cole argues that J. L. 
ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƐƚǇůĞǁĂƐ “ǀĞƌǇĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚ ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞĚŽĨ  “ĞǆĂĐƚĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨǁŽƌĚ
ƵƐĂŐĞ ?68 ? ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂƌĞ Ăƚ ŽĚĚƐ ǁŝƚŚ ,Ăƌƚ ?s method. According to Cole, 
language use is explored in The Concept of Law, but Hart goes beyond language use 
 ?ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ? ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ŽůĞ ? ŽŶĞ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ĨŝŶĚ ŝŶ : ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ) ?
However, despite the considerable dissimilarities in the approach of these two 
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ?ŽůĞďĞůŝĞǀĞƐ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƐƚŝůůĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚ ?ŽůĞ
writes, 
 QƵƐƚŝŶĐŽƵůĚŚĂƉƉŝůǇĞŶĚŽƌƐĞĂ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂůŵĞƚŚŽĚƐƚĂƌŬůǇĂƚŽĚĚƐ
with his own methodology, so long as linguistic analysis still provided the 
first step in the argument being advanced69.  
It follows that, according to Cole, The Concept of Law was not a book that J. L. Austin 
ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ǁƌŝƚƚĞŶ ? ďĞŝŶŐ  “ƐƚĂƌŬůǇ Ăƚ ŽĚĚƐ ? ǁŝƚŚ : ? >  ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ  ?ĂŶĚ
ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ďĞ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ŽĨ ĂŶ  ‘ƵƐƚŝŶŝĂŶ ? ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ) ? ďƵƚ : ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ĐŽƵůĚ
nonetheless have endorsed it (considering that it is a book that uses linguistic 
analysis).  This is an intriguing assertion, particularly taking into consideration Gilbert 
ZǇůĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚůǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ this thesis). As mentioned, Ryle and J. 
> ?ƵƐƚŝŶƉŝŽŶĞĞƌĞĚ ƚŚĞKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ >ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ĂƚKǆĨŽƌĚ ?ZǇůĞ ?Ɛ ŵŽƐƚ ǁĞůů-
known publication, The Concept of Mind70, is a great illustration of the application of 
Ordinary Language Philosophy to another area of ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? &ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ŽůĞ ?Ɛ
                                                          
67 Cole (n 2) 53. 
68 Cole (n 2) 54. 
69 Cole (n 2) 54. 
70 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept Of Mind (Kessinger Publishing 2007). 
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analysis, this would presumably be a piece of work that J. L. Austin would have never 
produced himself, but it is nonetheless unquestionably a work in Ordinary Language 
WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ŽůĞ ?ƐƉƌĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞƐŚĂƉĞŽĨĂŶ ‘ƵƐƚŝŶŝĂŶũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?
written by J. L. Austin  himself would be, leaves little room for an appreciation of what 
ĂǁŽƌŬ ŝŶKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ >ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ  ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ?ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ?ǁĂƐǁŚĂƚ : ? > ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
teachings were about) looks like.  
 Despite not endorsiŶŐƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁĂƐ ‘ƵƐƚŝŶŝĂŶ ? ?ŽůĞƚƌŝĞƐ ƚŽ
ƵŶĐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚďǇ,Ăƌƚ
in The Concept of Law ?ƐŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ?ŽůĞŝƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
work through a single quŽƚĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵ “WůĞĂĨŽƌǆĐƵƐĞƐ ?71. He starts by referencing 
an article published by Hart in 1951, ten years prior to the publication of The Concept 
ŽĨ>Ăǁ ?ŽůĞŶŽƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “>ŽŐŝĐŝĂŶ ?Ɛ&ĂŝƌǇdĂůĞ ?72 is one of the few publications that 
Hart dedicated to phŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ĂŶĚŽŶĞǁŚĞƌĞ : ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐŝŵƉĂĐƚĂŶĚ
influence can be clearly noted. This article is widely accepted as being a philosophical 
ƉŝĞĐĞ ? ǁƌŝƚƚĞŶ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ Ă ƚŝŵĞ ǁŚĞŶ : ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ǁĂƐ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ŝŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
academic life since the two were then teaching a seminar together. Cole does 
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ “>ŽŐŝĐŝĂŶ ?Ɛ&ĂŝƌǇdĂůĞ ?ĂŶĚThe 
Concept of Law is rather tenuous, given the time lapse between publications, but he 
argues that evidence for the relation can also be found (though not as explicitly) in 
ůĂƚĞƌĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ “ŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů:ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞŝŶDŝĚ-dǁĞŶƚŝĞƚŚĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?73 (published 
                                                          
71 Cf J. L. Austin (n 14). 
72 ,>,Ăƌƚ ? ‘>ŽŐŝĐŝĂŶ ?Ɛ&ĂŝƌǇdĂůĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?dŚĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůZĞǀŝĞǁ ? ? ? ? 
73 ,> ,Ăƌƚ ?  ‘ŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů :ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ DŝĚ-Twentieth Century: A Reply to Professor 
BodenŚĞŝŵĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ?hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŽĨWĞŶŶƐǇůǀĂŶŝĂ>ĂǁZĞǀŝĞ  ? ? ? ? 
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only 4 years prior to The Concept of Law).  Interestingly, when it comes to The Concept 
of Law, Cole argues that the evŝĚĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ ŵƵĐŚ ůĞƐƐ ĐůĞĂƌ ƐŝŶĐĞ  “,Ăƌƚ ĞƐĐŚĞǁƐ ĂŶǇ
explicit comment on the nature of language74 ? ?^ŽǁŚĂƚĚŽĞƐŽůĞ ?ƐŵĞƚĂ-thesis then 
ĂŵŽƵŶƚ ƚŽ ?  ŽůĞ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ : ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ŝŶThe 
Concept of Law in as much as there is a recognition (in his opinion) that certain 
ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨůĂǁ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ “ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ
of power conferring laws, would not have been adopted had Hart not already adopted 
certain views on language75. As previously, Cole gives no supporting evidence or 
reasons for the view.  
 /Ŷ ĂŶ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ǁŚĞƌĞ ŽůĞ ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞƐ ƚŽ ƵŶĐŽǀĞƌ : ? > ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŝŶThe 
Concept of Law, and help solve some methodological misunderstandings, Cole only 
makes direct and substantiated reference to The Concept of Law ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚ
: ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ) ĂůůĞŐĞĚ ǀŝĞǁƐ ŽŶ WŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ZĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ Ăůů ŽƚŚĞƌ ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽůĞ
mentions different articles that Hart published throughout his early career, prior to 
the publication of The Concept of Law, in which Cole feels that Hart better evidences 
his affiliation with philosophy of language. Few legal theorists oppose the views 
expressed by Cole that Hart published articles that were influenced by OLP. Even Leslie 
Green, who strongly objects to any reading of The Concept of Law in light of philosophy 
of language, acknowledges that Hart was part of the ordinary language philosophy 
movement at Oxford and published articles in this area76. Moreover, Cole, who 
                                                          
74 Cole (n 2) 41. 
75 Cole (n 2) 42. 
76 >ĞƐůŝĞ'ƌĞĞŶĂŶĚ,>,Ăƌƚ ? ‘dŚĞŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ>ĂǁZĞǀŝƐŝƚĞĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?DŝĐŚŝŐĂŶ>ĂǁZĞǀŝĞǁ
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?>ĞƐůŝĞ'ƌĞĞŶƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƵƐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞ>Ăǁ ?,>,Ărt and Tony Honoré, 
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ironically in the same article criticises Nicos Stavropoulos for only referring to The 
Concept of Law once in his article, is subject to exactly the same methodological 
weakness77.  
 
Hart and Descriptive Sociology 
 dŚŝƐ ĨŝŶĂů ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ǁŝůů ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  “ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ
ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ?ƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞŚŝƐůegal theory.  In the Preface to The Concept of Law, 
Hart writes: 
Notwithstanding its concern with analysis the book may also be regarded 
as an essay in descriptive sociology; for the suggestion that inquiries into 
the meanings of words merely throw light on words is false.78 
These remarks might seem relatively unimportant as, after all, Hart only mentions 
 “ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ?ŽŶĐĞ- ŝŶdŚĞWƌĞĨĂĐĞƚŽŚŝƐďŽŽŬ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ
his theory could also be read as descriptive sociology has, over the years, been 
ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽďǇĐƌŝƚŝĐƐĂƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŽĚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚĂŶĚĚŝƐĐƌĞĚŝƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?/ƚŝƐ
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ?ĂƐŽůĞĚŽĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨ ƚŚŝƐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ ?ŽůĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞƐ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ůĂďĞůŽĨ  “ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ
                                                          
 ‘ĂƵƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ>Ăǁ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ  “ĨĂĐŝůŝƚǇ ?ǁŝƚŚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨ
language. 
77 ŽůĞ ?Ŷ ? ) ?ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “ ? ? ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉs the most notable aspect of StavrŽƉŽƵůŽƐ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
semantic views is the almost complete abƐĞŶĐĞŽĨ,ĂƌƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵ ? Q )ƚŚĞŽŶůǇŶŽŶ-COL work 
ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ Stavropoulos appeals, itself not an express endorsement of ambitious 
analysis, was published almost a decade after COL, so can hardly provide good evidence that 
Hart held the view in quesƚŝŽŶĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŽĨǁƌŝƚŝŶŐK> ? ? 
78 Hart (n 4) vi. 
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ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ?ǁŝƚŚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐƵƐĂŐĞǁŝůůƐŚĞĚ
light on our understanding of the world we live in79. He then discusses a possible 
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƐŽŵĞ ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ : ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ80. 
ŽůĞ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ  “ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ
ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ? ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƐƚƌŽŶŐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽŚĂǀĞĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚ,ĂƌƚĨŽƌƐĂǇŝŶŐ
ƚŚĂƚŚŝƐǁŽƌŬ “may also be regarded as descriptive sociology81 ? ?/ŶƚĞrestingly, shortly 
ĂĨƚĞƌŝƚƐƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬǁĂƐƌĞǀŝĞǁĞĚŝŶƚŚĞBritish Journal of Sociology by 
Morris Ginsberg, a renowned sociologist82, who claims that though the book was 
primarily a contribution to analytic jurisprudence, there could be no doubt of the 
 “ŐƌĞĂƚǀĂůƵĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬĂƐĂĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽďŽƚŚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂŶĚƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇŽĨůĂǁ ?83.  
DŽƐƚ ůĞŐĂů ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ ǁŝƚŚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶ  ?ĂŶĚ ƉƌĞƐƵŵĂďůǇ ?
                                                          
79 Cole (n 2) 61. 
80 Cole (n 2) 58- ? ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐĨŝŶĂůƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŽůĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇŝŶThe Concept of 
Law  ?ƚŚŝƐŝƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŝŶƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ//ŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ) ?ŶĂŵĞůǇ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚThe Concept of 
Law may be described as essay in descriptive sociology (to be addressed in this section), and 
whether The Concept of Law is conventional or essentialist. This final commentary was 
purposely left out from this analysis since it would not help the advancement of this thesis. 
81 Cf text to footnote 79. 
82 /ƚ ŝƐ ŽĨ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ? Ă ďŽŽŬ ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ ďǇ Ă >Ăǁ ^ĞƌŝĞƐ  ?Ğ ?Ő ?
Clarendon Law Series), was reviewed by a renowned professor of sociology in an important 
and widely read sociology journal. About the reviewer, Morris Ginsberg, in a moving testimony 
ƚŽŚŝƐůŝĨĞĂŶĚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƌŝƚŝƐŚ^ŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ?DĂƌƐŚĂůůĂŶĚDĂĐZĂĞǁƌŝƚĞ P “ǇƚŚĞĚĞĂƚŚŽĨ
Morris Ginsberg British Sociology has lost one who was for a good many years its only 
professor ? ŝƚƐ ŵĂƐƚĞƌ ƚĞĂĐŚĞƌ ĂŶĚ ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚ ƐƉŽŬĞƐŵĂŶ ? ? dŝŵDĂƌƐŚĂůů ĂŶĚ ŽŶĂůĚ
DĂĐZĂĞ ? ‘DŽƌƌŝƐ'ŝŶƐďĞƌŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?dŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ:ŽƵŶĂůŽĨ^ŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ? ? ? ? 




ƚŚĞŶ ? ǁŝƚŚ 'ŝŶƐďĞƌŐ ?Ɛ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ) ? ƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐ ŽƵƚ ƚŚĂƚ , ƌƚ ?Ɛ ůĂďĞů ǁĂƐ ŝŶĂĐĐƵƌĂte84.  
Thus Fredrick Schaeur85 writes: 
So although The Concept of Law opens with the announcement that it is a 
ǁŽƌŬ ŝŶ  “ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ? ? ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ŽŶĞ ƚŚĂƚ ĨĞǁ
sociologists would be able to fathom86. 
As briefly mentioned in the third chapter of this thesis, Leslie Green wholeheartedly 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐ ^ĐŚĂĞƵƌ ?Ɛ ĐůĂŝŵ ? ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ůĂƚĞƐƚ ĞĚŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ The 
Concept of Law ƚŚĂƚ  “ŝƚ ŝƐ Ă ĨƵŶŶǇ ƐŽƌƚ ŽĨ ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ƚŚĂƚ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ ŶŽ ĨŝĞůĚǁŽƌŬ ? ŶŽ
statistical modelling, and even few legal cĂƐĞƐ ?87 ? ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ 'ƌĞĞŶ ? ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
description of his work was largely inaccurate, particularly given that an exercise in 
descriptive sociology should go beyond ordinary knowledge and arrive at 
generalisations or even predictions88 ? ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚ ĨƵůĨil any of these 
expectations. Green mentions that in an interview with David Sugarman Hart did 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞďŽŽŬŝƐŵŽƌĞĂŬŝŶƚŽĂ  “ŬŝŶĚ ?ŽĨƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ?ŽƌĞǀĞŶƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŽƌǇƚŽ
                                                          
84 For fuƌƚŚĞƌĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽŶƚŚŝƐ ŝƐƐƵĞƉůĞĂƐĞƐĞĞ^ŝŵƉƐŽŶ ?Ŷ ? ? ) ? ? ?ĂǀŝĚ^ƵŐĂƌŵĂŶ ? ‘,Ăƌƚ
/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚ P, ?> ? ?,ĂƌƚŝŶŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĂǀŝĚ^ƵŐĂƌŵĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨ>ĂǁĂŶĚ
Society 267 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2005.00324.x> accessed 20 October 
2015, Wayne Morrison, Theoretical Criminology From Modernity To Post-Modernism (1st edn, 
Routledge Cavendish 1995), Michael D Bayles, ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ>ĞŐĂůWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ PŶǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?>Ăǁ
and Philosophy Library) (1st edn, Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992). 
85 Frederick Schauer is David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law at the 
University of Virginia, not a sociologist. 
86 &ƌĞĚƌŝĐŬ^ĐŚĂĞƵƌ ? ‘ZĞ ?dĂŬŝŶŐ ),Ăƌƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ?,ĂƌǀĂƌĚ>ĂǁZĞ ŝĞǁ ? ? ? ? ? 




sociology89 ?/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐůǇ ?ŝŶĂǀŝĚ^ƵŐĂƌŵĂŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?,ĂƌƚŚŝŵƐĞůf remarks 
ƚŚĂƚŚŝƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ “ĚƌŝǀĞƐƉĞŽƉůĞŵĂĚ90 ? ?/ƚǁĂƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐĨŽƌ
this reason that Hart suggest that he should have said that The Concept of Law 
 “ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƚŚĞƚŽŽůƐĨŽƌĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ?ŶŽƚƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ91 ? ? 
 ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽŽůĞ ?ŵƵĐŚĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶ ŝƐŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚďǇƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĂƚŽƌǇ
statement as indicating that The Concept of Law ŚĂƐƚǁŽĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƐƚƌĂŶĚƐ ? “ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐ
ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ “ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ? ?ŽůĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? 
 Q,Ăƌƚ ? ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ ƚŚĞŵ  ?ŝ ?Ğ ?  “ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ? ĂŶĚ
 “ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ? )ĂƐƚǁŽĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨK> ?ŽƚŚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽ
the final theory, but they are pursued separately. Hart, however, presents 
them not as complementary aspects of the book, but as two different 
viewpoints from which the book as a whole can be seen. That is, the COL 
does not constitute an attempt to combine analytic jurisprudence with 
descriptive sociology92. 
According to Cole, J. L. Austin held that the study of words provides an insight into 
social reĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ďƵƚŝƚŝƐĂůƐŽƚƌƵĞƚŚĂƚŽďƐĞƌǀŝŶŐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ “ĂƚǁŽƌŬ ? ?ĂŶĚƐƚƵĚǇŝŶŐƚŚĞ
social realities, can also provide deep insight into the meaning of words. Therefore, by 
ĂĚŽƉƚŝŶŐĂŶƵƐƚŝŶŝĂŶŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ŽŶĞĐĂŶƐĞĞƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉƵƌƐƵŝƚ
led to an investigation which looked into both language and social realities93. 
                                                          
89 Ibid.  
90 Sugarman (n 84) 291.  
91 Ibid. 
92 Cole (n 2) 62. 
93 Cole (n 2) 63. 
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According to Hart, there are distinctions which are not immediately obvious between 
types of social situations which are often best examined taking into account the 
standard use of words and the context in which they are uttered94. This understanding 
ŽĨ,ĂƌƚŝƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŽǁŶĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĂǀŝĚ^ƵŐĂƌŵĂŶ ?,ĂƌƚĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ
the kinds of distinctions that come out of his analytical philosophy are distinctions that 
are absolutely vital for the study of sociology. The need to differentiate between 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŬŝŶĚƐŽĨƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ “ŚĂďŝƚƵĂů ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂŶĚ “ƌƵůĞ-
ďŽƵŶĚ ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ĂƌĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞŵĂĚĞĂŶĚƚŚŽƵŐŚƚĂďŽƵƚ ? 
As a way of explaining how the analysis provided through analytic jurisprudence is 
essential for the practice of sociology, Hart gives the example of discriminating 
between various types of situations, such as95: 
A. Habitually following someone. 
B. Accepting someone as a guide of conduct, and therefore taking his word as a 
ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ĨŽƌ ĂĐƚŝŶŐ ? ,Ğ ŝƐ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ Ă ŐƵŝĚĞ ƚŽ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ŽĨ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƉĞŽƉůĞƐ ?
conduct. 
C. Accepting someone as motherly and legitimating.  
dŚŝƐ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ƌĞƐŽŶĂƚĞƐ ǁŝƚŚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ƌƵůĞ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ŝŶ The 
Concept of Law96. There is a difference between a habit (as in example A and C) and 
ƚŚĞĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞŽĨĂƌƵůĞ ?ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ) ?zĞƚ ?ĨƌŽŵĂŶ “ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?ƚŚĞǇŵŝŐŚƚ
look exactly the same. It is important to discriminate between these different types of 
                                                          
94 Hart (n 4) vi. 
95 Sugarman (n 84) 291. 
96 Hart (n 4) 51-77. 
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situations in order to be able to analyse and understand them97 ?tĞĐĂŶƵƐĞ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
example of taking your hat off in church as an example.  A father and son enter church, 
the father takes off his hat and the son follows suit. As an external observer it would 
be hard, if not impossible, to tell whether the son took his hat off out of habit (he 
always does it), if it was because he looks up to his father and thinks he ought to do 
as he does, or whether it is because his father is regarded as a figure of authority or 
guide of conduct, and therefore he takes his word as a reason for acting. If it is the 
latter, and only if it is the latter, if someone else walked into the church and did not 
take their hat off, this would be seen by the son as a reason to criticize their behaviour. 
Though to an external observer there would be no difference, from an internal point 
of view only if someone was accepted as a guide of conduct would other people be 
criticised for not taking their word or following their behaviour. Understanding these 
nuances is important for analytical jurisprudence and descriptive sociology alike. The 
importance of understanding these nuances was discussed earlier in the thesis, in 
Chapter Three regarding the notion of obligation98, and the difference between 
 “ŚĂǀŝŶŐĂŶŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ “ďĞŝŶŐŽďůŝŐĞĚ ? ?
Overview 
                                                          
97 KŶƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ “ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů ?ĂŶĚ “ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ?ƉŽŝŶƚƐŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?
,ĂƌƚǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŚĞŵĞƐŽĨƚŚŝƐďŽŽŬŝs that neither law nor any other 
form of social structure can be understood without an appreciation of certain crucial 
ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚǁŽ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ŬŝŶĚƐ ŽĨ ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ / ŚĂǀĞ ĐĂůůĞĚ  “ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů ? ĂŶĚ
 “ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ?ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶďŽƚŚďĞŵĂĚĞǁŚĞŶƐŽĐŝĂůƌƵůĞƐĂƌĞŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ? ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? )ǆŝ ?




Cole identified a major gap in the relevant literature about The Concept of Law: 
ĂĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨĂŶ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ : ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŝŶThe Concept of 
Law. Though mentioned in passing by various legal theorists, Cole was the first (and 
so far, the only) theorist to undertake a serious investigation of how an awareness of 
: ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ǁŽƵůĚ ƐŚĂƉĞ ŽƵƌ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ? dŚŽƵŐŚ Ă
ǀĂůƵĂďůĞ ĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ ? ŽůĞ ?Ɛ Ăƌƚicle does not deliver its promised outcomes. As 
discussed throughout this chapter, Cole commits the same methodological mistakes 
as the legal philosophers that precede him. Firstly, he does not provide sufficient detail 
ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵƐŚĞŵĂŬĞƐ ?>Ğƚ ?Ɛ ƚĂŬĞ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŽůĞ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ƌĞƐŽŶĂƚĞƐ ǁŝƚŚ WŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ďŽůĚŶĞƐƐ ŽĨ ŽůĞ ?Ɛ
assertion, he does not give enough detail or evidence to substantiate his claim. 
^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ŽůĞ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƐĐƌĞĂƚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?
By claiming that J. L. Austin takes a phenomenological approach, Cole struggles to find 
ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŽƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂƚĞŚŝƐĐůĂŝŵƐ ?ƌĞƐŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƚŽŵĞŶƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ
a series of earlier articles where he could ĚƌĂǁƚĞŶƵŽƵƐĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ǀŝĞǁƐ ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ WŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ? /ŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇ ŽůĞ ?Ɛ ǀŝĞǁƐ ŽŶ : ? > ?
ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂůƐŽĐŽůŽƵƌŚŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŽůĞ
ĨŝŶĚƐ “ŽďƐĐƵƌĞ ? ?,ĂĚŽůĞƚĂŬĞŶĂŵŽƌĞŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵand more widely accepted view 
ŽĨ : ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ĂƐ ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ŵĂŶǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ŚĞ
ĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĞĚǁŚĞŶƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐŝŵƉĂĐƚŝŶThe Concept of Law would 
not have surfaced. It is argued throughout this chapter that the burden is on Cole to 
provide the reader with enough evidence and reasons as to why they should support 
his less accepted view of J. L. Austin as a phenomenologist. However, not only does 
he fail to provide such evidence, but his approach creates problems for his own 
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interpretation of The Concept of Law ?ŽůĞ ?ƐƐĐŚĞŵĞŽĨĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŝƐŚŽǁĞǀĞƌĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ
with the work of the other legal theorists whose work is analysed in the preceding 
chapters.  
Some of the issues discussed in this chapter, particularly those pertaining to 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇǁŝůůďĞƌĞǀŝƐŝƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŶĞǆƚŚĂƉƚĞƌĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ



















This final chapter of section B will focus on the reception of The Concept of 
Law1 in Hispanophone countries, namely Spain and Argentina. As discussed, all of the 
legal philosophers whose work has so far been analysed (with the exception of Tony 
Cole) studied at the University of Oxford. These four legal theorists, Bix, Marmor, 
Green and Stavropoulos, were students at Oxford during the same decade and were 
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚ ďǇ :ŽƐĞƉŚ ZĂǌ ? ŽĨƚĞŶ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ƚŚĞ ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ ŽŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
philosophy. Even though their approach to The Concept of Law varied significantly, as 
illustrated throughout this thesis, they all committed similar methodological mistakes 
ĂŶĚƐŽƌĞĂĐŚĞĚƐŝŵŝůĂƌĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚĂƌǇĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ?tŚĂƚƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ
offers is the perspective of a number of academics who were introduced to, and 
ƐƚƵĚŝĞĚ ? ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ŝŶ Ă ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ǁĂǇ ?dŚĞ Ăŝŵ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ŝƐ ƚŽ
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ
was limited to the Anglo-^ĂǆŽŶ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? Žƌ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ŚĂĚ Ă ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ
reception in other parts of the world.  In light of this ambition the chapter forms the 
last in this section of the thesis. Two main works will be discussed here (for there will 
be sufficient material even within this limited set to show that a difference exists): 
CĄŵĂƌĂ ?ƐďŽŽŬĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ “>ĂǁĂŶĚ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ PtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂŶĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐůĞŐĂů
                                                          
1 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Joseph Raz and Penelope A Bulloch eds, 3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2012). 
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ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?2 ? ĂŶĚ EĂǀĂƌƌŽ ĂŶĚ ŽƵǀŝĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ  “>ĞŐĂů ĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƌƵůĞ
ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ?3. 
Cámara, unlike the other legal philosophers whose work is analysed in this 
section, is a Professor of Philosophy in Spain. Even though his background was in Law, 
having graduated with a law degree, it appears that his main interest was philosophy4. 
ĄŵĂƌĂ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ŝƐ ĚŝǀŝĚĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ ƚǁŽ ŵĂŝŶ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ P ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ ŽĨĨĞƌƐ Ă ƐŚŽƌƚ ďƵƚ
comprehensive insight into Philosophical Investigations5, and the second section 
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇǁŝƚŚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽPhilosophical Investigations. Cámara asserts 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶŚĂƐŽǀĞƌ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇŝƐƵŶĚĞŶŝĂďůĞ ?ĂŶĚ
proposes to uncover the connections in question. Cámara covers many different 
aspects of The Concept of Law in his book, thus giving us the opportunity to investigate 
and draw within the present analysis some aspects of The Concept of Law that were 
passed over more quickly by the other legal theorists investigated here. Moreover, 
                                                          
2 Ignacio Cámara, Derecho Y Lenguaje (Universidade da Coruña 1996). Cámara is a Reader in 
Philosophy of Law at the University of Coruña. Currently this book is only available in Spanish. 
3 dŚĞ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ǁĂƐ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ  “dĞƌĐĞƌĂƐ :ŽƌŶĂĚĂƐ ƐŽďƌĞ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?  ?ƚƌĂŶslated as 
 “dŚƌĞĞ ĂǇƐ ĂďŽƵƚ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ? ) ?ŚŽƐƚĞĚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƵĞŶŽƐŝƌĞƐ ? ƌŐĞŶƚŝŶĂ ? ŝŶ
2004. The article was never published in a peer-reviewed journal. Both Navarro and Bouver 
are Professors at the Universidad Nacional de Cordoba in Argentina. Currently this article is 
only available in Spanish. 
4
 /ƚǁĂƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐĚƵĞƚŽƚŚŝƐƚŚĂƚůĂŶĐŽDŝŐƵĞůĞǌĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐĂŵĂƌĂ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂƐďĞŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚ
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ? Ă ďŽŽŬ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶ ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĂŶ ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ
offered an insight inƚŽĂƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
work. ^ƵƐĂŶĂ ůĂŶĐŽ DŝŐƵĠůĞǌ ?  ‘Ignacio Sánchez Cámara ? ĞƌĞĐŚŽ z >ĞŶŐƵĂũĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )
<http://ruc.udc.es/bitstream/2183/1922/1/AD-1-40.pdf> accessed 29 December 2015. 
5 Ludwig Wittgenstein and translated [from the German] by G. E. M. Anscombe, Philosophical 
Investigations Philosophische Untersuchungen (3rd edn, Blackwell Publishers 1967). 
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ƐŝŶĐĞĄŵĂƌĂ ?ƐƐŽůĞĨŽĐƵƐŝƐtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨŚŝƐǁŽƌŬ
will enable a clearer picture to emerge, in counterpoint, of the fundamental nature of 
: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐĐontribution to The Concept of Law ?dŽďĞĐůĞĂƌ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚĄŵĂƌĂ ?Ɛ
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ŝƐ  ?ŝƚ ƐĞĞŵƐ ƚŽ ŵĞ ) ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ Ɛƚŝůů
ƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ ŝŶŚŝƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚĐĂŶŽŶůǇďĞƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇƌĞƐŽůǀĞĚŽŶĐĞ: ?> ?
ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ŚĂƐďĞĞŶƚĂŬĞŶŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?dŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨĄŵĂƌĂ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁŝůů
be the main focus of this chapter. 
 EĂǀĂƌƌŽ ĂŶĚ ŽƵǀŝĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ Ă ŵŽƌĞ ŵŽĚĞƐƚ ŽŶĞ ? EĂǀĂƌƌŽ ĂŶĚ
Bouvier are both scholars working in the philosophy of law, but much like Cámara 
preseŶƚƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂƐĂƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ
philosophy. Unlike Cámara however, they are only focused on the issue of rule 
following. Whilst Cámara wants to analyse certain key parts of The Concept of Law in 
order to ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?EĂǀĂƌƌŽĂŶĚŽƵǀŝĞƌ
ǁĂŶƚƚŽĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŚŽǁtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐǁĞƌĞƋƵŝĐŬůǇ ĨŝůƚĞƌĞĚ ŝŶƚŽŽƚŚĞƌ
areas, namely Law. Even though their paper is yet to be published in a peer reviewed 
academic journal, it was presented at the III JORNADAS WITTGENSTEIN conference in 
Argentina6 ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞŝƚƐůĂĐŬŽĨĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?EĂǀĂƌƌŽĂŶĚŽƵǀŝĞƌ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌĂĚĚƐ
something different, and presents a point of view that is not found in anglo-saxon 
jurisprudential works7, namely a different understanding of the application of 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ? 
                                                          
6 <http://www.accionfilosofica.com/jornadas/jornada.pl?id=2> accessed 1 May 2015. 
7 Navarro and BoƵǀŝĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƐƚĂŶĚƐĂƚŽĚĚƐǁŝƚŚ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?^ƚĞĨĂŶŽĞƌƚĞĂ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶƚŚĞ
ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?^ĞĞ^ƚĞĨĂŶŽĞƌƚĞĂ ? ‘ZĞŵĂƌŬƐŽŶĂ>ĞŐĂůWŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚ




ǁŝƚŚEĂǀĂƌƌŽĂŶĚŽƵǀŝĞƌ ?Ɛ ?ŚŝƐǁŽƌŬǁŝůůďĞƚŚĞĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌǁŝƚŚŵuch 
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ŚŝƐ ďŽŽŬ ? ĄŵĂƌĂ ?Ɛ ƐŽůĞ ĨŽĐƵƐ ŽŶ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ
philosophy, and his aim to analyse the main points of The Concept of Law through 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ǁŝůůŚĞůƉƚĞƐƚĂŶĚĨŝŶĂůůǇĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ĐůĂŝŵ 
ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ŵƵƐƚ ƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ ďĞ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ : ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ? /Ŷ
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ? ƚŚĞ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ĄŵĂƌĂ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ǁŝůů ŚĞůƉĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ
ƚĂŬŝŶŐ ŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ : ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƵŶŝƋƵĞŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇǁŚĞŶƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ The Concept of 
Law. The fŝŶĂůƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌǁŝůůĚŝƐĐƵƐƐEĂǀĂƌƌŽĂŶĚŽƵǀŝĞƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ?ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? 
 
Cámara on Haƌƚ ?ƐDethodology 
Much like the other legal philosophers discussed in previous chapters, Cámara 
ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƐ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ contribution to The Concept of Law, but does not explore 
ŝƚŝŶĂŶǇŐƌĞĂƚĚĞƉƚŚ ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞĄŵĂƌĂ ?ƐĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶǁĂƐŵƵĐŚ
closer to Hart (geographically and personally), and therefore much more likely to have 
ŚĂĚĂŶ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽsophical background, Cámara still credits Wittgenstein 
ǁŝƚŚŝŶƐƉŝƌŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ĄŵĂƌĂƐĞĞƐ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶĂƐĂĚŝƐĐŝƉůĞŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?
ǁŚŽƐĞ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ǁĂƐ ĂŶ ĂĚĂƉƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ? ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ : ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽphy and The Concept of Law can be relegated to the 
position of supplement. Ultimately, writes Cámara, despite their adopting different 
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ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ?: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇǁĂƐŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚůǇtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶŝĂŶ8. As discussed 
in previous chapters, there is much speculation as to the extent to which the Oxford 
WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇ ?ĂŶĚĨŽůůŽǁĞĚ ?tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ9. Cámara 
argues that the fundamental difference between J.L. Austin and Wittgenstein lies in 
their methodologies, insofar as J.L. Austin perceived Ordinary Language Philosophy as 
Ă ŶĞǁ  “ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐŽƵůĚ ŚĞůƉ ƐŚĞĚ ƐŽŵĞ ůŝŐŚƚ ŽŶ ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů
philosophical problems, whereas Wittgenstein thought of it as a set of techniques 
which would dissolve philosophical problems.  Some philosophers, such as Morris 
Weitz, argue that Wittgenstein was instrumental and the single greatest philosophical 
influence for the Oxford Philosophers, whilst others such as Severin Schroeder 
disagree, claiming that the views of the two camps were far too diverse to classify 
them under a single influence. Schroeder writes:  
^ŽŽŶ ŝƚ ďĞĐĂŵĞ ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ƚŽ ƐƉĞĂŬ ŽĨ  “KǆĨŽƌĚ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? Žƌ  “KǆĨŽƌĚ
KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ?ƐĞĞŶďǇŵĂŶǇĂƐƚŚĞ “ƐĐŚŽŽů ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶ
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐPhilosophical Investigations. However, the label is 
                                                          
8 ĄŵĂƌĂ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ?/ƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂƌŐƵĞĚŝŶƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐƚŚĂƚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŚĂƐďĞĞŶ
ƌĞĂĚŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞǁŝĚĞůǇƚŚĂŶ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ?: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐƐƚŝůůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚǀĞƌǇƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ ?
and mainly only read by those with an interest in philosophy of language. It is therefore not 
ƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ĄŵĂƌĂ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ Ă ůŽƚ ŵŽƌĞ ĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌ ǁŝƚŚ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ƚŚĂŶ : ?> ?
ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ?ĄŵĂƌĂ ?ƐĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁŝůůďĞĐŽŵĞĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ
ƚŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? tŚĞŶ ƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐ ƚŽ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽrk, Cámara is referring to his later 
philosophy as per Philosophical Investigations. Ludwig Wittgenstein and translated [from the 
German] by G. E. M. Anscombe, Philosophical Investigations Philosophische 
Untersuchungen (3rd edn, Blackwell Publishers 1967). 
9 Cf Chaper Two, The Case for Ordinary Language Philosophy ?ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƚǁŽ “,ĂƌƚĂŶĚKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ
>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ? 
 230 
 
misleading, for the views of these philosophers were far too varied for 
them to be classed as members of the same school, and some of them 
(e.g. Austin, Ayer and Grice) were in many respects highly critical of 
Wittgenstein.10 
Though an interesting question, it would be beyond the scope of this thesis to add to 
ƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞŽŶtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶKǆĨŽƌĚWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ŽƌǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ
ŚĂĚ ƐƚĂƌƚĞĚ ŚŝƐ ƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐ ďĞĨŽƌĞ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ůĂƚĞƌ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ĞŵĞƌŐĞĚ ? tŚĂƚ ŝƐ
relevant however is the extent to which the teaching of the so-called Oxford 
WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ? ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ : ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ? ĞŵƵůĂƚĞĚ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ11. As argued 
                                                          
10 Severin Schroeder, Wittgenstein: The Way out of the Fly-Bottle (Polity Press 2006). Grayling 
ŝƐĂůƐŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚŝƐǀŝĞǁ ?,ĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “EŽne of the people who at the time were prominent 
in philosophy (in addition to Ryle and Austin there were, for example, Moore, Broad, Russell 
ĂŶĚǇĞƌ )ǁĞƌĞtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶŝĂŶƐ ?ŵŽƐƚŽĨ ƚŚĞŵǁĞƌĞ ůĂƌŐĞůǇƵŶĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚďǇtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ
later ideas, and some were ĂĐƚŝǀĞůǇŚŽƐƚŝůĞƚŽƚŚĞŵ ? ?'ƌĂǇůŝŶŐ ? Wittgenstein: A Very Short 
Introduction (Oxford University Press 2001), 129. 
11 /ƚŝƐƵŶĐůĞĂƌǁŚĂƚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐǁĞƌĞĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞǁĂƌ ?ŽƌƚŽǁŚĂƚĞǆƚĞŶƚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ
engaged with them. It is however undeniable that most Oxford philosophers admit that 
Wittgenstein was a great influence. Even though careful reading of their work suggests that 
KǆĨŽƌĚ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ĨŽůůŽǁĞƌƐ ? tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ
Oxford Philosophers cannot be disregarded. These questions have been around from very 
ĞĂƌůǇŽŶ ?ǁŝƚŚtĞŝƚǌǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶƐŽĨKǆĨŽƌĚWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŝƐĂ “ƚƌŝĐŬǇďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ? ?
ƐŝŶĐĞ ƐŽŵĞ ƐĂǇ ƚŚĂƚ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ  “ŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚ KǆĨŽƌĚ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ? ďƵƚ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ĂƌŐƵĞ  “ŝƚ
developed quite indepeŶĚĞŶƚůǇĨƌŽŵŚŝŵƵŶƚŝůĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞǁĂƌ ? ?DŽƌŝƚǌtĞŝƚǌ ?ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚŚĞŝƐ
ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ŐŝǀĞ ƚŚĞ  “ŵŽƌĞ Žƌ ůĞƐƐ ĂŐƌĞĞĚ ƵƉŽŶ ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽƌŝŐŝŶƐ ĂƐ ŽĨĨĞƌĞĚ ďǇ KǆĨŽƌĚ
WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐƵůŵŝŶĂƚĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶǁĂƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇƚŚĞ “ƐŝŶŐůĞ
greatĞƐƚ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ? ?,ĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P  “ŵŽŶŐƐƚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐĂƌĞWƌŝĐŚĂƌĚĂŶĚZŽƐƐ ?
because of their concern for linguistic propriety in ethical matters; Moore and later 
Wittgenstein and Wisdom; Price and Ryle, because they had led the revolt against traditional 
philosophy in Oxford in the late twenties; and the weekly seminar groups consisting of a 
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ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ďŽƚŚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐĂŶĚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĐĂŶďĞƚƌĂĐĞĚ
in The Concept of Law, but it is important to distinguish between the contributions of 
these two philosophers if we are to fully understand The Concept of Law. As discussed 
in Chapters four and five where Bix and Marmor were seen to impose a purely 
Wittgensteinien analysis, and later in Chapter seven where Cole pursues a peculiar 
ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƐŽůĞůǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ŽŶĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞǁĂƌǇŽĨ
imposing narrow and restrictive readings on The Concept of Law. Thus this section will 
be required to focus carefully on the philosophical and methodological differences 
between J. L. Austin and Wittgenstein. The one thing that can be agreed on regarding 
OLP is that, if as far back as 1953, at the pinnacle of Oxford Philosophy, there was no 
agreement as to the philosophical influences held by ƚŚĞ  ‘ŐƌŽƵƉ ? ? ŝƚǁŝůůďĞŚĂƌĚ ƚŽ
                                                          
number of younger Oxford dons, especially Austin and Berlin. The last of these, according to 
Berlin, is extremely important because it promoted in a unique way ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐŽǁŶƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů
procedures. All of these Oxford philosophers agree that Wittgenstein was the single greatest 
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ? ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ŶŽƚ ŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶ ŚĂůĨ Ă ĚŽǌĞŶ ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ƐƚƵĚŝĞĚ Śŝŵ ? ?  ^ĞĞ DŽƌƌŝƐ tĞŝƚǌ ?
 ‘KǆĨŽƌĚ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? dŚĞ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂl Review 187, 187. As mentioned in the 
introductory chapter, an important writer in this area is Morris Weitz. His importance pertains 
not to his philosophical status, but due to the fact that he was writing about Oxford Philosophy 
in 1953, when Oxford Philosophy was booming. It was Bertrand Russell, who Weitz met whilst 
doing French History Research at the University of Chicago that inspired him to follow 
Philosophy. His new found interest in philosophy lead him to visit Oxford for a year residency. 
Weitz ƐƉĞŶƚĂǇĞĂƌĂƚKǆĨŽƌĚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶŐĨŽƌ ?ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚŽƚŚĞƌƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ƚŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ?ƵƌŝŶŐtĞŝƚǌ ?Ɛ
residence at Oxford, he became good friends with Oxford Philosophers such as Gilbert Ryle, 
,ĞƌďĞƌƚ,ĂƌƚĂŶĚ/ƐĂŝĂŚĞƌůŝŶ ?ďƵƚĞǀĞŶƚŚĞŶ ?ŚĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŚŝŵƐĞůĨĂŶ “ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌ ? ?,ŝƐůĞŶŐƚŚǇ
ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ  “KǆĨŽƌĚ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ŐĂǀĞ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ĂŶ ŝŶƐŝŐŚƚ ŝŶƚŽ ǁŚĂƚ ǁĂƐ ŐŽŝŶŐ ŽŶ Ăƚ
KǆĨŽƌĚŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚŝƚǁĂƐĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶŵĞƌŝĐĂǁŚĞƌĞǀĞƌǇ
little was known about this post-war philosophical movement.  
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settle this question today. However, what Berlin, Weitz, Schroeder and many others12 
ƐĞĞŵƚŽĂŐƌĞĞŽŶŝƐƚŚĂƚƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇǁĂƐĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚŽ
that of Wittgenstein. So, even if Cámara was right to assume that J. L. Austin was 
ŝŶŝƚŝĂůůǇ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚďǇtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐŽŶƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ŚĞŵĂĚĞ ŝƚŚŝƐŽǁŶďǇ
ŚĂǀŝŶŐŚŝƐŽǁŶ  “ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ? ? /ƚ ŝƐ ƚŚŝƐ  “ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ?ƚŚĂƚ
ŵĂŬĞƐ ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ƵŶŝƋƵĞ ? ĂŶĚ ĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇ distinguishable from that of 
Wittgenstein13 ? /ƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ƚŽ ƐŚŽǁ ǁŚĂƚ : ? > ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ƵŶŝƋƵĞ
philosophical approach is. Perhaps the closest we can ever come to an explanation of 
: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŝŶĞŶŐĂŐŝŶŐKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ŝs through his article 
 “WůĞĂĨŽƌǆĐƵƐĞƐ ? ?14 /Ŷ “WůĞĂĨŽƌǆĐƵƐĞƐ ?15, Austin exemplifies how his method of 
analysis works using the topic of excuses as his source. He starts by thinking of 
                                                          
12 KŶ ƚŚĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ : ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ĂŶĚ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ƉůĞĂƐĞ ƐĞĞ <d &ĂŶŶ
(ed), Symposium on J.L. Austin (Routledge & Keegan Paul 1969), Richard Sørli, The Philosophy 
of J. L. Austin (Martin / Gustafsson and Richard Sorli eds, Oxford University Press 2011), Avner 
Baz, When Words Are Called for: A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy (Harvard 
University Press 2012). 
13 A.C. Grayling adds to this in A Very Short Introduction to Wittgenstein, where he writes: 
 “^Ž-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ >ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĨůŽƵƌŝƐŚĞĚ Ăƚ KǆĨŽƌĚ ŵĂŝŶůǇ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
 ? ? ? ? ?ƐĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ĐŚŝĞĨůǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƵƐƚŝŶ ? ŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŽďĞĂ ƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨ
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐ ?ďƵƚŝŶĨĂĐƚŚŝƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞǁĂƐĨĂƌůĞƐƐŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞƚŚĂŶƚŚĂƚ ?ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇ
Austin did not take himself to owe his ideas to Wittgenstein. There is no doubt that 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ǀŝĞǁƐ ŚĂĚ ƐŽŵĞ ƉĂƌƚ ŝŶ ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ĨŽƌ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ
which was dominant in the mid-century, even if only in part and at second-or-third-hand; but 
it is equally certain that tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ĨŽƵŶĚ ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ  ‘KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ
WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ƵŶĐŽŶŐĞŶŝĂů ? ?  'ƌĂǇůŝŶŐ ? Wittgenstein: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford 
University Press 2001), 129. 
14 :>ƵƐƚŝŶ ? ‘WůĞĂĨŽƌǆĐƵƐĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇand Linguistics 79, 3. 
15 J.L. Austin (n 14) 7. 
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different situations in which people might use excuses, and then examines their 
ordinary usage. Unlike Wittgenstein, Austin does not believe that Ordinary Language 
Philosophy will solve all philosophical problems (and Cámara acknowledges as much). 
tŚĂƚƵƐƚŝŶĂƌŐƵĞƐŝƐƚŚĂƚƐŝŶĐĞǁĞƵƐĞǁŽƌĚƐĂƐ “ŽƵƌƚŽŽůƐ ? ?ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚĞŶsure we 
ŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚǁĞŵĞĂŶǁŚĞŶǁĞƵƐĞƚŚĞŵ ?/ƚŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽ “ŚŽůĚƚŚĞŵĂƉĂƌƚ
ĨƌŽŵ ĂŶĚ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ? ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ? ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂĐŝĞƐ ŽĨ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ16. 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ŝƐƐůŝŐŚƚůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ?ǀĞŶ
though Wittgenstein is still concerned with how words are used, his focus is directed 
towards looking and seeing whether there is any connection from the different 
applications of a word17 and the insistence that one should describe the use of the 
word rather than theorize about it18 ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞWƌĞĨĂĐĞŽĨThe Concept of Law, where 
Hart sets the scene for his book and explains his methodology19. Cámara 
acknowledges that Hart quotes J.L. Austin in the preface to The Concept of Law, but 
since he views Austin as a disciple of Wittgenstein he does not consider this 
particularly relevant. Hart expressly rejects the idea that inquiries into the meaning of 
words merely throw light on words20. He believes that by examining the standards of 
                                                          
16 J.L. Austin (n 14) 8. 
17 Ludwig Wittgenstein and translated [from the German] by G. E. M. Anscombe, Philosophical 
Investigations Philosophische Untersuchungen (3rd edn, Blackwell Publishers 1967), ss 66. 
18 Wittgenstein (n 17) ss 109. For further discussion on this issue, please see Norman 
Malcolm, EŽƚŚŝŶŐ /Ɛ ,ŝĚĚĞŶ P tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ŽĨ ,ŝƐĂƌůǇ dŚŽƵŐŚƚƐ (Blackwell 
Publishers 1988), 237. 
19 Cf Chapter seven, text to footnote 68.  
20 Hart (n 1) vii. 
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use of different expressions, we can get an insight into important distinctions that 
would not be immediately obvious. This mirrors J.L. Austin when he claims that it is 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŚĂƚǁĞĞǆĂŵŝŶĞ “ǁŚĂƚǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚƐĂǇĂŶĚǁŚĞŶ ?21, since this will allow us 
ƚŽ  “ůŽŽŬ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ďůŝŶŬĞƌƐ ?22 ? ĨŽƌ : ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ďĞůŝĞǀĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  “ǁĞ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ
ŵĞƌĞůǇůŽŽŬŝŶŐĂƚǁŽƌĚƐďƵƚĂůƐŽƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƚŝĞƐǁĞƵƐĞƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐƚŽƚĂůŬĂďŽƵƚ ?23, hence 
,Ăƌƚ ĐĂůůŝŶŐ ŚŝƐ ďŽŽŬ  “ĂŶ ĞƐƐĂǇ ŝŶ ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ?24 ? KŶ ƚŚĞ ǁŚŽůĞ ? ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
approach has a much closer resemblance to that of J. L. Austin than to Wittgenstein. 
In various parts of The Concept of Law ?,ĂƌƚƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞƐĂĐĂƌĞĨƵůĞŶƋƵŝƌǇŝŶƚŽ “ǁŚĂƚ
ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚƐĂǇĂŶĚǁŚĞŶ ? ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ “ǁŚǇĂŶĚ ǁŚĂƚǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚŵĞĂŶďǇŝƚ ?25.  
 This important distinction between the methodologies of J.L. Austin and 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶĐĂŶďĞŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ?ƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ
and elucidation of the concept of law. To review what was already discussed in 
previous chapters in this thesis, in the first chapter of The Concept of Law Hart 
discusses the definition of the word Law, and argues that no agreement has yet been 
reached as to the precise definition of the concept of Law. Even though most people 
use this concept with ease, and would be able to identify phenomena as legal, and 
what would count as law, there is no definition as such of the concept of law. It is this 
                                                          
21 J.L. Austin (n 14) 7. 
22J.L. Austin (n 14) 7. 
23 J.L. Austin (n 14) 8. 
24 ,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? )ǀŝŝ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚŚŝƐďŽŽŬǁĂƐĂŶ “ĞƐƐĂǇŝŶĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ?ǁĂƐŶŽƚǁĞůů
received, and has sparked much debate. This issue was discussed at length in the previous 
chapter. Cf ŚĂƉƚĞƌƐĞǀĞŶ ?ŽůĞĂŶĚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ The Concept of Law, text to 
footnote 68.  
25 J.L. Austin (n 14) 7. 
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lack of consensus that leads Hart to enquire why it is that with so much common 
ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ “tŚĂƚŝƐ>Ăǁ ?ŝƐǇĞƚƚŽďĞĂŶƐǁĞƌĞĚ26. In order to tackle this 
question, Hart claims that what is needed is not yet another definition, but rather an 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨǁŚĂƚŝƚŝƐĂďŽƵƚ “ůĂǁ ?ƚŚĂƚŚĂƐƉƵǌǌůĞĚƐŽŵĂŶǇŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ámara, 
who analyses The Concept of Law through a purely Wittgensteinien point of view, 
understands this to mean that Hart is claiming that instead of providing a definition of 
ƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ůĂǁ ? ?ŚĞǁŝůůƚƌǇĂŶĚĨŝŶĚ>Ăǁ ?Ɛ  “ĐĞŶƚƌĂůĐĂƐĞ ? ?ĄŵĂƌĂǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
What Hart proposes is not another definition of Law in the traditional 
sense, nor a mere description of how the concept Law is used. He is 
ůŽŽŬŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞ “ĐĞŶƚƌĂůĐĂƐĞ ?ŽĨ>Ăǁ ?27 
 ĄŵĂƌĂ ? ĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ
philŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƐ ƚŚĞ  “ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ĐĂƐĞ ŽĨ >Ăǁ ? ĂƐ ďĞŝŶŐ ĂŶ ĂĚĂƉƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐĐŽƌĞĂŶĚƉĞŶƵŵďƌĂŽĨĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽĄŵĂƌĂ ?,ĂƌƚĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ
ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐĞǀĞƌĂůŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐƚŚĂƚĨĂůůǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ “ƉĞŶƵŵďƌĂ ? ?ďƵƚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐŽŵĞƚŚĂƚ
ĨŽƌŵƚŚĞ “ĐŽƌĞ ? ŽĨ>Ăǁ ?,ĞĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚǁŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚŝƐůŽŽŬŝŶŐĨŽƌŝƐƚŚŝƐ “ĐŽƌĞ ?ĐĂƐĞ ?Ă
ĐĞŶƚƌĂůĐĂƐĞǁŚŝĐŚǁŝůůĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞůĂǁ ?ƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁŝůůƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ
give us the definition of Law28 ?dŚŽƵŐŚ ŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚďǇtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?
                                                          
26 Hart (n 1) 1-3. 
27 Cámara (n 2) 53. Interestingly Stavropoulos, who claimed to also be analysing the semantic 
insights in The Concept of Law, reaches a completely different conclusion claiming that Hart 
is looking for the nature of law. Chapter six, Nicos Stavropoulos, text to footnote no. 10.  
28 Cámara (n 2) 53. It is important to clarify that, as illustrated in previous chapters, Hart does 
ƉůĂĐĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  “ĐŽƌĞ ?ĂŶĚ  “ƉĞŶƵŵďƌĂ ?ŽĨĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐ
ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁŚĂƚŝƐĚŝƐƉƵƚĞĚŝƐƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚǁĂƐůŽŽŬŝŶŐĨŽƌ
Ă “ĐĞŶƚƌĂůĐĂƐĞ ?ŽĨ>Ăǁ ? 
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according tŽĄŵĂƌĂ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŚŝŵĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŽĨ
KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ĂŶĚĂƌŐƵĂďůǇ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ƐŝŶĐĞŚĞŝƐŶŽƚ
looking for the use ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌĚ  “ůĂǁ ? ? dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ĄŵĂƌĂ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? Ă ĐůĞ ƌ
demonstration of the application of Philosophical Investigations, particularly the 
ĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ “ĐŽƌĞĂŶĚƉĞŶƵŵďƌĂ ?ŽĨĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ?/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ ĨŝŶĚǁŚĂƚĄŵĂƌĂĐĂůůƐƚŚĞ
 “ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ? ĐĂƐĞ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ? ,Ăƌƚ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞƐ ƚŚƌĞĞ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵ ŽĨ
questions, which are of prime importance to our understanding of it29: 
 
1. What relation is there between law, legal obligation and orders backed by 
threats? 
2. What relation is there between law and moral rules? 
3. What are rules? Does law consist of rules? Do courts really apply rules? What 
relation is there between rules and habits? 
 
ĄŵĂƌĂ ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŽŶĐĞ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƚŚƌĞĞ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ĂƌĞ
exposed and analysed, we will be able to reach consensus as to what law is. In other 
words, by addressing these three areas of concern Hart will be able to elucidate the 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨůĂǁ ?ĄŵĂƌĂůŝŶŬƐƚŚĞƐĞƚŽtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐĨĂŵŝůǇƌĞƐĞŵďůĂŶĐĞƐ ?,ĞĂƌŐƵĞƐ
that by answering all three questions, Hart claims that we can gain an insight into the 
different connections and similarities between them, and will therefore ascertain 
ǁŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  “ĐĞŶƚƌĂůĐĂƐĞ ?ŽĨ ůĂǁ ŝƐ ? /ƚ ŝƐŶŽƚĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ ĨƌŽŵĄŵĂƌĂ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬǁŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ
 “ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ? ĐĂƐĞ ŝƐ ? Žƌ ǁŚĂƚ ŝƚ ůŽŽŬƐ ůŝŬĞ ? ǀĞŶ ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ĄŵĂƌĂ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ ĂŶ ŝŶƚƌŝŐƵŝŶŐ
                                                          
29 Cámara (n 2) 53.  
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argument, it leaves a lot of questions unanswereĚ ? ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ǁŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ  “ĐŽƌĞ ? Žƌ
 “ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ?ĐĂƐĞŽĨůĂǁůŽŽŬƐůŝŬĞ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĂƚůŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƉĞŶƵŵďƌĂ ?dŚĞƐĞĂƌĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ
ƚŚĂƚ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ĂŶƐǁĞƌĞĚ ďǇ ĄŵĂƌĂ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬ ? dŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ? ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƐƚƌŽŶŐ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ĚĞůŝŶĞĂƚĞĚŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌ/ŽĨThe Concept of Law, might 
ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ŝŶ ůŝŶĞ ǁŝƚŚ KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ >ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚ ďǇ : ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
teachings30 ?&ŽƌƚŚŝƐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ?ůĞƚ ?ƐůŽŽŬĂƚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌ ? “WůĞĂĨŽƌǆĐƵƐĞƐ ?31, 
ǁŚĞƌĞ ?ǁĞƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌ )ƵƐƚŝŶĂŝŵƐƚŽĞǆĂŵŝŶĞƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŽĨ  “ĞǆĐƵƐĞƐ ? P what is an 
excuse, how it is used, and how others receive it32 ?ƐŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐŵĂŝŶĂŝŵ
in this article was to exemplify how OLP can be used to shed light on important issues, 
ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚŽƐĞŽĨ “ĞǆĐƵƐĞƐ ? ?/ŶƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝng of his paper, Austin writes: 
tŚĂƚ ?ƚŚĞŶ ?ŝƐƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?/ĂŵŚĞƌĞƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ĞǆĐƵƐĞƐ ?for a title, 
but it would be unwise to freeze too fast to this one noun and its partner 
ǀĞƌď PŝŶĚĞĞĚĨŽƌƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞ/ƵƐĞĚƚŽƵƐĞ “ĞǆƚĞŶƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?^ƚŝůů ?ŽŶ
                                                          
30 It is imporƚĂŶƚ ƚŽƌĞĐĂůů ƚŚĂƚ ŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞ  “:ŚĞƌŝŶŐ ?Ɛ,ĞĂǀ ŶŽĨŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ? ?ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ
throughout this thesis, Hart credits J.L. Austin and Wittgenstein with a whole new phase in 
ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? /ƚ ĐŽƵůĚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ďĞ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ŝŶ ůŝŶĞwith 
KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ũƵƐƚǁŝƚŚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂƐƉĞƌ
Philosophical Investigations. HLA Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford 
University Press 1983). 
31 J.L. Austin (n 14) 1. As it was mentioned, most ŽĨƚŚĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƚŽŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
philosophy were published post-ŵŽƌƚĞŵ ?ǁŝƚŚŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞŵďĞŝŶŐĚƌĂĨƚĞĚĨƌŽŵŚŝƐƐƚƵĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
notes. Austin did not feel the need to publish much, for his whole enterprise was based in the 
discussion of ideas.  “ WůĞĂ ĨŽƌ ǆĐƵƐĞƐ ? ŝƐ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ƉŝǀŽƚĂů ƉĂƉĞƌ ? DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ? ƚŚŝƐ ƉĂƉĞƌ
springs from a series of seminars that J.L. Austin ran with Hart on this same topic31.  We can 
ŽŶůǇƐƉĞĐƵůĂƚĞĂƐƚŽƚŚĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚŚĂĚŝŶƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉĂƉĞƌ ?ďƵƚƵƐƚŝŶĚŝĚĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚge 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ?ůĞĂǀŝŶŐƵƐƚŽĂƐƐƵŵĞƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞŽĨŝƚŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚĞĚ ?ŽƌĂƚ
least discussed, in the seminar he and Hart ran together. 
32 J.L. Austin (n 14) 1. 
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ƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞ “ĞǆĐƵƐĞƐ ?ŝƐƉƌŽďĂďly the most central and embracing term in 
the field, although this includes others of importance  W  “ƉůĞĂ ? ? “ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ? ?
 “ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĂŶĚƐŽŽŶ ?tŚĞŶ ?ƚŚĞŶ ?ĚŽǁĞ “ĞǆĐƵƐĞ ? ŽŶĚƵĐƚ ?ŽƵƌŽǁŶ
ŽƌƐŽŵĞďŽĚǇĞůƐĞ ?Ɛ ?tŚĞŶĂƌĞ “ĞǆĐƵƐĞƐ ?ƉƌŽĨĨĞƌĞĚ ?33 
Throughout the paper J. L. Austin picks out (and explains the significance of) different 
ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐǁŚĞƌĞ “ĞǆĐƵƐĞƐ ?ĂƌĞƉƌŽĨĨĞƌĞĚ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ P 
- As a defence: When someone is accused of having done something, but they 
do not accept full (or even partial) responsibility for having done so34 
- As a plea: When someone accepts that they have done it, but provides 
arguments for mitigating circumstances35 
- As a justification: When someone accepts that they have acted in a particular 
way, but they give reasons as to why they acted in that particular way.36 
 
                                                          
33 J.L. Austin (n 14). 
34 : ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ŷ ? ? ) ? ?ƵƐƚŝŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “/ŶƚŚĞŽŶĞĚĞĨ Ŷce, briefly, we accept responsibility but 
deny that it was bad: in the other, we admit that it was bad but don't accept full, or even any, 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ? 
35 Ibid. J. L. ƵƐƚŝŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “/ŶŐĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŽŶĞǁŚĞƌĞƐŽŵĞŽŶĞŝƐaccused of having 
done something, or (if that will keep it any cleaner) where someone is said to have done 
something which is bad, wrong, inept, unwelcome, or in some other of the numerous possible 
ways untoward. Thereupon he, or someone on his behalf, will try to defend his conduct or to 
ŐĞƚŚŝŵŽƵƚŽĨŝƚ ? ? 
36 /ďŝĚ ?: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “KŶĞǁĂǇŽĨŐŽŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŽĂĚŵŝƚĨůĂƚůǇƚŚĂƚŚĞ ?y ?ĚŝĚĚŽƚŚĂƚ
very thing, A, but to argue that it was a good thing, or the right or sensible thing, or a 
permissible thing to do, either in general or at least in the special circumstances of the 
occasion. To take this line is to justify the action, to give reasons for doing it: not to say, to 
ďƌĂǌĞŶŝƚŽƵƚ ?ƚŽŐůŽƌǇŝŶŝƚ ?ŽƌƚŚĞůŝŬĞ ? ? 
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ƐƐŚŽǁŶ ?ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ĞǆĐƵƐĞƐ ?ŝƐĂǀĞƌǇǁŝĚĞƚĞƌŵ ?ŝŶƐŽĨĂƌĂƐŝƚƵƐĞĚƚŽĐŽǀĞƌĂǀĂƌŝĞƚǇ
of situations.   When considering the term excuses it is not enough to focus on the 
general ordinary usage of the word (since it would not give our investigation any 
depth), we need to uncover the different situations when the expression excuses is 
uttered (such as its use as a plea, as a defence or as a justification), and appreciate its 
ŝŶƚƌŝĐĂƚĞĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?tĞŶĞĞĚƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĞŶǁĞ “ĞǆĐƵƐĞ ?ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĞŶ
 “ĞǆĐƵƐĞƐ ?ĂƌĞƉƌŽĨĨĞƌĞĚ ?: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶŝƐůŽŽŬŝŶŐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƐďǇƵŶĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐ
how the concept of excuses works in everyday practice. He is searching for the use of 
 “ĞǆĐƵƐĞƐ ?ŶŽƚďǇůŽŽŬŝŶŐĂƚŚŽǁƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƚĞƌŵŽĨ “ĞǆĐƵƐĞƐ ?ŝs used, but rather by 
looking at the different situations where the term excuses is featured and seeing what 
they might have in common. Hart reaches a similar conclusion regarding the analysis 
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ  “ůĂǁ ? ?  ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶƚŽǁŚĂƚ  “ůĂǁ ? ŝs, without careful 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ “ůĂǁ ?ŝƐĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ?ǁŽƵůĚ
be fruitless (as, Hart argues, can be seen by the definitions of law that have so far been 
provided). In a similar way to J.L. Austin, Hart is looking at the different, and often 
ĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂů ?ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŚĞƌĞ “ůĂǁ ?ŝƐƵƐĞĚ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞŝŶĐŽŵŵŽŶ ?
in order to fully understand The Concept of Law. Hart writes: 
WůĂŝŶůǇƚŚĞďĞƐƚĐŽƵƌƐĞŝƐƚŽĚĞĨĞƌŐŝǀŝŶŐĂŶǇĂŶƐǁĞƌƚŽƚŚĞƋƵĞƌǇ “tŚĂƚŝƐ
>Ăǁ ? ?until we have found what it is about law that has in fact puzzled 
those who have asked or attempted to answer it, even though their 
familiarity with the law and their ability to recognize examples are beyond 
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question. What more do they want to know and why do they want to know 
it?37 
,ĂƌƚĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞŽĨŶŽƵƐĞƚŽŐŝǀĞǇĞƚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ “>Ăǁ ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
first understanding the current disagreements. J.L. Austin takes a similar approach to 
ĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ “ĞǆĐƵƐĞƐ ? ?: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶĂƌŐƵes that when usage is loose, and 
we might at first not understand why there is a disagreement regarding usage, we 
ƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚ “ƐŚǇĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵŝƚ ? ?KŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇ ?ŝƚŝƐďǇĞǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ
that we will shed light on the true usage of concepts. He writes:  
If the usage is loose, we can understand the temptation that leads to it, 
ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ďůƵƌƐ P ŝĨ ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ  “ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ? ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?
ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶďĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŽƌĐĂŶďĞ “ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚ ?ŝŶƚǁŽǁĂǇƐ ?Žƌ
perhaps it is one where, for current purposes, the two alternatives come 
down to the same. A disagreement as to what we should say is not to be 
shied off, but to be pounced upon: for the explanation of it can hardly fail 
to be illuminating.38 
Even though we could, as Cámara doeƐ ? ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ ƚŽ ũƵƐƚŝĨǇ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ǁŝƚŚ
ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ďǇĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚŝƐůŽŽŬŝŶŐĨŽƌĂ “ĐĞŶƚƌĂů
ĐĂƐĞ ?ŽĨůĂǁ ?ƚŚĞĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐƵŶĞĂƐǇ ?ĂƐĞǆĞŵƉůŝĨŝĞĚďǇĄŵĂƌĂ ?ƐůĂĐŬŽĨĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ
ĨŽƌǁŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ  “ĐĞŶƚƌĂůĐĂƐĞ ? ŝƐŽƌǁŚĂt it would look like). However, the connection 
ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚĂďŽǀĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŽĨ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶƐĞĞŵƐĂůŽƚŵŽƌĞƐŽůŝĚ ?
:ƵƐƚĂƐ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶǁĂƐƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ “ĞǆĐƵƐĞƐ ?ĂƐĂƚŝƚůĞ ?,ĂƌƚŝƐƵƐŝŶŐ “ůĂǁ ?ĂƐ
                                                          
37 Hart (n 1), 5. 
38 J.L. Austin (n 14) 1. 
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an umbrella term which is comprised of a variety of different elements, from which 
Hart picks three which he believes are the most important in elucidating the concept 
of law.  
 
The Concept of Obligation 
dŚŽƵŐŚ^ƚĂǀƌŽƉŽƵůŽƐĂŶĚŽůĞŚĂǀĞĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ?ĄŵĂƌĂ
is the only tŚĞŽƌŝƐƚŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐƚŽĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?/ƚ
is particularly surprising that this is not mentioned by Cole since it will be argued it is 
ŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇǁŚĞƌĞ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŝƐŽŶĚŝƐƉůĂǇ ?ĄŵĂƌĂ
prŽǀŝĚĞƐĂǀĞƌǇďƌŝĞĨĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐũƵƐƚƐŚŽƌƚŽĨ
ƚŚƌĞĞ ƉĂŐĞƐ ŽŶ ĂŶ ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ ŽĨ
ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĄŵĂƌĂ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĨŽĐƵƐĞƐƐŽůĞůǇŽŶtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂŶĚ ?ĂƐ
wŝůů ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ? ŵŝƐƐĞƐ ƐŽŵĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ŶƵĂŶĐĞƐ ŝŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ďĞ
ƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ  ?ƐŝŶĐĞ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ? ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ ŝŶ Ă ŵŽƌĞ
ƵƐƚŝŶŝĂŶ ǀĞŝŶ ) ? ůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞ ŚŝƐ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ŽŶ: ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ƚŚŝƐ
suggests that Cámara believes all issues of Ordinary Language Philosophy to have been 
ĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ ďǇ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ůĂƚĞƌ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŶ ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ĂĚĚĞĚ ƚŽ ďǇ ŚŝƐ
followers. It is possibly for this reason that Cámara misses the connection to J. L. 
ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ĂŶĚ ƐŽŵĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ ŝŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? ,Ăƌƚ ƵƐĞƐ :ŽŚŶ ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
command theory as the foundation for his own theory in The Concept of Law. One 
ĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ:ŽŚŶƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇƚŚĂƚŝƐĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĚďǇ,ĂƌƚŝƐŚŝƐŝĚĞĂŽĨ “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?39. 
According to John Austin, law ŝƐĂƐƉĞĐŝĞƐŽĨĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ ? “ĂŶŝŶƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶŽƌĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ
                                                          
39 Hart (n 1) 82. 
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of a wish to do or forbear from doing something, backed up by the power to do harm 
ƚŽ ƚŚĞĂĐƚŽƌ ŝŶ ĐĂƐĞŚĞĚŝƐŽďĞǇƐ ?40. Hart starts by explaining that generally people 
perceive law as something that makes us act in a compulsory way. When there is law, 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƉĞŽƉůĞĨĞĞůƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŶŽŽƉƚŝŽŶ ?ŽƌĂŶ “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ƚŽĂĐƚŝŶĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ
way41 ? ,Ğ ďĞůŝĞǀĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ ŝĚĞĂ ŽĨ  “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŝƐ ŽŶĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĂƐ ůĞĚ ƚŽ ŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ
mistakes and misconceptions, namely arising from a confusion between expressions 
ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ  “ŽďůŝŐĞĚ ? ĂŶĚ  “ĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ŽďůŝŐĞĚ ? Žƌ  “ŚĂǀŝŶŐĂŶ ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? tŝƚŚ ƌĞŐĂƌĚƐ ƚŽ
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĞŶƋƵŝƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĄŵĂƌĂǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? 
He is not trying to distinguish between concepts, he is trying to distinguish the 
different uses of the same concept.42 
Cámara proceeds to explain how the concept of obligation is related to the idea of a 
social rule. He writes,  
An obligation is always dependent on the existence of a legal rule, the 
opposite however is not always true. So, when there is a legal rule, the 
human conduct is generally, in some way, obligatory. We need to 
distinguish the obligation resulting from an order uttered by a gunman 
ĂŶĚ ĂŶ ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ Ă ůĞŐĂů ƌƵůĞ ?  ? Q ) dŽ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ the 
difference, Hart resorts to a pure Wittgensteinian thought, given that the 
distinction is to be found in the ordinary use of the word43. 
                                                          
40 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (2nd edn, B Franklin 1970). 
41 Hart (n 1) 82. 
42 Cámara (n 2) 58. 
43 Cámara (n 2) 57. 
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So, according to Cámara even though all obligations are the result of a rule, not 
all rules impose obligations44.To ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞ ƚŚŝƐ ŚĞ ďŽƌƌŽǁƐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ
rules of etiquette  W these are undoubtedly rules but they do not impose 
obligations. Even though generally people think that rules of etiquette should 
ďĞĨŽůůŽǁĞĚ ?ƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?Žƌ “ĚƵƚǇ ?ǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŐĞnerally be associated 
to these kinds of rules. Thus, according to Cámara, the way to distinguish 
between rules that impose an obligation and those that do not is to consider the 
seriousness of the social pressure to conform to a particular norm45. Though it 
ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ďĞ ƐĂŝĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĄŵĂƌĂ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ŝƐ ŝŶĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞ  ?ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ
seriousness of social pressure is the primary factor determining whether a rule 
ŝŵƉŽƐĞƐĂŶŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŝŶĚĞĞĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶŝŶThe Concept of Law46), he 
misses some important aspeĐƚƐ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ĄŵĂƌĂ ŵĞƌŐĞƐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ  “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ  “ĨĞĞůŝŶŐŽďůŝŐĞĚ ?ǁŝƚŚ
ŚŝƐƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůƌƵůĞƐ ?ŵŝƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞŶƵĂŶĐĞŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
work which gives it depth and philosophical preĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?ŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶ
the idea of obligation through a more Austinian method will prove to uncover 
ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĚĞƉƚŚŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?/ƚŝƐƚŚĞŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽƐŚŽǁǁŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚůŽŽŬ
like; it will be seen that a much better, more natural, connection can be made 
                                                          
44 Ĩ,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ?,ĂƌƚǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “dŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞŚĂƐŽƌŝƐƵŶĚĞƌĂŶŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ
does indeed imply the existence of a rule; yet it is not always the case that where rules exist 
ƚŚĞƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŽĨďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞŵŝƐĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?
45
 Cámara (n 2) 58. 
46 ,Ăƌƚ  ?Ŷ  ? )  ? ? ? ,Ăƌƚ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P  “tŚĂƚ ŝƐ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ ŝmportance or 
seriousness of social pressure behind the rules is the primary factor determining whether they 
ĂƌĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŽĨĂƐŐŝǀŝŶŐƌŝƐĞƚŽŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? 
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ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĞŶƋƵŝƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨ “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶ “
WůĞĂĨŽƌǆĐƵƐĞƐ ?47. 
&ŽƌƚŚŝƐĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞĐůĞĂƌ ?ŝƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽƌĞĐĂůů,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?
To illustrate his argument, Hart uses the example of gunman A ?ǁŚŽ “ŽƌĚĞƌƐƚŽŚĂŶĚ
ŽǀĞƌŚŝƐŵŽŶĞǇĂŶĚƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶƐƚŽƐŚŽŽƚŚŝŵŝĨŚĞĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĐŽŵƉůǇ ?48. Hart explains 
that according to the theory of coercive orders this situation would demonstrate the 
ŝĚĞĂŽĨŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽƌĚƵƚǇ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ŝĨŽďĞǇĞĚ ?ƐŽƌĚers and gave him the 
ŵŽŶĞǇ ? ƉĞŽƉůĞ ǁŽƵůĚ ŶĂƚƵƌĂůůǇ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĞ ǁĂƐ  “ŽďůŝŐĞĚ ? ƚŽ ŚĂŶĚ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ
money to A. People would naturally assume that if B has not handed over the money 
to A, he might have got himself injured or worse. However, Hart argues that B did not 
have an obligation to hand over the money: 
It is, however, equally certain that we should misdescribe the situation if 
ǁĞƐĂŝĚ ?ŽŶƚŚĞƐĞĨĂĐƚƐ ?ƚŚĂƚ ‘ŚĂĚĂŶŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƌĂ ‘ĚƵƚǇ ?ƚŽŚĂŶĚŽǀĞƌ
the money. From the start it is clear that we need something else for an 
understanding of the idea of obligation. There is a difference, yet to be 
explained, between the assertion that someone was obliged to do 
something and the assertion that he had an obligation to do it.49 
Hart argues that a distinction should be made between our use of the expression 
 “ďĞŝŶŐ ŽďůŝŐĞĚ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ  “ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ĂŶ ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ,Ăƌƚ ? ǁĞ ǁŽƵůĚ
                                                          
47 J.L. Austin (n 14) 28. 
48 ,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ?dŚŝƐĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇŚĂƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇďĞĞŶĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚŝŶhapter 3, Leslie 
Green and The Third Edition of The Concept of Law, but will be revisited here to add greater 
ĐůĂƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĚĞƉƚŚ ?,ĂǀŝŶŐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐŝŶ
this thesis, we are now in a position to add greater ĐůĂƌŝƚǇƚŽƚŚŝƐĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? 
49
 Hart (n 1) 82. 
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ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƵƐĞ ƚŚĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ  “ǁĂƐŽďůŝŐĞĚ ? ŝŶ ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŽĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ďĞůŝĞĨƐĂŶĚ
motives, consequences that might arise from non-compliance or any other 
ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ? tĞ ŶŽƌŵĂůůǇ ĞŵƉůŽǇ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ  “ǁĂƐ ŽďůŝŐĞĚ ? ĂĨƚĞƌ
someone has already acted in a particular way. For example, in the gunman situation 
above, if B gave the money to A, for fear that he might be gravely injured otherwise, 
ǁĞǁŽƵůĚƐĂǇƚŚĂƚŚĞ “ǁĂƐŽďůŝŐĞĚ ?ƚŽŚĂŶĚŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŵŽŶĞǇ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁĞǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚ
ƐĂǇ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĞ  “ŚĂĚ ĂŶ ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŽ ŚĂŶĚ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ŵŽŶĞǇ ?A did not have a legal 
ĞŶƚŝƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŵŽŶĞǇ ? ,Ăƌƚ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  “ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ĂŶ ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? is quite 
independent from whether or not the subject will actually comply or do the required 
ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?^ŽŵĞŽŶĞǁŝůů “ŚĂǀĞĂŶŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĞǀĞŶŝĨŝƚŝƐďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŚĂƚĞǀĞŶŝĨŚĞĚŝĚŶŽƚ
comply with it, and he would never be found out. For example, people have an 
obligation to pay penalty charge notices, and this remains true even if the subject was 
ĂďůĞ ƚŽĞǀĂĚĞ ƚŚŝƐĂŶĚŶĞǀĞƌďĞĐĂƵŐŚƚ ? EŽǁ ůĞƚ ?ƐůŽŽŬĂƚ : ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ  “WůĞĂ ĨŽƌ
ǆĐƵƐĞƐ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
/ƚŝƐŶŽƚĞŶŽƵŐŚ ?ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ?ƚŽĂƚƚĞŶĚƐŝŵƉůǇƚŽƚŚĞ “ŬĞǇ ?ǁŽƌĚ Pnotice must 
also be taken of the full and exact form of the expression used. In 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐŵŝƐƚĂŬĞƐ ?ǁĞŚĂǀĞƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐĞƌŝĂƚŝŵ “ďǇŵŝƐƚĂŬĞ ? ? “ŽǁŝŶŐ
ƚŽĂŵŝƐƚĂŬĞ ? ? “ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŶůǇ ? ? “ŝƚǁĂƐĂŵŝƐƚĂŬĞƚŽ ? ? ?ƚŵĂŬĞĂŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŝŶ
ŽƌŽǀĞƌĂďŽƵƚ ŝƚ ? ?  “ƚŽďĞŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŶĂďŽƵƚ ? ?ĂŶĚƐŽŽŶ  ? Q )dŚĞƐĞǀĂƌǇŝŶŐ
ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐŵĂǇĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƋƵŝƚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůǇ ‘ĂŶĚƵƐƵĂůůǇĚŽ ?ŽƌǁŚǇƐŚŽƵůĚ
we burden ourselves with more than one of them?50 
                                                          
50 J.L. Austin (n 14) 24. 
 246 
 
With regards to excuses, J.L. Austin argues that we have to look at the use of words 
carefuůůǇ ?ĨŽƌǁĞĚŽŶŽƚƵƐĞƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ďǇŵŝƐƚĂŬĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǁĂǇƚŚĂƚǁĞƵƐĞ “ŽǁŝŶŐ
ƚŽĂŵŝƐƚĂŬĞ ? ?ĞƚĐ ?/ƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƐĞůŝƚƚůĞƐƵďƚůĞƚŝĞƐŽĨŽƵƌŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ
use of language if we are to truly understand the topic of excuses. J.L. Austin adds that 
not only do we need to be aware of the exact phrase, but we also need to pay 
attention to its place in the sentence. He gives a very good example of this when he 
asks the reader to compare four sentences: 
 
a1 He clumsily trod on the snail 
a2 Clumsily he trod on the snail 
b1 He trod clumsily on the snail 
b2 He trod on the snail clumsily51 
 
J.L. Austin writes that whereas in a1 and a2 we describe the treading on the snail as 
an accident due to his clumsiness, with b1 and b2 we describe the treading on the 
snail as being his aim, we assume he did it purposefully52.  Hart in The Concept of Law 
ĨŽůůŽǁƐ : ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ  “ĞǆĐƵƐĞƐ ? ? dŚĞ ĐĂƌĞĨƵů ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ǁŽƌĚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ
different context is an approach that is unique to J.L. Austin.  Even though 
WittgensƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ĂƚƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŽ  “ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ƵƐĞ ? ? ŚĞ ǁĂƐ ? ĂƐ ĄŵĂƌĂ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ53, 
concerned with solving the greatest problems of philosophy, and not the careful 
analysis of the ordinary concepts in different contexts. Wittgenstein aims to tackle the 
                                                          
51 J.L. Austin (n 14) 25. 
52J.L. Austin (n 14) 25. 
53 Cámara (n 2) 59. 
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biggest problems of philosophy, and is not particularly concerned with how our use of 
 “ĞǆĐƵƐĞƐ ?Žƌ “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĐŽƵůĚǀĂƌǇŝŶĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?dŚŝƐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽĚĞƚĂŝůŝƐ
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ǀĞƌǇ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ŝŶ : ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ĂŶĚ Ɛ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ďǇ ĞƌůŝŶ ĂŶĚ
others54, he derived pleasure from having lengthy philosophical discussions about the 
ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƵƐĞƐŽĨŽŶĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌŽůĞƚŚĂƚ
ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĨĂĐƚŽƌƐƉůĂǇŝƐĂůƐŽǀĞƌǇƵƐƚŝŶŝĂŶ ?/ĨǁĞůŽŽŬĂƚ “WůĞĂĨŽƌǆĐƵƐĞƐ ?55, 
J.L. Austin writes, 
 QƚŚĞƚŚŝƌĚƐŽƵƌĐĞ-book is psychology, with which I include such studies as 
ĂŶƚŚƌŽƉŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚĂŶŝŵĂůďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ? ? Q )ƵƚƚŚŝƐŝƐĂƚůĞ ƐƚĐůĞĂƌ ?ƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞ
varieties of behaviour, some ways of acting or explanations of the doing 
of actions, are here noticed and classified which have not been observed 
or named by ordinary men and hallowed by ordinary language, though 
perhaps they might have been so if they had been of more practical 
importance.56 
J.L. Austin places importance on psychological factors that might affect our actions. 
Hart criticises theorists for not viewing these as important. Hart criticises some 
ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ?  “ ?:ŽŚŶ ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ĂŵŽŶŐ ƚŚĞŵ ?57 ? ǁŚŽ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ƚĂŬĞ ŝŶƚŽ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
beliefs, fears and motives when thinking about whether people had aŶ “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽ
ĚŽƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ƚŚĞƐĞƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐůŽŽŬĂƚƚŚĞ “ĐŚĂŶĐĞ ?Žƌ “ůŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚ ?
that the person having the obligation will receive a punishment, rather than thinking 
                                                          
54 J.L. Austin (n 14) 24. 
55 J.L. Austin (n 14). 
56 J.L. Austin (n 14) 15. 
57 Hart (n 1) 83. 
 248 
 
about the important psychological factors, reducing this exercise to clear, hard and 
empirical facts, which they are not58. Hart writes, 
It has, indeed, been accepted sometimes as the only alternative to 
metaphysical conceptions of obligation or duty as invisible objects 
ŵǇƐƚĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ  “ĂďŽǀĞ ? Žƌ  “ďĞŚŝŶĚ ? ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ of ordinary, 
observable facts.59 
dŚŝƐŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐŚŽǁ ?ŽŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶ ?ƚŚŝƐĂƐƉĞĐƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇůĞŶĚƐŝƚƐĞůĨŵƵĐŚ
ďĞƚƚĞƌ ƚŽ ĂŶ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŝŶ ůŝŐŚƚ ŽĨ : ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐ ? dŚŽƵŐŚ ĄŵĂƌĂ ?Ɛ
conclusion that whether or not a rule imposes an obligation depends on the 
seriousness of the social pressure is important, it is equally, if not more, 
important to understand what this idea of obligation is. According to Hart, many 
misunderstandings have arisen due to the lack of understanding between the 
distinction and interplay between duty imposing rules, and rules that confer 
powers. This idea of what it means to have an obligation (as opposed to, for 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? “ďĞŝŶŐŽďůŝŐĞĚ ? )ŝƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŽƚŚŝƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ? 
 
Hart on Primary and Secondary Rules 
Another important aspeĐƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇƚŚĂƚĄŵĂƌĂĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐŝƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŝĚĞĂ
of primary and secondary rules. ĄŵĂƌĂ ?ƐǁƌŝƚĞƐ: 
                                                          
58 Hart (n 1) 83-84. 
59
 Hart (n 1) 83. 
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ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ?ƚŚĞ  “ŬĞǇƚŽƚŚĞƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŽĨ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?ĐĂŶďĞĨŽƵŶĚ ŝŶ
,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚǁŽ ƚǇƉĞƐ ŽĨ ƌƵůĞƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŚĞ ĐĂůůƐ ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ĂŶĚ
secondary respectively60 
/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĨƵůůǇĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶĚĄŵĂƌĂ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂƚŚŽƌŽƵŐŚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?ŝƚ
ŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽĨŝƌƐƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨůĂǁĂƐĂƵŶŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĂŶĚ
ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇƌƵůĞƐ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĞǆƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨůĂǁĂƐĂƵŶŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĂŶĚƐĞĐŽŶĚary rules, 
supplemented by a Rule of Recognition, is probably the key aspect of his thesis. This 
follows from the aforementioned discussion regarding what it is to have an 
 “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐ ŚŝƐ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐ ŽŶ  “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ,Ăƌƚ ƐĂǇƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ
iŶĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƌƵůĞƐĂƐĂůǁĂǇƐ ŝŵƉŽƐŝŶŐĂŶ  “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?,ĂƌƚŽďƐĞƌǀĞƐƚŚĂƚ
there are rules, for example rules of etiquette, which are undeniably rules but 
nonetheless they do not give rise to an obligation. Even though society expects rules 
of etiquette to be adhered to, if someone was not to follow these rules they would 
probably not be gravely reprimanded. However, rules such as those establishing that 
we should not harm other human beings attract very high demand for conformity, 
huge social pressure from society for them to be obeyed, and serious consequences 
if one fails to obey them. From this, Hart derives two main factors needed for the rule 
ƚŽ ŐŝǀĞ ƌŝƐĞ ƚŽ ĂŶ ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ P Ă  “ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ĚĞŵĂŶĚ ĨŽƌ ĐŽŶĨŽƌŵŝƚǇ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ  “ƐŽĐŝĂů
pressure brought to bĞĂƌƵƉŽŶƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽĚĞǀŝĂƚĞŽƌƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶƚŽĚĞǀŝĂƚĞŝƐŐƌĞĂƚ ?61. 
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ƚŚĞƐĞƌƵůĞƐĂƌĞĂůƐŽ “ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƚĞŶĂŶĐĞŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůůŝĨĞŽƌ
ƐŽŵĞ ŚŝŐŚůǇ ƉƌŝǌĞĚ ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ŝƚ ? ĂŶĚ  “ŝƚ ŝƐ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ
                                                          
60 Cámara (n 2) 60. 
61 Hart (n 1)  86. 
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required by these rules may, while benefiting others, conflict with what the person 
ǁŚŽŽǁĞƐƚŚĞĚƵƚǇŵĂǇǁŝƐŚƚŽĚŽ ?62.  
Hart views this combination of primary and secondary rules as the centre of 
the jurisprudential system, and its understanding will allow the reader to better grasp 
the fundamental concepts of obligation, validity, and subjective law, amongst 
others63. However, as noted by Cámara, Hart considers this model of primary rules to 
be too simplistic, bringing with it problems of uncertainty, the static character of rules 
and the inefficiency of the diffuse social pressure by which rules are maintained.   Hart 
concludes that, though unlikely, it would be possible for a society to function based 
on primary rules of obligation alone. Granted that this would have to be a small 
community, with common sentiment and shared beliefs, but it would nonetheless be 
possible. However, Hart notes that in such a community there would be three main 
problems. Firstly, there would be a sentiment of uncertainty as to the nature and 
content of these rules. Secondly, these rules would also be static, for the process 
through which social conventions and beliefs change is slow.  And finally these rules 
would also be inefficient, for there would always be dispute as to whether or not the 
rules were complied with and no independent body to address them64. Hart notes that 
ƚŚĞƌĞŵĞĚǇƚŽƚŚŝƐƉƌŽďůĞŵůŝĞƐ ŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ  “ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇƌƵůĞƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞ
rules of a different kind. These secondary rules are rules about the primary rules. 
Secondary rulĞƐ ƐƉĞĐŝĨǇ ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇƐ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ƌƵůĞƐ ŵĂǇ ďĞ  “ĂƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĞĚ ?
introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively 
                                                          
62 Hart (n 1) , 87. 
63 Cámara (n 2) 61. 
64 Hart (n 1) , 92-93 
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ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚ ?65.  Cámara is clear in his explanation of primary and secondary rules, and 
emphasises its importance in ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ĂƐƉĞƌŚŝƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĂŶĚ
ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇƌƵůĞƐĂƐƚŚĞ “ŬĞǇƚŽƚŚĞƐĐŝĞŶĐĞŽĨũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ66 ? ) ?,ĞĚŽĞƐŚŽǁĞǀĞƌĂĚĚ
ƚŚĂƚ “<ĞůƐĞŶĂŶĚZŽƐƐĂůƐŽĚĞŶŽƚĞĚĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?67. On this issue, it is important 
to note that Hart was thĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ƚŽĂĚŵŝƚ ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  “ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĂŶĚ
ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇƌƵůĞƐ ?ǁĂƐŶŽƚƵŶŝƋƵĞƚŽŚŝƐůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ĂŶĚŚĞĐůĂƌŝĨŝĞĚƚŚŝƐŝŶƚŚĞŶŽƚĞƐ
to The Concept of Law. What he claims is unique to his legal theory is the idea of a 
 “ƌƵůĞ ŽĨ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ? ? /nterestingly, Cámara mentions the Rule of Recognition, but 
does not place any emphasis on it. Though Cámara links the idea of primary and 
ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇƌƵůĞƐƚŽtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐŽŶƌƵůĞ-following, he does not explore the 
rule of recognition. A reason fŽƌƚŚŝƐŽŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƌƵůĞŽĨ
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶĚŽĞƐŶŽƚůĞŶĚŝƚƐĞůĨƚŽĂŶĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?Ɛ
discussed above in relation to the idea of obligation, Cámara appears to gloss over any 
ĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇƚŚĂƚŝƐŶŽƚƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůĂďůĞǁŝƚŚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƐŝƚǁĂƐŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌƐĞǀĞŶŽĨƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƌƵůĞŽĨƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ
ĐůĞĂƌůǇ ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ : ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ĂŶĚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ǁŽƌƚŚ
exploring. Regarding the rule of recognition, Hart writes: 
                                                          
65 Hart (n 1) , 94. 
66 Cf text to footnote 60. 
67 ĄŵĂƌĂ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ?ĄŵĂƌĂ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐƐŝŶĐĞŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞƐƚŽǁƌŝƚĞ
aboƵƚ  “ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ĂŶĚ ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇ ƌƵůĞƐ ? ŐŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĞ ǀŝĞǁƐ ƚŚŝƐ ĂƐ ƐŚŽǁŝŶŐ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ
ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŝŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ŚĞ ƚŚĞŶ ŵĞŶƚŝŽƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
 “ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĂŶĚƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇƌƵůĞƐ ?ǁĂƐŶ ?ƚŶĞǁƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ĂŶĚŚĂĚŝŶĨĂĐƚďĞĞŶŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ?ŝŶŽŶĞ 






For the most part the rule of recognition is not stated, but its existence is 
shown in the way in which particular rules are identified, either by the 
courts or other officials or private persons or their advisors.68 
 WhĂƚ,ĂƌƚŵĞĂŶƐďǇƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ŽƌƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚƐ ?ĚŽŶ ?ƚŽĨƚĞŶƐƚĂƚĞƚŚĞƌƵůĞŽĨ
recognition when mentioning a piece of legislation, or passing a judgement; however, 
the way in which society acts shows that this rule of recognition exists and is widely 
accepted. Hart compares his rule of recognition to the scoring of a game: when playing 
a game, the players rarely formulate the rules that constitute scoring (e.g. a goal), 
however, these rules are followed by the players and officials and this is shown by the 
way they score and identify what counts towards winning69. As mentioned earlier, the 
important aspect is that the acceptance of the rule of recognition, like the acceptance 
of the scoring of a game, is shown by the acts of the courts, lawyers and layman alike 
rather than the explicit formulation of a rule in every occasion that they apply. This is 
the very foundation of ordinary language philosophy; in order to understand the 
meaning of a sentence it is important to look at how people use it.  Morris Weitz, 
explaining the purpose of philosophy for ordinary language philosophers, writes that: 
 QƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ŝƐ ƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇ ƚŚĞ ĞůƵĐŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ďǇ ĂŶ
ĞůƵĐŝĚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞůŽŐŝĐŽĨŽƵƌŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ Q70 
 
                                                          
68 Hart (n 1) 101. 
69 Hart (n 1) 102. 
70 Weitz (n 11) 219. 
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As Weitz rightly states71, the concern of ordinary language philosophers is not with 
ordinary expressions, but rather with the logic behind their ordinary use. People 
recognise the rule of recognition and use it to assert the validity, or supremacy, of 
laws. The very fact that people ordinarily use this rule of recognition, even if they 
seldom refer to it directly, shows that this rule exists as a matter of fact. The meaning 
of the rule of recognition is understood once we look at its use.  From this follows one 
of the criticisms ƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƌƵůĞŽĨƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŚĂƐĂƚƚƌĂĐƚĞĚ PƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŽĨǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ ?
tŚŝůƐƚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƌƵůĞƐ ĐĂŶ ďĞ  “ǀĂůŝĚĂƚĞĚ ? ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ƌƵůĞ ŽĨ
recognition, the actual rule of recognition cannot be validated against any criteria. 
Addressing those leŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐǁŚŽĚŽƵďƚƚŚĞ “ǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ ?ŽĨƐƵĐŚĂƌƵůĞ ?,ĂƌƚǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
tĞŽŶůǇŶĞĞĚƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ  “ǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ ? ?ĂŶĚĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇŽŶůǇƵƐĞ ŝƚ ƚŽĂŶƐǁĞƌ
questions which arise within a system of rules where the status of a rule 
as a member of the system depends on its satisfying certain criteria 
provided by the rule of recognition. No such question can arise as to the 
validity of the very rule of recognition which provides the criteria; it can 
neither be valid nor invalid but it is simply accepted as appropriate for use 
in this way.72 
                                                          
71 Weitz (n 11 ) ? ? ? ?tĞŝƚǌǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “dŚĞŝƌĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝƐŶŽƚǁŝƚŚŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐĂƐƐƵĐŚďƵƚ
with the logic of their standard use. Their basic problem is to ascertain the ordinary use of 
certain ordinary expressions or sentences in order to provide an account of the logic that they 
ƵƐĞ ? ? Q )ƵƚƚŚĞƐĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐĚŽŶ ?ƚĨƵƐƐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŵď ĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ W that would 
be pointless  W but because they regard them as paradigms whose employment requires 
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ? 




rule within a system of rules, where the validity of such rule depends on a set of 
criteria. The rule of recognition is simply accepted as providing said criteria, and 
therefore it cannot be seen as either valid or invalid, for it is merely accepted for use 
in that way. Furthermore, the rule of recognition exists only as a practice of courts, 
officials and private persons, for identifying the validity of laws by reference to it73. It 
is important to look so closely at the Rule of Recognition to understand whether 
Cámara was correct in his interpretation of The Concept of Law, or whether there is in 
ĨĂĐƚ ?ĂƐ ŝƚ ŝƐĂƌŐƵĞĚ ?ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ƚŽďĞŐĂŝŶĞĚďǇ ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ in light of J. L. 
ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƌƵůĞŽĨƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĂƚĞǆŝƐƚƐĂƐĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨ ĨĂĐƚ ?ŚĂƐƐŽŵĞƌĞƐĞŵďůĂŶĐĞ
ƚŽƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽ “ƚƌƵƚŚ ? ?: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶǁƌŝƚĞƐŽĨ ƌƵƚŚƚŚĂƚ ? 
 Q ?ƚƌƵƚŚ ?ŝƚƐĞůĨŝƐĂŶĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚŶŽƵŶ ?ĂĐĂŵĞů ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?ŽĨĂůŽŐŝĐĂů construction 
ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ŐĞƚ ƉĂƐƚ ƚŚĞ ĞǇĞ ĞǀĞŶ ŽĨ Ă ŐƌĂŵŵĂƌŝĂŶ ? ? Q ) ǁŚĂƚ ŶĞĞĚƐ
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐƌĂƚŚĞƌŝƐƚŚĞƵƐĞ ?ŽƌĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƵƐĞƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ƚƌƵĞ ? ?/ŶǀŝŶŽ ?
ƉŽƐƐŝďůǇ ? ‘ǀĞƌŝƚĂƐ ? ?ďƵƚŝŶĂƐŽďĞƌƐǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵ ‘ǀĞƌƵŵ ? ?74 
As with the rule of recognition, there is nŽƉŽŝŶƚŝŶĚǁĞůůŝŶŐŽŶ “ǁŚĂƚŝƐƚƌƵƚŚ ? ?ĨŽƌŝĨ
 “ƚƌƵƚŚ ?ŝƐǁŝĚĞůǇĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƵƐĞĚŝŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƐƚŚĞŶŝƚŝƐĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚĨŽƌƵƐĞŝŶ
this way. What is important is to discuss the different uses of the word truth. Hence, 
if we accept that the rule of recognition exists as a matter of fact, since people use it 
and act in accordance with it, we can then move on to the more pressing issues of 
                                                          
73 Hart (n 1) 110. 
74 JL Austin and others, Philosophical Papers (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 1970), 85. 
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primary and secondary rules. Since Cámara is oblivious to the philosophical 
differences between Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin, and decides to ignore the latter, he 
ŵŝƐƐĞƐ ƚŚŝƐ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? tŚĂƚ ŝƐ ŵŽƌĞ ? ďǇ ŶŽƚ ĞŵďƌĂĐŝŶŐ : ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
influence in The Concept of Law, Cámara misses what is probably the most important, 
ŽƌĂƚůĞĂƐƚŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ?ƉĂƌƚŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ? 
 
Navarro and Bouvier on Social Rules 
 DĂŶǇůĞŐĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐŚĂǀĞƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞĚǁŝƚŚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůƌƵůĞƐ ?
as seen in Chapter Three where Leslie Green raises a few concerns as to the validity 
of such rules75. Moreover, there are other legal philosophers, such as Bix and Marmor, 
who when trying to rationalise the application of social rules to Hard Cases, 
ŽǀĞƌĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞ ŝƚĂŶĚƌĂŝƐĞ ƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ ŝŶƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?EĂǀĂƌƌŽĂŶĚ
ŽƵǀŝĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ĂŝŵƐ ƚŽ ĂŶƐǁĞƌ ƐŽŵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ďǇ ƉƌŽǀiding a different 
ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĨŽƌƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞŝƌ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂůďĞŝƚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ?
does nonetheless raise similar complications and tensions in the understanding of 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ƐŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ?EĂǀĂƌƌŽĂŶĚŽƵǀŝĞƌĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚĚƌĞǁŝnspiration from 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŽŶĞĐĂŶƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ
ďĞƚƚĞƌǁŚĞŶůŽŽŬŝŶŐĂƚŝƚǁŝƚŚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐŝŶPhilosophical 
Investigations76. This is perhaps why their framework for the understanding of social 
                                                          
75
 Cf Chapter Three, Leslie Green and the third edition of The Concept of Law, text to footnote 
42. 
76 EĂǀĂƌƌŽĂŶĚŽƵǀŝĞƌǁƌŝƚĞ P  “dŚĞ ƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐŽĨtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ? regarding the existence and 
nature of rules, were quickly filtered into contemporary legal theory through a book, 
published in 1961 by H.L.A. Hart, entitled dŚĞŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ>Ăǁ ? 76. Navarro and Bouvier (n 3) 1. 
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ƌƵůĞƐĐƌĞĂƚĞƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ Was will be seen, 
ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ǁĂƐ ŚĞĂǀŝůǇ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚ ďǇ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ůĂƚĞƌ
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ƚŚĞŝƌ ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬŚĂƐ ŶŽĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŽtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? /Ŷ opening 
illustration of their approach, Navarro and Bouvier comment on a few aspects of 
,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĂǀĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇďĞĞŶĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚ ŝŶƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐ ? ƐƵĐŚĂƐ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
distinction between rules and habitual behaviour (and in this section, they make 
comƉĞůůŝŶŐ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƐ ŽŶ ƌƵůĞ
ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ) ?ZĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚEĂǀĂƌƌŽĂŶĚŽƵǀŝĞƌĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞ
ŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞĂ “ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĚĞŵĂŶĚĨŽƌĐŽŶĨŽƌŵŝƚǇ ? ?ĂŶĚ “ƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ?ĨŽƌĐŽŶĨŽƌŵŝƚǇ
with the ƌƵůĞ )ǁĞƌĞŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚďǇtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶƌƵůĞ-following. According to 
Hart, there are salient differences between  “ŚĂďŝƚƐ ?ĂŶĚ “ƐŽĐŝĂůƌƵůĞƐ ? ?Ğ ?Ő. when there 
is a habit it is enough that behaviour converges, and deviation from such behaviour is 
not a matter for criticism77.  However, when there is a social rule, not only will criticism 
be expressed, but the mere fact that there was deviation from the social rule is seen 
ĂƐĞŶŽƵŐŚƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ?DŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚůǇ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĨŽƌ,Ăƌƚ “ƐŽĐŝĂůƌƵůĞƐ ? are 
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚďǇĂŶ “ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĂƐƉĞĐƚ ? ?tŚĞŶƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŵĞƌĞ “ŚĂďŝƚ ? ?ƚŚĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨ
the group do not need to think of the general behaviour of the group, or whether the 
                                                          
77 To illustrate this point, Hart uses the game of chess: participants in a game of chess do not 
move the Queen in the same way by mere habit. They have a critical reflective attitude to 
moving the Queen in a particular way: they perceive it as a standard of behaviour for all those 
who participate in the game, and demand conformity by criticising other players when 
conformity is threatened. Hart writes:  “&ŽƌƚŚĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƐƵĐŚĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐ ?ĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ ?ĂŶĚ
ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŵĞŶƚƐĂǁŝĚĞƌĂŶŐĞŽĨ “ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ?ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŝƐƵƐĞĚ ? ‘/ ?zŽƵ )ŽƵŐŚƚŶŽƚƚŽŚĂǀĞ




ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĐŽŶǀĞƌŐĞƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂ  “ƐŽĐŝĂůƌƵůĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂĚĞŵĂŶĚĨŽƌ 
compliance for the rule, and participants have a critical attitude78.  Hart writes that 
ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ ŽĨƚĞŶ ŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ? ĂŶĚ ĐůĂƐƐĞĚ ĂƐ Ă ŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨ  “ĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐ ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ
observable phenomena. However, he argues that despite the fact that where there 
are sociaůƌƵůĞƐƉĞŽƉůĞŵŝŐŚƚĨĞĞůĂ  “ĐŽŵƉƵůƐŝŽŶ ?ƚŽĂĐƚ ŝŶĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶǁĂǇ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ
ƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƌƵůĞƐďƵƚĚŽŶŽƚĨĞĞůĂ “ĐŽŵƉƵůƐŝŽŶ ?ƚŽĂĐƚĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ79. 
/ƚŝƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŝŶŵŝŶĚƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚĂƉƉůŝĞƐƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ “ƐŽĐŝĂůƌƵůĞƐ ?ƚŽ
Law, linking them to primary rules of obligation. According to Navarro and Bouvier, 
Wittgenstein makes a similar argument regarding language games and rule following 
in general. Wittgenstein believes, according to the theorists, that for there to be a 
rule, the social community needs to be in agreement as to what conduct is considered 
ĂƐ “ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĂƌƵůĞ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞĂƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞĨŽƌƉĞŽƉůĞƚŽĨŽůůŽǁƚŚĞ
rule. Wittgenstein writes: 
 “dŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ƌƵůĞ ?ĂƌĞrelated to one another, 
they are cousins. If I teach anyone the use of one word, he learns the use 
ŽĨƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƚŚŝƚ ? ?80 
                                                          
78
 Hart (n 1) 57. 
79 ,ĂƌƚǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “tŚĂƚŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĂĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝǀĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ
patterns of behaviour as a common standard, and that this should display itself in criticism 
(including self-criticism), demands for conformity, and in acknowledgements that such 
criticism and demands are justified, all of which find their characteristic expression in the 
ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇŽĨ ‘ŽƵŐŚƚ ? ? ‘ŵƵƐƚ ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƐŚŽƵů? ? ‘ƌŝŐŚƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ǁƌŽŶŐ ? ? ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? 
80
 Wittgenstein (n 17) ss 68. 
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Wittgenstein, and Hart, argue that following a rule is something people do, and there 
does not have to be a mental process behind it, leading Navarro and Bouvier to 
ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĂƚ “dŚĞůŝŵŝƚƐŽĨĂƐŽĐŝĂůƌƵůĞĂƌĞƚŚĞůŝŵŝƚƐŽĨŽƵƌƐŽĐŝĂůĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?81  
 As discussed in previous chapters, a problem arises for law at the point of the 
limit of a (social) rule, illustrated by hard cases. What happens when there is a rule 
and there is not a set agreement on how one should act? This is illustrated by Hart 
ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌƵůĞ  “ŶŽ ǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌŬ ?  ?ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ƚŚŝƐ
thesis). What happens when there is disagreement as to whether a bicycle is a vehicle 
ĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƌƵůĞ ?ƐĐĂŶďĞƌĞĐĂůůĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐŽŶŝǆĂŶĚDĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛ
work, both claim that Hart presents an argument in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. On the contrary, Navarro and Bouvier conceive of the use of necessary and 
ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĂƐĂĨŽƌŵĂůŝƐƚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ĂŶĚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚƚŚĞ “ŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ
ŽĨ ƌƵůĞƐ ? ? ĂŶĚ ũƵƐƚŝĨǇ ǁŚǇ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŝƐ ďĞƚƚer than that of the formalists. 
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽEĂǀĂƌƌŽĂŶĚŽƵǀŝĞƌ ?ǁŚĞŶĨĂĐĞĚǁŝƚŚĂƌƵůĞƐƵĐŚĂƐ “ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐŝŶthe 
ƉĂƌŬ ? ? ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵĂůŝƐƚƐ ? ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƚŽ ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚĞ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ
ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨ “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ? ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐĂŵŽƚŽƌ ?ĂŶĚĨŽƵƌǁŚĞĞůƐ82. With this in 
mind, if a case were to arise concerning whether or not a bicycle was a vehicle for the 
                                                          
81EĂǀĂƌƌŽ ĂŶĚ ŽƵǀŝĞƌ  ?Ŷ  ? )  ? ? ? ůƐŽ ? ĂƐ ,Ăƌƚ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? ƚŚ ƌĞ ŝƐ ŶŽ ŶĞĞĚ ĨŽƌ  “ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ?
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ?tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĂƌƵůĞŝƐĂŶĂůŽŐŽƵƐƚŽŽďĞǇŝŶŐan order. We are 
ƚƌĂŝŶĞĚƚŽĚŽƐŽ ?ǁĞƌĞĂĐƚƚŽĂŶŽƌĚĞƌŝŶĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌǁĂǇ ? ?
82 ƐĐĂŶďĞƌĞĐĂůůĞĚ ?ƚŚŝƐǁĂƐŝǆ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ĨŚĂƉƚĞƌ&ŽƵƌ ?ƌŝĂŶŝǆ ?ƚĞǆƚƚŽĨŽŽƚŶŽƚĞ ? ? ?
ŝǆǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? “dŚĞƚĂƐŬŽĨŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇƚŚĂƚŽĨĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶg of the 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůǁŽƌĚƐŽĨĂůĞŐĂůƌƵůĞ ?ůŝŬĞ “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ?ŝŶĂƌƵůĞĞǆĐůƵĚŝŶŐǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐĨƌŽŵĂƉĂƌŬ ?DŽƌĞ
particularly, the task of interpretation is to determine the range of reference of a word, or the 
ĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞ ŽĨ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƚ ƉŽŝŶƚƐ ? ? Brian Bix, Law, Language and Legal Determinacy 
(Oxford University Press 1995), 9. 
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purpose of this rule, the formalist response would be that it is not (since it does not 
meet the criteria: it is neither motorized nor does it have four wheels), even though 
this case had not been considered when the rule was enacted. However, Navarro and 
Bouvier argue that this would not be a favourable outcome.  According to Navarro and 
Bouvier an important distinction, missed by the formalists, needs to be made between 
the scope of a rule and the strength of rules. They argue that even though we 
understand what rules mean, disagreements over social rules generally arise 
ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ “ƐĐŽƉĞ ?ĂŶĚ “ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ ?ŽĨĂŐŝǀĞŶƌƵůĞ ?EĂǀĂƌƌŽĂŶĚŽƵǀŝĞƌĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŚĂƚ
the scope and strength of rules help us distinguish the  “ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
rules and instances when they are applicable83. They explain that if we maintain that 
there is an internal relationship between rules and the cases to which they apply, we 
can claim that: (a) the rule defines which cases fall within its scope, and (b) the rule 
determines whether the application to a certain case is justified84. To illustrate their 
ƉŽŝŶƚƚŚĞǇƌĞĨĞƌĂŐĂŝŶƚŽ “ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ? /ĨƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂŶĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇŝŶƚŚĞ
park, an ambulance would surely be allowed through and would not be prosecuted 
for breaching the rule. If however someone decided to take advantage of this fact and 
go for a joy ride in an ambulance through the park and were caught he would surely 
be prosecuted for this. The question then arises of how we could enforce the same 
rule differently. According to Navarro and Bouvier we are in effect giving different 
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌĚ  “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ? ĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? dŚĞǇ ǁƌŝƚĞ P  “dŚĞ
ĂŵďƵůĂŶĐĞŝƐĂŶĚŝƐŶŽƚĂŶĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ?ĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ
                                                          
83 Navarro and Bouvier (n 3) 25. 
84 Navarro and Bouvier (n 3) 25. 
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(i.e. whether it is an ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇ Žƌ ŶŽƚ ) ? ?  ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ďŽƚŚ ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ? ƚŚŝƐ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ
implausible conclusion arises due to two main assumptions that theorists normally 
make: firstly, that the meaning of a general term is fixed irrespective of context, and 
secondly that rules impose a solution to any case that they are applied to85. These 
assumptions should be challenged by taking into account the distinction between the 
scope and strength of a rule. Navarro and Bouvier claim that in the situation described 
above (i.e. the ambulance in the park), even though we agree on the scope of the rule 
(we agree that ambulances are vehicles, and fall within the scope of the rule), there 
are disagreements regarding its force (since we do not believe that it will solve a 
particular practical problem, and therefore deem the rule inapplicable in this case). 
So, they conclude that ambulances are indeed vehicles, but given the unfairness of 
ĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐƚŚŝƐƌƵůĞƚŽĂŶĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƌƵůĞŚĂƐŶŽ ‘ĨŽƌĐĞ ?ĂŶĚŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ
inapplicable.  
Though Navarro and Bouvier believe they are providing a better, more 
ĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚ ?ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ƐĐŽƉĞĂŶĚƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŽĨƌƵůĞƐ )ĐƌĞĂƚĞƐƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ ŝŶƚŚĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
work as ŶĚƌĞŝDĂƌŵŽƌ ?Ɛinterpretation (discussed in Chapter Four86). According to 
Navarro and Bouvier, in hard cases judges would have discretion to decide the 
ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌƵůĞ ŝŶ Ă ŐŝǀĞŶ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ƉƉůǇŝŶŐ ƚŚŝƐ ƚŽ &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ǁĞůů-known (and 
extensively discussed) example of a World War II memorial tank, we might agree that 
ambulances and trucks are within the scope of vehicle, but since the situation had not 
                                                          
85 Ibid. 
86 Cf Chapter Four, Brian Bix on Judicial Discretion, text to footnote 47. 
 261 
 
yet been considered the strength of the rule to solve this particular practical problem 
had not yet been decided. The judge does therefore have discretion to determine the 
strength of the rule (i.e. whether it would apply to this particular instance). So, the 
issue stops being about the meaning of concepts, or ordinary language, and relies 
ĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇŽŶĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐũƵĚŐĞment. If one agrees, like Navarro and Bouvier seem to, 
that Hart is inspired by Ordinary Language Philosophy, this appears to be a slightly odd 
conclusion.  It is argued instead that Hart is indeed focusing on the ordinary use of 
general terms (and not in the strength and scope of rules like Navarro and Bouvier 
suggest). Regarding the example of an ambulance, the question is not whether the 
outcome of considering an ambulance a vehicle would be desirable, but rather 
whether an ambulance is considered a vehicle for the purpose of the rule. As argued 
in Chapter Four, there is legislation covering emergency vehicles, and an ambulance 
on-duty (i.e. attending an emergency) would be exempt from such legislation. So, even 
though the ambulance would be in breach of ƚŚĞ  “ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ? ƌƵůĞ ? ŝƚ
would be exempt by the relevant legislation covering emergency vehicles87. As 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ŝŶ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐ ? ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŽƵůĚ ĂƉƉůǇ ƚŽ &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĚŝƐƉƵƚĞŝƐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƚƌƵĐŬŝƐĂ “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ? ?ĐŽǀĞƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞƌƵůĞ ) ?
ŽƌĂ “ŵĞŵŽƌŝĂů ? ?ĐŽǀĞƌĞĚďǇĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƐĞƚŽĨƌƵůĞƐ ) ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ƚŚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐ
ŽƉƉŽƐĞĚ ƚŽ EĂǀĂƌƌŽ ĂŶĚ ŽƵǀŝĞƌ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ ƐĐŽƉĞ ĂŶĚ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ ŽĨ ƌƵůĞƐ ? ĂǀŽŝĚƐ
further complications such as how one decides whether the outcome of a rule would 
be unfair, and whether the judge should have such discretion.  
                                                          
87
 Ibid. An interesting question here is ǁŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚďĞ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝĨǁĞůŝǀĞĚŝŶĂǁŽrld 
ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŽŶůǇ ůĞŐĂů ƌƵůĞ ǁĂƐ  “ŶŽ ǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ?; would the ambulance still be a 
vehicle for the purpose of this rule? This is explored in the Conclusion chapter, pages 279-280. 
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 Once again, it has been demonstrated that the proposed interpretation of The 
Concept of Law ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇŵĂŬĞďĞƚƚĞƌƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ďƵƚĂǀŽŝĚƐƚŚĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ
tensions ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ? 
 
Overview 
 This chapter has focused on two international contributions to the literature 
on The Concept of Law.  ĄŵĂƌĂ ?ƐƚŚŽƌŽƵŐŚŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬŝŶůŝŐŚƚŽĨ
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ŚĂƐ ĐůĞĂƌůǇ highlighted the importance of a holistic 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ƚĂŬŝŶŐŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŽŶŝƚƐŽǁŶ
ŵĞƌŝƚƐ ĂŶĚ ŶŽƚ ũƵƐƚ tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ůĂƚĞƌ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ĄŵĂƌĂ ƐƚĂƌƚƐ ŚŝƐ ďŽŽŬ ďǇ
explaining how The Concept of Law is an exercise in philosophy of language and should 
be understood as such. However, Cámara believes that Hart was mainly influenced by 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ĂŶĚƉƌŽĐĞĞĚƐƚŽĂŶůǇƐĞThe Concept of Law in this 
light. His misunderstanding of J.L. Austin as merely a Wittgenstein scholar leads to 
ƐŽŵĞ ƵŶĞĂƐǇ ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? ĄŵĂƌĂ ?Ɛ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ : ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŶ ? ĂůůŽǁĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƐŽŵĞ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ : ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
teachings and the extent to which they are in line with WitƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?
Though this had been alluded to in previous chapters, section I of this chapter allowed 
ĨŽƌ ĂŶ ĞǆƉůŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ : ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ? ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ // ĂŶĚ /// ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ
ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?through the analysis of the concept 
ŽĨ  “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌƵůĞ ŽĨ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ? dŚĞ ĨŝŶĂů ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ŝƐ
ĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŽEĂǀĂƌƌŽĂŶĚŽƵǀŝĞƌ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƐŽĐŝĂů ƌƵůĞƐĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ ŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶ




was analysed throughout this thesis. 
 In each chapter of Section B of this thesis the work of a different legal 
philosopher who contributed to the literature on The Concept of Law was analysed. 
As mentioned in the very beginning of this thesis, there is a considerable overlap in 
ƚŚĞĂƌĞĂƐŽĨĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐƐŝŶĐĞŵŽƐƚůĞŐĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶƐŝŵŝůĂƌĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
theory. However, as also noted, this should be seen as a strength of this thesis since 
it allowed the reader to see the main argument at play in different settings: that a 
holistic understanding of The Concept by taking into account both : ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐĂŶĚ
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇǁŝůůƉƌŽvide us with a richer and deeper understanding of 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?dŚĞŶĞǆƚ ?ĂŶĚĨŝŶĂů ?ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌǁŝůůĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐďǇƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĂŶ































The Philosophy in The Concept of Law 
As we come to its end, it is important to revisit some old ground and bring 
together some of the philosophical claims that I have made in this thesis. This 
conclusion therefore has two parts: the first section brings together the philosophical 
arguments and insights made throughout various chapters, to demonstrate how a 
philosophically nuanced understanding of The Concept of Law1 enlightens and 
ĞŶůŝǀĞŶƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ ?dŽƚŚŝƐĞŶĚ ?/ǁŝůůnot revisit the critical analysis of the work of 
the various legal theorists mentioned, but focus instead on the insights that the 
ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŚĂƐĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĞǁĂǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚŝƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƐŽƵƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
The Concept of Law. The second section will focus on where this research could take 
us, indicating the scope for future research. 
Before we begin this concluding project, it is worth reflecting once again on 
'ƵƐƚĂĨĨƐŽŶ ?ƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?,ĞǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? 
Of course, no one denies that ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ŝƐŽĨĐŽŶsiderable historical 
significance. We have to study it if we want to understand one important 
phase in the development of analytic philosophy. But is there really 
anything philosophically important to learn from him today?2 
 
                                                          
1 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Joseph Raz and Penelope A Bulloch eds, 3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2012). 
2 Richard Sørli, The Philosophy of J. L. Austin (Martin / Gustafsson and Richard Sorli eds, 
Oxford University Press 2011) 2. 
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My answer almost alone in the lŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞŽŶ,Ăƌƚ ŝƐĂƌĞƐŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ “ǇĞƐ ?ĨŽƌƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ
that I will now set out in summary. 
KŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇŝŶdŚĞŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ>Ăǁ 
 >ĞŐĂů ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ŚĂǀĞ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚ Ă ƉĂŶŽƉůǇ ŽĨ ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
methodology in The Concept of Law. As illustrated throughout chapters four to eight, 
ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽĂŐƌĞĞƚŚĂƚWŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚ
its impact differently. However, all those who agree that Ordinary Language 
WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ƉůĂǇĞĚ Ă ƉŝǀŽƚĂů ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ůĞŐĂů ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?also agree that 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁĂƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůŝŶƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?DǇƚŚĞƐŝƐ
argues that even though the influence of tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌǁŽƌŬ3 can be traced in 
,Ăƌƚ ?ƐThe Concept of Law, : ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁĂǇŽĨĚŽŝŶŐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŚĂĚĂŵore significant 
impact oŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŽǀĞƌĂůůŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ4. Though it might seem petty (after all, both of 
these philosophers were advocates of Ordinary Language Philosophy), it is a crucial 
ƉŽŝŶƚ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬwhilst adopting a more Austinian perspective 
makes better sense of some of the arguments presented by Hart in his book. 
tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐĨŽĐƵƐŝƐĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞuse of words and expressions: one should 
look and see whether there are any connections in the application of a word, and 
describe its application rather than theorise about it5. On the other hand, J.L. Austin 
                                                          
3 Ludwig Wittgenstein and translated [from the German] by G. E. M. Anscombe, 
Philosophical Investigations Philosophische Untersuchungen (3rd edn, Blackwell Publishers 
1967). 
4 The substantial part of this discussion plays out in Chapters Seven and Eight. See Chapter 
^ĞǀĞŶ ? “ŽůĞĂŶĚ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶdŚĞŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ>Ăǁ ? ?205-216; Chapter Eight, 
 “eyond the Anglo-^ĂǆŽŶZĞĂůŵ ? ?228-240. 
5 ^ĞĞŚĂƉƚĞƌŝŐŚƚ ? “eyond the Anglo-^ĂǆŽŶZĞĂůŵ ? ? 233. 
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was concerned with the use of individual words; for Austin, only by scrutinising what 
we mean when we use certain words will we be able to grapple with the inadequacies 
of language6 ? DǇ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƐĞĞŬƐ ƚŽ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ƚƌĂĐĞ : ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
influence from early on in The Concept of Law. Indeed, it first becomes apparent in 
ŚĂƉƚĞƌKŶĞŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬ7, where Hart claims that it would be fruitless to conduct a 
general investigation into what law is. Hart writes, 
Such a way with the question would be agreeably short. But it would have 
nothing else to recommend for it. For, in the first place, it is clear that 
ƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽĂƌĞŵŽƐƚƉĞƌƉůĞǆĞĚďǇƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ  ‘tŚĂƚ ŝƐ ůĂǁ ? ?ŚĂve not 
forgotten and need no reminder of the familiar facts which this skeleton 
question offers them. The deep perplexity which has kept alive the 
question, is not ignorance or forgetfulness or inability to recognise the 
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ůĂǁ ?Đommonly refers8. 
/ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ? ,Ăƌƚ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ “ǁŚĂƚ ůĂǁ ŝƐ ? ďǇ ƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐ ƚŽ
current disagreements regarding the use of the word law. Hart argues that we use the 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ  “ůĂǁ ?ĂƐĂŶƵŵďƌĞůůĂƚĞƌŵ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞĚŽĨ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĞůĞŵĞŶts. Hart 
picks out three of these elements, and raises three recurrent questions regarding law9: 
1. How does law differ from and how is it related to orders backed by threats? 
                                                          
6 Above (n 5), 233. 
7 Above (n 1), 1-17. 
8 Above (n 1), 5. 
9 Above (n 1), 13. 
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2. How does legal obligation differ from, and how is it related to, moral 
obligation? 
3. What are rules and to what extent is law an affair of rules? 
This is an interesting approach, and one that would not necessarily be considered of 
Ă ‘tŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶŝĂŶ ?ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚĂƚůĞŶŐƚŚŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌŝŐŚƚ10, it is however an 
approach that resembles : ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůŵĞƚŚŽĚ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇƚŚĂƚĞǆĞŵƉůŝĨŝĞĚ
ŝŶ “WůĞĂĨŽƌǆĐƵƐĞƐ11 ? ?ƌŝĞĨůǇ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶƵƐĞƐ “ĞǆĐƵƐĞƐ ?ƚŽĞǆĞŵƉůŝĨǇ
what can be gained by applying Ordinary Language Philosophy to practical concepts. 
He argues that Ordinary Language Philosophy can enlighten important issues. J.L. 
Austin argues that it is by looking at the disagreements that arise through the use of a 
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶǁŽƌĚŽƌĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞ “ĞǆĐƵƐĞƐ ? )ƚŚĂƚǁĞǁŝůůƐŚĞĚůŝŐŚƚŽŶŝƚƐƵƐĂŐĞ ?
He writes: 
A disagreement as to what we should say is not to be shied off, but to be 
pounced upon: for the explanation of it can hardly fail to be illuminating.12 
It is my argument that Hart is pursuing the same methodological approach, but 
applying it to the concept law. It is therefore expected that this same methodology 
ƉĞƌŵĞĂƚĞƐƚŚĞďŽŽŬ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĂƌĞĂĚŝŶŐĞŶůŝŐŚƚĞŶĞĚďǇ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐKƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ
Philosophy will thereby enliven and enrich the book.  
The Concept of Obligation and Primary Rules of Obligation 
                                                          
10 See Chapter EŝŐŚƚ ? “eyond the Anglo-^ĂǆŽŶZĞĂůŵ ? ? 228-240.  
11 John L Austin, "A plea for excuses: The presidential address." (1956) Proceedings of the 
aristotelian society 1. 
12 Ibid, 10.  
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We saw a fƵƌƚŚĞƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  “ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ĂŶ ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ  “ďĞŝŶŐ ŽďůŝŐĞĚ ?13 ? ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
discussion around the concept of obligation is founded on his argument against John 
ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁŽĨůĂǁĂƐĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƐ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ:ŽŚŶƵƐƚŝŶ ?ůĂǁŝƐ “ĂŶŝŶƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶŽƌ
expression of a wish to do or forebear from doing something, backed up by the power 
to do harm to the actor in case he disobeys14 ? ?,ĂƌƚĂŐƌĞĞƐǁŝƚŚ:ŽŚŶƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ
insofar as where there is law, there is a requirement to act in a certain way, and 
 “ŚƵŵĂŶĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝƐŵĂĚĞŝŶƐŽŵĞƐĞŶƐĞŶŽŶ-optional or obligatory15 ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?,Ăƌƚ
ĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ :ŽŚŶƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ŝƐ ƚŽŽƐŝŵƉůŝƐƚŝĐĂŶĚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŵƵůƚŝ-
faceted uses of the word  “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? Ɛ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ Ăƚ ůĞŶŐƚŚ ŝŶ ŚĂƉƚĞƌ ŝŐŚƚ ?
ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ,Ăƌƚ Ă ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ŶĞĞĚƐ ƚŽ ďĞ ŵĂĚĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ  “ďĞŝŶŐ
ŽďůŝŐĞĚ ?ĂŶĚ  “ŚĂǀŝŶŐĂŶŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?>ĞƚƵƐƌĞǀŝƐŝƚ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŐƵŶŵĂŶ
situation, in which Gunman A orderƐ “ƚŽŚĂŶĚŽǀĞƌŚŝƐŵŽŶĞǇĂŶĚƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶƐƚŽƐŚŽŽƚ
if he does not comply16 ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞǁŽƵůĚƐĂǇƚŚĂƚǁĂƐ “ŽďůŝŐĞĚ ?ƚŽ
ŚĂŶĚŽǀĞƌŚŝƐŵŽŶĞǇ ?ŚĂĚĚĞĐŝĚĞĚŶŽƚƚŽĐŽŵƉůǇǁŝƚŚ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĂŶĚŚĞĐŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞ
been severely injured, or even killed. Thinking of the gunman example, would we say 
ƚŚĂƚ   “ŚĂĚ ĂŶ ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŽ ŚĂŶĚ ŽǀĞƌ ŚŝƐ ŵŽŶĞǇ ƚŽ  ? ĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇ ŶŽƚ ?  ŚĂƐ ŶŽ
obligation to hand it over to him; he would be perfectly entitled to keep the money 
and try to escape from A (at the risk of being shot). However, if B were to hand over 
                                                          
13 This discussion can be found in Chapter Eight, Beyond the Anglo-Saxon Realm, p 241. 
ĂŵĂƌĂŝƐƚŚĞŽŶůǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐƚŚĞƐŝƐǁŚŽĞǆƉůŽƌĞƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶĂƌŽƵŶĚ
the concept of obligation.  
14 John Austin, The province of Jurisprudence Determined (2nd Edn, B Franklin 1970), 171. 
15 Hart (n 1) 82. 
16 Hart (n 1) 82. 
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ƚŚĞŵŽŶĞǇ ?ǁŽƵůĚǁĞƐĂǇ “ŚĞǁĂƐŽďůŝŐĞĚ ?ƚŽĚŽŝƚ ?tĞĂůŵŽƐƚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇǁŽƵůĚ ?DŽƐƚ
of us value life above material possessions, and would argue that he was obliged to 
hand over the money to avoid being injured. It is this very distinction that Hart argues 
ŝƐŵŝƐƐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵ:ŽŚŶƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ƵŶůŝŬĞ “ďĞŝŶŐŽďůŝŐĞĚ ?  ?ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇĂƉƉůŝĞĚĂĨƚĞƌ
ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ĂĐƚĞĚ ŝŶ Ă ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ǁĂǇ ? ĂƐ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ĂďŽǀĞ )  “ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ĂŶ ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŝƐ
independent of whether or not one chooses to comply with it, for the obligation will 
still stand even if one does not comply with it and it is never found out. As discussed 
ŝŶ ŚĂƉƚĞƌ ŝŐŚƚ ? ƚŚŝƐ ǀŝĞǁ ŝƐ ĐŽŶĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ : ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŝŶA Plea for 
Excuses17, where he writes: 
It is not enough, eithĞƌ ?ƚŽĂƚƚĞŶĚƐŝŵƉůǇƚŽƚŚĞ “ŬĞǇ ?ǁŽƌĚ PŶŽƚŝĐĞŵƵƐƚ
be also taken to the full and exact form of the expression used. In 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐŵŝƐƚĂŬĞƐ ?ǁĞŚĂǀĞƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ “ďǇŵŝƐƚĂŬĞ ? ? “ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŶůǇ ? ? “ŝƚ
ǁĂƐĂŵŝƐƚĂŬĞƚŽ ? ? “ƚŽŵĂŬĞĂŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŝŶŽƌŽǀĞƌĂďŽƵƚŝƚ ? ? “ƚo be mistaken 
ĂďŽƵƚ ? ?ĂŶĚƐŽŽŶ Q18 
Though interesting in itself, this demonstration of the intricacies of the concept of 
obligation is of particular importance for the understanding of primary rules of 
obligation. There is a wide discussion in the literature about social rules, namely the 
difference between a rule and a habit19. Consideration of what Hart said regarding the 
                                                          
17 Above (n 11). 
18 Above (n 11), 24. 
19 ŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚŝƐĐĂŶďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶ>ĞƐůŝĞ'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽThe Concept of Law, as 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌdŚƌĞĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞ'ƌĞĞŶĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƐŽĐŝĂůƌƵůĞƐ ?^ĞĞ
Chapter Three, Green and The Third Edition of The Concept of Law, p 79-87.  In addition, in 
the Notes to the Third Edition, particularly those pertaining to Chapter IV, Leslie Green offers 
ĂǁŝĚĞĂƌƌĂǇŽĨƚŝƚůĞƐǁŚŝĐŚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƐŽĐŝĂůƌƵůĞƐ ?^ĞĞ,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ?-315. 
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concept of obligation is pivotal to this discussion, particularly in light of the discussions 
ĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞůǇŶĂŵĞĚ “WƌŝŵĂƌǇZƵůĞƐŽĨKďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?20 ?ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƚŽ “ŚĂǀĞĂŶŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?,ĂƌƚĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚǁĞǁŽƵůĚďĞŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŶ
to claim that all rules impose obligations. He gives the example of rules of etiquette: 
these are undoubtedly rules, but they do not impose an obligation. It is true that 
society expects these to be adhered to, but it is equally true that if someone were not 
to follow them they would not be gravely reprimanded. In addition, it is important to 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  “ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ĂŶ ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ  “ĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ŽďůŝŐĞĚ ?
 ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĞƐĂǁŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞůǇĚĞĂůƐǁŝƚŚ'ƌĞĞŶ ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨďƵǇŝŶŐĐĂƌďŽŶ-
offset emissions21). Hart concludes that for rules to impose an obligation two main 
ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ŶĞĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ P Ă  “ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ĚĞŵĂŶĚ ĨŽƌ ĐŽŶĨŽƌŵŝƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ  “ƐŽĐŝĂů
ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞďƌŽƵŐŚƚƚŽďĞĂƌƵƉŽŶƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽĚĞǀŝĂƚĞŽƌƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶƚŽĚĞǀŝĂƚĞŝƐŐƌĞĂƚ ?22. 
Hart claims that for a Primary Rule of Obligation to exist it is important for there to be 
 “ŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ Žƌseriousness of social pressure behind the rules23 ? ? /ƚ
would be conceivable for a society to function based on primary rules alone, but, as 
Hart mentions, there would be three main problems: a sentiment of uncertainty, the 
static nature of rules, and inefficiency24. According to Hart, the simplest way to solve 
                                                          
20 This issue is discussed at length in Chapter Eight, Beyond the Anglo-Saxon Realm, 249-255. 
21 ƐĂĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůƌƵůĞƐ ?'ƌĞĞŶŐŝǀĞƐƚŚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ
believing they have an obligation to purchase carbon offsets against air travel without 
supposing that there is a common practice of doing it. See Chapter Three, Leslie Green and 
The Third Edition of The Concept of Law, 86-87. 
22 Hart (n 1) 87. 
23 Hart (n 1) 87. 




these issues is the introduction of secondary rules that supplement primary rules. 
^ĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇ ƌƵůĞƐ ƐƉĞĐŝĨǇ ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇƐ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ƌƵůĞƐ ŵĂǇ ďĞ  “ĂƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĞĚ ?
introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation deteƌŵŝŶĞĚ ?25. In 
ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĂƚŝƐƵŶŝƋƵĞĂďŽƵƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ŝƐƚŚĞ “ƌƵůĞŽĨƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚŝƐ “ƌƵůĞ
ŽĨ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ? ŚĂƐ ĂůƐŽ ďĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ŽĨ ŵƵĐŚ ĚĞďĂƚĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ?
Interestingly, whereas the idea of social rules is associated with WittgenstĞŝŶ ?Ɛ
philosophy, it is harder (as exemplified by Camara) to reconcile the rule of recognition 
ǁŝƚŚtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ26. As I demonstrated in previous chapters, 
ƚŚŝƐŝƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐǁĞƌĞďŽƌƌŽǁĞĚĨƌŽŵ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ.  
ǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůƌƵůĞƐŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚďǇtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ
ƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐŽŶƌƵůĞ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ /ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŝƐƉĞƌŵĞĂƚĞĚ
with more subtle insights into the use of expressions (such as the concept of 
obligation ) ?ĂŶĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƌĞƐĞŵďůŝŶŐ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůŵĞƚŚŽĚ ?ďŽƵƚƚŚĞƌƵůĞ
of recognition, Hart writes, 
For the most part the rule of recognition is not stated, but its existence is 
shown in the way in which particular rules are identified, either by the 
courts or other officials or private persons or their advisors.27 
 An important feature of the rule of recognition is that its acceptance is shown by the 
acts of the courts, lawyers and other members of society, rather than by explicit 
                                                          
25 Hart (n 1) 250. 
26 ĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚŝƐ ?ŶƚŚŽŶǇ^ĞďŽŬĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŚŽǁtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƌƵůĞŽĨƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?^ĞĞ^ĞďŽŬ ? “&ŝŶĚŝŶŐtŝƚƚŐĞŶƐƚĞŝŶĂƚ
ƚŚĞŽƌĞŽĨƚŚĞZƵůĞŽĨZĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? )^DhLaw Review 52, 75-109.  
27 Hart (n 1) 101. 
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formulation of the rƵůĞ ? dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ƚŚĞ ƉŽŝŶƚ Ăƚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ŵŽƐƚ
ĞǆŚŝďŝƚƐ ŝƚƐ ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ : ?> ? ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ KƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ >ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ P ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ
understand the meaning of a sentence, it is important to look at how people use it. 
For this reason, the issue ŽĨǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ ?ƐĂǇƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ŝƐŝƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƌƵůĞŽĨƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ
exists as a matter of fact, it is simply accepted as providing criteria, and the fact that 
it is accepted for use in that way means that it cannot be seen as valid or invalid28. The 
validity of the rule of recognition has been the subject of much debate in the 
literature, with many theorists arguing about the possible conventionalist nature of 
the rule of recognition29. My intervention seeks to establish that these challenges put 
forward in thĞůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌƵůĞŽĨƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚŝŶĚĞĞĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐŵŽĚĞůŽĨ
ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĂŶĚƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇƌƵůĞƐŽĨŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƌĞĚŝƐƐŽůǀĞĚǁŚĞŶƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶ
ůŝŐŚƚŽĨ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? 
 
KŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞKƉĞŶdĞǆƚƵƌĞŽĨ>Ănguage 
                                                          
28 As discussed in Chapter 9, Beyond the Anglo-Saxon Realm, p 254- ? ? ? ?,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝƐ
ƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚŽ: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ “ƚƌƵƚŚ ?ĂďŽƵƚǁŚŝĐŚƵƐƚŝŶĐůĂŝŵƐ
ƚŚĂƚ “ Q ?ƚƌƵƚŚ ?ŝƚƐĞůĨŝƐĂŶĂďƐtract noun, a camel, that is, of a logical construction which 
ĐĂŶŶŽƚŐĞƚƉĂƐƚƚŚĞĞǇĞĞǀĞŶŽĨĂŐƌĂŵŵĂƌŝĂŶ ? Q )ǁŚĂƚŶĞĞĚƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐƌĂƚŚĞƌŝƐƚŚĞƵƐĞ ?Žƌ
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƵƐĞƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ “ƚƌƵĞ ? ? ?: ?> ?ƵƐƚŝŶĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?Philosophical Papers (2nd edn, 
Oxford University Press 1970), 75. 
29 ^ĞĞ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?: ?ŝĐŬŝŶƐŽŶ ? “/ƐƚŚĞZƵůĞŽĨZĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶZĞĂůůǇĂŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůZƵůĞ ? ?
(2007) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 373-402; A. Marmor, Positive Law and Objective 
sĂůƵĞƐ ?KǆĨŽƌĚhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇWƌĞƐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?> ?'ƌĞĞŶ ? ‘WŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵĂŶĚŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 35, at 35 W52. 
 275 
 
Following on from and related to social rules, one of the key aspects of The 
Concept of Law ǁŝĚĞůǇĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ŝƐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŽƉĞŶ
texture of language. However, despite this widespread discussion and prolific 
publications in this area, there is still no agreement in the literature as to what Hart 
meant by open texture with various legal theorists claiming that there is no actual 
distinction between open texture and vagueness30. The last eight chapters 
demonstrate that there is an important distinction between the concepts of 
vagueness and open texture. Not only is this distinction important for our 
understanding of legal rules - and it does indeed clear some misunderstandings and 
tensions in the literature - it enlightens ŽƵƌ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ
ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ũƵĚŝĐŝĂů ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ? /Ŷ ƐƵŵ ? ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ KƉĞŶ dĞǆƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ
Language in The Concept of Law31 comes as a way to demonstrate that despite 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂ ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ sense of clarity and 
certainty when compared to precedent, this faith might be misplaced. A short 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ŝƐƐƵĞ ŽĨ ũƵĚŝĐŝĂů ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ǁŝůů ĨŽůůŽǁ ? ďƵƚ ůĞƚ ?Ɛ ƐƚĂƌƚ ďǇ
focusing solely on the issue of open texture. In order to do so it is important to recap 
the argument presented in this thesis in support of the view that Hart was indeed 
referring to open texture and not vagueness in The Concept of Law32. 
                                                          
30 This was demonstrated in previous chapters, please see Chapters 4, Brian Bix and Judicial 
Discretion p 94-110, and Chapter 5, Andrei Marmor on Easy Cases, 134-142. 
31 It is important to recall that Hart first introduced the notion of Open texture of language in 
his inaugural Harvard Lecture. See Chapter Four, Brian Bix on Judicial Discretion, footnote 
14.  
32 Above (n 1). 
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Open texture and Vagueness 
It is argued throughout this thesis33 that legal theorists have often conflated 
the terms open texture and vagueness and that this has resulted in a flawed analysis 
ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ ? /Ŷ ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ / ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ Ă ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů
philosophical difference between these two concepts, and one which when attended 
ƚŽǁŝůůƌĞǀĞĂůĂŵŽƌĞĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ
of language to legal rules. To recap, vagueness is the property of an expression that 
ŐŝǀĞƐƌŝƐĞƚŽ “ďŽƌĚĞƌůŝŶĞ ?ĐĂƐĞƐ ?/ŶŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐǁŚĞƌĞǀĂŐƵĞŶĞƐƐŝƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ?ŝƚŝs not clear 
whether a concept or expression is clearly applicable or not. In his chapter The Value 
of Vagueness34, Timothy Endicott gives a relevant example when he writes: 
By statute it is an offence to cause a child or young person to be 
 ‘ŶĞŐůĞĐƚĞĚ ? ĂďĂŶĚoned or exposed, in a manner likely to cause him 
ƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ Žƌ ŝŶũƵƌǇ ƚŽ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ?  ?ŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ĂŶĚ zŽƵŶŐ WĞƌƐŽŶƐ
Đƚ ? ? ? ? ?ƐĞĐ ? ? ) ) ?dŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƚĞĚĞĨŝŶĞƐ ‘ĐŚŝůĚŽƌǇŽƵŶŐ ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?precisely as 
referring to a person under the age of 16 years. But when is it lawful to 
leave a child at home, without supervision? Or when is it lawful to leave a 
child with a babysitter? And how old does the babysitter have to be? The 
statute states no ages. The act subjected all these questions to the 
                                                          
33 For references of the main discussion throughout the thesis see Chapter 4, Bix on Judicial 
ŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ “,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨtĂŝƐŵĂŶŶ ?ƐKƉĞŶdĞǆƚƵƌĞŽĨ>ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? ?
Chapter 5, Andrei Marmor on Easy Cases, text to footnote 25; and Chapter 6, Stavropoulos 
and the Metaphysical ApproĂĐŚ ?ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ “>ĞŐĂů/ŶĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂĐǇ ?^ŽĐŝĂůZƵůĞƐĂŶĚ
KƉĞŶdĞǆƚƵƌĞ ? ? 
34 Vijay K Bhatia, Vagueness In Normative Texts (P Lang 2005), 27-48. 
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vagueness of the terms  ‘ŶĞŐůĞĐƚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĂďĂŶĚŽŶĞĚ ? ?ĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞƋƵĂůŝĨǇŝŶŐ
ƉŚƌĂƐĞ ? ‘ŝŶĂŵĂŶŶĞƌǁŚŝĐŚŝƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŽĐĂƵƐĞŚŝŵƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐŽƌ
ŝŶũƵƌǇ ?35. 
On the other hand, a concept or expression is open textured when it is precise along 
some dimensions, but its applicability has not been considered along other 
ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶƐ ?tĞĐŽƵůĚƵƐĞƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ ?ĂƐĂŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?dŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ ?ŝƐŶŽƚ
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚǀĂŐƵĞ ?ŝƚƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞ ?ďƵƚŝƚŝƐ “ŽƉĞŶƚĞǆƚƵƌĞĚ ? ?ŝƌĐƌĂĨƚŝƐŽƉĞŶ
textured in the sense that technological advances have opened new possibilities 
(namely that of unmanned airplanes, commonly known as drones) where it is unclear 
if the term applies or not. With the introduction of drones, a new set of questions 
ŚĂǀĞĂƌŝƐĞŶ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ P ‘ƌĞĚƌŽŶĞƐĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘^ŚŽƵůĚĚƌŽŶĞƐďĞĐŽǀĞƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
ƐĂŵĞƐƚƌŝĐƚůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƐĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ ? ?tŚĞŶƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ ?ǁĂƐĨŝƌƐƚŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ?ŝƚƐ
application was definitive along certain dimensions but these new dimensions (namely 
the possibility of an unmanned device) were not considered36.  
Social Rules and Open Texture 
We shall now focus on the impact that the open texture of language has on 
legal rules. To recap, Hart starts by explaining that, to be effective, rules need to apply 
and deal with large groups of people. From this it follows that, in order to address 
large groups of people there need to be general rules, standards of conduct and 
principles37. According to Hart, there are two types of legal cases that arise from the 
                                                          
35 Ibid, 30. 
36 For further discussion see Chapter Four, Brian Bix on Judicial Discretion, 99-102. 
37 Hart (n 1), 124. For a definition of general terms see Chapter 4 footnote 31. 
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ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ P  “ĐŽƌĞĐĂƐĞƐ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚeir applicability to a certain situation is 
clear, and cases where it is not clear whether a given rule is applicable, which lie in the 
 “ƉĞŶƵŵďƌĂ ? ?DĂƌŵŽƌƚĞƌŵƐƚŚĞƐĞ “ĞĂƐǇ ?ĂŶĚ “ŚĂƌĚ ?ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ) ?dŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚŝƐ
thesis the example of a rule,  “ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ?, has been used to illustrate the 
ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŽƉĞŶ ƚĞǆƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? >Ğƚ ?Ɛ ƌĞǀŝƐŝƚ ƚŚŝƐ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŝŶ ůŝŐŚƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
clarification provided in previous chapters. According to Hart, when we enact a piece 
of legislation such as a rule prohibiting vehicles in the park, our legislative aim is clear 
in so far as we have decided that the peace and quiet in the park is to be maintained 
at the expense of not allowing vehicles in the park. From this it follows that there are 
clear cases in which the ƌƵůĞŝƐŝŶĚŝƐƉƵƚĂďůǇĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞ ?ǁŚĂƚ,ĂƌƚĐĂůůƐƚŚĞ “ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ?
cases): the motor-car, the bus, the motor-cycle. However, there will be other cases 
where the applicability of the rule is not clear; Hart gives the example of a toy motor-
car electrically propelled. So what is the rationale? According to Hart, we suffer from 
two main handicaps when enacting new legislation: relative ignorance of the facts and 
relative ignorance of the aim38. These handicaps are exemplified in the application of 
the aforementioned rule: when enacting the legislation we did not initially envisage 
ƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨĂƚŽǇŵŽƚŽƌ-car electrically propelled, and the pleasure that they 
would derive from using these things39. The applicability of the rule is unclear, and a 
                                                          
38 ,Ăƌƚ ?Ŷ ? ) ? ? ? ?,ĂƌƚǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “/ƚŝƐĂĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶƉƌĞĚŝĐĂŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚƐŽŽĨƚŚĞ
legislative one) that we labour under two connected handicaps whenever we seek to 
regulate, unambiguously and in advance, some sphere of conduct by means of general 
standards to be used without further official direction on particular occasions. The first 
ŚĂŶĚŝĐĂƉŝƐŽƵƌŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĨĂĐƚ PƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚŽƵƌƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĂŝŵ ? ?
39 Hart (n 1) 129 ?,ĂƌƚǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “tĞŚĂǀĞŶŽƚƐĞƚƚůĞĚ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞŚĂǀĞŶŽƚĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚ ?ƚŚĞ
question which will be raised by the unenvisaged case when it occurs: whether some degree 
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fresh decision needs to be made to establish whether or not toy motor-cars 
electrically propelled are vehicles for the purpose of this rule. It is important to 
emphasise the for the purpose of this rule aspect. Establishing that toy motor-cars 
electrically propelled are not vehicles for the purpose of ƚŚĞƌƵůĞ “ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ
ƉĂƌŬ ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁŝůůŶŽƚďĞǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨĂŶǇƌƵůĞ ?/ƚ ŝƐ
conceivable that there shall be another rule containing the general term vehicle that 
would be perfectly applicable to toy motor-cars electrically propelled.  
Navarro and Bouvier present an interesting scenario, that of an ambulance 
entering the park. If we apply the logic discussed above, the question before us is 
whether an ambulance would be a vehicle for the purpose of the rule40. In Chapter 
ŝŐŚƚ/ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚŝŶƚŚŝƐŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĂŵďƵůĂŶĐĞǁŽƵůĚďĞŝŶďƌĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞ “ŶŽ
ǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ?ƌƵůĞ ?ŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĞǆĞŵƉƚed by the relevant legislation covering 
emergency vehicles41. It could however be argued that in the instance of the 
ambulance, the reference to emergency vehicle legislation could be a way to eschew 
                                                          
of peace in the park is to be sacrificed to, or defended against, those children whose 
pleasure or interest it is to use these things. When the unenvisaged case does arise, we 
confront the issues at stake and can then settle the question by choosing between the 
competing interests in the way which best satisfies us. In doing so we shall have rendered 
more determinate our initial aim, and shall incidentally have settled a question as to the 
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƌƵůĞ ?ŽĨĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůǁŽƌĚ ? ?
40 dŚĞƌƵůĞďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞĂĨŽƌĞŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ “ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ? ?
41 ^ĞĞŚĂƉƚĞƌŝŐŚƚ ? “eyond the Anglo-^ĂǆŽŶZĞĂůŵ ? ? 261, text to footnote 87. This follows 
ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞůŽŐŝĐƚŚĂƚĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŽ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŽĨǁŚĞƚŚĞƌĂtŽƌůĚtĂƌ//ŵĞŵŽƌŝĂůƚĂŶŬ
was a vehicle for the purpose of the rule. In that instance, it is argued that the memorial tank 
would be considerĞĚĂ “ŵĞŵŽƌŝĂů ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚĂ “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŶŽƚĂǀĞŚŝĐůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞ
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a more interesting and philosophical issue: if we lived in a world where there were no 
ŽƚŚĞƌ ƌƵůĞƐ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ  “ŶŽ ǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌŬ ? ƌƵůe, would an ambulance be 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ?&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚ
be an instance where a fresh decision would need to be reached. The ambulance on-
duty42 (if entering the park for an emergency) would be a novel situation, a dimension 
that had not yet been considered and therefore a fresh decision would need to be 
made. As Hart would put it, our aim is indeterminate in this direction. My argument 
ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĞƐƚŚĞŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐŝŶƚŚĞůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞĂƌŽƵŶĚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƉƉůication of open 





Chancery Bar had an impact in his view and appreciation of judicial discretion43. 
/ƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ Žƌ ŶŽƚ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ĂƌĞ ƚƌƵĞ ? ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ (as interpreted 
through Ordinary Language Philosophy) clearly advocates for judicial discretion in 
novel instances where it is an unclear whether a particular term or concept is 
ĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞ ? /ƚ ŝƐŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƚŚĂƚĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚeory 
ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞƐĨŽƌũƵĚŝĐŝĂůĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨůĂǁĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĚĞƉĞŶĚ
on the existence of judicial discretion. Hart never denies that greater certainty 
                                                          
42 As discussed in previous chapters, if someone took the ambulance for a joy-ride through 
the park, and not to attend to an emergency situation, it would indeed be considered a 
vehicle for the purpose of the rule. 
43 See Chapter Four, Brian Bix on Judicial Discretion, 114. 
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(regarding when rules were to be applicable) could be achieved. Thus, using the 
example above, one could decide to specify clearly all the instances to which the 
concept of  “ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ?ĂƉƉůŝĞƐ ?,ĂƌƚǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? 
One way of doing this is to freeze the meaning of the rule so that its 
general terms must have the same meaning in every case where its 
application is in question. To secure this we may fasten on certain features 
present in the plain case and insist that these are both necessary and 
sufficient to bring anything which has them within the scope of the rule, 
whatever other features it may have or lack, and whatever may be the 
social consequences of applying the rule in this way.44 
 
ZĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ  “ŶŽ ǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌŬ ? ? ǁĞĐŽƵůĚ ŝŵƉŽƐĞ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ
something to be a vehicle (e.g. that any contraption with wheels and a motor would 
be considered a vehicle). In this instance, (if we were living in our fictional one-rule 
world) an ambulance attending an emergency would fall foul of this rule. This would 
have damaging social consequences (e.g. paramedics and ambulance drivers could 
start refusing to attend to emergencies in the park), but it would nonetheless ensure 
that there would be much greater certainty in the application of the rule. The question 
at hand, for Hart at least, is whether, considering the handicaps of our relative 
ignorance of the facts and aims when enacting legislation, it would be desirable to 
diminish the need to consider the facts presented to make a decision about whether 
or not the rule is applicable to a particular case. According to Hart, making such 
                                                          
44 Hart (n 1) 129. 
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specifications would not be advisable, but it would nonetheless be possible. Thus, this 
ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ Ă ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ŽƉĞŶ
texture, that we can understand his support of judicial discretion, and start to address 
claims that his views on judicial discretion were unfounded. 
 
Scope for future research 
Many issues thrown up by this research are understandably awkward or 
uncomfortable for the present state of jurisprudence as a discipline. Hart is currently 
a main contributor (if not THE main contributor) to the present state of jurisprudence 
as a discipline, and yet this thesis not only highlights some questionable 
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽĐĂůůƐŝŶƚŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƐĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚ
by various legal phiůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐǁŚŽŚĂǀĞĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?/Ĩ/ĂŵƌŝŐŚƚ
(and plainly I think I am), this research challenges the accepted understanding of what 
is held to be the greatest book in jurisprudence of the 20th Century. If indeed I am 
right, we ought to re-appraise The Concept of Law as a work in Ordinary Language 
WŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ŝŶƐƵĐŚĂǁĂǇƚŚĂƚǁŝůůĂůůŽǁƵƐƚŽƐĞĞƚŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŽĐĐƵƉŝĞƐĂŶ
even more central and important role in twentieth century philosophy of language 
and ideas than has commonly been supposed.  
This research should prompt the scholars discussed in Section B, all (excluding 
Leslie Green) of whom are already invested in a philosophically informed reading of 
The Concept of Law, to re-examine their own arguments and conclusions. It is my hope 
that the re-appraisal of The Concept of Law, by scholars already engaged with its 
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůƌŽŽƚƐ ?ǁŝůůůĞĂĚƚŽĂŶĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ
and use of the target scholarship, with the ideas voiced in it deployed with more 
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caution or circumspection than before. As has been shown throughout Section B and 
in this final Chapter the re-examination and re-ĂƉƉƌĂŝƐĂůŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬǀĂƌŝŽƵƐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ
ƵŶƚĂŶŐůĞƐƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĞƐƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ŽŶƚŚĞƐubject of 
social rules, open texture and judicial discretion) and allows for a better understanding 
ŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐĂŶĚŝĚĞĂƐ ?dŚŝƐƌĞ-ĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůŽǁƐƵƐƚŽĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ
for its simplicity and helps us settle and move on from questions that have vexed 
jurisprudence for years. After more than half a century, we can settle the question of 
what was ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞƌƵůĞ “ŶŽǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ? ?ĂŶĚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌ
not open texture is to be considered as distinct from vagueness. Settling questions 
such as these will allow us to discuss the more interesting, and perhaps fruitful, 
questions such as, not whether vagueness and open texture are features of our legal 
system, but whether they are characteristics that we should cherish rather than 
dismiss or fear. Perhaps equally importantly, this re-examination also allows us to 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐďŽŽŬĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŽĨĨĞƌ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐŶĞǀĞƌĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽŽĨĨĞƌ ) ?
such as an exploration of how judges should or indeed do apply legal rules. This 
appreciation would perhaps settle the semantic sting debate, and highlight that Hart 
and Dworkin were indeed pursuing different lines of inquiry (as discussed by Hart with 
David Sugarman45). Moreover, this re-examination will help us address the different, 
and ŽĨƚĞŶĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŽƌǇ ?ĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞŵĂĚĞĂďŽƵƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?  
In addition, my aim is also for the work to act as the catalyst for more incisive, 
more bountiful inter-disciplinary work on Hart, which might better combine the 
                                                          
45 David Sugarman,຃Hart Interviewed: H.L.A. Hart in Conversation with David SugarmaŶຄ 
(2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society 267 accessed 20 October 2015. 
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insights and knowledge of legal scholars and philosophers alike. The research also 
leads to the thought that other works in philosophy of law might have suffered in 
similar ways too, so it would also be worth investigating whether this is a phenomenon 
affecting only Hart, or whether other works would have much to gain from the 
application of a more holistic and historically aware interpretation. The Concept of 
Law, itself an inter-disciplinary work, would greatly benefit from an in-depth inter-
disciplinary analysis, to isolate and better ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽ
both Ordinary Language Philosophy (by demonstrating its practical application in the 
legal field)  and Law. Moreover, this research comes at a time of renewed interest in 
Ordinary Language Philosophy46. The re-appraisal of The Concept of Law would not 
only be a significant contribution to the legal world, providing a new and deeper 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ďƵƚ ŝƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ĂůƐŽ ĂŝĚ ĂŶĚ ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ
within philosophy; demonstrating, as it does, the influence and breadth in application 
of Ordinary Language Philosophy, particularly the work of J. L. Austin. 
This thesis has the grandest of ambitions: to be the trigger for both some 
serious re-appraisal on the part of present practitioners and a prompt for fresh lines 
of future research. This new research is revisionary and looks to the future with the 
ambition of setting a different course for the nature of academic scholarship in 
jurisprudential areas. 
                                                          
46 See, for example, T. P. USCHANOs຅s article,ຉThe Strange Death of Ordinary Language 
PhilosophǇ຋, Article Death of Ordinary Language Philosophy, 
http://www.helsinki.fi/~tuschano/writings/strange/ (last accessed 17/08/17); A.Baz, When 
words are called for: A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2012); Richard Sørli, The Philosophy of J. L. Austin (Martin / Gustafsson and 
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